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Facing Poetry : Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten's Theory of Literature

Berndt, Frauke

Abstract: Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714–1762) is known in intellectual history for having established the discourse of philosophical aesthetics with his "Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus" (Reflections on Poetry) and "Aesthetica" (Aesthetics), which consists of two books and is considered Baumgarten's most important work. But this book amends that history. It shows that Baumgarten's aesthetics is a science of literature that demonstrates the value of literature to philosophy. Baumgarten did not intend to pursue such a task, but in working on his philosophical texts and lectures, he ends up analyzing, synthesizing, and contextualizing literature. He thereby treats it not as belles lettres or as a moral institution but rather as an epistemic object. His aesthetics is thus the first modern literary theory, and his articulation of this theory would never again be matched in its complexity and systematicity. Baumgarten's theory of literature has never been discovered. It waits latently to take its place in intellectual history.

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Frauke Berndt
Facing Poetry

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Frauke Berndt

Facing Poetry

Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten's Theory of Literature

Translated by Anthony Mahler

With an afterword by Gabriel Trop
and English translations from the *Aesthetica*
by Maya Maskarinec and Alexandre Roberts

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For my friends

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I hope that *Facing Poetry* will contribute to an appreciation of Baumgarten's work as the articulation of a theory of literature unparalleled in its depth and precision.

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Spring 2020

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1 Introduction

Qu'est-ce que la littérature? Jean-Paul Sartre posed this question in *Les temps modernes* in 1948.¹ Two hundred years earlier, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten had provided what remains a largely neglected answer: “LITERATURE is *perfect sensate discourse*” (MED § 9; *Oratio sensitiva perfecta est POEMA*). This definition lays the foundation for Baumgarten’s philosophical approach to literature, which is what this book is about. With constant and open-minded attention to concrete literary texts – “facing poetry,” so to say – Baumgarten presents this definition as the result of a radical conceptualization of literature:

I intend to demonstrate that many consequences can be derived from a single concept of literature which has long ago been impressed on the mind, and long since declared hundreds of times to be acceptable, but not once proved.

Ut enim ex una, quae dudum mente haeserat, poematis notione probari plurima dicta iam centies, vix semel probata posse demonstrarem. (MED, [preface], 4)²

In intellectual history, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, who was born on July 17, 1714, in Berlin and died on May 27, 1762, in Frankfurt an der Oder, is known as the last prominent representative of Wolffian scholastic philosophy. He worked in an age when every great philosopher sought to publish a universal system of philosophy, spanning all the disciplines. Baumgarten’s publications reflect this objective with his often enormous monographs on aesthetics, metaphysics, ethics, jurisprudence, and epistemology. His aesthetics thus belongs to a holistic philosophical system, and it must be considered from such a perspective. But it is his aesthetics – which he initiated with his 1735 master’s thesis, entitled *Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus*, and extended with the two volumes of his *Aesthetica*, published in 1750 and 1758 – for which he is best known. With these works, he established the modern discourse of aesthetics and gave the discipline its name. Intellectual history has thus particularly sought to determine where Baumgarten fits in the development of major facets of modern aesthetic philosophy, such as the autonomy of art, the universality of aesthetic judgments, and the subjectivity of aesthetic experience. My study aims to intervene in the traditional understanding of his aesthetics by outlining how it developed the first modern theory of literature and discovered the

1 Jean-Paul Sartre, “Qu’est-ce que la littérature?,” pts. I–VI, *Les Temps Modernes* 17 (février 1947): 769–805; 18 (mars 1947): 961–988; 19 (avril 1947): 1194–1218; 20 (mai 1947): 1410–1439; 21 (juin 1947): 1607–1641; 22 (juillet 1947): 7–114.

2 I here translate “poema” not as “a poem,” but as “literature.” See 2.1 Ambiguity; 5.1 Prose.

central relevance of literature to philosophy. In brief, I want to show that as the “science of everything that is sensate” (KOLL § 1; Wissenschaft von allem, was sinnlich ist), Baumgarten’s aesthetics is actually a science of literature.

Baumgarten did not set out to demonstrate the value of literature to philosophy. But in working on his philosophical writings and lectures, he ended up analyzing, synthesizing, and contextualizing literature. It thereby became clear to him that aesthetics demands a sensate realization; or put differently, aesthetics is always an embodied philosophy. In any case, his aesthetics does not deal with literature as belles lettres or as a moral institution but rather as an epistemic object. Through his philosophical work, he discovers literature’s own unique capacity to address philosophical problems. Although Baumgarten was a philosopher and not a literary critic, he was able to tackle his philosophical project only because he approached it as a literary theorist *avant la lettre*. His aesthetics is thus formative for a way of thinking about literature that would coalesce in the coming centuries, beginning in particular with Friedrich Schlegel, who mobilized the concept of theory against the poetological tradition and was the first to programmatically call his poetics a theory. But no later literary theorist would ever again match Baumgarten’s holistic view.

Despite the scope and significance of his work on aesthetics, his insights into “the logic without thorns” (KOLL § 1; la logique sans épines) – a moniker for aesthetics that he quotes from Dominique Bouhours³ – were quickly superseded by Immanuel Kant.⁴ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel does not even mention Baumgarten, and the European Romantics were utterly uninterested in his scholastic philosophy with its hundreds of numbered paragraphs in indigestible Latin.⁵ Baumgarten’s aesthetics was thus relegated to oblivion, and his theory of literature remains undiscovered, waiting to take its rightful place in intellectual history. This oversight is based on a simple misunderstanding of the role literature plays in his philosophical project. Literature was always at the heart of Baumgarten’s theoretical interests, beginning with his 1735 master’s thesis. Both his *Meditationes* and the later *Aesthetica* largely draw on literary examples,

3 See Dominique Bouhours, *La manière de bien penser dans les ouvrages d’esprit* (Paris: Veuve de S. Mabre-Cramoisy, 1688; facsimile, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1974), 11.

4 See Courtney D. Fugate and John Hymers, “Introduction,” in *Baumgarten and Kant on Metaphysics*, ed. Fugate and Hymers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 1–4.

5 See Hans Reiss, “Die Einbürgerung der Ästhetik in der deutschen Sprache des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts oder Baumgarten und seine Wirkung,” *Jahrbuch der deutschen Schillergesellschaft* 37 (1993): 109–138; Egbert Witte, *Logik ohne Dornen: Die Rezeption von A. G. Baumgartens Ästhetik im Spannungsfeld von logischem Begriff und ästhetischer Anschauung* (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 2000).

at first predominantly from lyric poetry, but later mainly from the great epics and fables of antiquity. The passages he selects fascinate him because of their figural, poetic qualities – and not because they belong to the genre of lyric poetry.

In the scholarship on Baumgarten, these passages are considered mere examples for something else, namely, for the “science of sensate cognition” (AE § 1; *scientia cognitionis sensitivae*). But if that were actually the case, then one would expect Baumgarten to cite examples from other technical or fine arts.⁶ He does not. Only in a very few instances does he refer to other arts at all, and these references never carry epistemological weight. Baumgarten is thus concerned not with art in general but with literature in particular. And the concept of literature itself emerges when he abstracts from his examples and draws attention to the structure of literary discourse, the actual focus of his theory. This means that by the mid-eighteenth century, literary theory had developed not only out of genre poetics, as scholars have often claimed, but also out of philosophy, albeit unintentionally.

To understand this unintended articulation of a theory of literature, one needs to remember what Baumgarten’s philosophical project of aesthetics is about. He ultimately wants to radically alter the order of knowledge, as he claims in the second letter of the *Philosophische Briefe von Aletheophilus*, in which he introduces his project in 1741: “Why shouldn’t a talented philosopher be able to work on a philosophical encyclopedia in which he presents the sciences that belong to philosophy in total in their relationship to one another?” (PHB, 6; *Warum sollte nicht ein geschickter Philosoph sich an eine philosophische Encyclopädie machen können, darinn er die zur Philosophie gehörende[n] Wissenschaften insgesamt in ihrer Verbindung vorstellte?*). Such an overview of human knowledge would have to consider both the upper and lower cognitive faculties, which motivates Baumgarten to organize his approach to an encyclopedia differently from Johann Heinrich Alsted’s standard reference work of early modern knowledge, the *Encyclopaedia septem tomis distincta* (1630). Baumgarten’s outline for a philosophical encyclopedia only appeared posthumously in 1769 – it was entitled *Sciagraphia encyclopaediae philosophicae* and edited by Johann Christian Förster – but in this earlier “silhouette” (PHB, 6; *Schatten-Riß*), he presents logic

⁶ See Jochen Schulte-Sasse, “Aesthetic Orientation in a Decentered World,” in *A New History of German Literature*, ed. David E. Wellbery et al. (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 351; Frauke Berndt, “Halle 1735: Die Entdeckung der Literatur,” in *Medialität: Historische Konstellationen*, ed. Christian Kiening and Martina Stercken (Zurich: Chronos, 2019), 371–377.

as a science of rational cognition or distinct insight, and reserves the laws of sensate and vivid cognition, even if it does not ascend to distinctiveness in the most precise sense, for a specific science. He calls the latter aesthetics.

als eine Wißenschafft der Erkenntnis des Verstandes oder der deutlichen Einsicht [...] und behält, die Gesetze der sinnlichen und lebhaften Erkenntnis, wenn sie auch nicht bis zur Deutlichkeit, in genauester Bedeutung, aufsteigen sollte, zu einer besondern Wissenschaft zurück. Diese letztere nennt er die Aesthetik. (PHB, 7)

It is thus apparent that Baumgarten establishes the “art of aesthetic experience” (PHB, 8; *Aesthetische Erfahrung Kunst*) as a theoretical and not as an empirical science. Aesthetics is intimately related and equal to logic, “its older sister by birth” (AE § 13; *soror eius natu maior*), which substantiates his claim to its relevance. With this revaluation of sensate cognition and the elevation of aesthetics with regard to logic, Baumgarten overturns his predecessors’ positions, in particular those of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Christian Wolff, and brings the pre-modern order of knowledge into flux. In the end, aesthetics encompasses epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics, allowing Baumgarten to outline, as his eighteenth-century biographer Thomas Abbt succinctly puts it, a “metapoetics” of sensation.⁷

But in this philosophical project – and this is the crux – Baumgarten lacks concepts for defining the a priori rules of sensate cognition and so instead turns to literary texts to discover these fundamental principles. He insists that identifying these principles must be done in a philosophically legitimate way and not through habit, that is, not through basing the rule on a single case and then expecting to encounter similar cases. Only then can aesthetics claim to have the status of a science.⁸ As early as the preface of his *Meditationes*, he wishes “to make it plain that philosophy and the knowledge of how to construct a poem, which are often held to be entirely antithetical, are linked together in the most amiable union” (MED, [preface], 4; *hoc ipso philosophiam & poematis pangendi scientiam habitas saepe pro dissitissimis amicissimo iunctas connubio ponerem ob oculos*). Literature is not just a source of examples; it rather provides the foundational model for Baumgarten’s aesthetics, which makes his aesthetics a theory of literature, worthy of a philosopher: “I may now satisfy this obligation, I have chosen a subject which many, to be sure, hold to be too trifling and remote to deserve the attention of philosophers” (MED, [preface], 4; *Nunc autem ut fiat*

⁷ Thomas Abbt, “Leben und Charakter Alexander Gottlieb Baumgartens,” in *Vermischte Werke*, vol. 4 (Berlin: Friedrich Nicolai, 1780; facsimile, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1978), 222.

⁸ See 2.1 Ambiguity.

satis, materiam eam elegi, quae multis quidem habebitur tenuis & a philosophorum acumine remotissima).

We can thus conclude that Baumgarten presents the first modern theory of literature without intending to do so. In his theory, literature and philosophy do not relate to each other as the particular to the general. According to the principles of his aesthetics (see AE § 73), literary texts should not be used to provide initial examples or evidence. In other words, he employs examples in a rhetorical and not a dialectical context. By establishing an analogy between literature and sensate cognition, he lets the two illuminate each other reciprocally in an epistemological balancing act. And while his analogical method may have made him uncomfortable as a philosopher, he turned to it again and again during the twenty-five years he devoted to this project – though in the end Baumgarten was not able to recognize his own ultimate achievement.

Only through the detour of contemplating and describing lyric, dramatic, and epic texts can Baumgarten translate the laws of logic into the laws of aesthetics. Viewed historically, this should not come as a surprise. In the eighteenth century, many reflections on aesthetics exhibited a poetological character, and literature was about to become the prototype for sensate world-making. But such reflections lacked philosophical relevance. Literature first became epistemologically relevant when Baumgarten encountered its philosophical potential while reading. His work drew his attention to poetic passages; in dealing with them, he engages with the linguistic medium of literature in all its captivating phonetic and textual features. Not only tropes but also the rhetorical figures of detail (*amplificatio*) and figures of presence (*hypotyposis*) produce the striking structure of literary discourse as a *supermedium*. For that reason, the concept of *figura* (*schema*) is at the center of this theory of literature, which is indeed nothing less or more than a philosophy of rhetorical figures.

When analyzing poetic passages, Baumgarten becomes attentive to the unique power of what Ernst Cassirer calls “sensory ‘signs’ and ‘images’” as human interpretations of the self and the world.⁹ The elevation of sensuality in the eighteenth-century anthropological turn is accompanied by a radical affirmation of contingency: the predictable world, in which the rational subject prevails by using a logical calculus, belongs to the past; the new world is sensate, and the subject who interprets it operates aesthetically. Literature is thus positioned to offer privileged access to a sensate world that has lost its predictability.

⁹ Ernst Cassirer, “The Concept of Symbolic Form in the Construction of the Human Sciences (1923),” in *The Warburg Years (1919–1933): Essays on Language, Art, Myth, and Technology*, trans. S. G. Lofts and A. Calcagno (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 75.

In Baumgarten's meticulous work on literature, its epistemological, metaphysical, and ethical capacities for negotiating self and world come to the fore, and its servile function of transmitting moral messages recedes into the background. His reflections thus produce a literary epistemology, and literature migrates within the order of knowledge from the blurry margins to the luminous center.

Although Baumgarten's theory of literature contributes to a historical network of concepts spanning multiple disciplines, the argument of my study is not primarily a historical one. Only a perspective trained in contemporary literary theory and willing to take on what Hans-Georg Gadamer calls in *Wahrheit und Methode* (1960) the fusion of horizons can awaken Baumgarten's approach from its latency. How can and should we engage in the twenty-first century with literature and literary theory? I would argue that what is needed is not a reductionist approach or one that is overly specialized with an isolated, discrete interest – such as a theory of figurality, of performativity, of authorship, of fiction, or of praxeology, all of which can find their foundations in Baumgarten – but rather a holistic theory of literature that cannot be subsumed under any one particular school or ideology.

This book outlines Baumgarten's holistic theory of literature *as a theory*. To do so, I address its methodological basis (2 Methodology) and the epistemological justification of his philosophical project (3 Epistemology), before articulating its metaphysical aspects (4 Metaphysics). I then consider how his treatment of lyric, dramatic, and epic texts prompts him to develop a narratology that contains, with its constellation of epistemological and ontological perspectives, the most significant eighteenth-century theory of fiction (5 Narratology). Finally, I expand the frame of the book by addressing how he ties aesthetics to ethics in evaluating creative practices and their traces in literary texts (6 Ethics). My study thus aims to provide the first comprehensive engagement with Baumgarten's theory of literature. In contrast to studies of intellectual history, which focus on his relevance to the Enlightenment reorganization of the order of knowledge, this book is also particularly attuned to his relevance to literary theory today.

Central to my study are the 117 paragraphs of the *Meditationes*, which grew into the 904 paragraphs of the *Aesthetica* over the course of decades of work. Baumgarten's supposed magnum opus can thus be viewed as a palimpsest of the largely underestimated earlier work. Of the two, only the *Meditationes* has been translated into English. I quote from this 1954 translation by Karl Aschenbrenner and William B. Holther. The passages quoted from the *Aesthetica* have been translated by Maya Maskarinec and Alexandre Roberts for this book. I also consider the *Metaphysica*, which he published in seven editions between 1739 and 1757; Courtney D. Fugate and John Hymers translated this work into

English in 2013.¹⁰ Finally, I take into consideration the *Ethica philosophica* from the year 1740, which appeared in a second edition in 1751 and in a third in 1763; translations from this work are also by Maskarinec and Roberts.¹¹

The transcript of Baumgarten's lectures on aesthetics, *Kollegium über die Ästhetik*, also proves to be particularly insightful for my purposes. In these academic lectures held in Frankfurt an der Oder, 613 paragraphs of the *Aesthetica* are roughly translated into German. The freedoms Baumgarten takes in this translation significantly increase the epistemological value of this first modern theory of literature. Anthony Mahler has translated the quoted passages into English as well as the quotes from Baumgarten's *Philosophische Briefe von Aletheophilus*, published in 1741. Facing poetry, Baumgarten crosses the border between meta-language and object language: concepts give way to images, examples, similes, and metaphors, to metonymies, allegories, and personifications; proofs take on a subordinate role to that of associative, narrative, and scenic relations. This observation motivates my close readings: in large stretches of this book, Baumgarten's theory of literature is read *as literature* – with just as much attention to its stylistic techniques as to its propositional content.

Chapter 3 (Epistemology) is a comprehensive reworking of a chapter (2.1 Die Struktur des Gedichts) from my book *Poema / Gedicht: Zur epistemischen Konfiguration der Literatur um 1750*, which was published in 2011 by De Gruyter. Most notably, I have added a section (3.1.2 Desire) that considers the crucial significance of the appetitive faculties to Baumgarten's aesthetics. Chapter 4 (Metaphysics) and chapter 6 (Ethics) also pick up some threads from my earlier book, but their argumentative content and structure have been substantially changed and enlarged. Chapters 2 (Methodology) and 5 (Narratology) are new. Preliminary work for some of the chapters was published in essays cited in the footnotes.

10 I do not consider Baumgarten's *Initia philosophiae practicae: Primae acromaticae* (1760). For an English translation of this work, which was published shortly after I completed this manuscript, see *Baumgarten's Elements of First Practical Philosophy: A Critical Translation with Kant's Reflections on Moral Philosophy*, trans. Courtney D. Fugate and John Hymers (Oxford: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020).

11 A translation of this work is planned. See Fugate and Hymers, "Introduction," 3.

2 Methodology

2.1 Ambiguity

By defining aesthetics as the “science of everything that is sensate,” Baumgarten claims that it is autonomous from logic. This entails a revaluation of the abundance (ubertas) of the sensate world and how that abundance is perceived, a revaluation that he undertakes by engaging with the arts in general¹ – and with literature in particular. Baumgarten begins this philosophical project in the first edition of his *Metaphysica* from 1739, where he defines aesthetics as follows: “The science of knowing and presenting with regard to the senses is AESTHETICS” (MET1 § 533; *Scientia sensitive cognoscendi et proponendi est AESTHETICA*). In the fourth edition from 1757, he adds a parenthesis to this definition:² “The science of knowing and presenting <proponendi> with regard to the senses is AESTHETICS (the logic of the inferior cognitive faculty, the philosophy of graces and muses, inferior gnoseology, the art of thinking beautifully, the art of the analogue of reason)” (MET § 533; *Scientia sensitive cognoscendi & proponendi est AESTHETICA, (Logica facultatis cognoscitivae inferioris, Philosophia gratiarum & musarum, gnoseologia inferior, ars pulcre cogitandi, ars analogi rationis)*). What makes this definition so remarkable is the enormous tension between the two poles of aesthetics, two poles that are, from a philosophical perspective, incompatible: the philosophical pole of cognition and the medial pole of presentation, which are connected in the Latin definition by an ampersand. The “fundamental ambiguity” of aesthetics not only consists in its combination of the theory of sensation and the theory of beauty, as Robert E. Norton states, but most of all in its combination of epistemology and media theory.³ Embedded in this way in the order of knowledge, the new science of aesthetics encompasses sensate cognition, sensate desire,⁴ and sensate presentation. This transforms a

1 See Arbogast Schmitt, “Die Entgrenzung der Künste durch ihre Ästhetisierung bei Baumgarten,” in *Ästhetische Erfahrung im Zeichen der Entgrenzung der Künste: Epistemische, ästhetische und religiöse Formen von Erfahrung im Vergleich*, ed. Gert Mattenklott (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2004), 55–71.

2 The editions were published in the following years: 1st: 1739, 2nd: 1743, 3rd: 1750, 4th: 1757, 5th: 1763, 6th: 1768, 7th: 1779. The second and third editions already mention the logic of the lower cognitive faculty (*logica facultatis cognoscitivae inferioris*). See Paul Menzer, “Zur Entstehung von A. G. Baumgartens Ästhetik,” *Zeitschrift für Deutsche Kulturphilosophie* 4 (1938): 292.

3 Robert E. Norton, *The Beautiful Soul: Aesthetic Morality in the Eighteenth Century* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 85.

4 See 3.1.2 Desire.

philosophical critique of reason, as epitomized by Kant, into a critique of culture, as later founded by Cassirer.⁵

In light of this definition, one can foresee the problems with this philosophical project. In 1758, seven years after the appearance of the first volume of the *Aesthetica*, Baumgarten published the second volume and quit the project. A monograph of colossal prolixity, the *Aesthetica* has since been treated as an unfinished work. Its abandonment cannot be explained by any biographical event: Baumgarten only died four years later and still managed to publish the *Acroasis logica in Christianum L. B. de Wolff* in 1761. Abandoning the experiment was, rather, a necessity. In the two decades in which he worked on his aesthetics, he encountered something so new that it exceeded what was philosophically thinkable in his time. One can thus find traces of a permanent wrestling with concepts throughout his writings on aesthetics. Johann Gottfried Herder, one of Baumgarten's first and most careful readers, accused him of an imperfect approach to this "je ne sais quoi": his "mixing both concepts together [...] naturally results in a monstrosity of aesthetics."⁶ The fact that "the trains of thought corresponding to the two primary considerations" – epistemology and media theory – "constantly run side by side" is not, however, a "sign of Baumgarten's lack of methodological awareness"⁷ but rather the heart, the point, the essence of aesthetics. The ambiguity of aesthetics reflects an awareness of a problem that Enlightenment philosophy lacked methods and concepts for. And this awareness applies first and foremost to the problem of the mediality of cognition itself.⁸

In the preface to the *Meditationes* from 1735, this ambiguity is preceded by a reference to the coming amicable marriage between epistemology and media theory. Baumgarten attempts, in fact, to marry an extremely dissimilar pair –

5 See Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, vol. 1, *Language*, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), 80; Frauke Berndt, "Symbolisches Wissen: Zur Ökonomie der 'anderen' Logik bei Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten," in *Kulturen des Wissens im 18. Jahrhundert*, ed. Ulrich Johannes Schneider (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), 383–390.

6 Johann Gottfried Herder, "Critical Forests: Fourth Grove, on Riedel's *Theory of the Beaux Arts*," in *Selected Writings on Aesthetics*, ed. and trans. Gregory Moore (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 189–190.

7 Hans Rudolf Schweizer, *Ästhetik als Philosophie der sinnlichen Erkenntnis: Eine Interpretation der "Aesthetica" A. G. Baumgartens mit teilweiser Wiedergabe des lateinischen Textes und deutscher Übersetzung* (Basel: Schwabe, 1973), 25.

8 See Christoph Menke, "Schwerpunkt: Zur Aktualität der Ästhetik von Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten," *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 49.2 (2001): 229–231; Rüdiger Campe, "Der Effekt der Form: Baumgartens Ästhetik am Rande der Metaphysik," in *Literatur als Philosophie – Philosophie als Literatur*, ed. Eva Horn, Bettine Menke, and Christoph Menke (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2006), 17–33.

theory and art, spirit and matter, truth and method – and the announced marriage of cognition and presentation will have to mediate between all these fundamental opposites. The prolegomena to the *Aesthetica* from 1750 do not testify, however, to a happy and fertile union but rather to fifteen years of acrimonious bickering, which the first paragraph ends by divorcing the unhappy pair. Since the marriage failed, Baumgarten amends the marriage contract and renounces the ambiguity of aesthetics as the science of both sensate cognition and sensate presentation – the ambiguity openly asserted in his earlier writings: “AESTHETICS (the theory of the liberal arts, inferior gnoseology, the art of thinking beautifully, the art of the analogon of reason) is the science of sensate cognition” (AE § 1; AESTHETICA (theoria liberalium artium, gnoseologia inferior, ars pulcre cogitandi, ars analogi rationis,) est scientia cognitionis sensitivae).

Like the earlier definition in the *Metaphysica*, this one still bravely combines “the theory of the liberal arts, inferior gnoseology, the art of thinking beautifully,” and “the art of the analogon of reason” into a new superdiscipline.⁹ The “science of sensate cognition” encompasses in parentheses the four subdisciplines of logic, psychology, rhetoric, and metaphysics. Yet the new definition removes the ambiguous relation between epistemology and media theory by making aesthetics only the science of sensate cognition and no longer also the science of sensate presentation. With the new definition, Baumgarten makes a few decisive revisions. While he uses the adverb *sensitive* to designate the process of knowing and presenting something “sensately” in the *Metaphysica*, in the *Aesthetica* he employs the adjective *sensitiva* to specify *cognitio*. This transforms the old definition’s dynamic activity of “knowing and presenting with regard to the senses” into a one-sided, static abstraction in the new definition: “sensate cognition.” As the “theory of the liberal arts,” presentation has been relegated to the parentheses, where it appears, like the “philosophy of graces and muses” and the “art of thinking beautifully,” as a mere apposition to aesthetics. As a result of these revisions, the *Aesthetica* only defines *one* science – the science of sensate cognition.

Although the price of this disambiguation is high since it fundamentally pares down the new science, Baumgarten seems happy to pay it. He can now qualify sensate cognition, like every other kind of cognition, with the six categories of perfection while ignoring the origin of these categories in the rhetorical qualities of style:¹⁰ “abundance, greatness, truth, clarity, certitude, and life”

⁹ See Michael Jäger, *Kommentierende Einführung in Baumgartens “Aesthetica”: Zur entstehenden wissenschaftlichen Ästhetik des 18. Jahrhunderts in Deutschland* (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1980), 92–189.

¹⁰ See 3.2 Rhetoric.

(AE § 22; Ubertas, magnitudo, veritas, claritas, certitudo, et vita cognitionis; see also MET § 515).¹¹ The origin of these categories can be ignored because the amended definition installs a hierarchy among the disciplines that have been combined into a superdiscipline, a hierarchy that subordinates sensate presentation to sensate cognition. In other words, first one cognizes, then one presents; and because this is so, the disciplinary origin of the categories can no longer play any tricks on their new philosophical application.

Disambiguating aesthetics is also the precondition for Baumgarten to be able to convince the republic of letters of the philosophical dignity of aesthetics, allowing it to be put to use in philology, hermeneutics, exegesis, rhetoric, and musicology (see AE § 4). In contrast to these historical disciplines (see AE §§ 5–12), however, the “science of sensate cognition” is worthy of a philosopher because its object is capable of truth. And this would not be the case if he had not disambiguated aesthetics. A medial presentation is not capable of truth in a philosophical sense since it is tied to its materiality and is thus only given in the experience of the medium. Medial presentation thus threatens the philosophical project of aesthetics. This is why Baumgarten has to deny rhetoric its independence and place it in the service of a philosophical principle, which he proposes to do in the relevant paragraphs of the *Aesthetica*:

Hence, if the mind is to separate true rules from spurious ones, the particular arts require a highest principle from which they can know their own particular rules; and this is so that the art of aesthetics does not have to be established solely through the same unreliable expectation of similar cases in order to be rendered into the form of a science (§. 70).

Indigent hinc artes speciales, si veras a spuriis regulis seiungere sit animus, ulteriori principio, ex quo speciales suas regulas cognoscere possint, et hoc, ars aesthetica, ne per eandem male fidam expectationem casuum similium unice stabiliendum sit, ut in formam scientiae redigatur. §. 70. (AE § 73)

¹¹ See Wolfgang Bender, “Rhetorische Tradition und Ästhetik im 18. Jahrhundert: Baumgarten, Meier und Breitinger,” *Zeitschrift für Deutsche Philologie* 99.4 (1980): 481–506; David E. Wellbery, *Lessing’s “Laocoon”: Semiotics and Aesthetics in the Age of Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 53; Heinz Paetzold, “Rhetorik-Kritik und Theorie der Künste in der philosophischen Ästhetik von Baumgarten bis Kant,” in *Von der Rhetorik zur Ästhetik: Studien zur Entstehung der modernen Ästhetik im 18. Jahrhundert*, ed. Gérard Raulet (Rennes: Philia, 1995), 9–40; Dagmar Mirbach, “Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten: ‘Gnoseologische Rhetorik,’” in *Herders Rhetoriken im Kontext des 18. Jahrhunderts: Beiträge zur Konferenz der Internationalen Herder-Gesellschaft Schloss Beuggen nahe Basel*, ed. Ralf Simon (Heidelberg: Synchron, 2014), 93–111; Ralf Simon, “Rhetorik in konstitutionstheoretischer Funktion (Leibniz, Baumgarten, Herder),” in Simon, *Herders Rhetoriken*, 113–127.

On this basis, Baumgarten can derive the “laws of sensation” (PHB, 7; *Empfindungs-Gesetze*), which he also calls the laws of sensate cognition, in the second letter of the *Philosophische Briefe von Aletheophilus*.¹² These laws claim an a priori validity beyond experience: “Hence there is a need for distinct insight a priori into the truth of the more important rules, and experience may then confirm and illustrate this truth, just as experience was perhaps the first step in discovering it” (AE § 73; *Hinc opus est perspicientia veritatis regularum graviorum a priori, quam dein confirmet ac illustret experientia, sicut illius inveniendae forte primum fuit subsidium*).

Acting as a medially differentiated theory of presentation, rhetoric only possesses a servile function in this philosophical project. Above all, Baumgarten draws on classical rhetoric as a descriptive inventory. In other words, *ars* is in the service of *scientia*; rhetorical presentations are supposed to reveal the principles of sensate cognition. It accordingly makes sense that he actually pays more attention to presentation than to cognition despite his ultimate focus: “Hence that part of aesthetics which treats of such presentation is more extensive than the corresponding part of logic” (MED § 117; *hinc aestheticae pars de proponendo prolixior esset, quam logicae*). Only by attending to sensate presentation can he articulate the laws of sensate cognition.

Despite the revisions, the ambiguity of combining epistemology and media theory, cognition and presentation, remains rampant. Even though Baumgarten only uses the term *presenting* (*proponere*) in the *Metaphysica*, this ambiguity reveals its explosiveness in the *Aesthetica*. There, *presenting* is still found in the descriptions of medial practices such as writing and painting, and it is also replaced by the concept of *representation* (*repraesentatio*), which refers to both ideas and medial presentations and is used at times for both. From here on, I will therefore only use *representation* and not *presentation*.¹³ All of this work on concepts of representation makes clear that Baumgarten engaged with them extensively. So if we follow Winfried Menninghaus’s claim that the concept of representation – *Darstellung* in German – “is hardly to be found in philosophy, poetics, and rhetoric before 1774 but [...] becomes omnipresent and a kind of

¹² See Dagmar Mirbach and Andrea Allerkamp, “Ale.theophilus Baumgarten / Wenn die Magd in den Brunnen fällt,” in *Schönes Denken: A. G. Baumgarten im Spannungsfeld zwischen Ästhetik, Logik und Ethik*, ed. Allerkamp and Mirbach, *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und Allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft Sonderheft 15* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2016), 317–340; Alessandro Nannini, “Alexander G. Baumgarten and the Lost Letters of Aletheophilus: Notes on a Mystery at the Origins of Modern Aesthetics,” *Diciottesimo Secolo* 2 (2017): 23–43.

¹³ See 3.1.1 Cognition.

trademark of every significant theoretical project after 1790,”¹⁴ then Baumgarten must be viewed as one of the most important milestones in the early history of this concept.

Although he lists a series of different kinds of representations in the prolegomena to the *Aesthetica* – a list that mixes concepts from epistemology and media theory and includes sensory perceptions, fantasies, and inventions (see AE § 6) – he understands literature as the prototypical representation. Literary texts are thus the actual epistemic objects of analysis in Baumgarten’s aesthetics. “That is” – as Baumgarten’s late eighteenth-century biographer Abbt explains – “he already saw then, as one does in the twilight, that the rules poets work by must come from basic principles that are perhaps more universal than one imagines now, and that they must be capable of a more precise proof than has so far been given for them.”¹⁵

Facing poetry – this is the action that is responsible for Baumgarten’s philosophical project, the most important epistemological foundation of which is therefore his *Meditationes*. This master’s thesis is something like an outline for the *Aesthetica*, but with a focus on literature. It is thus the key to unraveling this aesthetic theory that deduces its laws from literature. As Howard Caygill asserts, “Given the consistency between the fundamental structure of the two texts, the earlier work represents the nearest Baumgarten came to developing a complete philosophical treatment of art, and the development represented by the *Aesthetica* appears less as an ‘abortive attempt’ than as a nuanced reconsideration of a previous achievement.”¹⁶ This is confirmed by the attention that scholars such as Stefanie Buchenau, Simon Grote, and Ursula Franke – in her study *Baumgartens Erfindung der Ästhetik* (2018), a revision of her pioneering *Kunst als Erkenntnis* (1972), she even provides her own “Baumgartian” theory of lyric poetry – have recently given to the role of the poem (poema) in Baumgarten’s aesthetics.¹⁷

14 Winfried Menninghaus, “‘Darstellung’: Friedrich Gottlieb Klopstocks Eröffnung eines neuen Paradigmas,” in *Was heißt “Darstellen”?*, ed. Christiaan L. Hart Nibbrig (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1994), 205. See also Claudia Albes and Christiane Frey, eds., *Darstellbarkeit: Zu einem ästhetisch-philosophischen Problem um 1800* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2003).

15 Abbt, “Leben und Charakter Alexander Gottlieb Baumgartens,” 222–223.

16 Howard Caygill, *Art of Judgement* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 152.

17 See Ursula Franke, *Baumgartens Erfindung der Ästhetik* (Münster: Mentis, 2018), 119–133. See also Frauke Berndt, *Poema / Gedicht: Die epistemische Konfiguration der Literatur um 1750* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2011), 12–127; Stefanie Buchenau, “Die Sprache der Sinnlichkeit: Baumgartens poetische Begründung der Ästhetik in den *Meditationes philosophicae*,” in “Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten: Sinnliche Erkenntnis in der Philosophie des Rationalismus,”

But when Baumgarten speaks of *poema* in the *Meditationes*, he is referring to a concept of literature in general. *Poema* thus does not exclusively refer to a lyric text, as Franke claims,¹⁸ and one cannot employ it for a general theory of prose either, though Ralf Simon does note the relation between *poema* and *silva*, which recalls the “old prose genre of poetic forests.”¹⁹ But such generic considerations do not make much sense here. As stated in the introduction, Baumgarten is not concerned with poetics but rather with the concept of literature as such, and the poetic passages of different genres serve as examples for this concept. And while he tends to cite examples from lyric poetry in the *Meditationes* – which is reflected in Aschenbrenner and Holther’s translation of *poema* as “poem” – in the *Aesthetica* he also draws on dramas and epics.²⁰ *Literature* is thus where Baumgarten comes face to face with sensate cognition. As Brigitte Scheer asserts when she defines the relationship between epistemology and media theory in Baumgarten’s aesthetics: “The cognitive significance of sensate representations first became clear to Baumgarten in the techniques of literature.”²¹ In the poetic passages or aesthetically thick descriptions from literary texts, he finds “an appropriate methodological heuristic for the modalities of [literature’s] techniques”; he derives this heuristic “as an *ars* from the rhetorical repertoire.”²² And while the principles he heuristically derives from analyzing literature are different from the principles of logic, they are still principles.

ed. Alexander Aichele and Dagmar Mirbach, thematic issue, *Aufklärung* 20 (2008): 151–173; Buchenau, “Die Einbindung von Poetik und Ästhetik in die Logik der Aufklärung,” in *Kunst und Wissen: Beziehungen zwischen Ästhetik und Erkenntnistheorie im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert*, ed. Astrid Bauereisen, Stephan Pabst, and Achim Vesper (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2009), 71–84; Buchenau, *The Founding of Aesthetics in the German Enlightenment: The Art of Invention and the Invention of Art* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 114–151. See Simon Grote, *The Emergence of Modern Aesthetic Theory: Religion and Morality in Enlightenment Germany and Scotland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 102–146; Werner Strube, “Alexander Gottlieb Baumgartens Theorie des Gedichts,” in *Dichtungstheorien der deutschen Frühaufklärung*, ed. Theodor Verwey in collaboration with Hans-Joachim Kertscher (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1995), 1–25.

18 Franke, *Baumgartens Erfindung der Ästhetik*, 121.

19 Ralf Simon, *Die Idee der Prosa: Zur Ästhetikgeschichte von Baumgarten bis Hegel mit einem Schwerpunkt bei Jean Paul* (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2013), 52.

20 See 5.1 Prose.

21 Brigitte Scheer, *Einführung in die philosophische Ästhetik* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1997), 56. See also Scheer, “Baumgartens Ästhetik und die Krise der von ihm begründeten Disziplin,” *Philosophische Rundschau* 22.1/2 (1976): 108–119.

22 Anselm Haverkamp, “Wie die Morgenröthe zwischen Nacht und Tag: Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten und die Begründung der Kulturwissenschaften in Frankfurt an der Oder,” *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte* 76.1 (2002): 17.

It thus makes absolute sense to conclude that Baumgarten's aesthetics is based on an "internalization" and "individualization" of rhetoric.²³ For where literature as perfect sensate discourse *is*, there sensate cognition must *have been*. In both the *Meditationes* and the *Aesthetica*, he patiently and confidently analyzes his examples and neatly extracts the structure of literary discourse from them. What underwrites this logic is the simple *like* of analogy: sensate cognition functions *like* literature. This method ensures that he can analyze sensate cognition in literature and, vice versa, can legitimize the truth of literature with the "laws of sensation." But this does not mean that Baumgarten simply equates sensate cognition and literature. The analogy operates, rather, with two objects, that of sensate cognition and that of literary texts, and reflects their literal incompatibility through the binary relation.

2.2 Analogy

Ut poema cognitio sensitiva – this extraordinary analogy makes it possible for Baumgarten to move back and forth between literature and sensate cognition. With a giant leap, it replaces the original analogy between logic and aesthetics, which serves as the foundation of his philosophical project. The first analogy is necessary because it makes it possible to adopt the categories of perfection from logic – abundance, greatness, truth, clarity, certitude, and life – for the great unknowns of the new science. And the second analogy is essential because it enables him to observe and describe the structure and functions of sensate cognition when they are manifested in literary texts' perceptible forms. In contrast to all the other arts, these structures and functions appear in literature in a way that is analogous to logic because literature is a linguistic medium that can be analyzed using rhetorical and grammatical concepts and so is in a sense logical. For precisely this reason – which he notes in passing – Baumgarten's philosophical project starts with the *Meditationes*, in which he reflects on literature, and ends with the *Aesthetica*, where he does not present a general media theory but instead a genuine theory of literature.

Baumgarten's propaedeutic deployment of literary examples in his master's thesis is well known in the scholarship. These examples provide evidence for how sensate cognition and representation function analogously because the two share a mediating element: both operate with the same rhetorical techni-

²³ Petra Bahr, *Darstellung des Undarstellbaren: Religionstheoretische Studien zum Darstellungsbegriff bei A. G. Baumgarten und I. Kant* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 51.

ques. In using such examples, Baumgarten trusts in the tried and tested method of analogy. Since antiquity, the example has been primarily defined “as a function and not as a genre concept.”²⁴ In the tradition of logical and dialectical proofs, the example has three functions in scholarly discourse: it can be used in “grounding induction, introducing a concept, and articulating a concept.”²⁵ The example thus serves an important purpose not only in the writing of history but also, as in Baumgarten, in philosophy.²⁶

At the rhetorical origin of the example, this analogical relationship turns out to be a lot more problematic than one would first expect, given the set of functions examples normally serve. Presupposing an intimate relation between dialectics and rhetoric, Aristotle defines the rhetorical example – *paradeigma* in Greek – as inductive evidence (epagoge), but the example is something totally different from a proof since its epistemological foundation is formed by similarity and not by conceptual structures:

It has been explained that a paradigm is an induction and with what kinds of things it is concerned.²⁷

It is reasoning neither from part to whole nor from whole to part but from part to part, like to like, when two things fall under the same genus but one is better known than the other.²⁸

With similarity, Aristotle leaves ontologically secure ground and entrusts examples to common sense: similar is what is held to be similar or what qualifies as similar, which is independent of whether the laws of genre allow this similarity or not: “It is an example when the <first> extreme is proved to belong to the middle by means of something similar to the third extreme.”²⁹ Precisely this stylistic

²⁴ Bernd Engler and Kurt Müller, “Einleitung: Das Exemplum und seine Funktionalisierungen,” in *Exempla: Studien zur Bedeutung und Funktion exemplarischen Erzählens*, ed. Engler and Müller (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1995), 10. See also Frauke Berndt, “Die Kunst der Analogie: A. G. Baumgartens literarische Epistemologie,” in Allerkamp and Mirbach, *Schönes Denken*, 183–199.

²⁵ Gottfried Gabriel, “Logik und Rhetorik der Beispiele,” in *Darstellungsformen der Wissenschaften im Kontrast: Aspekte der Methodik, Theorie und Empirie*, ed. Lutz Danneberg and Jürg Niederhauser (Tübingen: Gunter Narr, 1988), 244.

²⁶ See Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*, trans. Keith Tribe (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 27–28.

²⁷ Arist., *Rhet.* 1356b. Quoted from Aristotle, *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*, trans. George A. Kennedy, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

²⁸ Arist., *Rhet.* 1357b19.

²⁹ Arist., *An. pr.* 68b35. Quoted from Aristotle, *Prior Analytics*, trans. Robin Smith (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989). See Christof Rapp, “Ähnlichkeit, Analogie und Homonymie bei Aristoteles,” *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 46.4 (1992): 526–544.

technique of analogy moves the example into the vicinity of the metaphor, a fact that Anselm Haverkamp has brought attention to by drawing a line from Aristotle to Thomas Kuhn and Hans Blumenberg.³⁰ Aristotle himself defines the analogical metaphor as its own type of metaphor. Because it is both an argument of comparison and “occasionally for Ornament,”³¹ ancient rhetoric assigns the example both to the canon of invention (*inventio*) and to the canon of style (*elocutio*). Stated roughly, this is because similarity (*similitudo*), which regulates the relation between the substitute and the substituted, can be used to invent arguments or to create figures. Quintilian, Baumgarten’s authoritative source in the *Aesthetica*, therefore also thinks of similarity in a spatial manner when he describes the stylistic technique of the example (*exemplum*) as the “matching of similar things [*adpositio similium*].”³² This similarity can be of “either Similars or Dissimilars or Contraries [*similia, dissimilia, contraria*].”³³ From this it follows that analogy is a technique, and similarity a quality.

Rhetoric thus draws attention to something other than the relationality of the example, namely, to its semiotic quality. Indeed, rhetoric presupposes that the example has more of a linguistic character than an ontological one. This linguistic character consists, in part, in an epistemic function that Gottfried Gabriel ties to a “visually concretizing function (in discourse).”³⁴ Evidentia thus results from examples; examples present something to the eyes solely on the basis of their phenomenal particularity. Indeed, the particular, the concrete, the individual makes an example an example. But the evidentia of examples is not really generated by how an example stands for something like a metaphor; instead, one could speak here, with analytical philosophy, of singular terms, and Quintilian uses the concept of the image (*eikon*).³⁵ Similarly, historiography has shown that examples produce evidentia not through metaphorical substitution but through constituting very short stories: “The exemplum as a minimal narrative

30 See Anselm Haverkamp, “Paradigma *Metapher*, Metapher *Paradigma* – Zur Metakinetik hermeneutischer Horizonte (Blumenberg/Derrida, Kuhn/Foucault, Black/White),” in *Epochenschwelle und Epochenbewusstsein*, ed. Reinhart Herzog and Reinhart Koselleck (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1987), 547–560.

31 Quint., *Inst.* 8.5.10. Quoted from Quintilian, *The Orator’s Education*, ed. and trans. Donald A. Russell, 5 vols., Loeb Classical Library 124–127, 494 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001).

32 Quint., *Inst.* 5.11.1.

33 Quint., *Inst.* 5.11.5.

34 Gabriel, “Logik und Rhetorik der Beispiele,” 241.

35 See Quint., *Inst.* 5.11.24.

unit relates to the minimal systematic unit of the moral-philosophical precept in such a way that they virtually form a compound.”³⁶

Baumgarten’s literary epistemology is based on a reentry of this rhetorical epistemology of exemplarity. On the one hand, the literary text serves as an example of sensate cognition. On the other, the rhetorical figure of the example, which he already attends to in the *Meditationes*, is itself used as an example of what makes literature literature – or, more precisely, it serves as an example of the literary, which is what he is interested in. That is why he treats the *exemplum* in the *Meditationes* as a particularly poetic tool and isolates it – the Latin *eximere* means to “take out,” “separate,” “sort out” – from other rhetorical figures when analyzing literary texts. Examples are, one could say, the figural islands that Baumgarten focuses on. He differentiates categorically between the epistemology and pragmatics of exemplarity by outsourcing the pragmatics to a footnote in paragraph 22. There he criticizes both the arbitrariness and inexhaustibility of the cultural heritage with reference to Leibniz’s *Causa Dei asserta per iustitiam eius* (1719), which relies on the evidence of normative examples:

The illustrious Leibniz sees this in that excellent book in which he undertakes to justify the ways of God, where he says, “The chief object of history, as well as of poetry, should be to teach prudence and virtue through examples.” When we look for an example of an example, we are confronted, rather like Tantalus, with such swimming abundance that we scarcely know which draught to take. Let us race off to the sea of the unhappy Ovid: the less determined representation –

Often when one god oppresses, another god brings help –

has scarcely escaped from his mouth, which drips with salty streams of tears and sea water, when, behold! the poet suddenly justifies himself, to the extent of six verses, with a gathering flood of examples:

Vulcan stood against Troy, for Troy Apollo ..., etc.

Id, quod vidit Ill. LEIBNITZIUS egregio illo libro, quo caussam Dei defendendam suscepit Part. II. p. 148. quando ait: *Le but principal de la Poesie doit etre d’enseigner la prudence & la vertu par des exemples*. Exemplum exempli dum quaerimus, paene facti sumus Tantali in tanta affluentia, unde potissimum hauriendum incerti. Decurramus ad mare miseri Nasonis Trist. I.I. & II. minus determinata repraesentatio:

Saepe premente deo fert deus alter opem.

vix elapsa erat ex ore falsis lacrumarum & maris imbribus rorante: & ecce repente sequitur 6 versus sibi vindicans exemplorum decumanus fluctus

Mulciber in Troiam pro Troia stabat Achilles &c. (MED § 22)

36 Karl-Heinz Stierle, “Story as Exemplum – Exemplum as Story: On the Pragmatics and Poetics of Narrative Texts,” in *New Perspectives in German Literary Criticism: A Collection of Essays*, ed. Richard A. Amacher and Victor Lange, trans. David Henry Wilson et al. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 400.

Baumgarten is not actually interested in the normativity of the example here but rather in what is sensate in the example, which is independent of its moral uses.

Examples thus wander out of the footnotes and into the paragraphs of the *Meditationes*, allowing Baumgarten to analyze the structure of sensate cognition with the example of the example. There the example functions as the microdouble of sensate cognition such that the relationship between sensate cognition, the literary text, and the rhetorical figure of the example forms a double syllogism: the rhetorical figure of the example is the example of the literary text, which is, in turn, the example of sensate cognition. The third element of both analogies is their sensate nature:

major term: aesthetics | literature

middle term: sensate

minor term: literature | example

Because Baumgarten's analogy is anchored in the rhetorical epistemology of the example – that is, because he neither draws conclusions a priori about the laws of sensate cognition nor chooses an example for these laws – his philosophical project leads directly to the modern epistemology of exemplarity. While Kant and nineteenth-century philosophical idealism rejected exemplarity, the example later became an “actual agent for creating knowledge.”³⁷ In particular, Ludwig Wittgenstein developed a method of the example,³⁸ in which examples neither precede concepts nor illustrate them after the fact. Instead, they are a necessary epistemic tool that replaces induction or deduction by forming analogies.

What is epistemologically spectacular about the rhetorical example is how it neither moves from the particular to the general nor illustrates the general using the particular but rather operates between a particular and another particular. With regard to Baumgarten's literary epistemology, this means that cognition is not related to representation like the general to the particular: both operate at the same level of the particular, concrete, and individual. As Stefan Willer convincingly notes, “In view of this, the explicability of rules becomes problematic: they actually appear as a simulacrum produced by examples.”³⁹ Giorgio Agamben refers to exactly this contentious point when he argues that the example and

37 Gabriel, “Logik und Rhetorik der Beispiele,” 242.

38 See Luiz Antônio Marcusch, *Die Methode des Beispiels: Untersuchungen über die methodische Funktion des Beispiels in der Philosophie, insbesondere bei Ludwig Wittgenstein* (Erlangen: Palm & Enke, 1976).

39 Stefan Willer, “Was ist ein Beispiel? Versuch über das Exemplarische,” in *Originalkopic: Praktiken des Sekundären*, ed. Gisela Fehrmann et al. (Cologne: DuMont, 2004), 55.

regularity really exclude one another and compares the example with the state of exception:

What the example shows is its belonging to a class, but for this very reason the example steps out of its class in the very moment in which it exhibits and delimits it [...]. If one now asks if the rule applies to the example, the answer is not easy, since the rule applies to the example only as to a normal case and obviously not as to an example. The example is thus excluded from the normal case not because it does not belong to it but, on the contrary, because it exhibits its own belonging to it. The example is truly a *paradigm* in the etymological sense: it is what is “shown beside,” and a class can contain everything except its own paradigm.⁴⁰

If that is the case, if the example really lacks an anchoring in the general because it balances the particular and the particular, then Alexander Gelley offers a convincing deconstruction of exemplarity: an “example cannot assume a whole on which it draws. Rather, it is oriented to the recovery of a lost whole or the discovery of a new one.”⁴¹ With regard to Baumgarten, one can therefore hardly avoid a topsy-turvy chronology: on the one hand, his rhetoric of analogy belongs to early modernity, “the age of exemplarity”;⁴² on the other, he skips the beginnings of modernity in such a way that his ideas constantly take the reader directly into postmodernism.

Although the scholarship has paid a lot of attention to aesthetics as analogous to logic, Baumgarten’s method of analogy, which helps him establish the new discipline, has been neglected. Instead, the scholarship has contributed to reining in the ambiguity of aesthetics and perpetuating the subordination of *ars* to *scientia*, rhetoric to science.⁴³ But in Baumgarten’s analogical method lies the unrecognized and unprecedented potential of this otherwise traditional philosopher, beholden to the Leibniz–Wolffian school. In a manner that is to some extent at odds with the thoroughly metaphysical positions he takes in search of the “laws of sensation,” this method displays his utterly nonmetaphysical thinking. For it is his stylistic technique of drawing analogies that thwarts his self-censorship and the disambiguation of aesthetics. Following these operations might require a lot of patience, but it offers promising possibilities to leave

⁴⁰ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 22.

⁴¹ Alexander Gelley, “Introduction,” in *Unruly Examples: On the Rhetoric of Exemplarity*, ed. Gelley (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 3.

⁴² John D. Lyons, *Exemplum: The Rhetoric of Example in Early Modern France and Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 12.

⁴³ See 2.1 Ambiguity.

the beaten tracks of the scholarship and outline Baumgarten's theory of literature.

2.3 Etymology

With the double analogy of, on the one hand, logic and aesthetics and, on the other, sensate cognition and literature, the literary text moves into the epistemological center of Baumgarten's philosophical project. He did not intend to become a literary theorist, but his analogical method turned him into one. In addition to the analogy with sensate cognition, literature shapes his philosophical project in another, entirely different way. His theory of literature is a theory made *out of* literature, a theory in which transtextuality constitutes the "unique characteristic" of his writings.⁴⁴ While transtextuality is often a criterion for distinguishing literary texts from nonliterary ones, Baumgarten's transtextuality is rooted in early modern scholarly practices. All such relationships between texts and pretexts can be described well with Gérard Genette's typology, which groups together quotes and paraphrases in the first type of transtextuality, called intertextuality.

With *intertextuality*, Genette refers to "a relationship of copresence between two texts or among several texts: that is to say, eidetically and typically as the actual presence of one text within another."⁴⁵ Within intertextuality, Ulrich Broich and Manfred Pfister further differentiate between three forms, which I find very useful for typologizing Baumgarten's scholarly practices:

- (1) intertextuality: the *Aesthetica* refers to texts by other authors;
- (2) intratextuality: the *Aesthetica* refers to other texts by Baumgarten;
- (3) autotextuality: the *Aesthetica* refers to the text of the *Aesthetica* itself.⁴⁶

(1) *Intertextuality*. Proving the presence of texts by other authors in Baumgarten's writings does not require any great philological art since he cites and paraphrases a great deal. And his allusions also operate within a canonical framework, allowing him to assume that his audience possesses the classical ed-

⁴⁴ Dagmar Mirbach, "Praeponitur – illustratur: Intertextualität bei A. G. Baumgarten," in Allerkamp and Mirbach, *Schönes Denken*, 81.

⁴⁵ Gérard Genette, *Palimpsests: Literature in the Second Degree*, trans. Channa Newman and Claude Doubinsky (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 1–2.

⁴⁶ See Manfred Pfister, "Konzepte der Intertextualität," in *Intertextualität: Formen, Funktionen, anglistische Fallstudien*, ed. Ulrich Broich and Pfister (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1985), 11–20.

ucation required to understand them. Dagmar Mirbach's 2007 translation of the *Aesthetica* into German documents these citations and allusions in endnotes, a useful index, and a reference list of the texts and authors they refer to.⁴⁷ They show that Baumgarten favors particular dialogue partners. Both the *Meditationes* and the *Aesthetica* cite Horace extensively, especially his "Ars poetica,"⁴⁸ which serves as the intertextual basso continuo in Baumgarten's theory of literature. He turns to Horace to lend authority to many of his own reflections on literary texts. But he cites Horace in a way that proceeds more topically than argumentatively: following the rhetorical tradition, he uses short sentences as mnemonic places (*loci*) and attaches his own arguments to this scaffolding. The same is the case for Cicero, whom Baumgarten cites in the *Aesthetica* even more often than Horace, especially in the context of epistemological problems, as Buchenau has eruditely demonstrated.⁴⁹ In addition, Pseudo-Longinus's treatise *On the Sublime* particularly plays a role when Baumgarten treats ethical problems, and, above all, his philosophical project would be unthinkable without Quintilian's *Institutionis oratoriae*. For this reason, one hears the double voice of "Baumtilian" across entire paragraphs of the *Aesthetica*, with Quintilian's analysis of rhetorical figures especially resonant.⁵⁰ And the list of influences continues with a number of other ancient and early modern rhetorical and poetic texts.

While Baumgarten directly appropriates and integrates these texts on rhetoric and poetics, his relationship to the two preeminent philosophers of the German Enlightenment, Leibniz and Wolff, is ambivalent. He positions his philosophical project in response to them as if they were Scylla and Charybdis. As is well known in the scholarship, Baumgarten begins a repudiation of rationalist philosophy in his *Metaphysica*, and the *Aesthetica* continues this work. But despite this antagonism, he quotes exhaustively from the rationalist canon and employs Leibniz-Wolffian concepts, which he redefines. Following Harold Bloom, we can interpret this ambivalence as a textual figuration of anxiety. Although Bloom only applies his model to literature, it captures well Baumgarten's relationship to Leibniz and Wolff. Baumgarten jostles with these two giants not only for epistemic space and legitimacy for his new science but also for his own place in the history of philosophy – his own imaginary identity and unique-

⁴⁷ See Mirbach's "Anmerkungen," "Personenregister," and "Bibliographie" in *Ästhetik* by Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, trans. Mirbach, vol. 2 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2007), 935–1050, 1193–1201, 1263–1274.

⁴⁸ See Bengerd Juul Thorsen, "Baumgarten's *Meditationes* as a Commentary on Horace's 'Ars Poetica,'" *Philosophica* 44 (2014): 9–25.

⁴⁹ See Buchenau, *The Founding of Aesthetics*, 137–151.

⁵⁰ See 3.4 Poetics.

ness. In his psychoanalytic theory of influence, Bloom considers such an oedipal rivalry between powerful men and presumably weaker followers as the driving force of history. They “make that history by misreading one another, so as to clear imaginative space for themselves.”⁵¹

(2) *Intratextuality*. Maybe even more stunning than Baumgarten’s references to others’ texts are his references to his own. The *Aesthetica* refers constantly to both his *Metaphysica* and his *Ethica*, forming an intratextual triad out of a thick net of cross-references. Mirbach even refers to the *Ethica* and the *Aesthetica* as the *Metaphysica*’s twin daughters:⁵² the *Ethica* delves further into the appetitive faculties,⁵³ while the *Aesthetica* investigates the cognitive faculties.⁵⁴ These cross-references reflect Baumgarten’s own understanding of the *Metaphysica* as his principle work – or at least as the work that lays claim to philosophical authority and so frequently has to come to the aid of the contentious “science of everything that is sensate.”

(3) *Autotextuality*. The abundance of intertextuality and intratextuality in the *Aesthetica* should not let us forget that it, above all, unyieldingly refers to its own paragraphs – both to paragraphs within the same section and to paragraphs from previous sections; to single paragraphs, groups of paragraphs, and entire sections. This permanent insinuation of coherence and consistency comes across as the textual figuration of an obsessive compulsion. But Baumgarten’s meticulousness is more than justified. These self-citations often set the stage for his conceptual work, which defines his philosophical project. For example, he transfers concepts from the sphere of desire into the sphere of cognition – like *sensitivus*⁵⁵ – or invents *aestheticologicus* to describe a new concept of truth for sensate cognition.⁵⁶

So far I have described what texts Baumgarten cites, including texts by other authors and his own. More significant, however, is the text that he does not cite at all, his *Meditationes*. Although he embraces transtextuality in the *Aesthetica*, he conspicuously leaves out the text that initiated his aesthetic project in 1735.

51 Harold Bloom, *The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 5.

52 See Dagmar Mirbach, “*Magnitudo aesthetica*, Aesthetic Greatness: Ethical Aspects of Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten’s Fragmentary *Aesthetica* (1750/58),” *The Nordic Journal of Aesthetics* 20.36–37 (2008/2009): 104.

53 See 3.1.2 Desire.

54 See 3.1.1 Cognition.

55 See 3.2 Rhetoric. When referring to Latin adjectives or participles as concepts, I only use the masculine nominative singular ending to improve readability.

56 See 4.1.2 Truth.

The *Aesthetica* does not mention his earlier reflections on poetics a single time, making it seem like Baumgarten is trying to avoid the topic that actually forms the core of the *Aesthetica*: the theory of literature. This avoidance of poetics is surprising since he extensively quotes the entire literary canon of antiquity, in particular Virgil's *Aeneis*.⁵⁷ The scholarship usually explains the absence of poetics by differentiating (misleadingly) between the main work, the *Aesthetica*, and its preliminary stages in the *Meditationes*, the *Brieffe*, and part 3 of the *Metaphysica* on psychology (psychologia).

Contrary to this generally accepted position in the scholarship, I argue that the *Meditationes* is latently and compulsively present in the *Aesthetica*. The connection to the *Meditationes* is first of all transmitted through Horace, whom Baumgarten cites equally indefatigably in both works. Second, the *Aesthetica* is structurally based on the *Meditationes*. Both are organized according to the canons of rhetoric (*officia oratoris*; see MED § 10; AE §§ 13, 18–20): heuristics (*inventio*), methodology (*dispositio*), and semiotics (*elocutio*). But before engaging with this structure,⁵⁸ I want to turn to yet another type of transtextuality in order to show that the *Meditationes* is not merely a preliminary draft of the *Aesthetica*. Genette would classify the relationship between the two works as a fourth type of transtextuality that he calls hypertextuality: “By hypertextuality I mean any relationship uniting a text B (which I shall call the *hypertext*) to an earlier text A (I shall, of course, call it the *hypotext*), upon which it is grafted in a manner that is not that of commentary. The use of the metaphoric ‘grafted’ and of the negative determination underscores the provisional status of this definition.”⁵⁹ In comparison to the concept of intertextuality, the concept of hypertextuality does not refer to a single, precisely locatable reference such as a quote or a paraphrase. Text B can refer to text A by mentioning text A but also without doing so. What is decisive is that B cannot structurally exist without A. Text B is due to a more-or-less obvious transformation of text A; that is, hypertextuality occurs in the case of “an entire work B deriving from an entire work A.”⁶⁰ This means that only a text that chronologically precedes a hypertext can become a hypotext. The chronology guarantees the direction of the references: text B cannot exist without text A, but A can exist without B; A influences the existence of B, but B does not influence the existence of A.

Such hypertextuality depends structurally on the fifth, most abstract type of transtextual relationship outlined by Genette: “The fifth type (yes, I know), the

⁵⁷ See 5 Narratology.

⁵⁸ See 3.2 Rhetoric.

⁵⁹ Genette, *Palimpsests*, 5.

⁶⁰ Genette, *Palimpsests*, 9.

most abstract and most implicit of all, is *architextuality*, as defined above. It involves a relationship that is completely silent, articulated at most only by a paratextual mention, which can be titular (as in *Poems, Essays, The Romance of the Rose*, etc.) or most often subtitled (as when the indication *A Novel*, or *A Story*, or *Poems* is appended to the title on the cover), but which remains in any case of a purely taxonomic nature.”⁶¹ For the same phenomenon, Broich and Pfister offer the perhaps even more fitting concept of systemic reference, which they differentiate from intertextual references to single texts.⁶² The *Meditationes* and the *Aesthetica* are related by exactly such a systemic reference because both works share a rhetorical blueprint – as I will later show in detail.⁶³ Based on this systemic reference, we can infer that the *Aesthetica* has the same epistemic object as the *Meditationes*: the literary text.

If one accepts that a systemic reference conjoins the *Meditationes* and the *Aesthetica*, then one can either claim that the *Meditationes* is a condensed version of the *Aesthetica* or that the *Aesthetica* suppresses the *Meditationes* into latency; the latter view has a lot to commend it. Baumgarten’s anxiety might perhaps even apply less to his philosophical predecessors than to his own preceding text. Perhaps he wanted to distance himself from his earlier poetics because it appeared unworthy to him as a philosopher? After all, his aesthetics aims to establish a new position in the order of knowledge. For precisely that reason, it seems as if he wanted to steer clear of literature, the epistemic object that his philosophical project depends on.

From the perspective of this avoided intertextuality, the hierarchy between the two texts is inverted: the *Meditationes* is not a preliminary stage of the *Aesthetica*, the supposed main work; rather, it is the other way around. The *Meditationes* already reflects theoretically on everything Baumgarten views as important to literary texts, and it is where he gives a name to his aesthetic child: literature (poema). We are thus dealing here with an inversion in the chronology between text A and text B. Genette himself believes that such a temporal inversion is at the base of all theories of intertextuality: “I can also trace in just about any work the local, fugitive, and partial echoes of any other work, be it anterior or ulterior.”⁶⁴ In *Quoting Caravaggio: Contemporary Art, Preposterous History* (1999), Mieke Bal outlines a model of such a topsy-turvy chronology, in which influences are no longer one-way streets. This model plots texts in a nonlinear history, viewing earlier works as the belated reworkings (aftereffects) of later

⁶¹ Genette, *Palimpsests*, 4.

⁶² See Manfred Pfister, “Zur Systemreferenz,” in Broich and Pfister, *Intertextualität*, 52–58.

⁶³ See 3.2 Rhetoric.

⁶⁴ Genette, *Palimpsests*, 9.

works. In this context, the *Meditationes* only unfolds its significance for Baumgarten's œuvre when one views it as an aftereffect of the *Aesthetica* or as an aftereffect of the entire triad of the *Metaphysica*, *Ethica*, and *Aesthetica*. Only under the condition of this thought experiment does the preeminent role of literature in his philosophical project become clear.

In addition to rampant transtextuality, Baumgarten's *Aesthetica* is defined by his unique style. While Mirbach emphasizes that his style is "achromatic"⁶⁵ – meaning that his text is formulated for the purpose of academic lecturing and so proceeds less abstractly than philosophical discourse – I would like to point out, as I did in the introduction, that Baumgarten lacked the requisite concepts for his philosophical project. The *Aesthetica* thus functions with the help of a "translation machine" that allows him to use the same concepts in different contexts. Stubbornly and awkwardly, he transfers these concepts not only from one discipline to another but also from one book to another. The translation begins with epistemology (psychology, rhetoric, semiotics, poetics) and then leads from metaphysics to ethics. His narratology, which is treated in the present book for the very first time, forms an interface between epistemology and metaphysics as he expounds on psychology, rhetoric, ontology, and even cosmology.

Baumgarten's philosophy can thus basically be considered as a philosophy of style in which the concepts themselves are discursively produced. They form argumenta ex vi verbi. Originally rooted in dialectics, this method soon found its way into rhetoric, which provides, on the one hand, topoi in the canon of invention and, on the other, figures in the canon of style. Cicero further develops the dialectical method from Aristotle's *Topics* in his own *Topica* and in *De inventione*, where he provides catalogues of how to form arguments etymologically and describes such arguments as loci ab etymologia. Baumgarten's translation machine is based on precisely this method, and its most important etymologically rooted figure is analogy. Following Jacques Derrida, "all the so-called *symbolical* or *analogical* figures" perform the etymological work of displacing words.⁶⁶ But one does not need to look into the future to postmodernism, for Baumgarten imports etymology (etymologia) as an analogical method from dialectics into philosophy in his *Philosophia generalis*, edited and published posthumously in 1770 by Förster. In the first part, on onomatology (onomatologia), he associates etymology with the artes liberales in general, and with figures and tropes in particular (see PHG §§ 5–20).

⁶⁵ Mirbach, "Intertextualität bei A. G. Baumgarten," 74.

⁶⁶ Jacques Derrida, "White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy," in *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 215.

As I will demonstrate in this study, the essential foundation of aesthetics turns out to be the “fundament of literalness.”⁶⁷ In the process of working on his philosophical project, Baumgarten switches back and forth between different disciplinary registers, conjoining them etymologically to such an extent as to produce an interdisciplinary relay. The transferred concepts do not have an origin; instead, his paragraphs invoke with every single concept a loop of disciplines that I will enter in the following chapter at the arbitrary point of psychology. In doing so, I take the commonplace that his aesthetics is based on the lower faculties of the soul as the starting point of my argument.

⁶⁷ Stefan Willer, “Orte, Örter, Wörter: Zum *locus ab etymologia* zwischen Cicero und Derrida,” in *Rhetorik: Figuration und Performanz; DFG-Symposium 2002*, ed. Jürgen Fohrmann (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 2004), 39.

3 Epistemology

3.1 Psychology

3.1.1 Cognition

The ambiguity of aesthetics arises from its combination of epistemology and media theory. The order of knowledge forms its epistemological basis, literature is its object, establishing its autonomy from logic is its goal, analogy its method, and etymology its style. The eighteenth-century order of knowledge parcels cognition up into a bright upper part and a dark lower part at the ground of the soul (*fundus animae*) – thereby revisiting what Niklaus Largier analyzes as a prominent “trope of mystical discourse.”¹ As is well known, Baumgarten’s “science of everything that is sensate” contradicts the topical order of the faculties of the soul, which was established by Leibniz and confirmed in Wolff’s *Psychologia empirica* (1732), by transposing the vertical spatial order into a horizontal order in which sensation (*sensatio*/*Empfindung*) is the equal of reason. But in reconstructing the epistemology of Baumgarten’s aesthetics, the scholarship often makes a decisive mistake: it attends to the cognitive faculties (*facultates cognoscitivae*) but neglects the appetitive faculties (*facultates appetitivae*). In the following, I will discuss the lower cognitive faculty in relation to the appetitive faculty. In contrast to affect in the seventeenth century and feeling in the late eighteenth century, Baumgarten posits that both sensate cognition and sensate desire follow laws analogous to those of reason, making it possible to analyze the formal processes of both. His aesthetics thus does not give emphatic irrationality the role that it will later have in the eighteenth century in theories like Herder’s.

Baumgarten differentiates between higher cognitive faculties (*facultates cognoscitivae superiores*) and lower cognitive faculties (*facultates cognoscitivae inferiores*). He articulates this distinction in detail in the *Metaphysica*, but it is already present in the *Meditationes*, where he distinguishes between things known (*noeta*) and things perceived (*aistheta*), and determines that “*things known* are to be known by the superior faculty as the object of logic; *things perceived* [are to be known by the inferior faculty, as the object] of the science of perception, or

¹ Niklaus Largier, “The Plasticity of the Soul: Mystical Darkness, Touch, and Aesthetic Experience,” *MLN* 125.3 (2010): 537. See also Hans Adler, “Fundus Animae – der Grund der Seele: Zur Gnoseologie des Dunklen in der Aufklärung,” *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte* 62.2 (1988): 197–220.

aesthetic” (MED § 116; Sint ergo νοητά cognoscenda facultate superiore obiectum logices, αισθητά επιζημης αισθητικης sive AESTHETICAE).² He thus understands sensation “as an organ of cognition independent from reason” that represents “the connections of things in its own particular way.”³

In this conception of sensation, the discipline of psychology is responsible for articulating the laws of “representing”⁴ or “appropriating the world sensately.”⁵ In part 3 of the *Metaphysica* on psychology (psychologia) – where Baumgarten treats both empirical and rational (speculative) psychology – he derives the following series of sensate faculties (facultates sentiendi) from the different characteristics of sensations:

(1) the inferior faculty for knowing the correspondences of things (§572, 279), to which pertains a sensitive wit (§575); (2) the inferior faculty for knowing the differences of things (§572, 279), to which pertains sensitive acumen (§575); (3) sensitive memory (§579, 306); (4) the faculty of invention (§589); (5) the faculty of judging (§606, 94), thus sensitive judgment (§607) and that of the senses (§608); (6) the expectation of similar cases (§610, 612); and (7) the sensitive faculty of characterization (§619, 347). All of these, insofar as they are similar to reason in representing the nexus of things, constitute the ANALOGUE OF REASON (§70), or the collection of the soul’s faculties for representing a nexus confusedly.

1) inferior facultas identitates rerum cognoscendi, §. 572, 279 quo ingenium sensitivum, §. 575. 2) inferior facultas diversitates rerum cognoscendi, §. 572, 279. quo acumen sensitivum pertinet, §. 575. 3) memoria sensitiva, §. 579, 306. 4) facultas fingendi, §. 589. 5) facultas diiudicandi, §. 606, 94. quo iudicium sensitivum, §. 607. & sensuum, §. 608. 6) expectatio casuum similium, §. 610, 612. 7) facultas characteristicam sensitiva, §. 619, 347. Hae omnes, quatenus in repraesentando rerum nexu rationi similes sunt, constituunt ANALOGON RATIONIS, §. 70. complexum facultatum animae nexum confuse repraesentantium. (MET § 640; see also AE §§ 30 – 37)

Baumgarten then organizes the third part of the *Metaphysica*, which is based on this list of faculties, as follows:

² See Hans Adler and Lynn L. Wolff, eds., *Aisthesis und Noesis: Zwei Erkenntnisformen vom 18. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2013). See also Ted Kinnaman, “Aesthetics before Kant,” in *A Companion to Early Modern Philosophy*, ed. Steven Nadler (Malden: Blackwell, 2002), 578–582.

³ Ursula Franke, *Kunst als Erkenntnis: Die Rolle der Sinnlichkeit in der Ästhetik des Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1972), 37. See also Franke, “Sinnliche Erkenntnis – was sie ist und was sie soll: A. G. Baumgartens Ästhetik-Projekt zwischen Kunstphilosophie und Anthropologie,” in Aichele and Mirbach, “Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten,” 73–99.

⁴ Franke, *Kunst als Erkenntnis*, 41.

⁵ Friedhelm Solms, *Disciplina aethetica: Zur Frühgeschichte der ästhetischen Theorie bei Baumgarten und Herder* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1990), 21.

- Section IIII: Imagination (phantasia)
- Section V: Perspicacity (perspicacia)
 - Faculty of wit (ingenium)
 - Faculty of acumen (acumen)
- Section VI: Memory (memoria)
- Section VII: Faculty of invention (facultas fingendi)
- Section VIII: Foresight (praevisio)
- Section VIII: Judgment (iudicium)
- Section X: Anticipation (praesagitio)
- Section XI: Faculty of characterization (facultas characteristica)

The science for analyzing these sensate faculties requires, like any science, a method. As we saw in the last chapter, Baumgarten's "science of everything that is sensate" is largely based on the rhetorical figure of analogy, so it employs a rhetorical method.⁶ He thus follows, as Herder astutely notes, a path that is more philologically than philosophically grounded: "I am getting closer to the heart of Baumgarten's philosophy and have noticed that it is so tied up with language that his explanations, differentiations, and proofs often seem to work etymologically."⁷ In other words, Baumgarten seems to shift the weight of his arguments onto the concepts that constitute them. Herder becomes especially riled up with Baumgarten's use of *sensitivus*, in English "sensate," which he seems to apply to everything possible. In the context of the analogon of reason, the data (sense perceptions), organs (faculties), and products (representations, with regard to both quantity and quality) are all described with one and the same word: *sensitivus*. Herder bemoans this fact in his discussion of Friedrich Justus Riedel's *Theorie der schönen Künste* (1767), which follows Baumgarten's mold:

We Germans dispute words as other nations dispute causes; we are as blessed with definitions as others are with inventions, and in his definition Baumgarten has moreover used a word that is rich and pregnant enough to conceal multiple meanings, thus leaving itself open to dispute and misuse: the word *sensuous* [*sinnlich*; I translate as "sensate," F. B.]. How many concepts German philosophy associates with this word! *Sensuous* leads us back to the source and medium of certain representations, and these are the *senses*; it signifies those faculties of the soul that form such representations, and these are the so-called *lower* faculties of the soul; it characterizes *the species* of representation, confused and pleasant precisely in this rich, engaging confusion; that is, *sensuous*; finally, it refers also to the intensity with which the representations enrapture us and excite *sensuous* pas-

⁶ See 2.2 Analogy.

⁷ Johann Gottfried Herder, "Von Baumgartens Denkart in seinen Schriften," in *Werke*, ed. Martin Bollacher et al., vol. 1, *Frühe Schriften 1764–1772*, ed. Ulrich Gaier (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1985), 653.

sions – on all four conceptual paths the multifaceted words *sensuous*, *sensitive* are in keeping with the definition of Wolff, Baumgarten, and Mendelssohn.⁸

Baumgarten's conceptual politics made more than a small contribution to this inflation. Even the concept *aesthetics* itself is an argument based on words (*argumentum ex vi verbi*). By deriving *aesthetica* from an etymological topos (*locus ab etymologia*) in the first paragraph of the *Kollegium*, Baumgarten traces the name for the “science of everything that is sensate” back to its original meaning and provides an etymological explanation for the analogy between reason and sensation:⁹

It actually comes from *aisthanomai* [I sense]; this word refers to what *sentio* refers to in Latin, namely, to all clear sensations. Since sensations can be divided into external and internal ones – into those that I am conscious of occurring in my body and that relate to all the senses, and those that only occur in my soul – this word, which refers to clear sensations in general, applies to both. Since, furthermore, the word *sentio* refers to perceiving something with the senses and the Greek is completely the same, it will also refer to sensate representations.

Es kommt eigentlich von *αἰσθάνομαι* her; dieses Wort bezeichnet das, was *sentio* im Lateinischen bezeichnet, nämlich alle klaren Empfindungen. Da die Empfindungen in äußerliche und innerliche eingeteilt werden, in solche, die in meinem Körper als mir bewußt vorgehen und sich auf alle Sinne beziehen, oder in solche, die nur in meiner Seele vorgehen, so wird dieses Wort, das klare Empfindungen überhaupt bezeichnet, auf beides gehen. Da ferner das Wort *sentio* etwas sinnlich wahrnehmen bezeichnet, das griechische aber mit ihm völlig einerlei ist, so wird es auch sinnliche Vorstellungen bezeichnen. (KOLL § 1; see also MET § 535)

Baumgarten's etymology twists and turns, exhibiting a stylistic technique that does not reach an ontological origin – “a semantics beyond language” – but rather always only refers, in a process of “continual displacement,” to other words.¹⁰ In his thoroughly circular conclusion, he equates the subjective activity of sense perception (*aisthanomai/sentio*) with the result of this activity, the (external or internal) clear sensations, which are then ascribed, based on etymology, the same sensate quality that characterizes the verb. In this definition, Baumgarten contorts the topical method for securing proofs into the stylistic technique of the *figura etymologica*, which produces words by moving through different morphological forms of the same root word, transforming etymology from a

⁸ Johann Gottfried Herder, “Critical Forests,” 264.

⁹ See Cic., *Top.* 2.8–10.

¹⁰ Willer, “Orte, Örter, Wörter,” 39.

method for dialectical proofs into a stylistic technique on the surface of discourse.

Herder recognizes that precisely such an etymological method, which is at work in the vocabulary of the Leibniz–Wolffian school, would be “conducive to new paths” in philosophy:¹¹

If only there were a German philosopher who could forget all the tradition of the schools and all Greek and Roman philosophy (a very difficult art!) and philosophized in our language through and through; who did not place our language’s names as addendums after the accepted scholastic concept, whether it be Latin or Latinized German – but rather made acquiring a philosophy for our language his primary goal. He would proceed from the common use of a word, try to develop his concept, to define it, to explain it, and, when necessary, to improve it using the received philosophy of other languages.¹²

Separating Baumgarten’s philosophical arguments from his etymological method, as the scholarship has been wont to do, is thus a crude simplification. In Baumgarten, there is no philosophy without philology.

That is even the case when he takes up the traditional assumption in the *Metaphysica* that the reflective organ of the soul is a representing power (*vis repraesentativa*). When he defines the analogon of reason as the reflective organ that processes sensate cognition, Baumgarten’s arguments do not address the matter at hand but rather ground the concepts: “I think about my present state. Therefore, I represent my present state, i.e. I SENSE it. The representations of my present state, or SENSATIONS (appearances), are representations of the present state of the world (§369)” (MET § 534; *Cogito statum meum praesentem. Ergo repraesento statum meum praesentem, i.e. SENTIO. Repraesentationes status mei praesentis seu SENSATIONES (apparitiones) sunt repraesentationes status mundi praesentis, §. 369; see also MED §§ 24, 27*). The philosophical definition of sensation as representation only reproduces what Baumgarten stipulates in his etymological practice of writing. The word *sensio* – the substantive that comes from *sentire* and that he especially uses in the *Meditationes* – becomes *sensatio* through adding the letters *at* in the middle. By first shifting the root word from one morphological form to the next and, second, by adding two letters, Baumgarten’s etymological method anticipates what the definition explains with great effort or disguises as a logical derivation. The letters *at* mark the conceptual aspect of sensation, which refers to both its repeatability and its orientation toward a consciousness for whom this sensation is given. The ar-

¹¹ Herder, “Von Baumgartens Denkart,” 654.

¹² Herder, “Von Baumgartens Denkart,” 653–654.

gument of repetition is depicted by the prefix *re-*, that of representation by the prefix *prae-*. Together with *sensatio*, they yield the word *re-prae-sentatio*, in which, additionally, the *s* in the middle of *sensatio* is switched to a *t* to form *re-prae-sentatio*.

In the *Metaphysica*, Baumgarten analyzes the etymologically produced concept of sensation – or sensate representation – first with regard to the temporal relations of representations and represented states and their changes (past, present, future); second with regard to the media of representation (imagination, literature, foresight, prophecies); and third with regard to the fundamental sensate operations that compare states with one another (similarity and difference). Considering the effort he invests in his etymologies, it is surprising that Baumgarten does not trust his etymological method when he deals with sensations in more detail; instead, he introduces a foreign word to adequately describe sensate representations: “A representation that is not distinct is called a SENSITIVE [I translate as “sensate,” F. B.] REPRESENTATION. Therefore, the power of my soul represents sensitive perceptions through the inferior faculty (§520, 513)” (MET §521; REPRAESENTATIO non distincta SENSITIVA vocatur. Ergo vis animae meae repraesentat per facultatem inferiorem perceptiones sensitivas, §. 520, 513).

While the attribute *distinctus* qualitatively differentiates between indistinct representations and distinct ones, the attribute *sensitivus* seems at first to be superfluous since sensations are already sensate on the basis of their etymology. Have they now become even more sensate? We can only find an answer by turning from the cognitive faculties to the appetitive faculties. That is where Baumgarten obtains this attribute so as to import it into his characterization of cognition.

3.1.2 Desire

The use of the concept *sensitivus* implies, as Franke explains, “differentiating” sensation “from the sensual.”¹³ This would mean that the concept offers a particular perspective on processing sensate data that is more beholden to epistemological interests than psychological ones. While Hans Rudolf Schweizer, who translated parts of the *Aesthetica* into German, has asserted that there is “no reason to differentiate between ‘sensualis’ and ‘sensitivus,’”¹⁴ the concept

¹³ Franke, *Kunst als Erkenntnis*, 40.

¹⁴ Schweizer, *Ästhetik als Philosophie der sinnlichen Erkenntnis*, 22.

sensitivus actually does mark a difference to the attribute *sensualis*, the adjective derived from the substantive *sensus*. This difference emphasizes the non-sensual nature of *sensitivus*, which I translate as “sensate”: “Sensate does not mean sensual.”¹⁵ This differentiation adds a further argument to the conceptual one, an argument that is insightfully explained in the *Kollegium*: “Here one is not looking at their [the acute senses’] tools, for example, at the eye or the ear” (KOLL § 29; Man sehe hier nicht auf die Werkzeuge derselben, z. B. auf das Auge oder Ohr). In contrast to the external organs of sensation, the faculties of sensation refer to an “inner consciousness” (inneres Bewußtsein), an “inner feeling” (innere[s] Gefühl; KOLL § 29). Unlike the inner senses (*sensus interni*), the outer senses (*sensus externi*) merely supply raw sensations (see MET § 535; AE § 30) by functioning as “aids” (Hülffs-Mittel), “weapons,” (Waffen), or “tools” (PHB 8; Werkzeuge[]). As markers of two different interests in sensation, the two competing attributes, *sensualis* and *sensitivus*, only meet in the *Meditationes* a single time: “By **sense representations** we mean representations of present changes in that which is to be represented, and these are sensate, § 3” (MED § 24; REPRAESENTATIONES *mutationum repraesentantis praesentium* sunt *SENSUALES*, eaeque *sensitivae* §. 3).

Sensitivus is a loanword. Baumgarten imports this epistemological neologism along with its ethical implications from Wolff’s theory of desire into his *Meditationes*, where it technically does not belong. For desire and cognition are two different psychological realms. Wolff defines desire in general as the soul’s inclination to an object due to the good represented in the object.¹⁶ A desire is called rational when it comes “from a distinct representation of the good”;¹⁷ in contrast, a desire is called sensate when it comes “from a confused idea of the good.”¹⁸ It is against this backdrop that Baumgarten applies the attribute *sensitivus* to the representations he is interested in: “By **sensate representations** we mean representations received through the lower part of the cognitive faculty” (MED § 3; REPRAESENTATIONES *per partem facultatis cognoscitivae inferiorem comparatae* sint *SENSITIVAE*). The risky transfer from the theo-

15 Alfred Baeumler, *Das Irrationalitätsproblem in der Ästhetik und Logik des 18. Jahrhunderts bis zur Kritik der Urteilskraft*, 2nd ed. (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1967; repr., Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1981), 214.

16 See Christian Wolff, *Psychologia empirica, methodo scientifica pertractata, qua ea, quae de anima humana indubia experientiae fide constant, continentur et ad solidam universae philosophiae practicae ac theologiae naturalis tractationem via sternitur*, new rev. ed., in *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. Jean École, vol. 2.5 (Frankfurt, 1738; facsimile, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1968), § 579.

17 Wolff, *Psychologia empirica*, § 880.

18 Wolff, *Psychologia empirica*, § 580.

ry of desire into epistemology is again elegantly managed by means of analogy. Both sensate desire and sensate cognition share the tertium comparationis of being confused, which Baumgarten mentions in the note to the third paragraph of the *Meditationes*:

Since desire, so far as it derives from a confused representation of the good, is called sensate, and since, on the other hand, a confused representation, along with an obscure one, is received through the lower part of the cognitive faculty, we can apply the same name to confused representations, in order that they may be distinguished from concepts distinct at all possible levels.

Quoniam appetitus quam diu ex confusa boni repraesentatione manat, sensitivus appellatur: confusa autem cum obscura repraesentatione comparatur per facultatis cognoscitivae inferiorem partem, poterit idem nominis ad ipsas etiam repraesentationes applicari, ut distinguantur ita ab intellectualibus distinctis per omnes gradus possibiles. (MED § 3n)

With regard to Baumgarten's import of the concept *sensitivus* from Wolff's analysis of the appetitive faculties, Clemens Schwaiger points out that Baumgarten "does not take over a single essential definition unchanged, and he introduces a series of central new terms."¹⁹ Most significantly, his "reformulation of the [Wolffian] '*lex appetitus*' is [...] kept morally neutral."²⁰

But even more remarkable than the foreign origin and transformation of the concept is, once again, Baumgarten's etymological technique, which he uses to displace the word *sensitivus* from the theory of desire into epistemology. The analogy does not, however, obscure the fact that he must first semantically empty the concept *sensitivus* in order to be able to redefine it in the foreign discipline. In emptying the concept of meaning, the surface of discourse again moves into the foreground and the argument retreats into the background. The made-up word builds on the root of *sentire*, *sensio*, and *sensatio*, above all through the addition of the letters *itiv*, which mark the performative aspect of sensation in the adjective. The German translations of Baumgarten's writings nullify the etymologically produced difference between *sensitivus* and *sensualis* by using the word *sinnlich* for everything based on the root *sens*. I maintain this difference by following Aschenbrenner and Holther's translation of *sensitivus* as "sensate," which I have chosen over the English word *sensitive*, since the latter term often denotes the quality of being easily and acutely affected by external objects.

¹⁹ Clemens Schwaiger, "Baumgarten's Theory of Freedom: A Contribution to the Wolff–Lange Controversy," in Fugate and Hymers, *Baumgarten and Kant on Metaphysics*, 45.

²⁰ Schwaiger, "Baumgarten's Theory of Freedom," 46.

In the transfer of *sensitivus*, its original connotation from the theory of desire is not, however, entirely replaced but rather suppressed into latency. Desire remains desire and never fully becomes cognition. And it is important to remember that in rationalist philosophy, the appetitive faculties and the cognitive faculties are always juxtaposed. In his *Metaphysica*, Baumgarten defines the appetitive faculty as follows: “If I endeavor or make an effort to produce some perception, i. e. if I determine the power of my soul, or myself, to produce some perception, I DESIRE. The opposite of what I desire, I AVERT” (MET § 663; Si conor seu nitor aliquam perceptionem producere, i. e. si vim animae meae seu me determino ad certam perceptionem producendam, APPETO. Cuius oppositum appero, illud AVERSOR). Here Baumgarten makes the faculties of the soul, which are in themselves only potential powers, dependent on a representing power and defines this power through its effect. One can thus understand desire and aversion as purposeful (dis)inclinations toward an object.

The cognitive faculty and the appetitive faculty relate to each other in such a way that desire and cognition can never be fully detached from one another.²¹ Mario Casula stresses the dependence of the appetitive faculty on the cognitive faculty.²² Desire is not just a blind drive; rather, as a perception or representation, it is whitewashed so as to appear to some extent logical. The common denominator consists in the fact that Baumgarten understands cognition and desire as representations. Representations that contain the basis of an intention are the “moving” causes of desires and aversions: “Whoever desires or averts intends the production of some perception (§341, 663). Hence, the perceptions containing the ground of this sort of intention are the impelling causes of desire and aversion, and thus they are called the INCENTIVES OF THE MIND <ELATERES ANIMI> (§342)” (MET § 669; Appetens & aversatus intendit productionem alicuius perceptionis, §. 341, 663. hinc perceptiones intentionis eiusmodi rationem continentes caussae impulsivae sunt appetitiones aversationesque, unde ELATERES ANIMI vocantur, §. 342).

All verbs that express desire and aversion – to endeavor (conari), to make an effort (niti), and to intend (intendere) – stress the dynamics of such representations. They relate the present to the future (see MET § 664), and they are directed toward a goal they seek to reach (see MET § 665). Desire is therefore, as Schwaiger emphasizes, closely related to the cognitive faculties of foresight and anticipation. He additionally points out that for a thing to “become a target of my de-

²¹ See Ernst Bergmann, *Die Begründung der deutschen Ästhetik durch Alex. Gottlieb Baumgarten und Georg Friedrich Meier* (Leipzig: Röder & Schunke, 1911), 166–172.

²² See Mario Casula, *La metafisica di A. G. Baumgarten* (Milano: Mursia, 1973), 177–180.

sire, it must not leave me indifferent, but rather must plainly and simply please me.”²³ Cognition is thus living when it effectively sets desire or aversion in motion; and desire or aversion are successful when they have reached their goal in the future. Baumgarten thus makes the soul dynamic and differentiates between moving and inert cognition: “KNOWLEDGE [I translate as “cognition,” F. B.], insofar as it contains the incentives of the mind, is MOVING (affecting, touching, burning, pragmatic, practical, and, more broadly, living), and insofar as it does not contain these incentives, it is INERT (theoretical and, more broadly, dead)” (MET § 669; COGNITIO, quatenus elateres animi continet, MOVENS (afficiens, tangens, ardens, pragmatica, practica & viva latius), quatenus minus, INERS (theoretica & mortua latius)).

When one considers this context, it makes sense that Baumgarten equates sensate cognition with intuition and movement. It thus guarantees an interpretation of the world far more effective than logic:

Hence, symbolic knowledge, as such, is notably inert (§652), and only intuitive knowledge is moving (§652). [...] Therefore the vaster, nobler, truer, clearer, hence more lively or distinct, more certain, and more brilliant knowledge is, the greater it is (§515, 531).

Hinc cognitio symbolica, qua talis, est notabiliter iners, §. 652, sola intuitiva movens, §. 652. [...] Ergo quo vastior, quo nobilior, quo verior, quo clarior, hinc vividior vel distinctior, quo certior, quo ardentior cognitio est, hoc maior est, §. 515, 531. (MET § 669)

Finally, he captures the emphasis on movement in the opposition between living cognition (cognitio viva) and dead cognition (cognitio mortua):

The KNOWLEDGE THAT MOVES effective desires or aversions, and ITS MOTIVE power (§222), is LIVING (more strictly, cf. §669, rousing or sufficient for what is to be done). The KNOWLEDGE, and ITS MOTIVE power (§222), of ineffective desires or aversions is DEAD (more strictly, cf. §669, insufficient for whatever must be done, solicitation). The KNOWLEDGE that moves complete desires or aversions, and ITS POWER, is COMPLETELY MOVING, and the knowledge that only moves incomplete desires and aversions is IMCOMPLETELY MOVING. Living knowledge, all else being equal, is greater than dead knowledge, and incompletely moving knowledge is less than completely moving knowledge (§669).

COGNITIO MOVENS appetitiones aversationesve efficientes, & VIS EIUS MOTRIX, §. 222. est VIVA (strictius cf. §. 669. incendens, sufficiens ad agendum). COGNITIO & VIS EIUS MOTRIX, §. 222. appetitionum aversationumve inefficientium est MORTUA (strictius cf. §. 669. insufficiens ad agendum, sollicitatio). COGNITIO movens appetitiones aversationesve plenas, & VIS EIUS est COMPLETE MOVENS, movens tantum minus plenas est INCOMPLETE MOVENS. Cognitio viva, caeteris paribus, maior est mortua, incomplete movens minor complete movente, §. 669. (MET § 671)

23 Schwaiger, “Baumgarten’s Theory of Freedom,” 47.

Like in the faculties of cognition, Baumgarten differentiates between a higher appetitive faculty (*facultas appetitiva superior*) and a lower appetitive faculty (*facultas appetitiva inferior*). When desires and aversions are formed by the higher faculty and are rational (see AE § 689), he treats them as volitions and nolitions of the faculties of the will and of refusal:²⁴

Rational desire is VOLITIO <VOLITIO>. I will <volo>. Therefore I have a faculty of willing, the WILL (§216). Rational aversion is NOLITIO. I refuse <nolo>. Therefore, I have a faculty of refusing <nolendi>, REFUSAL <NOLUNTATEM> (§216). The superior faculty of desire is either will or refusal (§689). Representations that are the impelling causes of volitions and nolitions are MOTIVES. The incentives of the mind (§669) are either stimuli or motives (§677, 521).

Appetitus rationalis est VOLITIO. Volo. Ergo habeo facultatem volendi, VOLUNTATEM, §. 216. Aversatio rationalis est NOLITIO. Nolo, ergo habeo facultatem nolendi, NOLUNTATEM, §. 216. Facultas appetitiva superior est vel voluntas, vel noluntas, § 689. Repraesentationes, volitionis nolitionisque caussae impulsivae, sunt MOTIVA. Elateres animi, §. 669. vel sunt stimuli, vel motiva, §. 677, 521. (MET § 690)

When desire and aversion are formed by the lower faculty, they are sensate (appetitiones & aversiones sensitivae; see MET § 676). Baumgarten calls the faculty of sensate desire the concupiscible faculty (*facultas concupiscibilis*) and the faculty of sensate aversions the irascible faculty (*facultas irascibilis*): “Sensitive desires and aversions arise either from obscure representations or from confused ones (§676, 520). And, insofar as they are the impelling causes of desiring and averting, both are STIMULI (§669)” (MET § 677; *Appetitus aversionesque sensitivae vel oriuntur ex repraesentationibus obscuris, vel ex confusis, §. 676, 520. Utraeque, quatenus appetendi aversandique caussae impulsivae sunt, sunt STIMULI, §. 669*). Together, the lower cognitive and appetitive faculties belong to the flesh (*carus*). Interestingly, desire and aversion can either be pure – that is the default mode of desire or aversion – “or they follow that intellect in which there is some admixture of confusion, and these are volitions and nolitions in which there is some sensitive admixture” (MET § 692; *vel sequuntur intellectionem, cui aliquid admixtum est confusionis, & erunt volitiones nolitionesque, quibus aliquid admixtum est sensitivi*). This leads to an interesting problem: “Then a CONFLICT BETWEEN THE INFERIOR AND SUPERIOR FACULTIES OF DESIRE (dissension) arises (a conflict between sensitive and rational desire, between flesh and reason). [...] That faculty of desire is VICTORIOUS through which I completely desire or avert after a conflict” (MET § 693; *LUCTA FACULTATIS APPETITIVAE INFERIORIS ET SUPERIORIS (appetitus sensitivi & ra-*

²⁴ See 6.3.2 Parrhesia.

tionalis, carnis & rationis). [...] Per quam facultatem appetitivam post luctam plene appeto aut aversor, illa VINCIT).

In the wake of this impure admixture of desire from the lower and higher faculties, Baumgarten stumbles on a paradox in sections 20 on choice (*arbitrium*) and 21 on freedom (*libertas*), a paradox that is highly relevant to his theory of literature, both to the structure of literary discourse²⁵ and to the ethics of literature.²⁶ There *sensate choice* (*arbitrium sensitivum*) forms in the realm of desire the counterpart to rational free choice (*liberum arbitrium*): “The faculty of sensitively desiring and averting according to one’s own preference is SENSITIVE CHOICE. The faculty of willing or refusing according to one’s own preference is FREEDOM (free choice), cf. §707, 708, 710 (moral freedom, freedom in the unqualified sense)” (MET § 719; *Facultas appetendi aversandive pro lubitu suo sensitive, est ARBITRIUM SENSITIVUM, facultas volendi nolendive pro lubitu suo est (liberum arbitrium) LIBERTAS* cf. §. 707, 708, 710. (*moralis, simpliciter sic dicta*)). As Schwaiger explains, “With this conceptual opposition of sensible and free choice, Baumgarten more distinctly emphasizes the cognitive character of human freedom than does Wolff. Freedom, in a strict sense, belongs only to willing or rational desire [...] not to sensible desire.”²⁷

In the paragraphs that follow, Baumgarten equips *sensate desire* and *aversion* with a noteworthy rationality, which moves both of them into close proximity with the faculties of the will and refusal. He notices this when he is brooding over *sensate choice* and comes to the conclusion that *volitions* and *nolitions* are always imbued with *sensate choice*:

I sensitively desire and avert many things according to my own preference. Therefore, I have sensitive choice (§216, 719). I will and refuse many things according to my own preference. Therefore I have freedom (§216, 719). Many actions of mine, many actions of my soul, and the soul in many of its own actions are free. Something of the sensitive is mixed with all of my volitions and nolitions (§692). Hence pure freedom does not belong to me; for in my freest actions, my freedom is mixed with sensitive choice (§719). Both sensitive and free choice are actualized through the power of the soul for representing the universe according to the position of my body in it (§712, 667).

Multa appeto aversorque sensitive pro lubitu meo. Ergo habeo arbitrium sensitivum, §. 219, 719. Multa volo noloque pro lubitu meo. Ergo habeo libertatem §. 216, 719. Multae actiones meae, multae actiones animae meae, & anima in multis actionibus suis, sunt liberae. Omnibus meis volitionibus nolitionibusque sensitivi quid admixtum est, §. 692. Hinc non convenit mihi pura libertas, in liberrimis meis actionibus arbitrio sensitivo mixta mea est

²⁵ See 3.4.3 Performativity.

²⁶ See 6.1 Anthropology.

²⁷ Schwaiger, “Baumgarten’s Theory of Freedom,” 52.

libertas, §. 719. Tam arbitrium sensitivum, quam liberum, actuantur per vim animae repraesentativam universi pro positu corporis mei in eodem, §. 712, 667. (MET § 720)

If there is no pure freedom (*pura libertas*) and if, in addition, the upper and lower appetitive faculties cooperate to a certain extent in all decisions, then a problem appears in the theory of desire: the question inevitably arises of whether there is not only a rational will but also a “sensate will,” which would be by definition paradoxical. Since sensate desire and rational will as well as sensate aversion and rational refusal are analogous, the will reigns both in the realm of reason and in the realm of sensation. And such a sensate will is the actual contentious proposal of the “science of everything that is sensate.” It is not the positive revaluation of the lower faculties but rather the consequence of a sensate will that riles rationalist philosophy.

The scholarship has drawn much attention to the content of the argument but has ignored the etymological method at its base. It has focused on how, contrary to the alternative *sensualis*, the concept *sensitivus* emphasizes an independent, “productive modeling” in sensation.²⁸ Sensate cognition represents “man’s ability for structured creation, for meaningfully formative action,”²⁹ an activity or an “independent organ”³⁰ that makes present the states, changes, and relations of the soul and the world in its own particular way. Due to a certain tunnel vision in philosophy, the discussion quickly reaches a point that abstracts from Baumgarten’s stylistic techniques of argumentation and instead judges his concept of sensate cognition in terms of the history of philosophy.

Such scholarship above all asks how Baumgarten’s psychologically based aesthetics relates to Kant’s transcendently based aesthetics. While some, like Heinz Paetzold, assume that Baumgarten’s grounding of aesthetics attains its goal with Kant,³¹ others, such as Schweizer, deny such a teleology: “As the ‘science of all a priori principles of sensation,’ ‘transcendental aesthetics’ almost has nothing more than a name in common with Baumgarten’s new discipline.”³² In contrast to Kant, Baumgarten emphasizes, as Caygill explains, “the continuity between sensation and reason in place of a strict separation between the facul-

28 Schweizer, *Ästhetik als Philosophie der sinnlichen Erkenntnis*, 22.

29 Steffen W. Groß, *Felix aestheticus: Die Ästhetik als Lehre vom Menschen; Zum 250. Jahrestag des Erscheinens von Alexander Gottlieb Baumgartens “Aesthetica”* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2001), 70.

30 Franke, *Kunst als Erkenntnis*, 37.

31 See Heinz Paetzold, *Ästhetik des deutschen Idealismus: Zur Idee ästhetischer Rationalität bei Baumgarten, Kant, Schelling, Hegel und Schopenhauer* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1983), 54.

32 Schweizer, *Ästhetik als Philosophie der sinnlichen Erkenntnis*, 23.

ties of reason and sensation.”³³ According to Petra Bahr, this position constitutes a virtually insurmountable “distance” between Baumgarten and Kant: “Whereas Baumgarten remains in the imponderable threshold on the border of rationalist philosophy, which he duly strains yet cannot overcome, Kant sees the landscape of human consciousness in a new light – and recognizes its boundary lines, for which he designs a map with transcendental philosophy.”³⁴

In fact, however, this philosophical discussion is about nothing more than the meaning of the word *sensitivus*. Does it have a transcendental meaning? Does Baumgarten “already” consider the conditions of the possibility of processing sensate data? Does he also assume an operating system that serves as the foundation for this process but is itself independent from it? Or does the word have a different meaning – and in this context, different would mean one that is not transcendental. The etymology of the word determines whether the relationship between reason and sensation is based on continuity or difference, and it thereby also defines how Baumgarten’s and Kant’s aesthetics are related.

But only an even more precise analysis of Baumgarten’s etymological method – which does not allow itself to be reduced to simple statements and whose stylistic techniques are themselves relevant to meaning – can reveal the subtleties of the “science of everything that is sensate.” In the case of the word *sensitivus*, the etymological method leads away from psychology into rhetoric, where the concept obtains its profile.

3.2 Rhetoric

As a loanword from the theory of desire, the concept *sensitivus* acquires a sophisticated rhetorical profile in the *Meditationes* before Baumgarten elaborates it psychologically in the *Metaphysica*. In the first six paragraphs of the *Meditationes*, he uses the concept to define discourse (oratio): “By **discourse** we shall understand a series of words which designate connected representations” (MED § 1; ORATIONEM cum dicimus, *seriem vocum repraesentationes connexas significantium* intelligimus). This definition invokes Baumgarten’s decisive analogy, in which discourse leads to cognition and cognition to discourse as in a circle. He thus concludes that “connected representations are to be apprehended from discourse, § 1” (MED § 2; *Ex oratione repraesentationes connexae cognoscen-*

³³ Howard Caygill, “Über Erfindung und Neuerfindung der Ästhetik,” *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 49.2 (2001): 239. See also Caygill, *Art of Judgement*, 152.

³⁴ Bahr, *Darstellung des Undarstellbaren*, 173.

dae sunt §.1). After introducing the unexpected loanword *sensitivus* for representations formed by the lower cognitive faculties in the third paragraph, he uses the term to define discourse that does not capture its objects with concepts but rather visualizes them: “By **sensate discourse** we mean discourse involving sensate representations” (MED § 4; ORATIO *repraesentationum sensitivarum* sit SENSITIVA). Five paragraphs later, this definition sets the stage for turning to literature, which is related to discourse as the particular is related to the general: “LITERATURE is perfect sensate discourse” (MED § 9, my translation; *Oratio sensitiva perfecta est* POEMA). The general discipline of rhetoric correspondingly forms the background for the particular discipline of poetics.³⁵

Ut oratio cognitio sensitiva – this analogy is at the epistemological epicenter of the “science of everything that is sensate.” While nothing changes in Baumgarten’s etymological method – he transfers the word *sensitivus* from one side of the definition to the other so that it now defines discourse and cognition – dramatic things still take place in the opening paragraphs. This is because the concept *sensitivus* becomes the door for rhetoric to enter epistemology. Rüdiger Campe is therefore right to ask if, since it is based on the *Meditationes*, Baumgarten’s “phenomenal aesthetics” interprets rhetoric and, further, if the *Aesthetica* even outlines “a material rhetoric and poetics.”³⁶ What role does rhetoric play in this theory? He himself calls for an experimental use of rhetoric, which he differentiates from the usual technique of compilation (*actum compilationis*; see KOLL § 114).

But in contrast to this demand, the function of rhetoric in his writings turns out to seem rather conventional. Following Wolff’s *Philosophia rationalis sive logica* (1728) and many other texts, Baumgarten uses rhetoric as a blueprint. Although he simply numbers the paragraphs of the *Meditationes* consecutively and does not divide it into parts or chapters, he still successively treats the rhetorical canons of invention (*inventio*), method (*dispositio*), and style (*elocutio*), as he outlines in the preface:

To this end, through § 11 I shall be occupied in developing the notion of a poem and the appropriate terminology. From § 13 to § 65 I shall try to work out some view of poetic cognition [*inventio*]. From § 65 to § 77 I shall set forth that lucid method of a poem which is common to all poems [*dispositio*]. Finally, from § 77 to § 107 I shall subject poetic language to a rather careful investigation [*elocutio*]. After I have in this way exhibited the fruitfulness of my definition, I regard it proper to compare it with some others and to add at the end a few words about poetics in general.

³⁵ See 3.4 Poetics.

³⁶ Rüdiger Campe, “Bella Evidentia: Begriff und Figur von Evidenz in Baumgartens Ästhetik,” *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 49.2 (2001): 252.

usque ad §. XI. in evoluenda poematis & agnatorum terminorum idea teneor, deinde cogitationum aliquam poeticarum imaginem animo concipere laboro a §. XIII–LXV. post haec methodum poematis lucidam, qua communis est omnibus, eruo a §. LXV–LXXVII. tandem ad terminos poeticos conversus eos etiam ponderare curatius instituo §. LXXVII–CVII. Definitionis nostrae foecunditate declarata eandem conferre visum est, cum non nullis aliis, & in fine de poetica generali tria verba subnectere. (MED, [preface], 4–5)

He later organizes the *Aesthetica* like an educational book of rhetoric into two parts, a first part on theoretical aesthetics (aesthetica theoretica) and a second part on practical aesthetics (aesthetica practica). The first part again encompasses the rhetorical canons:

Our aesthetics (§ 1), just like logic, her older sister by birth, consists of (I) a THEORETICAL first part that is instructive and general, teaching (1) about matters and potential thoughts HEURISTICALLY (chapter 1), (2) about lucid organization, METHODOLOGY (chapter 2), and (3) about the signs of what is thought and organized beautifully, SEMIOTICS (chapter 3); and (II) a PRACTICAL second part that is applied and particular.

Aesthetica nostra §. I. sicuti logica, soror eius natu maior, est I) THEORETICA, docens, generalis, P[ars]. I. praeciens 1) de rebus et cogitandis HEURISTICE. C[aput]. I. 2) de lucido ordine, METHODOLOGIA C[aput]. II. 3) de signis pulcre cogitatorum et dispositorum, SEMIOTICA, C[aput]. III. II) PRACTICA, utens, specialis. P[ars]. II. (AE § 13)

In both the *Meditationes* and the *Aesthetica*, a second structure runs obliquely to this one; it organizes the paragraphs based on the canon of style. This is because Baumgarten treats three concepts that further delineate sensate discourse: confusio, claritas, and vita. These concepts obviously mirror the three most important categories of the six categories of style.³⁷ Everything in Baumgarten revolves around these three concepts: aesthetic abundance (ubertas aesthetica) = confusio, aesthetic light (lux aesthetica) = claritas, and aesthetic life (vita cognitionis aesthetica) = vita. He also organizes the fifty-three finished sections on heuristics (inventio) in the *Aesthetica* according to the six stylistic categories. Within each set of sections, another schema from ancient rhetoric divides the argumentation into general and specific problems;³⁸ under specific problems, the canon of style is also extensively treated.

In these sets of sections, Baumgarten is particularly interested in interpreting the stylistic techniques of ornamentation as operations of both sensate cog-

³⁷ See 2.1 Ambiguity.

³⁸ See Marie-Luise Linn, “A. G. Baumgartens *Aesthetica* und die antike Rhetorik,” *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte* 41.3 (1967): 429; Klaus Dockhorn, *Macht und Wirkung der Rhetorik: Vier Aufsätze zur Ideengeschichte der Vormoderne* (Bad Homburg: Gehlen, 1968).

nitio and sensate desire. To do so, he understands rhetorical figures as form-giving patterns and turns his attention to figures of thought (*figurae sententiae*), figures of order (*figurae ordinis*), and figures of speech (*figurae significationis*, *figurae dictionis*; see AE § 26). Baumgarten's intention is obvious: he aims to reveal the laws of sensation using the canon of style. Trusting in analogy, he thus outlines "the singularity and diversity of things" according to the figures of detail, or amplification (*amplificatio*), and figures of presence, or hypotyposis.³⁹ Against this backdrop, he can classify sensate representation rhetorically:

A PERCEPTION whose power manifests itself in knowing the truth of another perception, and ITS POWER, is PROBATIVE. A perception whose power renders another perception clear, and ITS POWER, is EXPLANATORY (revealing). A perception whose power renders another perception lively, and ITS POWER, is ILLUSTRATIVE (depictive). A perception that renders another perception distinct, and ITS POWER, is RESOLVING (explicative).

PERCEPTIO, cuius vis se exserit in veritate alterius perceptionis cognoscenda, & VIS EIUS, est PROBANS (*g*), cuius vis alteram claram reddit, & VIS EIUS, est EXPLICANS (*h*) (declares), cuius vis alteram vividam reddit, & VIS EIUS, est ILLUSTRANS (*i*) (pingens), quae alteram distinctam, & VIS EIUS, est RESOLVENS (*k*) (evolvens). (MET § 531)

One could thus say that the *Aesthetica* presents the first philosophy of the rhetorical figure, an endeavor that would only be taken up again two hundred years later by deconstruction. Baumgarten professes his commitment to this experiment in the *Kollegium*: "We will group them according to the six parts of cognition" (KOLL § 26; wir werden sie aber mit Grund nach den sechs Stücken der Erkenntnis einteilen). He thus organizes the sections of the first part of the *Aesthetica* as follows:

- Sections VIII–XIII: aesthetic abundance (*ubertas aesthetica*)
 - Section XI: enriching arguments (*argumenta locupletantia*)
- Sections XV–XXVI: aesthetic greatness (*magnitudo aesthetica*)
 - Section XXIII: magnifying arguments (*argumenta augmentia*)
- Sections XXVII–XXXVI: aesthetic truth (*veritas aesthetica*)
 - Section XXXIII: evidential arguments (*argumenta probantia*)
- Sections XXXVII–XXXVIII: aesthetic light (*lux aesthetica*)⁴⁰
 - Section XXXXIII: illustrative arguments (*argumenta illustrantia*)

³⁹ Rüdiger Campe, *Affekt und Ausdruck: Zur Umwandlung der literarischen Rede im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1990), 5.

⁴⁰ In the synopsis of the *Aesthetica*, the concepts *claritas* and *certitudo* are replaced by *lux* and *persuasio*.

Sections XXXXVIII–LIII (fragmentary): aesthetic persuasion (*persuasio aesthetica*)

Section LIII (fragmentary): persuasive arguments (*argumenta persuasoria*)

Planned sections: aesthetic life (*vita cognitionis aesthetica*)

Planned section: passionate arguments (*argumenta ardentia*)⁴¹

In the course of this unconventional use of rhetoric, Baumgarten inverts the traditional production phases of discourse. He does not proceed from sensate cognition (*inventio*) but from sensate representation (*elocutio*).⁴² The analysis of expression therefore always precedes the analysis of thought, and stylistic categories are transferred from the canon of style into the canons of invention and method. In other words, thought is “never clearly separated from aspects of linguistic expression.”⁴³ This “interest in representation corresponds with a change in the weighting of aesthetic *inventio* and *elocutio* in favor of the latter. As has been shown, Georg Friedrich Meier would later expand the significance of aesthetic *elocutio* to such a degree that it almost makes up the entire discipline of aesthetics.”⁴⁴ *Dispositio* and *inventio* are left out of rhetoric so that representation can become “coextensive with the rhetorical in general.”⁴⁵

In projecting the canon of style onto the canon of invention, Baumgarten not only initiates considerable changes within the rhetorical system but also within the order of knowledge. Since such an extension cannot remain without consequences, Ulrich Gaier has diagnosed this “rhetoricization of thinking” as a fundamental epistemic change, which he sees not only in Baumgarten but also in Leibniz and Wolff.⁴⁶ The “downgrading of rhetoric into philosophy” comes at the end of the classical episteme,⁴⁷ which portrays cognition and representation as transparent reflections of one another. In the episteme that follows, rhetoric – or at least *inventio* and *dispositio* – loses its significance, and representation becomes opaque. Menninghaus describes this process as follows: “People have frequently overlooked how the avowed end of the rhetorical model of discourse is only one side of a process; on the other side of it, a genuinely rhetorical conception of language as nontransparent action migrates into the basic assumptions of

⁴¹ See 3.4.3 Performativity.

⁴² See 2.1 Ambiguity.

⁴³ Linn, “Baumgartens *Aesthetica*,” 428.

⁴⁴ Caygill, “Erfindung und Neuerfindung der Ästhetik,” 238. See also Linn, “Baumgartens *Aesthetica*,” 441–443.

⁴⁵ Menninghaus, “Darstellung,” 220.

⁴⁶ Ulrich Gaier, “Rhetorisierung des Denkens,” in *Homo inveniens: Heuristik und Anthropologie am Modell der Rhetorik*, ed. Stefan Metzger and Wolfgang Rapp (Tübingen: Gunter Narr, 2003), 19.

⁴⁷ Gaier, “Rhetorisierung des Denkens,” 19.

poetics and philosophy.”⁴⁸ But when rhetoric moves into philosophy, the pure, free thought of rational logic also comes to an end since, instead of linguistic expression, “thought becomes principally a form of selectable *elocutio*.”⁴⁹ Menninghaus makes a similar argument when he emphasizes that *elocutio* still displays remnants of *inventio*: “From a modern perspective, representation [Darstellung] is no longer merely a supplementary, decorative performance; rather, it itself arranges the field of the represented, which was otherwise found in *inventio* and ordered in *dispositio*. *Elocutio* thereby becomes theoretical.”⁵⁰ Campe therefore concludes that “philosophical aesthetics assesses rhetoric in one of its parts not as an art (of words) but rather as a simple or antecedent fact of the human (cognitive) faculty.”⁵¹

Like the eighteenth century in general, Baumgarten was vexed by the effects of employing rhetoric in an experimental manner. This vexation reveals itself in the fact that he abandoned the *Aesthetica*, despite having only covered four and a half of the six stylistic categories, because he must have found that he had already said everything there was to say. What more could he possibly state about *dispositio* and *elocutio* when the *Aesthetica* already exhaustively deals with the canon of style in *inventio*? Strictly speaking, nothing! And the concept of representation itself also produces problems. Baumgarten cannot exhaust its potential for his philosophical project because he remains committed to the rationalist ideal of transparency despite the innovative force at work in his writings. This ideal is continually challenged by the materiality of representation, for which rationalist philosophy does not provide any concepts. Only much later would phenomenology develop the concepts used in aesthetic theory today. For that reason, Baumgarten falls back on rhetoric to express his interests in materiality. Rhetorical terms function for him as “search term[s] for the material, pre-predicative shaping of our language,”⁵² as concepts for the pre-predicative aspect of representation.

This causes immense cracks in the foundation of Baumgarten’s philosophical project. Although he does everything he can in the *Aesthetica* to subordinate rhetoric to philosophy and degrade *elocutio* to a propaedeutic for epistemology, the ambiguity of aesthetics again breaks through precisely where he transfers the

48 Menninghaus, “Darstellung,” 221.

49 Gaier, “Rhetorisierung des Denkens,” 19.

50 Menninghaus, “Darstellung,” 220–221.

51 Campe, *Affekt und Ausdruck*, 5–6.

52 Sybille Krämer, “Sprache – Stimme – Schrift: Sieben Gedanken über Performativität als Medialität,” in *Performanz: Zwischen Sprachphilosophie und Kulturwissenschaften*, ed. Uwe Wirth (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2003), 332.

canon of *elocutio* into the canon of *inventio*. In contrast to what the scholarship has presupposed until now, this transfer does not carry out a replacement but rather maintains a constitutively equivocal discourse. Baumgarten does not treat representation to draw conclusions about cognition; nor does he simply treat representation. Rather, as in a reversible figure, the epistemological arguments turn out to be rhetorical, and the rhetorical ones epistemological, and there is no way out of this circle. In these etymological transfers from one discipline to another, ambiguity is continually produced anew.⁵³

It is Kant who inadvertently completes what Baumgarten started. That is surprising since Kant's concepts of pure sensation and pure intuition are epistemologically anchored. While Baumgarten's concept *sensitivus* marks a specifically material interest in representation, Kant's concept of representation does not have a material aspect "in the sense of re-praesentatio, meaning reproduction" but rather has "the meaning of 'sensately construable,' 'viewable,' 'immediately palpable to the senses.'"⁵⁴

There is, however, one passage in Kant that is comparable to Baumgarten. At one point in the *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (1790), Kant is forced to employ an etymological method, which immediately results in a comparable surplus of insight into media theory. Like the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1781), the *Kritik der Urteilskraft* probes the question of how concepts and intuitions come together. In the relevant passage, Kant is concerned with the assertion that ideas of reason (*Vernunftideen*) do not have any corresponding immediate intuitions. As a result, the productive imagination must find mediated intuitions for rational ideas by using metaphors:

All intuitions that are ascribed to concepts *a priori* are thus either **schemata** or **symbols**, the first of which contain direct, the second indirect presentations of the concept. The first do this demonstratively, the second by means of an analogy (for which empirical intuitions are also employed), in which the power of judgment performs a double task, first applying the concept to the object of a sensible intuition, and then, second, applying the mere rule of reflection on that intuition to an entirely different object, of which the first is only the symbol.⁵⁵

With the symbol, Kant also transforms epistemology into rhetoric. As the form of intuition for ideas of reason, the symbol requires that Kant describe it in its materiality; to do so, he falls back, like Baumgarten, on the canon of style, mainly

⁵³ See 2.1 Ambiguity.

⁵⁴ Scheer, *Einführung in die philosophische Ästhetik*, 107.

⁵⁵ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), § 59.

on analogical figures. Such an intuition is just as much a hypotyposis – which means a “presentation [Darstellung], *subjecto sub adspectum*”⁵⁶ – as an epistemological category. At a loss for a concept for this peculiar problem, Kant imports hypotyposis into his aesthetics: “The use of the word **symbolic** in contrast to the **intuitive** kind of representation has, of course, been accepted by recent logicians, but this is a distorted and incorrect use of the word: for the symbolic is merely a species of the intuitive. The latter, namely (the intuitive), can be divided into the **schematic** and the **symbolic** kinds of representation. Both are hypotyposes, i.e., presentations (*exhibitiones*).”⁵⁷ Kant turns to the concept of hypotyposis when there are no other available terms for what he wants to say. Where he struggles with words, the canon of style appears in his epistemology, just as it does in Baumgarten’s. But in contrast to Kant’s third critique, the problem Baumgarten encounters is not an epistemological state of exception but rather the rule. Like Kant, Baumgarten also refers to sensate cognition in the traditional philosophical sense as intuitive cognition (*cognitio intuitiva*; see MET § 620). Because intuitive cognition requires mediation, he also has to come to grips with the same methodological problem for which Kant employs the concept of the symbol. But Baumgarten only refers to intellectual cognition as symbolic cognition (*cognitio symbolica*). For the mediation of intuition, he instead mobilizes the loanword *sensitivus*.

The ambiguity of aesthetics is thus bundled up in this attribute such that *sensitivus* is not only itself an ambiguous concept but also a concept that refers to the principle of ambiguity. No strategy of disambiguation is in a position to remove the ambivalence introduced by this concept because it always refers to two different things: a mode of cognition and a mode of representation. The one can never be had immediately but is rather always mediated in the mirror of the other in such a way that the permanent reference of cognition to representation and of representation to cognition inevitably drives discourse about literature into an infinite regress. How can one acknowledge representation even only for a second as the index (the materially fixed trace) of cognition if one always projects cognition from representation? One can thus bid farewell to the categorical separation of epistemology and rhetoric. In Baumgarten, there is no cognition measured without mediation.

56 Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, § 59. See Rodolphe Gasché, “Some Reflections on the Notion of Hypotyposis in Kant,” *Argumentation* 4.1 (1990): 85–100.

57 Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, § 59.

3.3 Semiotics

The concept of representation confronts rationalist philosophy with materiality, which defies the ideal of the transparency of cognition. The discipline where this confrontation occurs is neither psychology (the theory of the soul) nor rhetoric (the theory of representation) but rather semiotics (the theory of signs).⁵⁸ Until the mid-eighteenth century, semiotics was based on the rationalist paradigm of representation; its theories uncoupled the relation of sign and meaning from all relations of similarity and described signification as a psychological process of representation. According to David E. Wellbery, this rationalist paradigm of representation “replaces rhetoric with semiotics. Semiotics makes possible the comparative study of different types of aesthetic representation, the description of their intrinsic limits and possibilities, the measurement of their relative efficacy.”⁵⁹

Before Baumgarten, rhetoric was “only seldom explicitly confronted with the representational theory of the sign”⁶⁰ – in the seventeenth century above all in Bernard Lamy – but after Baumgarten, semiotics was everywhere. He did not, however, establish a semiotic aesthetics. His specific interest in representation as it becomes manifest differentiates his approach from a “general theory of signs.”⁶¹ He is neither a semiotician nor a media theorist, and that applies to all the steps in his argumentation. Semiotics (*scientia de significanda*) does not replace rhetoric (*scientia de proponenda*; see KOLL § 1) in his discipline either; rather, it only adds a further perspective to the ambiguity of aesthetics.⁶² Following Leibniz and Wolff, Baumgarten differentiates the representation of the signified (*repraesentatio signati*) from that of the sign (*repraesentatio signi*). Rationalist semiotics adds a third representation to these two since, as Michel Foucault has explained, a sign “can become a sign only on condition that it manifests, in addition, the relation that links it to what it signifies. It must represent; but that representation, in turn, must also be represented within it.”⁶³

58 See Ursula Franke, “Die Semiotik als Abschluß der Ästhetik: A. G. Baumgartens Bestimmung der Semiotik als ästhetische Propädeutik,” *Zeitschrift für Semiotik* 1.4 (1979): 345–359; Dietfried Gerhardus, “Sprachphilosophie in der Ästhetik,” in *Philosophy of Language: An International Handbook of Contemporary Research*, ed. Marcelo Dascal et al., vol. 2 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1995), 1519–1528.

59 Wellbery, *Lessing's “Laocoon,”* 47.

60 Campe, *Affekt und Ausdruck*, 473.

61 Wellbery, *Lessing's “Laocoon,”* 70.

62 See 2.1 Ambiguity.

63 Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (London: Routledge, 2005), 71.

Based on this premise, Baumgarten differentiates logical signs from sensate signs:

I perceive signs together with the signified, and therefore I have a faculty of joining signs together in a representation with the signified, which can be called the FACULTY OF CHARACTERIZATION (§216). [...] The nexus of signification is known either distinctly or indistinctly, and hence the faculty of characterization will be either sensitive (§521) or intellectual (§402).

Signa cum signatis una percipio; ergo habeo facultatem signa cum signatis repraesentando coniungendi, quae FACULTAS CHARACTERISTICA dici potest [...]. Nexus significativus vel distincte, vel indistincte cognoscitur, hinc facultas characteristica vel sensitiva erit, §. 521. vel intellectualis, §. 402. (MET § 619)

The signified and the sign are thus the two sides of semiotics; and only a miracle – a formal function – makes sure that the sign means something by representing that something. Since the Enlightenment always strives to suppress the material aspects of the sign – aspects that Baumgarten comes face to face with – it “can be considered as fundamentally in conflict with the sign.”⁶⁴ He manages this conflict by means of the concept *sensitivus*, which always emphasizes something in the process of signification other than what is signified.⁶⁵ Based on this attempt to capture the sign, Bahr determines that Baumgarten’s semiotics cannot do “without being qualified through rhetoric”: “Only in this way can he set it off from the logical sign theories of the time [...]. A semiotized rhetoric should save the indexical and iconic aspects of the sign.”⁶⁶

It is not, however, the attention Baumgarten draws to the sign’s representational function, its function as an image, that subverts the paradigm of representation but rather the attention he draws to the sign’s own materiality. He comes to consider the materiality of signs through a new interest in representations that are essentially based on a relational logic: signs stand for something else; they signify or represent this other. Such a negativity applies to both intellectual and sensate representations. Material representations are affirmative. “They do not only represent or substitute for something,” as Dieter Mersch, who elaborates on semiotics by drawing on media theory, concludes, “but rather with them the thing itself comes into view – not the thing of reference, the signified, but rather the reality of the symbolic or of the representation itself, its specific ma-

⁶⁴ Wellbery, *Lessing’s “Laocoon,”* 71.

⁶⁵ See Dieter Mersch, “Medial Paradoxes: On Methods of Artistic Production,” in *Critical Composition Today*, ed. Claus-Steffen Mahnkopf (Hofheim: Wolke, 2006), 62–74.

⁶⁶ Bahr, *Darstellung des Undarstellbaren*, 51.

teriality or mediality.”⁶⁷ Mersch thus defines representations not as signs but as acts of “*showing*.”⁶⁸ In opposition to the rationalist ideal of transparency, Baumgarten proposes – like other theorists after him – a sign whose materiality makes the sign opaque. This semiotic model takes into account the “surplus of the sign over the signified in the representation of aesthetic ideas” and “the (reflexive) inclusion of unrepresentability in the representation itself.”⁶⁹ For that reason, the material surplus of the sign characterizes the sensate process of signification:

If the sign is joined together in perception with the signified, and the perception of the sign is greater than the perception of the signified, this is called SYMBOLIC KNOWLEDGE. If the perception of the signified is greater than the perception of the sign, the KNOWLEDGE will be INTUITIVE (intuited).

Si signum & signatum percipiendo coniungitur, & maior est signi, quam signati perceptio, COGNITIO talis SYMBOLICA dicitur, si maior signati repraesentatio, quam signi, COGNITIO erit INTUITIVA (intuitus). (MET § 620)

In the *Aesthetica*, Baumgarten does not reserve such a material surplus of the sign for any specific medium. On the contrary, different media of *one* sensate representation stand for each other unproblematically: “Here we do not only mean language. One can also explain oneself to someone else through other signs” (KOLL § 37; Wir verstehen hier nicht bloß die Sprache. Man kann auch durch andere Zeichen sich dem anderen erklären), and one can do so “in facial expressions, words, brush strokes, and so on” (KOLL § 13; in Mienen, in Worten, in Pinselstrichen usw.). All rhetorical figures and tropes can thus be performed with any sign material. For a metaphor is, according to Baumgarten,

every elegant substitution of one perception for another, whether signified with transferred words, which is most familiar, or with sounds substituted for each other by a musician, or with colors by a painter, or when through any other type of sign you express that you elegantly have one thing in mind in place of another.

omnem elegantem perceptionis unius pro altera substitutionem, sive vocabulis translatis significetur, quod notissimum, sive sonis sibi invicem substitutis a musico, sive coloribus a pictore, sive per aliud quodcunque signorum genus eleganter te pro uno aliud cogitasse exprimas. (AE § 780)

⁶⁷ Dieter Mersch, “Paradoxien der Verkörperung: Zu einer negativen Semiotik des Symbolischen,” in *Aktualität des Symbols*, ed. Frauke Berndt and Christoph Brecht (Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach, 2005), 34.

⁶⁸ Mersch, “Medial Paradoxes,” 67.

⁶⁹ Menninghaus, “Darstellung,” 219.

In contrast to, for example, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing's medially differentiated semiotics in his *Laokoon oder über die Grenzen der Mahlerey und Poesie* (1766), the problem of medial difference and competition thus plays only an ancillary role in this "early theory of the sign and communication" (see MED §§ 40–41).⁷⁰ There is no trace of the premodern paragone in Baumgarten's writings. Steffen Groß finds that this "abstaining from fixing a canon of acceptable forms or media of expression" constitutes the "modernity und current relevance" of the *Aesthetica*, which Baumgarten seems to advertise as being useful for all the arts (see AE § 4).⁷¹

In this semiotics, the messenger or medium does not disappear after delivering the message; instead, it remains present on the semiotic scene of the literary text. But with its concept of an abstract sign that applies to various media, the *Aesthetica* forfeits medial differentiation and instead implicitly focuses on the medium of literature. The materiality of the literary text plays a major role in the *Meditationes*, and the preface of that work brings together semiotics and the three-stage model of production from rhetoric, the discipline responsible for the tangible materiality of the linguistic medium: "The various parts of sensate discourse are: (1) sensate representations, (2) their interrelationships, (3) the words, or the articulate sounds which are represented by the letters and which symbolize the words, § 4, § 1" (MED § 6; *Orationis sensitivae varia sunt 1) repraesentationes sensitivae, 2) nexus earum 3) voces sive soni articulati litteris constantes earum signa.* §. 4. 1).

Semiotically, the signs of sensate discourse are based on the links (nexus) between representations (repraesentationes) and signs (signa). And Baumgarten does not begin with individual signs but rather with links between multiple signs, which he bases on the rhetorical canon of method and transfers into semiotics. This focus on links makes clear that his semiotics is based on a textual model.⁷² Against this backdrop, the concept of nexus becomes theoretically relevant because it is the first argument that ascribes a concrete media profile to *sensitivus*. A discourse is only sensate when it links together multiple elements, which Baumgarten calls marks (notae), following rationalist philosophy. With these links and marks, he is thinking of the materiality of sensate discourse, its words, and, most of all, its letters. Words or articulated sounds (voces sive soni articulati) consist in written letters (litterae) as their signs. This doubling on the side of the sign goes back to Aristotle, who couples sensate signs with

⁷⁰ Groß, *Felix aestheticus*, 88.

⁷¹ Groß, *Felix aestheticus*, 87.

⁷² See 3.4.1 Complexity; 5.2.1 Sequentiality.

sounds and sounds with letters: “Now spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul, and written marks symbols of spoken sounds.”⁷³ For Aristotle, both sounds and letters are media, which means they are events in an emphatic sense – unrepeatable in their auratic eventfulness: “And just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs of – affections of the soul – are the same for all; and what these affections are likenesses of – actual things – are also the same.”⁷⁴

Baumgarten steers clear of this eventfulness of sounds – signs of a sensate representation – by *not* defining them: “But these things the poem has in common with imperfect sensate discourse. We may, then, easily pass them over so as not to wander too far from our purpose. There will, therefore, be nothing here about the character of a poem as a series of articulate sounds” (MED § 97; sed haec ipsi cum imperfecta sensitiva oratione communia facile transimus, pro fine ne nimii simus. Nihil ergo de qualitate poematis, qua series sonorum articulorum). Instead of considering sounds as events, he works with a conceptualized voice so as to address the problematic relation between the two medial representations of language in any discourse: text and voice. In his few paragraphs on metrics – in which he refers not only to ancient Greek and Latin poetics but also to Hebrew philology – Baumgarten notes how the transformation from the acoustic medium of the voice into the graphic medium of the text does not proceed without a loss due to friction: “By **quantity of a syllable** we mean that property which cannot be known apart from association with another syllable. Therefore, quantity cannot be known from the value of the letters” (MED § 98; QUANTITAS SYLLABAE est, *quicquid in ea non potest cognosci sine compresensentia alterius syllabae. Ergo ex moris elementorum non potest cognosci quantitas*). The orthographic measurement of syllables is thus also fundamentally different from the prosodic measurement of syllables because the latter is based not on the number of letters but on the syllable as an internally structured phonetic entity. Defining the length of syllables occurs in the context of quantitative metrics, which uses a ratio of 1:2 for short:long: “Amongst the grammarians, the value of a letter is the unit of time necessary for pronouncing it. Now, since the matter concerns only syllables, by the ‘duration of a syllable’ we shall understand, allowing necessary changes, the unit of time necessary for pronouncing the syllable” (MED § 100n; Mora in grammaticis est pars temporis elemento efferendo necessaria, iam ergo quum de syllabis solum agendum est, mutandis

⁷³ Arist., *Int.* 16a3–4. Quoted from Aristotle, *De interpretatione*, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation*, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

⁷⁴ Arist., *Int.* 16a5–8.

mutatis per moram syllabae intelligimus partem temporis efferendae syllabae necessariam). The reference to “grammarians” – both those of antiquity like Quintilian and Cicero and those of Renaissance humanism like Joseph Justus Scaliger and Gerhard Johannes Vossius (see MED § 9) – shows what Baumgarten is aiming at. In *De causis linguae latinae* (1540), Scaliger relates the differential principle of language to the paradigm of the sign. And Scaliger outlines this principle of clearly differentiable sounds with reference to the graphic medium of text and a concept for the representation of sounds: *litterae*.⁷⁵ As a proper *voice of the text*, the so-called *vox* produces ideal “letter sounds” that distinguish themselves from real sound events by their repeatability – and this voice stays silent.

The *vox*, or voice, of the text, which Baumgarten wrestles with in a characteristically meticulous way following rationalist semiotics, appears in the *Meditationes* next to a voice whose sounds cannot be represented by letters, or at least not completely. There can thus be no doubt about whether he differentiates between medial aspects and conceptual aspects of written and spoken language.⁷⁶ Baumgarten’s rationalist model of the linguistic sign assumes that it represents both a sound and the letter that represents that sound. For the letter to represent the sound, it must be able to recall the sound concept; that is, it must recall the concept of the other medium. Since he understands letters as signifying sounds, Baumgarten moves sounds to the side of the signified. Along these lines, Charles S. Peirce determines that the meaning of a sign always contains “the translation of a sign into another system of signs” as its interpretant.⁷⁷ From this, it follows that “the meaning of a sign is the sign it has to be translated into.”⁷⁸

But the matter is even more intricate. Baumgarten not only differentiates the concepts of signs and the media of their realization but also assumes that the

75 See Gregor Vogt-Spira, “Vox und Littera: Der Buchstabe zwischen Mündlichkeit und Schriftlichkeit in der grammatischen Tradition,” *Poetica* 23.3/4 (1991): 295–327, esp. 311–315; Albrecht Koschorke, *Körperströme und Schriftverkehr: Mediologie des 18. Jahrhunderts*, 2nd ed. (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2003), 323–346.

76 See Wulf Oesterreicher, “Grenzen der Arbitrarität: Zum Verhältnis von Laut und Schrift,” in *Mimesis und Simulation*, ed. Andreas Kablitz and Gerhard Neumann (Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach, 1998), 218. See also Peter Koch, “Graphé: Ihre Entwicklung zur Schrift, zum Kalkül und zur Liste,” in *Schrift, Medien, Kognition: Über die Exteriorität des Geistes*, ed. Koch and Sybille Krämer (Tübingen: Stauffenburg, 1997), 43–81.

77 Charles Sanders Peirce, “The Logic of Quantity,” in *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, vol. 4, *The Simplest Mathematics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933), 99.

78 Peirce, “The Logic of Quantity,” 105.

medial qualities are themselves preserved in memory and retrievable in the process of remembering. Thus, despite all the rationalist abstraction, a secret Ur-szene of articulation is actually the basis for how he models the voice of the text. Every stimulation of the senses through optical, olfactory, haptic, or acoustic stimuli is processed into a sensate representation. He thus converts the relation of concept and event into a cycle in which the phonetic sequence of an articulated word is perceived but this perception assumes the concept of the phonetic sequence: “Words, in the respect that they are articulate sounds, belong among audible things; hence they elicit sense perceptions” (MED § 91; *Voces, qua soni articulati, pertinent ad audibilia, hinc ideas sensuales producunt*).

Baumgarten’s model of the sign offers the possibility of defining all the qualities of the media of representation – including, for example, the graphic qualities of the textual image perceived by the reader (lector; see MED § 113) – as sensate representations. With this move, he converts the relation of event and concept into a cycle without beginning and end, since the perception of articulated sounds both assumes and produces concepts. One can thus find the paradox of a *conceptualized performativity* at the base of the *Meditationes*. In Baumgarten, a complex semiotic process replaces the simple rationalist model of the sign. He integrates a syntactic complexity, which creates a linking of signs, with a medial complexity of text and voice, breaking through, in multiple respects, the rationalist fixation on the singular word.

3.4 Poetics

3.4.1 Complexity

Turning rhetoric and semiotics into aesthetics depends on qualities of literary texts. To analyze these qualities in more detail, Baumgarten draws on concepts from poetics instead of from rhetoric, a switch that forces him to determine heuristically the importance of literature within the framework of rhetorical argumentation. That he then works with a categorical differentiation between *rhetoricus* and *poeticus* is indicated through the most important analogy in the *Meditationes* – through Baumgarten’s notoriously repeated phrase *sensate, hence poetic* (*sensitivus ergo poeticus*). With this switch from rhetoric to poetics, he generates the added value of aesthetic cognition over “merely” sensate cognition, which in the end does aim to apply a concept. This added value is thanks to the harmless replacement of one word with another. He not only ensures that

the “*sensuous constitution*”⁷⁹ – and that means the “*stock*”⁸⁰ of an object’s sensately perceivable qualities – is recognized and conceptually classified but also that this process goes hand in hand with attention to the nondiscursive, “phenomenal presence of the object,”⁸¹ which does not enter into the archive of knowledge that is held to be true. On this basis, Martin Seel differentiates sensate cognition from aesthetic cognition, and this differentiation forms the core of Baumgarten’s theory of literature in the *Meditationes*.

In articulating his theory of literature, Baumgarten replaces the word *discourse* with the word *literature*, for which the same things apply as for discourse: “The several parts of a poem [I translate as “literature,” F. B.] are: (1) sensate representations, (2) their interrelationships, (3) words as their signs, § 9, § 6” (MED § 10; *Poematis varia sunt, 1) repraesentationes sensitivae 2) earum nexus 3) voces earum signa.* §. 9. 6). This replacement specifies the preconditions for discourse that Baumgarten creates with the concept *sensitivus*, but instead of sensate discourse, suddenly perfect sensate discourse is being put to the test: “By **perfect sensate discourse** we mean discourse whose various parts are directed toward the apprehension of sensate representations, § 5” (MED § 7; *ORATIO SENSITIVA PERFECTA est, cuius varia tendunt ad cognitionem repraesentationum sensitivarum.* §. 5). At first, the difference between sensate discourse and perfect sensate discourse is not an essential difference but a quantitative one, so I would actually propose first translating *perfectus* at the disciplinary interface of poetics and rhetoric as “complete” instead of immediately arguing on a metaphysical level with “perfect.” A discourse is more complete the more marks it integrates: “A sensate discourse will be the more perfect the more its parts favor the awakening of sensate representations, § 4, § 7” (MED § 8; *Quo plura varia in oratione sensitiva facient ad excitandas repraesentationes sensitivas, eo erit illa perfectior.* §. 4. 7). After defining complete sensate discourse by this gradation, Baumgarten simply replaces it with the concept of literature, which stands at the end of the scale since it integrates the most marks: “LITERATURE is perfect sensate discourse” (MED § 9, my translation; *Oratio sensitiva perfecta est POEMA*).

But behind this definition hides nothing other than an affirmation of the “*phenomenal individuality*”⁸² achieved by literary texts. While sensate cognition can store its objects in a conceptual archive, literature – especially in its poetic passages – is characterized by the highest possible degree of completeness and

⁷⁹ Martin Seel, *Aesthetics of Appearing*, trans. John Farrell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 45.

⁸⁰ Seel, *Aesthetics of Appearing*, 46.

⁸¹ Seel, *Aesthetics of Appearing*, 25.

⁸² Seel, *Aesthetics of Appearing*, 28.

so usually by an openness that does not aim for conceptual fixation. Literature is thus the most prominent and worthy example of aesthetic cognition. And in an ingenious move, Baumgarten transforms the argument of quantity into one of quality by making the substantive *poema* into the adjective *poeticus*: “By **poetic** we shall mean whatever can contribute to the perfection of a poem” (MED § 11; POETICUM dicetur *quicquid ad perfectionem poematis aliquid facere potest*). With the adjective *poeticus*, he refers to a specific structure of discourse oriented toward an excellence that elevates the material surplus of the literary text into a distinguishing criterion. Discourse has a poetic structure when it deviates stylistically from “normal” discourse. I refer to this structure as the *structure of literary discourse*.

With *confusio*, *claritas*, and *vita*, Baumgarten conceptualizes three functions of the structure of literary discourse: the functions of complexity, opacity, and performativity. These three functions follow from one another and correspond in the *Aesthetica* to *ubertas aesthetica*, *lux aesthetica*, and *vita cognitionis aesthetica*, respectively. To describe these functions in his theory of literature, he can continue to rely on the six rhetorical categories of style, which serve as categories of perfection in the *Metaphysica* and the *Aesthetica*: “Therefore the vaster, nobler, truer, clearer, hence more lively or distinct, more certain, and more brilliant knowledge is, the greater it is (§515, 531)” (MET § 669; Ergo quo vastior, quo nobilior, quo verior, quo clarior, hinc vividior vel distinctior, quo certior, quo ardentior cognitio est, hoc maior est, §. 515, 531).

I will begin by reconstructing the first function of the structure of literary discourse: complexity. The starting point is, as stated, the poetic passages of literary texts. Even though single marks can be sensately discerned in such pregnant representations (*repraesentationes praegnant*es),⁸³ there are too many to process, so the passage cannot be captured in a concept. This main idea leads Baumgarten in the *Meditationes* to a descending series of objects from the higher genus, the lower genus, and the species down to individual objects (see MED § 20): “Individuals are determined in every respect. Therefore, particular representations are in the highest degree poetic, § 18” (MED § 19; Individua sunt omnimode determinata, ergo *repraesentationes singulares sunt admodum poeticae* §. 18). This is why his theory of literature is grounded in examples; as a singular term that represents a bundle of marks, an example is preferable to any general term.⁸⁴ Surprisingly, Baumgarten demonstrates the example’s particularity with proper names, which – like rhetorical *antonomasia* – are poetic due to their

⁸³ See 4.1.3 Twilight.

⁸⁴ See 2.2 Analogy.

abundance of marks: “Proper names are names designating individuals. Since these are highly poetic, proper names are also poetic, § 19” (MED § 89; *Nomina propria* sunt individua significantia, quae quum admodum poetica, *poetica* etiam nomina propria § 19).

Baumgarten’s theory of literature depends on this conceptually undefinable abundance of marks in poetic passages. Because he always relates epistemology and media theory,⁸⁵ the affirmation of particularity requires the affirmation of a harmony (consensus) that, as he says again and again in the *Aesthetica*, is a phenomenon (AE § 18; *qui phaenomenon sit*, §. 14).⁸⁶ This harmonic unity is not phenomenally manifest on the level of thoughts or organization but rather on the level of signs. Because Baumgarten attends in the *Aesthetica* to phenomena as phenomena, he also takes into consideration the difference between sensate and aesthetic appearance, which corresponds in the *Meditationes* to the difference between the attributes *rhetoricus* and *poeticus*. On this difference, Seel notes that “both are ways in which the empirical *appearance* of an object is accessible. Aesthetic appearing is thus a mode of the sensuous givenness of something.” This is because aesthetic objects “are given to us in an outstandingly sensuous manner; they are grasped by us in an outstandingly sensuous way.”⁸⁷

Following Baumgarten three decades later, Kant attributes this quantitative excellence to, above all, the mode of the aesthetic idea. He defines the aesthetic idea as “that representation of the imagination that occasions much thinking though without it being possible for any determinate thought, i.e., **concept**, to be adequate to it, which, consequently, no language fully attains or can make intelligible.”⁸⁸ In a comparable way to Baumgarten, when Kant writes that it “occasions much thinking,” he means it in a thoroughly quantitative sense: “The aesthetic idea is a representation of the imagination, associated with a given concept, which is combined with such a manifold of partial representations in the free use of the imagination that no expression designating a determinate concept can be found for it, which therefore allows the addition to a concept of much that is unnameable, the feeling of which animates the cognitive faculties and combines spirit with the mere letter of language.”⁸⁹

From a similar quantitative point of view, Baumgarten defines sensation – as well as the other sensate and intellectual cognitive faculties – using Leibniz’s and Wolff’s two-coordinate system. One of its axes measures the recognizability

⁸⁵ See 2.1 Ambiguity.

⁸⁶ See 4.1.1 Perfection.

⁸⁷ Seel, *Aesthetics of Appearing*, 22.

⁸⁸ Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, § 49.

⁸⁹ Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, § 49.

of a representation and stretches from obscure (*cognitio obscura*) to clear (*cognitio clara*); its other axis measures the differentiability of the marks of a representation and ranges from distinct (*cognitio distincta*) to confused (*cognitio confusa*). Intellectual representations aim to be clear and distinct, while sensate representations aim to be clear but confused (*repraesentatio clara et confusa*; see MED § 12; MET §§ 519–533). Clear, confused representations guarantee the recognizability and repeatability of their marks but not differentiation or identification (see MED §§ 13–14). Knowledge is “confused,” as Leibniz explains, “when I cannot enumerate one by one marks [*nota*] sufficient for differentiating a thing from others, even though the thing does indeed have such marks and requisites into which its notion can be resolved. And so we recognize colors, smells, tastes, and other particular objects of the senses clearly enough, and we distinguish them from one another, but only through the simple testimony of the senses, not by way of explicit marks.”⁹⁰ In fact, however, Baumgarten’s concepts have less to do with Leibniz’s than one might initially think. In particular, Baumgarten seems to take the attribute *confusus* somewhat literally. Although the two functions of complexity (*confusio*) and opacity (*claritas*) are complementary, their respective etymologies emphasize different aspects of the structure of literary discourse. “When it is said that poetry is confused,” as Aschenbrenner and Holther state to explain their translation of *confusus*, “it is meant that its representations are fused together and not sharply discriminated. (The reader of the *Reflections* must be careful to keep *fusion* foremost here and not *confusion* in the derogatory sense.)”⁹¹ The etymological play is based on the meaning of the Latin words *fusio* and *confusio*. The translators emphasize that representations in literary texts flow into one another like liquids mixing together.

Based on the etymological proximity to *fusio*, the spindle (of the Parcae), I think it is even more productive to shift the metaphorical resonance for *confusus* from liquids to textiles in the sense that a textile is a complex, interlinked structure. In the *Meditationes*, Baumgarten at one point speaks of singular terms as complex concepts (*conceptus complexus*; see MED § 23), and in the *Aesthetica*, he correspondingly equates *complexus* with abundance (see AE §§ 731–732). In sum, he is interested less in confused cognition than in complex cognition (*cognitio complexa*), cognition in which many marks are con-fused, or fused together. A glance at the *Kollegium*, in which he mathematically calculates complexity

⁹⁰ Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, “Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas (1684),” in *Philosophical Essays*, ed. and trans. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), 24.

⁹¹ Karl Aschenbrenner and William B. Holther, “Introduction,” in Baumgarten, *Reflections on Poetry*, 21.

and makes proposals for increasing the number of marks, can substantiate the degree to which Baumgarten actually thinks about this in a material manner: “One first thinks, for example, of only 10 marks of a thing and afterwards, in the mixture of clear and confused, one thinks of the thing perhaps in 150 marks” (KOLL § 80; Man denkt sich z. B. erstlich nur 10 Kennzeichen von einer Sache und hernach in der Mischung vom Klaren und Dunkeln denkt man die Sache vielleicht in 150 Kennzeichen).

Complex cognition assumes, of course, a certain form of intuition in which a representation is given to consciousness. This is why the phenomenon of the series is central to Baumgarten’s theory of literature. He already settled on the series in the first paragraph of the *Meditationes* as the defining criterion for discourse. In series, marks not only follow one another but are also firmly located in their sequence such that the spatial relations between the linked marks can be described. The question as to whether or not Baumgarten relates the spatial form of intuiting literature to the graphic medium of text does not actually play a role in his argumentation. Even if one did not start – as he in fact does – from sequences of letters but rather only from phonetic sequences, the spatial form of intuition would remain constitutive for the literary text. In this case, one would have to treat a kind of “textual phoneticism” that can be realized either graphically or acoustically.⁹²

The poetic passages in literary texts thus lead Baumgarten to syntagmatic structures with at least two parts and usually infinitely many. He delineates these structures during a long and tedious foray through the rhetorical canon of style, mainly through the figures of amplification. In searching there for the logic of literature, he encounters the so-called figures of repetition, figures that link their marks into a spatial composition (see MED § 39) according to the maxims of similar with similar (*simile cum simili*) and related with related (*cognatum cum cognato*; see MED §§ 72, 69). In the *Aesthetica*, he distributes his analyses of the figures of repetition into sections on enriching, magnifying, and evidential arguments. There he also registers the established phonological and morphological figures of repetition: *homoeoteleuton*, *anaphora*, *epiphora*, *symploce*, *repetitio*, *epizeuxis*, *epanalepsis*, *anadiplosis*, *ploce*, *pleonasm*, and *polyptoton*. Every form of repetition is at first an “intratextual copy” because the “element that qualifies as (‘mere’) repetition [...] refers to an earlier” ele-

⁹² See 3.3 Semiotics.

ment.⁹³ One could thus consider the figure as a matrix of literature. It is formed by the aesthetic rule: out of one, make two.

For trained phenomenologists such as Eckhard Lobsien, the form of intuition in which spatial simultaneity is given immediately entails also considering the temporal form of intuition. “One can only speak of a repetition if the perception of an element (A) is explicitly accompanied by an awareness that it actually has to do here with the repetition of an earlier element (that is, with A⁰, or more precisely, A⁰[A]).”⁹⁴ As soon as consciousness links two elements or marks of a series together, this mutual dependence of the spatial and temporal forms of repetition becomes manifest. Lobsien thus describes the spatiotemporal structure of the literary text as follows: “Rhetorical repetition brings out the similarity of signs (from the level of phonemes up to the level of the entire text) in the organization of succession; it assembles series of correspondence and paradigmatic sequences in linear succession”⁹⁵ because “one and the same item [appears] at two different points in time.”⁹⁶ In his aesthetic theory, Baumgarten does not, however, consider aesthetic repetition in which marks can be experienced in their spatial “simultaneity.”⁹⁷ Instead, aesthetic repetition remains what it was as rhetorical repetition: a relation of marks that are reproduced in a series and can only be experienced successively in their linking.

In further elaborating on the phenomenon of repetition, Baumgarten delineates four relations of identity between repeated elements: they can be similar, equal, congruent, or markedly the same (see AE § 735). It is possible that he imported his categories from Aristotelian metaphysics or rationalist philosophy. But in the disciplinary context of topics, Cicero and others translate these logical and ontological relations into linguistic, material ones.⁹⁸ In the course of this materialization, the categorial differences between the various relations of identity lose their distinctiveness such that Baumgarten only uses the concepts to evaluate greater or lesser degrees of identity, resulting in a structural approach to the phenomena. Figures are based on the technique of sensate mnemonics and sensate wit (see MED § 73) because they constitute either relations of correspondence (ingenium) or relations of difference (acumen; see MET § 640). Following

⁹³ Eckhard Lobsien, *Wörtlichkeit und Wiederholung: Phänomenologie poetischer Sprache* (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1995), 15.

⁹⁴ Lobsien, *Wörtlichkeit und Wiederholung*, 15. See also Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. Paul Patton (London: Bloomsbury, 2013).

⁹⁵ Lobsien, *Wörtlichkeit und Wiederholung*, 23.

⁹⁶ Lobsien, *Wörtlichkeit und Wiederholung*, 22.

⁹⁷ Lobsien, *Wörtlichkeit und Wiederholung*, 23.

⁹⁸ See Cic., *Top.* 2.7–9; *De or.* 2.130.

Roman Jakobson, we can say that Baumgarten's typology of figural operations does not just try to differentiate relations of identity (that is, repetitions of the same elements) from relations of equality and similarity but also that each of these relations – and not merely the method of forming a syntagm – “*projects the principle of equivalence from the axis of selection into the axis of combination*. Equivalence is promoted to the constitutive device of the sequence.”⁹⁹

This is why Baumgarten is above all interested in figures that can be categorized as amplifying a discursive object. As figures of quantity, they produce text by dissecting a discursive object into all its marks and lining up the elements according to the rules of syntax (see MED § 20n). He fundamentally differentiates between amplification that only defines one object and amplification that moves from one object to another. He then adds a second differentiation to this first one. Sometimes amplification divides an object into its marks and subordinates them. This way of amplifying the object aims for a self-contained, closed representation of it that encompasses the object in all its marks. To this kind of amplification belong the figures of definition (*determinatio*; see MED §§ 19–21, 50–52), addition (*epitheton*; see MED § 86), and description (*descriptio*; see MED §§ 54–55); one would also expect enumeration (*enumeratio*) and distribution (*distributio*) to belong here. To this group Baumgarten adds enriching,¹⁰⁰ magnifying,¹⁰¹ evidential,¹⁰² illustrative,¹⁰³ and persuasive figures in the *Aesthetica*.¹⁰⁴ Alternatively, amplification can simply collect the marks of an object and coordinate them in a representation that never completely grasps the object in its manifold marks and relations. “Texts of this kind,” notes Heinrich Plett, as if he

⁹⁹ Roman Jakobson, “Linguistics and Poetics,” in *Language in Literature*, ed. Krystyna Pomorska and Stephen Rudy (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1987), 71.

¹⁰⁰ See section 11 on *argumenta locupletantia*: *pleonasmus* (AE § 145); *synonymia*, *synthesis*, *ellipsis* (AE § 146); *hypallage*, *homoeoteleuton*, *periphrasis* (AE § 147); *praeteritio*, *synathroismus* (AE § 148).

¹⁰¹ See section 23 on *argumenta augmentia* (following Pseudo-Longinus's *On the Sublime*): *αὔξησις* (*amplificatio*) – *augmentum/incrementum* (AE § 330); *meteora* (AE § 331); *hypotyposis* (AE § 332); *repetitio* (AE § 333); *hyperbaton*, *climax*, *gradatio* (AE § 334); *anticlimax* (AE § 335); *metaphora*, *similia*, *comparatio* (AE § 336); *hyperbole* (AE §§ 339–341); *polyptoton* (AE § 342); *anaphora* (AE § 343); *epistrophe/epiphora* (AE § 344); *symploce*, *epanalepsis*, *anadiplosis*, *ploce*, *epizeuxis* (AE § 345); *synathroismus* (AE § 348); *parrhesia* (AE § 349); *exclamatio* (AE § 351).

¹⁰² See section 33 on *argumenta probantia*: *sententia* (AE § 549); *definitio*, *descriptio* (AE § 551).

¹⁰³ See 3.4.2 *Opacity*.

¹⁰⁴ See 6.3.1 *Ethopoeia*.

were referring directly to Baumgarten's theory of literature, "can be either clearer or more cryptic than others."¹⁰⁵

One way or the other, amplification is, of course, always threatened with losing sight of the object or talking it to death. Baumgarten's examples show how increasingly distinguishing the marks constantly crosses the limit of perception into knowledge, leading him to justify famous examples of digressive series like the famous Homeric catalogue of ships:

Our tyro poets, far from observing this nicety of a poem, turn up their noses at Homer, who tells in *Iliad* II of the

Leaders and chieftains, commanders of ships, and all the fleet.

In VII he tells the stories of all those who crossed Hector's path. In the Hymn to Apollo he lists the many places sacred to the god. Likewise, in Virgil's *Aeneid*, anyone who reads through book VII and following will have many opportunities to observe the same thing. We may also cite, in the *Metamorphoses* of Ovid, the enumeration of the dogs who rend their master to shreds.

Nostris Choerilis tantum abest, ut observetur haec poematis elegantia, ut potius naso adunco suspendant Homerum II. β. ηγεμονας και κοιρανθς, αρχθς αυνηων νηας τε προπασας dicentem, narrantem II. η omnes, Hectori qui obviam ire sustinebant, in Hymno autem Apollinis plurima regnantis dei loca sacra recensentem. Idem in Virgilii Aneide, qui libr. VII. finem & posteriores evolverit satis superque notare poterit. Addatur & Ovidii catalogus canum dominum lacerantium in Metamorphosi. (MED § 19n)

For Baumgarten, the most significant digression is in Horace's first ode. Such examples are particularly exciting since they expand the links of the structure of literary discourse; in them, all words function as "nodal points of numerous ideas"¹⁰⁶ and so open up the literary encyclopedia.¹⁰⁷

If there were no merit in putting narrower concepts for broader ones, why, then, in this poem "great-grandsires" for ancestors, "Olympic dust" for the dust of the Games fields, "the palm" for the prize, "Libyan threshing-floors" for productive countries, "the circumstances of Attalus" for affluence, "Cyprian beam" for a trading ship, "Myrtoan sea" for a dangerous sea, "Africus struggling against the Icarian floods" for the wind, "Old Massic" for a well-aged wine, "the Marsian boar" for a destructive animal, and so on?

¹⁰⁵ Heinrich F. Plett, *Einführung in die rhetorische Textanalyse*, 9th ed. (Hamburg: Helmut Buske, 2001), 57.

¹⁰⁶ Sigmund Freud, "The Interpretation of Dreams," in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, ed. and trans. James Strachey in collaboration with Anna Freud, vol. 5, *The Interpretation of Dreams (Second Part) and On Dreams (1900–1901)* (London: Hogarth Press, 1964), 340.

¹⁰⁷ See 5.3.3 Accessibility.

Cur in ea *atavi* pro maioribus, *pulvis olympicus*, pro pulvere ludorum, *palma* pro praemio, *Lybicae areae* pro terris frugiferis, *Attalicae conditiones* pro magnis, *trabs Cypria* pro mercatoria, *mare myrtoum* pro periculoso, *luctans Icaris fluctibus Africus*, pro vento, *vetus Massicum* pro vino generoso, *Marsus aper* pro fulmineo &c. nisi virtutis esset substituere conceptibus latioribus angustiores. (MED § 20n)

Similarity is, in the end, also the central category of the amplifications that leads to the comparisons, the heart of the figures of repetition:

By **resemblances** [I translate as “comparisons,” F. B.] we shall indicate the means by which a superior concept combines like with like. Therefore, resemblances pertain to the same species or the same genus. Therefore, it is highly poetic to represent resemblances along with an image to be represented, § 35.

SIMILIA sunt, *quibus idem convenit conceptus superior*, ergo similia ad eandem speciem vel genus idem pertinent. Ergo *cum repraesentando phantasmate uno repraesentare similia admodum poeticum*. §. 35. (MED § 36)

Baumgarten elaborates this further in the sections of the *Aesthetica* on illustrative arguments (*argumenta illustrantia*), which is based on the eighth and ninth books of Quintilian’s *Institutio oratoria*. Baumgarten does not “rewrite” his mentor Quintilian’s text in an emphatic sense but rather simply copies from him.¹⁰⁸ To a certain extent, in a longwinded compilation, Baumgarten plays Quintilian off against Quintilian in such a way that something new appears through this transtextual relation. Baumgarten explicates comparison in the broad sense (*comparatio latius dicta*), which, as the principal illustrative figure (*figura princeps illustrantium*), encompasses all the special cases of producing complexity qua similarity (see AE §§ 735, 742). The comparisons are based on substituting or linking words that are in a relation of similarity or affinity to one another:

Hence the substitution of one beautifully thinkable perception for another, or the conjunction of one with another, not without vividness, will produce an ARGUMENT that illustrates BY COMPARISON, which others call BY MEDITATION (§ 730). As for us, let us call the figure (§ 26) COMPARISON and collation IN THE BROADER SENSE, which includes assimilation but also extends to many kinds of arguments other than those based on something similar.

Hinc substitutio illius pro hac pulcre cogitanda, vel coniunctio illius cum hac, non sine vividitate, dabit ARGUMENTUM illustrans A COMPARATIS, quod aliqui dicunt A MEDITATIONE, §. 730, nos dicamus figuram, §. 26, COMPARATIONEM et collationem LATIUS, quae complectitur assimilationem, sed in multa etiam alia argumentorum genera diffunditur, quam quae petantur a simili. (AE § 734)

108 Cf. Haverkamp, “Wie die Morgenröthe,” 17.

Baumgarten divides up comparison as the master figure into four groups; of these four groups, he first names those that are based on the four types of identity:

Comparison more broadly speaking can include an argument that illustrates (1) from something similar, equal, congruent, or quite markedly the same; this figure is more properly called ASSIMILATION (§ 734) if similar, equal, congruent, or quite markedly the same things are conjoined. It is also possible for one of these to be substituted for the other in thought.

comparatio latius dicta sub se comprehendet argumentum illustrans 1) a simili, aequali, congruente, notabilius eodem, quod figura dicitur a potiori ASSIMILATIO, §. 734 si similia, aequalia, congruentia, notabilius eadem coniungantur. Potest et eorundem unum cogitando substitui pro altero. (AE § 735)

Yet comparisons in which the relationship between object and detail is regulated according to other relations that go back to topics also belong to comparisons in the broad sense. These include comparisons based on relations of part and whole (comparatio maioris et minoris/comparatio adscendens et descendens; see AE § 742), antitheses (antithesis; see AE § 763), and comparisons in the narrow sense (comparatio strictius dicta). Under the last of these, Baumgarten treats external amplification, which crosses the border from one object to another (see AE § 773).

This differentiation of the methods of linking comparisons reduces the distance of the leap when one moves from the level of figures to the level of texts. The microstructure of figurality thus models the macrostructure of textuality.

3.4.2 Opacity

Complexity and opacity are complementary functions of the structure of literary discourse. Yet the scholarship has paid much more attention to the concept of *claritas* because Baumgarten uses it to analyze the *evidentia* of poetic passages. In Baumgarten, *evidentia* serves as the collective name for the entire register of figures and tropes.¹⁰⁹ Bahr thus refers to *evidentia* as the “master trope” of Baumgarten’s aesthetics.¹¹⁰ *Evidentia* certainly has a special place in his theory of literature; and in engaging with *evidentia*, the very luminosity of the Enlightenment is to some extent at stake. The epistemological preeminence of intuition

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Campe, “Bella Evidentia,” 253.

¹¹⁰ Bahr, *Darstellung des Undarstellbaren*, 109.

in the eighteenth century grants *evidentia* a central role in metaphysics.¹¹¹ But even in rhetoric, the matter is not as simple as the one-size-fits-all definitions suggested in the scholarship. With regard to *evidentia*, Baumgarten does not treat a single concept but instead considers the two stylistic categories of clarity (*enargeia*) and vividness (*energeia*) – which are tied together in the rhetorical concept of *evidentia* – as two different functions of the structure of literary discourse. Literature is therefore, in a way I will define more precisely, both clear (*clarus*) and vivid (*vividus*). With *vividus* (or *vivus* in the *Aesthetica*), the third function of the structure of literary discourse comes into play: the performativity of literature.¹¹²

With regard to clarity, Baumgarten combines the textile metaphors of the first literary function, complexity, with visual metaphors to produce an algorithm: the more complex a representation is, the clearer it is – or, more precisely, the more extensively clear. For this differentiation, he adds a third axis to the Leibniz–Wolffian two-coordinate system; this third axis differentiates between the intensive and extensive clarity of cognition. A sensate representation is thus not distinct but confused, not obscure but clear, and in this quality not intensively but extensively clear. With regard to the lower cognitive faculties, the *Metaphysica* states the following: “Therefore, clarity is increased by a multitude of notes [I translate as “marks,” F. B.] (§162). Greater clarity due to the clarity of notes can be called INTENSIVELY GREATER CLARITY, while greater clarity due to the multitude of notes can be called EXTENSIVELY GREATER CLARITY” (MET § 531; Ergo multitudine notarum augetur claritas, §. 162. CLARITAS claritate notarum maior, INTENSIVE (*a*), multitudine notarum, EXTENSIVE MAIOR (*b*) dici potest). The result of this combination presents a paradox: the light of a representation increases, the more densely the marks are interwoven (see AE § 747). Thus, if a representation’s degree of complexity increases due to the number of marks, the degree of clarity also intensifies:

When in representation A more is represented than in B, C, D, and so on, but all are confused, A will be said to be **extensively clearer** than the rest.

[n] We have had to add this restriction so that we may distinguish these degrees of clarity from those, already sufficiently understood, which, through a discrimination of characteristics, plumb the depths of cognition and render one representation *intensively clearer* than another.

Si in repraesentatione A plura repraesententur, quam in B. C. D. &c. sint tamen omnes confusae, A erit reliquis EXTENSIVE CLARIOR.

111 See 4.1.2 Truth.

112 See 3.4.3 Performativity.

[n] Addenda fuit restrictio, ut distinguerentur hi claritatis gradus a satis cognitis illis, qui per notarum distinctionem descendunt ad cognitionis profunditatem, & unam repraesentationem altera intensive reddunt clariorem. (MED § 16; see also MED §§ 15, 17)

With this paradox, Baumgarten makes several unreasonable demands. How should something be clear if it is thickly woven together at the same time? Or, put differently, how can the successiveness of linking be converted into the simultaneity of vision? He treats this problem in the *Aesthetica* in the sections on aesthetic light (*lux aesthetica*). With liberal recourse to Quintilian,¹¹³ he ties the clarity of thickly woven sensation to sensate perspicuity (*perspicuitas sensitiva*), which must be differentiated categorically from the concept of perspicuity in Cartesian logic (see AE § 614). Since he obtains his concepts by aestheticizing logical concepts based on the analogical method, the old concepts acquire a totally different meaning in the new context. Contrary to intellectual perspicuity, which appears step by step, sensate perspicuity takes Baumgarten once again to the register of figures and tropes (see AE § 852). In section 43 on illustrative arguments (*argumenta illustrantia*), the concept of clarity acquires a profile that sharpens the structure of literary discourse:

ARGUMENTS whose force (whether unique, more proper, or now most worthy of consideration) is to shed light on a given perception are DECLARATIVE (explanatory). Accordingly, they impart perspicuity, either intellectual – such arguments are SOLVENT (analytic), such as a *definition that explains the particular nature of any given thing* (Cic., *De or.* 1.190) – or sensate (§§ 614, 618); such arguments exhibit brilliance, at times, to be sure, absolute brilliance (§§ 617, 625), at other times, at any rate, some brilliance, and are preferably called ILLUSTRATIVE (depictive).

ARGUMENTA, quorum (vel unica, vel potior, vel nunc maxime considerata,) vis est, lucem datae perceptioni affundere, sunt DECLARANTIA (explicantia). Dabunt itaque perspicuitatem vel intellectualem, RESOLVENTIA (analytica) quale est *definitio, propriam cuiusvis rei vim declarans*, Cic. de Or. I. 190. vel sensitivam, § 614, 618. nunc absolutam certe, §. 617, 625, nunc omnino nitorem aliquem exhibent, et a potiori dicuntur ILLUSTRANTIA (pingentia). (AE § 730)

With such depictive arguments (*argumenta pingentia*), sensate “images” now truly stand at the center of Baumgarten’s theory of literature. Yet they raise surprising points, since he does not consider the simultaneity of images and also does not advance an emphatic concept of the image. The starting point of his analysis of the structure of literary discourse is rather the integration of visuality into the complexity of the literary text.

113 See Quint., *Inst.* 8.2.22–23.

Like many eighteenth-century theories of literary imagery, Baumgarten's is characterized by an analogical method: statements about the medium of the image are applied to the medium of the text. Like others, he derives the visual function of language from mental images (phantasmata): "for who would deny that an image is what we have imagined? [...] What, then, are images if they are not newly made (reproduced) impressions (representations) received from sense? This is what is intended here under the concept of things sensed" (MED § 28n; *quis enim negaret phantasma esse, quod imaginati sumus? [...] Quid ergo phantasmata, nisi refictae (reproductae) sensualium imagines (repraesentationes) a sensatione acceptae*). Following this presumption, Baumgarten differentiates the media of pictures and texts by describing a picture as representing just the surface of a mental image (phantasma in superficie) and a text as images of words and discourse (phantasma vocum et orationis; see MED §§ 40–41).

Projected onto the rationalist paradigm of representation, both picture and text can be combined into the Horatian analogy: "*Poetry is like a picture*" (MED § 39n; *Ut pictura, poesis erit*). Both representations of pictures (repraesentationes picturarum) and images (phantasmata) are similar to the sensual idea (idea sensualis) of what they represent (see MED §§ 38–41). That Baumgarten is using the attribute *sensualis* is due to the fact that the picture, as a medium closer to perception, is more strongly anchored in reality than literature. He thus concludes: "Therefore, a poem and a picture are similar, § 30" (MED § 39; *Ergo poema & pictura similia* §. 30). When he speaks of this imagery of literature, he often uses the concept *imago* instead of *pictura* and speaks of the poetic image (imago poetica).

But neither the analogical method nor the reference medium of the picture is suitable to define the concept of *claritas*, though Baumgarten does not explain why. He merely remarks:

Since a picture represents an image only on a surface, it is not for the picture to represent every aspect, or any motion at all; yet it is poetic to do so, because when these things are also represented, then more things are represented in the object than when they are not, and hence the representing is extensively clearer, § 16.

Pictura cum repraesentet phantasma in superficie tantum, eius non est omnem situm ul-lumque motum repraesentare, sed est poeticum, quia his etiam repraesentatis plura in obiecto repraesentantur, quam non repraesentatis iis, & hinc fit illud extensive clarius §. 16. (MED § 40)

A theory and critique of images thus go hand in hand in the *Meditationes* when, in an about-face, Baumgarten holds images to be less clear – and that means less poetic (see MED § 29) – than other sensate representations and even explicitly

evaluates visions (visiones; see AE § 490) negatively. The medial comparison does not, however, anticipate the arguments about the simultaneity of images and the successiveness of texts (see MED §§ 49–51) – arguments that will determine the semiotic debate starting in France and Germany a few years later. Instead, Baumgarten's interest in the reference medium of images simply languishes to such an extent that in the end images entirely disappear from the argumentation.

At first the image is replaced by the literary text's visual function of representation; examining this function would have affected Baumgarten's assumptions about the reference medium if he had risked even just another sidelong glance at it. From the beginning, he emphasizes the poetic image's net-like links, which are stored in the spatial form of intuition but do not allow a simultaneous vision. In the *Aesthetica*, he only applies one and the same concept – *claritas* – to the long list of all the figures of description, the visual figures that come under the general concept of hypotyposis: "Since HYPOTYPOSIS, the vivid description of something, not only illustrates (§ 618) but also proves something (§§ 550, 551), it is deservedly reckoned among the better depictive arguments (§ 731)" (AE § 733; Quoniam HYPOTYPOSIS, vivida alicuius descriptio, non illustrat solum, §. 618, sed etiam probat, §. 550, 551. inter meliora pingentium argumenta merito refertur, §. 731). Placing before the eyes (*ob oculos ponere*) is accordingly the task of literature (see AE § 39 *passim*), as Baumgarten copies from Quintilian, who copied from Cicero: "As for what Cicero calls 'putting something before our eyes,' this happens when, instead of stating *that* an event took place, we show *how* it took place, and that not as a whole, but in detail. [...] Celsus actually calls the Figure *evidentia*, but others prefer *hypotyposis*, that is, the expression in words of a given situation in such a way that it seems to be a matter of seeing rather than of hearing."¹¹⁴ "Not as a whole" (simultaneity) "but in detail" (successiveness) – this formulation of Quintilian's can easily be made consistent with what Baumgarten intends for the structure of literary discourse. The demand to see successiveness refers to a new function of this structure, which he discusses with recourse to visual figures. In the "abundance of its roles and the variety in its types of substitution and effect, placing before the eyes appears itself like the unknown of a function," a function that Baumgarten explores without having anything more than one unsuitable reference medium (images) and an unwieldy catalogue of figures and tropes.¹¹⁵ For this literary the-

¹¹⁴ Quint., *Inst.* 9.2.40.

¹¹⁵ Rüdiger Campe, "Vor Augen Stellen: Über den Rahmen rhetorischer Bildgebung," in *Poststrukturalismus: Herausforderung an die Literaturwissenschaft; DFG-Symposium 1995*, ed. Gerhard Neumann (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1997), 209.

orist, there is no other alternative than to make use of these inadequate concepts as best as possible. In the rhetorical tradition, enargeia encompasses “painterly description, plastic expression, and modeling; examples here are *hypotyposis*, *diatyposis*, *illustratio*, *demonstratio* with the subforms *effictio*, *conformatio*, *descriptio*, *topographia*.”¹¹⁶ The stylistic technique of description (*descriptio*) therefore takes up a lot of space in the *Meditationes*. By developing it in four variants – *descriptio rei*, *descriptio personae*, *descriptio loci*, *descriptio temporis* – Baumgarten moves this antiquated concept from baroque poetics into the center of the first modern theory of literature (see MED §§ 31–32, 54–55). Descriptions produce detailed poetic images by accounting for as many marks of an object as possible.

With this elevation of description, Baumgarten follows the otherwise feuding parties – which include Johann Christoph Gottsched, Johann Jakob Bodmer, and Johann Jakob Breitinger – in the contemporaneous poetology of the imagination, though unlike them he gives priority to description for theoretical reasons. Moses Mendelssohn and the supporters of sensualist aesthetics also held description as suitable for producing *evidentia* and were influenced by Baumgarten.¹¹⁷ But unlike the others, Baumgarten could not get anywhere with the contemporary concepts of clarity based on simultaneous vision. In his view, *sensate perspicuity* is never clear since the inner gaze cannot pause and fixate on a poetic image. Instead, this gaze wanders through space, realizing as many links as possible until the poetic image becomes completely opaque in the movement of this wandering. Baumgarten thus has to make a few corrections to the visual figures, especially to the tropes, since they have been held since antiquity to be the quintessential visual technique. Metaphors in particular are traditionally understood to belong to a text’s “imagery” in English or are referred to as *Sprachbilder* in German. They are understood to deal with images and could thus guarantee a simultaneous vision.

But does Baumgarten’s “metaphorology”¹¹⁸ actually renounce the syntagmatic linking of marks merely because he turns to their paradigmatic replacement in tropes? Anything but! Neither in the *Meditationes* nor in the *Aesthetica* does he exclude the concept of metaphor from the complexity that makes metaphor into a figure *sui generis*. In section 47 on tropes (*tropi*), Baumgarten lets the

116 Ansgar Kemman, “Evidentia, Evidenz,” in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik*, ed. Gert Ueding, vol. 2 (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1996), col. 40.

117 See Moses Mendelssohn, *Philosophical Writings*, ed. and trans. Daniel O. Dahlstrom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 178.

118 Bahr, *Darstellung des Undarstellbaren*, 74.

cat out of the bag.¹¹⁹ There he defines tropes not only by taking a spirited position in an old rhetorical fight but also by resolving the conflict between text (successiveness) and image (simultaneity). He at first confirms substitution as the primary operation of tropes, which are neither just ornamentation nor a lexical necessity:

I do not attend much here to TROPES, seeing as they are *the skillful exchange of a word's or phrase's proper meaning for another meaning* (Quint., *Inst.* 8.6.1), and even less to tropes that necessity and the poverty of language make necessary whenever something is to be expressed for which a given language does not have a dedicated word, and least of all to tropes forged in the process of speaking by ignorance of a word's proper meaning. Instead, I attend to every elegant substitution of one perception for another.

TROPUM hic non attendo tantum, quatenus *est verbi vel sermonis a propria significatione in aliam cum virtute mutatio*, Quint. VIII. 6. multo minus, quem necessitas et linguae paupertas necessarium facit, quoties significandum est, cuius non est in data lingua proprium vocabulum, minime, quem ignorantia proprietatis in loquendo procudit: sed omnem elegantem perceptionis unius pro altera substitutionem. (AE § 780)

In opposition to Quintilian, who defines metaphor as the substitution of the meaning of a word (*translatio*),¹²⁰ Baumgarten does not treat the metaphorical operation on the side of the signified. In the *Meditationes*, he is concerned with the complexity of metaphors, a complexity they acquire, like all other tropes, on the basis of their own phenomenal particularity; and this particularity depends, first of all, on literalness. Thus, while Baumgarten defines tropes as producing a tension between word and meaning, he reckons not with the transferred meaning but with the literal one of the metaphor – and in this he is closer to Aristotle than Quintilian:

Nonproper meaning lies in the nonproper word. Nonproper terms, since most of them are appropriate to sensate representations, are poetic figures, because (1) the representation which approaches a thing through a figure is sensate, hence poetic, § 10, § 11; and (2) these terms supply complex confused representations in abundance, § 23.

Significatus improprius est in voce impropria. Improprii autem termini, quum plerumque sint proprii repraesentationis sensitivae, tropi poetici : 1) quia repraesentatio per tropum accedens sensitiva est, hinc poetica §. 10. 11. 2) quia suppeditant repraesentationes complexas confusas §. 23. (MED § 79)

119 Baumgarten catalogues exceptio, metaphor, synecdoche, irony, metonymy, antonomasia, allegory, metalepsis, enigma, catachresis, hyperbole, and emphasis.

120 See Quint., *Inst.* 8.6.4–6.

In the *Aesthetica*, he comes in the end to a stunning conclusion: the metaphor is a figure. To be able to formulate this thesis, Baumgarten deconstructs Quintilian, who differentiates operations with words in their literal sense (figures) from operations with words in a figurative sense (tropes). At this point, Baumgarten plays Quintilian off against Quintilian with a quote in which the question of method ranks above the question of meaning: “We must note, however, that Trope and Figure are often combined in the same sentence, because metaphorical words can contribute to a Figure just as much as literal ones.”¹²¹ This statement in Quintilian is enough for Baumgarten to justify his own theory of literature (see AE § 783).

After first measuring all the tropes with the yardstick of the figure, Baumgarten is pushed toward a subtler approach that secures for tropes their own unique position among the visual figures based on changed parameters. “Normal” figures substitute an object with its features and portray this operation in a sequence. By contrast, Baumgarten speaks of cryptic figures when the substitution of one element for another is, to a certain extent, contracted into the smallest amount of space: “Every trope I have defined is a FIGURE, but a CRYPTIC one whose genuine form is not immediately apparent since it is a figure abbreviated through substitution” (AE § 784; *Omnis tropus, quem definivi, est FIGURA, sed CRYPTICA, cuius genuina forma non statim apparet, quoniam est figura contracta per substitutionem* §. 782). With the attribute *crypticus*, Baumgarten imports a foreign word taken from “Petrus Ramus” (KOLL § 1) into his aesthetics and adapts it to his needs:

Scholastic logicians teach that an EXPONIBLE PROPOSITION is composed cryptically out of an affirmative and a negative proposition, which are exclusive, exceptive, restrictive, and so on. If I did not fear being disagreeable to Latin ears, I would call tropes exponible figures.

Logici scholasticorum docent PROPOSITIONEM EXPONIBILEM, ex affirmanti et negante cryptice compositam, quales exclusivae, exceptivae, restrictivae, e. c. Nisi vereretur latinis incommodus esse auribus, tropos figuras dicerem exponibiles. (AE § 785)

Norman Kretzmann explains this Ramian concept with reference to the need for such propositions or figures to be elucidated if one wants to integrate this logical concept into aesthetics: “An exponible proposition is a proposition that has an obscure sense requiring exposition in virtue of some syncategorema occurring either explicitly or included within some word.”¹²²

¹²¹ Quint., *Inst.* 10.1.9.

¹²² Norman Kretzmann, “Syncategoremata, Exponibilia, Sophismata,” in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scho-*

But Baumgarten is less interested in the obscurity of exponible figures (*figurae exponibiles*) or cryptic figures (*figurae crypticae*) than in their spatialization through the necessary context, since he underlays the concept of *claritas* with the spatial form of intuition. It is this spatiality that, in a certain way, makes the trope into a textual image, a *Textbild*, and not into linguistic imagery, a *Sprachbild*. Baumgarten accomplishes this turn by at first tying tropes to the methods of comparison that are at the center of amplification: “From this arises the trope, the not-inelegant substitution of the term of a comparison in the place of its subject (§ 780)” (AE § 781; *Unde nascitur substitutio termini comparationis pro subiecto eiusdem non inelegans, tropus, §. 780*). He changes course in this way so as simply to apply the typology of comparison in the broad sense (*comparatio latius dicta*) to tropes, which he defines as contracted varieties of the figural techniques: *contracta assimilatio, contracta comparatio maioris et minoris, contracta antithesis* (see AE § 782):

Explain a metaphor, and you’ll have a manifest assimilation (§ 735). Explain a synecdoche, and you’ll see a comparison of larger and smaller. It is therefore either an ASCENDING or DESCENDING SYNECDOCHE (§ 742). Explain irony, and you’ll have an antithesis (§ 763). Finally, metonymy is resolved into some form of comparison more strictly speaking (§§ 773, 782). And so whatever has been said up to now about the figures mentioned above (§§ 730–779) is not necessary for us to repeat about tropes, the concealment of figures.

Metaphoram exponens habebis manifestam assimilationem, §. 735. Synecdochen exponens videbis comparationem maioris et minoris. Est ergo vel ADSCENDENS SYNECDOCHE, vel DESCENDENS, §. 742. Expone ironiam: habebis antithesin, §. 763. Metonymia denique resolvetur in aliquam comparationem strictius dictam. §. 773, 782. Quicquid itaque de figuris commemoratis huc usque dictum est. §. 730–779. illud ut de tropis, earum crypsesi, repetamus, non est necesse. (AE § 786)

In this context, Quintilian’s definition of metaphor, which Baumgarten makes the basis of his own, is put in a new light: “In general terms, Metaphor is a shortened form of Simile; the difference is that in Simile something is *compared* with the thing we wish to describe, while in Metaphor one thing is *substituted* for the other. It is a comparison when I say that a man acted ‘like a lion,’ a Metaphor when I say of a man ‘he is a lion.’”¹²³ While in “normal” figures, the substitute and the substituted appear at two positions of the syntagm, the cryptic figure diverts attention away from surface of the literary text. Attention is turned

lasticism, 1100–1600, ed. Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 215n17. See also Haverkamp, “Wie die Morgenröthe,” 16; Haverkamp, *Figura cryptica: Theorie der literarischen Latenz* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2002), 14.

¹²³ Quint., *Inst.* 8.6.9. See also AE § 787.

to what is contracted in the techniques based on similarity or affinity – to the substituted, which is suspected to be in the crypt of the text. Haverkamp speaks of the “elementary deep structures of the cryptic functioning of the senses for every interpretation” and apprehends the proper meaning “in the deep moments motivating the surface, moments that Baumgarten’s *ars analogi rationis* theorizes in detail.”¹²⁴ But this crypt knows neither depth nor deeper meanings. Despite all of his efforts in reflecting on the matter, the trope cannot be anything other than a further figuration on the surface of the literary text, an ornament. While the “normal” figures are characterized by how they project the principle of repetition from the axis of selection (paradigm) onto the axis of combination (syntagm), the cryptic figures proceed exactly the other way around. They posit that the paradigm already has the syntagmatic structure, which is actually first created by the figure through the process of projection.

The result is clear: the surface of the literary text and the deep structure of the crypt can no longer be differentiated. In contrast to the “normal” figures, the cryptic figures link one text to other texts, making it encyclopedic. With tropes, Baumgarten thus also identifies the point when the structure of literary discourse becomes encyclopedic. It is the point when the trope receives his attention as a singular term. Here again, the more media-specific argumentation in the *Meditationes* proves to be superior to the *Aesthetica*. In his Halle master’s thesis, he favors the first two of the four Aristotelian types of metaphor – metaphors in which a concept of a species is replaced by a concept of a genus or a concept of a genus by a concept of a species. The relationship leads Baumgarten first to synecdoches, in which the species replaces the genus and the individual the species (see MED § 84), and then to allegory, which results in this trope outstripping metaphor as the master trope. The structure of literary discourse, as oriented along the spatial form of intuition, would not actually allow it any other way. Due to their doubled linking – both paradigmatic (words) and syntagmatic (sentences) – allegories surpass every other trope by far in complexity, and Baumgarten elevates them to the figurative principle of the literary (see MED § 85; AE §§ 802–805).¹²⁵

The point of the compilation from Quintilian consists, of course, in how Baumgarten dissolves the traditional differentiation between tropes and figures. Tropes are figures because they, like all other figures, depict two elements at two

¹²⁴ Haverkamp, “Wie die Morgenröthe,” 16. See also Haverkamp, “Metaphora dis/continua: Figure in de/construction; Mit einem Kommentar zur Begriffsgeschichte von Quintilian bis Baumgarten,” in *Allegorie: Konfigurationen von Text, Bild und Lektüre*, ed. Eva Horn and Manfred Weinberg (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1998), 29–45.

¹²⁵ See 5.2.1 Sequentiality.

positions in space. Hypotyposis therefore becomes the umbrella term for all tropes. In Baumgarten, the sensate perspicuity of tropes does not result from imagery but from the links between the positions of the substituted and the substitute. He not only replaces the traditional model of *evidentia* with a model of complex and almost encyclopedic intertextuality, he also shifts his interest from the meaning of the sign to its materiality, with emphasis on the opacity of the literary text. In this, he pursues a possibility suggested by classical rhetoric, as when Quintilian emphasizes the moment of self-reference and how the figure exhibits itself in visual figures: “We must thus count as an Ornament the quality of *enargeia*, which I mentioned in giving instructions for Narrative, because vividness, or, as some say, ‘representation,’ is more than mere perspicuity, since instead of being merely transparent it somehow shows itself off.”¹²⁶ This phenomenal “showing itself off” points to the performativity of literature at the center of Baumgarten’s literary theory.

3.4.3 Performativity

In the structure of literary discourse, the function of opacity depends on that of complexity. Complex cognition and representation are evident. In rhetoric, however, *evidentia* has always been discussed in relation to two discursive functions: on the one hand, it is about a certain manner of clarity; on the other, about vividness. Whereas clarity is manifested as the opacity of poetic passages, aesthetic vividness concerns the performativity of such passages. Analyzing it therefore requires changing the frame of reference. While the scholarship has especially addressed the relation between art and epistemology in Baumgarten’s aesthetics, I will show in the following that the third function of the structure of literary discourse – which he refers to with the attribute *vividus* and then *vivus* in the *Aesthetica* – depends on the theory of desire. The form of the sensate will is *vivus*, “living,” in the structure of literary discourse. He thus categorically differentiates figures into those based on images and those based on movement. The temporal form of intuition, which goes along with *energeia*, brings movement into the spatial form of intuition, which is activated by *enargeia*. As I will show in the following, clarity stimulates images and vividness stimulates actions.

The third function, performativity (*vita*), can first be described as an action – not as an action that is the object of a literary text like those Lessing considers in

126 Quint., *Inst.* 8.3.61–62.

his *Laokoon* but rather as an action that consummates the structure of literary discourse. This action is thus less an action than a function. Whenever Baumgarten defines the characteristics of literature in the *Meditationes*, the grammar of his sentences ascribes semantic agency – the role of the one who acts, “whose various parts are directed toward the apprehension of sensate representations, § 5” (MED § 7; *cuius varia tendunt ad cognitionem repraesentationum sensitivarum*. §. 5) – to the literary text. By emphasizing such a performativity in perfect sensate discourse, a “directing toward” or an “aiming” (*tendere*), Baumgarten assigns both a direction and a goal – the goal of perfection – to the spatial linking of elements within the structure of literary discourse. In its performativity, the literary text becomes the agent of the sensate will.

Just as poetics is to guide literature toward perfection (*perfectio*; see MED § 115), aesthetics aims for the perfection of sensate cognition. In this sense, the prolegomena of the *Aesthetica* make the famous claim that the “goal of aesthetics is the perfection of sensate cognition as such (§ 1)” (AE § 14; *Aesthetices finis est perfectio cognitionis sensitivae, qua talis*, §. 1). The syntactic construction leaves open – as Michael Jäger has pointed out¹²⁷ – whether the phrase “*perfectio cognitionis sensitivae*” is to be read as an objective or subjective genitive. As a subjective genitive, sensate cognition would indeed be an action that aims for perfection. This grammatical decision complements Baumgarten’s stylistically conspicuous personification of sensate cognition in the paragraph. Sensate cognition seems to be like an agent that intentionally aims to reach a goal in the future.

Because of this intentional aiming, one is forced to switch with Baumgarten from the cognitive faculties to the appetitive faculties when reconstructing this third function of the structure of literary discourse. This is because the first two functions and the third function are not – in contrast to what Caroline Torra-Mattenklott claims¹²⁸ – actually related according to their systematic positions. Although this aiming still has to do with *evidentia*, the performative function is not a visual function but rather sets the elements within the structure of literary discourse in motion. To refer to this performativity of literature, Baumgarten uses the traditional rhetorical concept *vividus* in the *Meditationes*: “We call that **vivid** in which we are allowed to perceive many parts either simultaneously or in succession” (MED § 112; *VIVIDUM dicimus, in quo plura varia, seu simultanea fuerint, seu successiva, appercipere datur*).

127 See Jäger, *Kommentierende Einführung in Baumgartens “Aesthetica,”* 31.

128 Cf. Caroline Torra-Mattenklott, *Metaphorologie der Rührung: Ästhetische Theorie und Mechanik im 18. Jahrhundert* (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2002), 176.

In eighteenth-century poetics, *vididus* is, as Baumgarten notes, generally translated in German as “lebhaft[]” (MED § 112n). Not only literature but also paintings, speeches, and behaviors are described as vivid. Instead of *vididus*, however, the *Aesthetica* uses the term *vivus*, or “living,” which he takes from the *Metaphysica*. There it refers to living cognition (*cognitio viva*), which sets desire and aversion in motion such that they reach their goal in the future.¹²⁹ Scheer explains the relevance of living cognition to Baumgarten’s aesthetics as follows: “Beautiful thinking is thereby induced to an unending movement between partial representations. In contrast, intellectually determined thinking proceeds in a much less moving and lively manner. For it tends to make the process of representation finite in a result; that is, it fixes its object with a concept on the basis of fewer marks. This concept makes constantly running through the object’s abundance of marks anew unnecessary.”¹³⁰

In section 37 on aesthetic light (*lux aesthetica*), Baumgarten therefore distinguishes the concept of life from vividness:

Brilliant vividness, graceful meditations – let it not be confused with its fire or life (§ 22), which will be further discussed later. It is right and beautiful that they are joined as often as possible so that thoughts not only gleam but are also ablaze (§§ 142, 143; see Quint., *Inst.* 8.3). Yet by their nature these beauties appear separately in the process of thinking and should be judged separately according to an accurate theory of them.

Nitida vividitas venustae meditationis ne confundatur cum eius ardore ac vita, §. 22. de qua deinceps curatius. Recte pulcreque coniunguntur, quoties fieri potest, ut cogitationes non splendeant solum, sed et ardeant. §. 142, 143. cf. Quint. VIII.3. Natura tamen sua disiunctae sunt in cogitando veneres, per accuratam harum theoriam separatim expendendae. (AE § 620)

The difference between vividness and life metaphorically encapsulates the two different functions of the structure of literary discourse. In contrast to the concept of life (*vita*; *vivus*), which evokes the metaphors of fire that have belonged to the rhetoric of affects since antiquity, the concept of vividness (*vividitas*; *vividus*) is related to metaphors of light, which belong to the second function of the structure of literary discourse, opacity (*claritas*; *clarus*). Before Baumgarten differentiates the two functions of vividness and life in the *Aesthetica*, he uses the concept *vididus* to integrate affect into the structure of literary discourse. In the *Metaphysica*, he defines extensively clear perceptions as vivid in the sense that they stimulate the affects: “An extensively clearer PERCEPTION is LIVELY [I

129 See 3.1.2 Desire.

130 Scheer, *Einführung in die philosophische Ästhetik*, 64–65.

translate as “vivid,” F. B.]” (MET § 531; Extensive clarior PERCEPTIO est VIVIDA). This use of the concept corresponds to the contemporaneous poetological demands for “vivid perspicuity” in literature.¹³¹ In the *Aesthetica*, he remedies the excessive structural demand on this concept by differentiating within evidentiality between opacity and performativity as two different functions of the structure of literary discourse.

It is not surprising that affect plays a major role in Baumgarten’s theory of literature. Deleting the two letters *i* and *d* in *vividus* yields the word *vivus* and leads back to empirical and rational psychology, the disciplines in which Wolff analyzes affect. According to Campe’s explanation of the theoretical framework, empirical psychology characterizes and classifies the individual affects, and rational psychology asks “how the passions are to be explained from certain modifications to the faculty of representation in a perceptual apparatus that is bound to its body and so positioned within the world.”¹³² With this framework, Wolff removes “the reasons for the unanalyzability of affect as they had existed up to the end of the seventeenth century.”¹³³ In the middle of the eighteenth century, affect stands “between perception/judgment and desire/will, between theoretical questions within perception and disciplinary moral practice.”¹³⁴ The way in which Baumgarten treats affect may thus not meet one’s expectations, given that this epoch was the height of sensibility (*Empfindsamkeit*). He criticizes the definition of affect in Johann Georg Walch’s *Philosophisches Lexikon*, arguing that literature does not speak a “language of affects”; he thereby marks a significant distance between himself and the epochal code (see MED § 114).

In his psychological definition, in which he follows Wolff, affects are libidinous impulses (stimuli), a kind of representation,¹³⁵ which Baumgarten places on a scale from weak to strong:

The (stronger) desires and aversions originating from confused knowledge are AFFECTS (sufferings, affections, perturbations of the mind), and their science is (1) PSYCHOLOGICAL PATHOLOGY, which explains the theory of these; (2) AESTHETIC PATHOLOGY, which contains the rules as to how they are to be excited, restrained, and signified, and to this pertains oratorical, rhetorical, or poetic pathology (§622); and (3) PRACTICAL PATHOLOGY, which exhibits the obligations of the human being with respect to their affects.

131 Johann Jakob Breitinger, *Critische Dichtkunst* (Zurich: Conrad Orell, 1740; facsimile, Stuttgart: Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1966), 52.

132 Campe, *Affekt und Ausdruck*, 71.

133 Campe, *Affekt und Ausdruck*, 71.

134 Campe, *Affekt und Ausdruck*, 71.

135 See 3.1.2 Desire.

Appetitiones aversationesque (fortiores) ex confusa cognitione sunt AFFECTUS (passiones, affectiones, perturbationes animi), eorumque scientia PATHOLOGIA 1) PSYCHOLOGICA, eorundem theoriam explicans, 2) AESTHETICA, eorum excitandorum, compescendorum, significandorumque regulas continens, quo pertinet pathologia oratoria, rhetorica, poëtica, §. 622. 3) PRACTICA, obligationes hominis respectu affectuum exhibens. (MET § 678)

Neither in the *Meditationes* nor in the *Aesthetica* does Baumgarten actually offer a new evaluation of affect like the one with which Herder later establishes a culture of emotion. Contrary to affect, emotion always has a semantic script and tends toward narration. The semantic catalogue of affective ready-mades in the *Metaphysica* may point in this direction (see MET §§ 682–685), but beyond that, affects in Baumgarten remain libidinous impulses and often appear as representations in conjunction with other sensations in poetic passages:¹³⁶

Since affects are rather marked degrees of pleasure or pain, their sense representations are given in the representing of something to oneself confusedly as good or bad. Therefore, they determine poetic representations, § 24; and therefore, to arouse affects is poetic, § 11.

Affectus cum sint notabiliores taedii & voluptatis gradus, dantur eorum repraesentationes sensuales in repraesentante sibi quid confuse, ut bonum & malum, ergo determinant repraesentationes poeticas §. 24. ergo *affectus movere est poeticum*. §. 11. (MED § 25; see also MET §§ 655–662)

Since Baumgarten integrates affects into the paradigm of representation, he understands them “in their basic definition as types of perception, sensation, and representation.”¹³⁷ This allows him to incorporate affect “into the grammaticality of textual expression and into the logic of representation,”¹³⁸ erasing “the distance between sign theory and rhetoric.”¹³⁹ Baumgarten accordingly places affects on a scale in the same way he does other sensate representations (*repraesentationes sensitivae*):

Whatever increases the stronger sensitive pleasures and displeasures increases the affects (§678). Hence the more composite, the more noble (§515), the truer, the livelier, the more certain, and the more brilliant are the pleasure or displeasure from which affects arise (§658, 669), the greater are these affects (§656). If one were only to sense the cause of an affect as evil or good, and another were at the same time to imagine it to themselves

¹³⁶ See Ernst Stöckmann, *Anthropologische Ästhetik: Philosophie, Psychologie und ästhetische Theorie der Emotionen im Diskurs der Aufklärung* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 2009), 89.

¹³⁷ Campe, *Affekt und Ausdruck*, 72.

¹³⁸ Campe, *Affekt und Ausdruck*, 73.

¹³⁹ Campe, *Affekt und Ausdruck*, 75.

and foresee it, then the affect of the latter, all else being equal, will be greater than that of the former (§595, 557).

Quicquid auget voluptates & taedia sensitiva fortiora, augebit affectus, §. 678. Hinc quo magis composita voluptas taediumve, ex quibus affectus, quo nobiliores, §. 515. quo veriores, vividiores, certiores, ardentiores, §. 658, 669. hoc illi maiores, §. 656. Si alter tantum sentiat affectus caussam, ut malum, vel bonum, alter simul imaginetur, simul praevideat, posterioris affectus, caeteris paribus, maior erit, quam prioris, §. 595, 597. (MET § 681)

Based on such statements, Albert Riemann points out that Baumgarten ascribes affects with “an even greater clarity” than other sensations, since affects form “a composite concept with the representations that they cling to,” a concept “that, as a result, possesses greater extensive clarity than a simple concept.”¹⁴⁰ Such complex representations legitimize “the poeticality of affect.”¹⁴¹ Despite the “pure occurrence of movement in affect,”¹⁴² he does not see a conflict between this paradigm of movement and the paradigm of representation.¹⁴³ The “concatenation of representation and movement”¹⁴⁴ is first dissolved in the 1770s in the same breath with which modern antirationalist psychology becomes the discipline that regulates the discourses concerning the newly liberated emotions. The fact that Baumgarten does not always use the logically colored attribute *sensitivus* but rather also the attribute *sensualis* marks the border between the paradigms, between his premodern aesthetics, anchored in rationalism, and modernity. It is the border between sensation analogous to reason and “real” sensuality, between rationalist representation and the presence of aesthetic experience.

But where then does affect become manifest in the structure of literary discourse? The answer is obvious: not in visual figures but in what I call *performative figures*. For the “movement that is affect” is analogous to the movement “through which the use of figures is defined.”¹⁴⁵ This has to do, first, with the performativity of every figure in which vividness and life have been related to one another in the long history of these concepts.¹⁴⁶ In this history, Campe ex-

140 Albert Riemann, *Die Ästhetik Alexander Gottlieb Baumgartens unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der “Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus” nebst einer Übersetzung dieser Schrift* (Halle an der Saale: Max Niemeyer, 1928), 53–54.

141 Torra-Mattenklott, *Metaphorologie der Rührung*, 175.

142 Campe, *Affekt und Ausdruck*, 34.

143 See Campe, *Affekt und Ausdruck*, 102–104, 465–467.

144 Campe, *Affekt und Ausdruck*, 379.

145 Campe, *Affekt und Ausdruck*, 25.

146 See Heinrich F. Plett, *Rhetorik der Affekte: Englische Wirkungsästhetik im Zeitalter der Renaissance* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1975), 135–136.

plains, additions and substitutions are not only confronted with “terminological mix-ups” but also with an “eclectic synopsis of different concepts of language”¹⁴⁷ that consolidates a visual, representational concept of language from late antiquity (enargeia) with an energetic, performative concept of language that dates back to Aristotle (energeia). The one letter *e* that differentiates *energeia* from *enargeia* therefore marks nothing other than a media-theoretical expansion of static representation (enargeia) into dynamic representation (energeia). Searching for the technical operations of such a representation, Baumgarten touches on the temporally indexed figures of actualization (present verb forms, the imperative, apostrophe, direct speech), which Aristotle also provides,¹⁴⁸ but tropes are even more important techniques of dynamic representation in the *Aesthetica*.

“Two types of energeia,” as Torra-Mattenklott explains, “gain the most relief: on the one hand, the visualization of events and characters by being staged, and on the other, the metaphorical animation of inanimate objects.”¹⁴⁹ To adapt them theoretically, Baumgarten does not make recourse to any particular reference medium, as had been done until then, but rather to a physical model: following Aristotle, he asserts that there is an analogy between figures, physical movement, and desire. Aristotle transfers the principle of dynamism from his *Physics* into his *Metaphysics* and *Nicomachean Ethics* before importing it as the principle of movement into his *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*.¹⁵⁰ In his *Rhetoric*, Aristotle defines *energeia* in the following way: “I call those things ‘before-the-eyes’ that signify things engaged in activity.”¹⁵¹ In this context, metonymy in particular gains in significance among the tropes, leading Aristotle to say that Homer, who always trusted in the power of metonymies of “the lifeless for the living” and of “metaphor by analogy”¹⁵² in his epics, “makes everything move and live, and *energeia* is motion.”¹⁵³ With reference to Quintilian, Campe captures the merging of *enargeia* and *energeia* in the theory of the figure as follows: “The rhetorical technique of ornament thus binds the simple seeing of something before oneself of *enargeia* to a representation with action in mind, which is here called *energeia*.”¹⁵⁴

147 Campe, *Affekt und Ausdruck*, 230n22.

148 See Arist., *Rhet.* 1410b; [Longinus], *De subl.* 27.1; Quint., *Inst.* 9.2, 9.41.

149 Torra-Mattenklott, *Metaphorologie der Rührung*, 181.

150 See Anselm Haverkamp, “Masse mal Beschleunigung: Rhetorik als Meta-Physik der Ästhetik,” in *Masse und Medium: Verschiebungen in der Ordnung des Wissens und der Ordnung der Literatur 1800/2000*, ed. Inge Münz-Koenen and Wolfgang Schäffner (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2002), 65–77; Torra-Mattenklott, *Metaphorologie der Rührung*, 185–196.

151 Arist., *Rhet.* 1411b.

152 Arist., *Rhet.* 1411b.

153 Arist., *Rhet.* 1412a.

154 Campe, “Vor Augen Stellen,” 218.

Because Baumgarten attempts to grasp the performativity of the structure of literary discourse with the concept of *vita* and the physical model of movement, nothing actually speaks for accepting a displacement of the “moment of animation or effectiveness from the metaphorical production of the represented to the relation between speech and listeners,”¹⁵⁵ as Torra-Mattenklott proposes. While “life and activity are qualities of representation in Aristotelean rhetoric, in Baumgarten they concern, by contrast, the relation between the text and the reader or listener.”¹⁵⁶ From this, it follows that “movement and representation” coexist “in the context of the same aesthetic and epistemological configuration.”¹⁵⁷ Since Baumgarten’s student Meier “develops a lot that his teacher just hints at without deviating significantly from the implications of Baumgarten’s concepts,” Torra-Mattenklott takes the concept of life from Meier’s *Anfangsgründe aller schönen Wissenschaften* (1748–1750), but this method has considerable disadvantages.¹⁵⁸ Although the rhetorical discussion of figures offers connection points for the aesthetics of both production and reception – connection points that Meier’s kindred rendering of the *Aesthetica* realizes¹⁵⁹ – Baumgarten only extrapolates moving cognition (*cognitio moventis*) from the canon of *elocutio*. In this sense, the Renaissance scholar Scaliger – whose works were important to Baumgarten – also treats *energeia* as the force of words (*vis verborum*).¹⁶⁰

With his emphatic focus on reception aesthetics, Meier actually deviates considerably from Baumgarten’s argumentation, which is primarily oriented toward the literary text. Reconstructing the third function of the structure of literary discourse is certainly complicated by the fact that the *Aesthetica* remains a fragment and that the intended sections on aesthetic life (*vita cognitionis aesthetica*) are presented in the synopsis but then never developed further. According to the logic of the rhetorical system, these sections would have had to typologize the passionate arguments (*argumenta ardentia*)¹⁶¹ and translate the eighteenth-century theory of affects (*Affektenlehre*) into aesthetics. They would also have had to formulate the conditions for delineating the concept of *vita* in the canon of style. In other words, the theory of affects would not have migrated

155 Torra-Mattenklott, *Metaphorologie der Rührung*, 189.

156 Torra-Mattenklott, *Metaphorologie der Rührung*, 184.

157 Torra-Mattenklott, *Metaphorologie der Rührung*, 19.

158 Torra-Mattenklott, *Metaphorologie der Rührung*, 142; see also 145.

159 See Georg Friedrich Meier, *Anfangsgründe aller schönen Wissenschaften*, 2nd ed., 3 vols. (Halle an der Saale: C. H. Hemmerde, 1754–1759; facsimile, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1976).

160 See Plett, *Rhetorik der Affekte*, 116.

161 See 6.2.3 Melancholy.

into the canons of invention and method but would rather have remained in the canon of style.

In fact, the best clues as to how Baumgarten wanted to profile the concept of *vita* are found in the *Metaphysica*. Its paragraphs on living cognition (*cognitio viva*) are key to understanding the performativity of the literary text. The attribute *vivus* refers to cognition that is resolutely oriented toward its object: “KNOWLEDGE, insofar as it contains the incentives of the mind, is MOVING (affecting, touching, burning, pragmatic, practical, and, more broadly, living), and insofar as it does not contain these incentives, it is INERT (theoretical and, more broadly, dead)” (MET § 669; COGNITIO, quatenus elateres animi continet, MOVENS (afficiens, tangens, ardens, pragmatica, practica & viva latius), quatenus minus, INERS (theoretica & mortua latius)). One can therefore reconstruct how the sections on aesthetic life (*vita cognitionis aesthetica*) would have articulated the concept of *vita* in analogy to the “psychic apparatus as a wish machine”:¹⁶² certain rhetorical figures set the structure of literary discourse in motion.

For that reason, Baumgarten would probably not have just considered figures and tropes in general; instead, he would perhaps have carried out a change of medium from the visual medium of the text and its letters (*litterae*) to the acoustic medium of the voice (*vox*). The *Meditationes* suggest as much: as soon as he is concerned with movement, the spatial form of intuition, which is so important for analyzing the structure of literary discourse, recedes into the background of the argumentation. This is because movement presupposes a temporal form of intuition, and so performative figures draw Baumgarten’s attention to the voice.¹⁶³ As a consequence of this attention to the voice, he does not discuss literature in general but rather lyric poetry in particular in the difficult definition of the concept of life: “Since the poem, taken as a series of articulate sounds, excites pleasure in the ear, § 92, § 91, there must also be a perfection in it, § 92, and indeed the highest perfection, § 94” (MED § 96; Quum *poema* excitet voluptatem aurium, qua series sonorum articulorum §. 92. 91. qua tali etiam inesse debet perfectio §. 92. & quidem summa §. 94).

In eighteenth-century poetics like those of Gottsched, Bodmer, and Breitinger – all of whom made new discoveries in the analysis of literature around the same time as Baumgarten – the “doctrine of generally assigning actio to the affects is,” as Campe observes, “entirely developed with regard to the voice (pro-

¹⁶² Torra-Mattenklott, *Metaphorologie der Rührung*, 147.

¹⁶³ See 3.3 Semiotics.

nuntiatio, and in it the vox).¹⁶⁴ Baumgarten thus holds meter to be the most important performative figure responsible for the actio of the voice: a verse form that orders all the syllables of poems according to the same pattern of long and short syllables: “Since meter produces sense impressions by § 103, § 102, and since these have the greatest extensive clarity, they are to that degree the most poetic, and more so than those less clear, § 17. Thus it is highly poetic to observe most carefully the laws of meter, § 29” (MED § 107; *Quum metrum ideas sensuales producat §. 103. 102. eae vero extensive clarissimae adeoque maxime magisque poeticae, quam minus clarae §. 17. metri leges accuratissime observari admodum poeticum. coll. §. 29; see also MED § 103*). In his definition of meter, Baumgarten seems to orient himself obstinately on Greek quantitative meter. Accentual meter, which Martin Opitz campaigned for as a German prosody in the seventeenth century, does not interest Baumgarten at all; indeed, he explicitly objects to correlating accent and the length of a syllable (see MED § 101n). Baumgarten takes Greek quantitative meter to be so natural and universally accepted that he only recalls it in passing and instead relates meter in almost all his arguments to its material, phonetic manifestation. For example, he explains the association of the length and the scansion of syllables as follows: “Thus, in scanning, as much time as the quantity of the syllable requires, so much will be its value” (MED § 100n; in scandendo ergo, quantum temporis syllabae quantitas postulat, tantum eius est morae); and two paragraphs later he introduces the ear as the *éminence grise* in his metrical theory: “Measure produces pleasure in the ear, § 101. Therefore it is poetic, § 95” (MED § 102; *Numerus voluptatem auribus creat §. 101. ergo est poeticus §. 95*). Baumgarten invokes this organ of aesthetic cognition again and again, and in these invocations, apostrophe follows closely on the heels of personification. The ear should differentiate one syllable from another, determine whether they are short or long, and recognize their relation to forms of verse. The ear is the part of consciousness that first constitutes a temporal relation, because it recognizes similarity (*ingenium*) in the sequence of syllables, differentiates (*acumen*) them from other sequences, remembers (*memoria*) previous sequences, and anticipates (*praesagitio*) future ones. In short, the ear gives the text of the poem its time; the aesthetics of movement is based on the sensate judgment (*iudicium*) of the ear.

This discussion of meter may seem to be theoretically imprecise, but it proves to be extremely consistent with regard to the structure of literary discourse. The ear’s constant judgments about the lengths of syllables and their relations have a remarkable effect on how Baumgarten switches media to define

164 Campe, *Affekt und Ausdruck*, 68.

the concept of life. These judgments reverse, to a certain extent, the flow of the voice; they interrupt the spatial intuition of text by creating links between elements that project a temporal intuition onto it. In every individual act of consciousness, the ear projects the temporal form of intuiting the voice onto the spatial form of intuiting text. This occurs, for example, in the definition of end rhyme (see MED § 106), which Baumgarten does not derive from the acoustic figure of homoeoteuton but rather from the graphic figure of paronomasia finalis. In the same enumeration of such textual, or eye, rhymes, he treats the play with letters in acrostics and the phenomena that today fall under the general concept of visual poetry (*expressiones figurarum*). Every trace of the voice is missing from this argumentation because, for Baumgarten, stable repetition cannot exist without memory, and memory is only reflected in the space of text.

In this way, the ear actually reinstalls the spatial form of intuiting text, which was Baumgarten's starting point for analyzing the structure of literary discourse. Hans-Jost Frey posits this temporalization of space or, turned the other way round, spatialization of time – and the resulting simultaneity of the two forms of intuition, the spatial one for text and the temporal one for voice – as a condition for the rhythm of literary texts (see MED § 106). In going back to the model of walking, he emphasizes “that rhythm can only be constituted as an experience and that it therefore does not only depend on how one walks but also on the fact that there is someone who walks and on how he experiences his walking.”¹⁶⁵ With this “that” and “how,” Frey relates the temporal form of intuiting experience to the spatial form of intuiting text. “But this being swept along has an artificial structure as its precondition, a structure that, in creating expectations, stretches into the future of what is yet to come, and this structure, not rapture, is the distinguishing feature of the rhythmic.”¹⁶⁶ In his *Kollegium*, Baumgarten recalls an artform in which time and space have been related to one another since antiquity – dance: “Good feet and a well-structured posture are required from every single person, but they are required above all from female dancers who have the intention of pleasing us with the dexterity of their feet” (KOLL § 269; Man erfordert von einem jeden Menschen gute Füße und eine wohlgeordnete Stellung, man erfordert sie aber vorzüglich von einer Tänzerin, die den Vorsatz hat, uns durch die Geschicklichkeit ihrer Füße zu vergnügen). A good poem is like a good dance – one also finds this comparison in the *Meditationes*, where Baumgarten notes that the shepherds Damon and Al-

165 Hans-Jost Frey, *Vier Veränderungen über Rhythmus* (Basel: Engeler, 2000), 89.

166 Frey, *Vier Veränderungen über Rhythmus*, 107.

phesiboeus from the fifth of Virgil's *Eclogae* “will imitate the dancing satyrs” with their songs (MED § 109; *Saltantes Satyros imitabitur Alphesiboeus*).

With this comparison of literature to dance, Baumgarten attaches the physical reference model of movement – a model he needs to define the performative function of the structure of literary discourse – to a reference medium from the sphere of the arts that would rise to prominence under the rubric of representation (*Darstellung*) beginning in the 1770s. The relevant studies frequently refer to how Aristotle differentiates contemplation (*theoria*), action (*praxis*), and creation (*poiesis*), which Quintilian later builds on to divide the arts into the theoretical arts (like astronomy), the active arts (like dance), and the creative arts (like painting and poetry). Whereas the goal of creation lies outside of itself in the work (*ergon*), action is limited to carrying out the action itself (*energeia*). Because Baumgarten dismisses the reference medium of the image, the new reference medium of dance must have appeared particularly attractive to him. With it, he is able to establish the performativity of literature and attain a level of differentiation that no other theory of literature would be able to replicate for centuries.

4 Metaphysics

4.1 The Beautiful

4.1.1 Perfection

Baumgarten discovers not just the laws of sensate cognition but those of both sensate cognition *and* sensate desire, which are intrinsically tied together at the dark ground of the soul, where one would usually expect “the other” of reason. Moreover, he uncovers these laws in the poetic passages of literary texts, whose structure and functions he analyzes in the *Meditationes*. In analyzing literary discourse as perfect sensate discourse (*oratio sensitiva perfecta*), he becomes attentive to the metaphysical capacities of literature. Within the scope of this analysis, sensate cognition turns out to be aesthetic cognition. Baumgarten’s literary epistemology thus encompasses more than just rhetorical, semiotic, and poetological applications of his psychology. His epistemology also leads to questions about being, which belong to ontology; about the world, which belong to cosmology; and about God, which belong to natural theology. In his *Kollegium*, Baumgarten boils aesthetics down to its essence: “One could thus call aesthetics, due to some similarity, the metaphysics of beauty” (KOLL § 1; so könnte man die Ästhetik nach einiger Ähnlichkeit die Metaphysik des Schönen nennen). “For the world of the senses is,” as Gadamer formulates it, “not mere nothingness and darkness but the outflowing and reflection of truth.”¹ Today, anchoring literature in metaphysics is generally considered ideologically dubious, but Baumgarten’s analogical method alone clears him of all suspicion.² He does not become ensnared in the ideological traps that the metaphysics of art falls into at the end of the eighteenth century. This is in part because his aesthetics pursues what Carsten Zelle refers to as “paralogical objectives,”³ meaning that in the *Aesthetica*, the metaphysical attributes of perfection “have all already appeared in the guise of poetology or aesthetics before the concept of truth is theoretically treated.”⁴ In other words, Baumgarten continues to transfer his theoretical concepts from one discipline to another. The point is not, however, that

1 Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, ed. Garrett Barden and John Cumming (New York: Crossroad, 1975), 66.

2 See 2.2 Analogy.

3 Carsten Zelle, *Die doppelte Ästhetik der Moderne: Revisionen des Schönen von Boileau bis Nietzsche* (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1995), 70.

4 Scheer, *Einführung in die philosophische Ästhetik*, 70.

he develops a typology and metaphorology of truth in the *Aesthetica*; rather, it is that he confronts the beauty of literature with its sheer materiality, with the real. His investigation into the beauty of literature thus reveals itself to be an Urszene of the modern metaphysics of media.

Literature and beauty pivot around the concept of *perfectio*. What qualifies as completeness in rhetoric is perfection in metaphysics. In the *Meditationes*, this concept marks the difference between poetics and rhetoric since literature, in contrast to sensate discourse more generally, strives toward perfection:⁵ “**General rhetoric** may be defined as the science which treats generally of unperfected presentation of sensate representations, and **general poetics** as the science which treats generally of the perfected presentation of sensate representations” (MED § 117; *Iam quum perfecte hoc fieri possit & imperfecte, hoc doceret RHETORICA GENERALIS scientia de imperfecte repraesentationes sensitivas proponendo in genere, & illud POETICA GENERALIS scientia de perfecte proponendo repraesentationes sensitivas in genere*; see also MET § 533). Designating a discourse as literature presumes its perfection in a metaphysical sense, and only imperfect sensate discourse can be the object of descriptive rhetoric (see KOLL § 24), which is a historical discipline for analyzing a series of given examples. Describing perfect sensate discourse therefore requires a different method and a different discipline. In the *Meditationes*, the science of perfect sensate discourse is called poetics, and in the first edition of the *Metaphysica* from 1739, Baumgarten expands its scope to all forms of art: “The science of cognizing and presenting sensately is AESTHETICS, the science of sensate meditation and discourse aiming either for lesser perfection, RHETORIC, or greater perfection, UNIVERSAL POETICS” (MET1 § 533; *Scientia sensitive cognoscendi et proponendi est AESTHETICA, meditationis et orationis sensitivae vel minorem intendens perfectionem, RHETORICA, vel maiorem POETICA UNIVERSALIS*). In considering the *Meditationes* and the *Aesthetica* together, my contention is that the *Aesthetica* realizes precisely such a universal poetics by elaborating a holistic theory of literature.

In the *Aesthetica*, perfection in the realm of aesthetics is defined as beauty: “The goal of aesthetics is the perfection of sensate cognition as such (§ 1). This, however, is beauty (*Metaphysica* §§ 521, 662)” (AE § 14; *Aesthetices finis est perfectio cognitionis sensitivae, qua talis, §. 1. Haec autem est pulcritudo, Metaphysic. §. 521, 662*). This marks the crossroads where the discourses of beauty and

5 See 3.4.1 Complexity.

literature meet.⁶ Baumgarten cites Shaftesbury's *Sensus communis* (1709) to justify associating truth, beauty, and literature (see AE § 556).⁷ In Baumgarten, beauty does not just partially overlap with literature, as Kant later proposes in the *Kritik der Urteilskraft* when he refers to metaphorically produced beauty as a "symbol of the morally good."⁸ Instead, beauty is a constitutive quality of literature, which differentiates perfect sensate cognition from all other forms of sensate cognition. With his art of beautiful thinking (*ars pulcre cogitandi*), Baumgarten thus takes up a provocatively anachronistic position in the contemporaneous European discourses on beauty and art.

Whereas Bouhours and Jean-Baptiste Dubos, who both influenced Baumgarten, subject beauty to the *sensus communis* – and that means to the public's tastes – Baumgarten does not want to have anything to do with such democratic half measures. In the *Kollegium*, he argues that the well-known French treatises oriented toward the so-called *artes* cannot "exhaust" (KOLL § 1; erschöpfen) the problem of beauty. For he is not concerned with being moved by beauty but rather with the truth of beauty. Under this metaphysical premise, Baumgarten counters every "nescio quid" with the conviction that one has to be able to argue about taste (*elegantia*). He knows *what is* beautiful and *what is not* – namely the imperfect, which for him is ugly: "and the imperfection of sensate cognition as such is to be avoided (§ 1). This, however, is ugliness (*Metaphysica* §§ 521, 662)" (AE § 14; et cavenda eiusdem, qua talis, imperfectio, §. 1. Haec autem est deformitas, *Metaphysic.* §. 521, 662).

In the *Kollegium*, Baumgarten confirms that the perfection of cognition in general is the criterion for aesthetics in particular: "Aesthetics will have to have the perfection that cognition in general must have if it is to be perfect" (KOLL § 22; Die Ästhetik wird die Vollkommenheit haben müssen, die die Erkenntnis überhaupt haben muß, wann sie vollkommen sein soll). In the course of his reflections, he ties this demand for perfection back to *confusio*, the first function of the structure of literary discourse, by equating perfection with the abundance of marks. He even arithmetically calculates beauty through its degrees of perfection:

6 See Joachim Jacob, *Die Schönheit der Literatur: Zur Geschichte eines Problems von Gorgias bis Max Bense* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 2007).

7 See Third Earl of Shaftesbury (Anthony Ashley Cooper), "Sensus Communis, an Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour in a Letter to a Friend," in *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times*, ed. Lawrence E. Klein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 65.

8 Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, § 59.

Suppose I were thinking perfectly well in the low manner of thinking = 10 [perfections], in the middle manner of thinking = 100 [perfections], in the sublime manner of thinking I should reach 1000 [perfections], but I only reached them –100 [perfections] and –10 [perfections], then I would only have [890] perfections, which in all their mistakes would be, however, greater than the 100 perfections and the 10 perfections that I would have reached without mistakes in the other manners of thinking.

Gesetzt, ich dächte in der niedrigen Denkungsart = 10° vollkommen gut, in der mittleren = 100°, in der Erhabenen sollte ich 1000° erlangen, ich erlangte sie aber nur – 100° und – 10°, so hätte ich nur 89° Vollkommenheiten, die aber bei allen ihren Fehlern doch noch größer wären als jene 100 und als jene 10 Vollkommenheiten, die ich ohne Fehler in den anderen Denkungsarten erlanget hätte. (KOLL § 210)

Both the perfection of every cognition (*perfectio omnis cognitionis*) and, analogously, the beauty of sensate cognition (*pulcritudo cognitionis sensitivae*) are measured using the same rhetorical categories of style: abundance, greatness, truth, clarity, certitude, and life.⁹ With this analogy, Baumgarten presupposes, of course, a universal concept of beauty (*pulcritudo universalis*). Based on this concept, he opens, as Franke explains, a “discussion about the beauty of art within a field of problems” “that Kant then delimits terminologically through defining, on the one hand – teleologically justified – natural beauty and, on the other, artistic beauty.”¹⁰ In Baumgarten, this categorical division between natural and artistic beauty does not exist. The universal beauty of sensate cognition (*pulcritudo sensitivae cognitionis universalis*) is therefore measured like the particular beauty of singular phenomena using the same six categories of style. As Scheer puts it, the ontological predicates of being are made in the *Aesthetica* into conditions for the existence of beauty.¹¹

In part 1 of the *Metaphysica* on ontology (*ontologia*), Baumgarten accordingly grounds beauty in the three logical principles: the principle of contradiction, the principle of ground, and the principle of sufficient ground, which he then transfers to the *Aesthetica* (see AE § 426).¹² But instead of endorsing Benedetto Croce’s position that this Leibnizian inheritance demonstrates the antiquated-

⁹ See 2.2 Analogy.

¹⁰ Franke, *Kunst als Erkenntnis*, 79.

¹¹ See Scheer, *Einführung in die philosophische Ästhetik*, 70.

¹² See Hans Carl Finsen, “Evidenz und Wirkung im ästhetischen Werk Baumgartens: Texttheorie zwischen Philosophie und Rhetorik,” *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte* 70.2 (1996): 202.

ness of the *Aesthetica*,¹³ I will show that Baumgarten's ontology can shed new light on central concepts in his literary epistemology,¹⁴ in particular on his narratology, which I will discuss in chapter 5. In his ontology, he lists six predicates of being that are universally valid:

- Section I: The possible (*possibile*)
- Section II: The connected (*connectum*)
- Section III: A being (*ens*)
- Section IIII: The one (*unum*)
- Sections V–VI: The true (*verum*)
- Section VII: The perfect (*perfectum*)

In the following, I will discuss the three predicates of being italicized above; I will address the true later in this chapter¹⁵ and the possible in the context of his theory of fiction.¹⁶

In section 2 on the connected (*connectum*), Baumgarten adds another ontological justification for the structure of literary discourse to the three logical principles; this justification consists in the linking of the manifold elements or marks of an object.¹⁷ The series A, B, C thereby becomes a logical series: “The ground A of ground B is the ground of the consequence C. From the ground of B, it is possible to know why C is (§23); hence, A is the ground of C (§14)” (MET § 25; Ratio A rationis B, est ratio rationati C. Ex ratione τ8 B cognosci potest, cur C sit, §. 23. hinc A est ratio τ8 C. §. 14; see also MET § 33). In section 7 on the perfect (*perfectum*), Baumgarten defines precisely this linking as the agreement (*consensus*) of all elements within a structure: “If several things taken together constitute the sufficient ground of a single thing, they AGREE. The agreement itself is PERFECTIO, and the one thing in which there is agreement is the DETERMINING GROUND OF PERFECTION (the focus of the perfection)” (MET § 94; Si plura simul sumta unius rationem sufficientem constituunt, CONSENTIUNT, consensus ipse est PERFECTIO, et unum, in quod consentitur, RATIO PERFECTIONIS DETERMINANS (focus perfectionis)). This definition culminates in the concept of

13 See Benedetto Croce, *Storia dell'estetica per saggi* (Bari: Gius. Laterza & Figli, 1942), 93–122; Croce, “The *Aesthetica* of Baumgarten,” in *Philosophy, Poetry, History: An Anthology of Essays*, trans. Cecil Sprigge (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 427–450.

14 See 3 Epistemology. See also Angelica Nuzzo, “Determination, Determinability, and the Structure of *Ens*: Baumgarten's Ontology and Beyond,” in Fugate and Hymers, *Baumgarten and Kant on Metaphysics*, 23–41.

15 See 4.1.2 Truth.

16 See 5.3.1 Possibility.

17 See 3.4 Poetics.

a rule-bound structure: “Therefore, in perfection there is order (§78) and common rules of perfection (§86)” (MET § 95; ergo est in perfectione ordo, §. 78. et communes perfectionis regulae, §. 86). Since rhetorical figures and tropes prescribe the rules of perfection in the *Meditationes*, rhetorical and metaphysical perfection coincide.

In the *Metaphysica*, perfection is closely accompanied by the question of how the parts of a structure relate to a composite (compositum) whole. Whereas in section 4 on the one (unum), Baumgarten engages with this problem from a philosophical perspective, the *Aesthetica* is concerned with how elements relate to each other to form a unity in the structure of literary discourse. To put this ontological principle in a nutshell, *a lot* must become *one* for something to be not only quantitatively complete but also qualitatively perfect: “The universal beauty of sensate cognition will be (§ 14) (1) the agreement of thoughts [...] among themselves upon a single thing that is a phenomenon (§ 14; *Metaphysica* § 662)” (AE § 18; Pulcritudo cognitionis sensitivae erit universalis, §. 14. 1) consensus cogitationum [...] inter se ad unum, qui phaenomenon sit, §. 14. Metaphysic. §. 662). In a syntactic analysis of this passage, Schweizer convincingly argues that the “masculine ‘qui,’ which begins the relative clause, can only refer back to ‘consensus.’ The representations thus do not, as the ‘ad’ in the expression ‘ad unum’ at first leads one to expect, refer to something beyond themselves; rather, the unity that their ‘agreement’ is based on is equated with the phenomenon itself.”¹⁸ In his translation of the fourteenth paragraph – “[a]esthetices finis est perfectio cognitionis sensitivae qua talis” – Haverkamp even emphasizes that the apposition “qua talis” (as such) refers to “perfectio” and not to the genitive modifier “cognitionis sensitivae.”¹⁹ In this way, the grammar completes a self-reflexive turn with regard to beauty.²⁰ Both perfection in paragraph 14 and unity in paragraph 18 are set free from heteronomous points of reference (God, world, nature) because the elements of sensate cognition are linked among themselves (inter se), which encompasses both the relation of elements to one another (determinationes internae) and their relation to other objects (determinationes externae; see AE § 439). This allows Baumgarten to liberate beauty both from its task of imitating the world (mimesis)²¹ and from its duty to serve other systems like religion or morality. We have thus entered the realm of modern poesis in its emphatic sense.

¹⁸ Schweizer, *Ästhetik als Philosophie der sinnlichen Erkenntnis*, 38–39.

¹⁹ See Haverkamp, “Wie die Morgenröthe,” 15n23.

²⁰ See Finsen, “Evidenz und Wirkung im ästhetischen Werk Baumgartens,” 211.

²¹ See 5.3.2 Probability.

Yet between the parts and the whole of the perfect order there arises an enormous tension, indeed, a structural contradiction, which Baumgarten resolves in the *Aesthetica* in the sections on aesthetic abundance (*ubertas aesthetica*). There he posits that all rhetorical figures and tropes should strive for “copiousness, profusion, multitude, riches, and wealth” (AE § 115; *copia, abundantia, multitudo, divitiae, opes*). In these sections, he particularly exploits Pseudo-Longinus’s *On the Sublime* by relying, like Kant, on superlatives to describe the sublime. Here again, the most important thing is the abundance of marks, which distinguishes the sublime from the other types of style: “Thus, according to this scale of intensity, the most beautiful argument and figure will be one that at once makes the cognition of something else [...] richer and weightier and truer and clearer and more certain and more ardent (§ 22)” (AE § 142; *Erit itaque secundum hanc intensionis scalam argumentum et figura pulcherrima, quae cognitionem et locupletiolem, et graviolem et veriolem et clariolem et certiolem et ardentiolem alterius [...] simul efficiant, §. 22*).

As Schweizer explains, the concept *ubertas* “anticipates on the level of rhetorical instruction what is called ‘metaphysical’ and at the same time ‘real’ and ‘material’ truth in the context of the epistemological questions” (see AE § 424). He continues: “The ‘abundance’ of the manifest world cannot be even approximately grasped with either logical cognition or aesthetic cognition; it transcends all cognitive possibilities and appears on the level of the epistemological questions as a ‘metaphysical’ horizon of truth”²² such that “the rhetorical concept of ‘abundance’ is only used here as a symbol for the abundance of manifest reality in general.”²³

Yet in these same sections on aesthetic abundance (*ubertas aesthetica*), Baumgarten surprisingly demands a well-rounded brevity (*brevitas rotunda*), which he develops based on Cicero’s qualities of style. He already claims in the *Meditationes* that “it is poetic to omit certain details and more remote connections” (MED § 76; *quaedam determinantia & remotius connexa omittere poeticum*): “By **intrinsically** or **absolutely brief discourse** we mean that which has nothing in it that could be left out without loss of a degree of perfection. Such brevity, since it is proper to every discourse, is also proper to a poem, § 9” (MED § 74; *INTRINSECE sive ABSOLUTE BREVIS est ORATIO, cui nihil inest, quod salvo perfectionis gradu abesse posset. Talis brevitatis, quum sit omnis orationis, est etiam poematis §. 9*). Here Baumgarten takes up the classical oratorical ideal of brevity and combines it with the reflexive figure of the circle, a

22 Schweizer, *Ästhetik als Philosophie der sinnlichen Erkenntnis*, 48.

23 Schweizer, *Ästhetik als Philosophie der sinnlichen Erkenntnis*, 47.

symbol of perfection in the Neoplatonic tradition. To quote again from Schweizer, “The concept of ‘brevitas’ points, in contrast, to the individual act of sensate cognition and representation, to ‘intuition,’ which always only captures – visually speaking – a ‘round something’ in the fluctuating abundance of phenomena, whether it has to do with poetic, rhetorical expression or purely receptive acts of cognition.”²⁴

Aesthetic cognition thus has to “obtain at the same time both a pleasing round brevity (sections XIII–XIV) and beautiful coherence (§ 437)” (AE § 439: *et placentem simul rotundam illam brevitatem S. XIII. XIV. et pulcrum obtinebis cohaerentiam, §. 437*): “We may refer to every kind of thinking beautifully as seemly brevity (§ 160), that full and replete brevity (§ 158), not lacking, without gaps (§ 159), nevertheless frugal and sober (§ 164), not luxuriant or disreputable (§ 165), in a word, ROUND BREVITY” (AE § 166; *Brevitatem omne pulcre cogitandi genus decentem, §. 160, plenam illam et refertam, §. 158, non mancā, non hiulcam, §. 159. parcam tamen ac sobriam, §. 164, non luxuriantem aut maculosam, §. 165. uno nomine ROTUNDAM BREVITATEM dicere liceat*; see also AE § 657). Only this well-rounded brevity transfers the infinite curvature of the metaphysical line of beauty onto the formal conditions of literature in a structurally analogous way, which induces Baumgarten to a comparison with geodesy: “Just as the horizon appears now wider, now narrower in geography, so can my aesthetic horizon be contracted or broadened” (AE § 149; *Sicut in geographicis horizon apparet, nunc latior est, nunc angustior, ita meus horizon aestheticus potest contrahi, potest dilatari*). The horizon is curved as far as necessary to grasp the limitless aspects of such a unique object in its well-rounded unity (see AE § 561).

In rhetoric, both abundance and brevity are quantitatively measured either by the number of arguments (using the spatial form of intuition) or by the duration of a speech (using the temporal form of intuition). Is it sufficient to simply transform quantity into quality for the metaphysics of beauty? Since Baumgarten refrains from any concrete comment about the point at which beautiful brevity turns into ugly length, a different model than quantitative measurement appears conceivable, and I am, indeed, of the opinion that the double unity of abundance and brevity follows a different logic when Baumgarten deploys it as a model for beauty. In this model, determining abundance and brevity is not simply a matter of calculating more or fewer links. With aesthetic abundance, he assigns an eccentricity to the structure of literary discourse, and with brevity he

24 Schweizer, *Ästhetik als Philosophie der sinnlichen Erkenntnis*, 48.

places a concentricity at its side; without both of them, literature cannot be beautiful.

This model leads back again to rhetorical figures, the matrix of literature in Baumgarten's theory. Eccentricity and concentricity define the two sides of figures. This understanding of figures is based on the appetitive faculties. The sensate will, which Baumgarten conceptualizes in his psychology, defines the performative function of the structure of literary discourse in the context of his poetics. It is this function, which plays out sensate desire, that sets literature in motion. Every figure is performative since it can be conceived as a series (abundance).²⁵ Figures are then also eccentric since the first element of a figure – which has by definition at least two positions – desires the second, the second the third, and so forth, without this open structure ever arriving at the goal of this desire. But we can also think of a figure as a circle (brevity). Figures are concentric since their elements aim to arrange each other in a circle. In that closed form, all the elements have the same distance from the center of the circle.

The eccentricity and concentricity of literature make it a self-reflexive entity and produce, through the opposing movements, the ambiguity of literature. So far I have referred to the ambiguity of aesthetics to emphasize that Baumgarten's new science consists in both epistemology and media theory, but the concept of ambiguity also applies to the structure of literary discourse itself. Its "ambiguity is not a contingent but a constitutive dimension."²⁶ The ambiguity of an infinite finitude or a limited limitlessness positions beauty in an unresolvable tension between openness and closure. Achieved through the lower cognitive faculties, the beautiful remains "tied to a particular place and to a particular time";²⁷ the desire for beauty is a never-ending process, kept in motion in literature by the difference from the absolute. The tension between an existing form, on the one hand, and such an ambiguous beauty, on the other, culminates in the exclusion of sensation and perfection. In this context, one should once again recall the matrix of literature, the rhetorical figure.²⁸ Figures are structurally characterized by how they make two out of one in the repetition of their elements. In Baumgarten's theory of literature, figures thus form not only the core of poetics but also the core of metaphysics. So when Cassirer writes that "the beautiful is essentially and necessarily a symbol because, and to the extent that, it is split

²⁵ See 3.1.2 Desire; 3.4.3 Performativity.

²⁶ Frauke Berndt and Klaus Sachs-Hombach, "Dimensions of Constitutive Ambiguity," in *Ambiguity: Language and Communication*, ed. Susanne Winkler (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2015), 273.

²⁷ Schweizer, *Ästhetik als Philosophie der sinnlichen Erkenntnis*, 44.

²⁸ See 3.4.1 Complexity.

within itself, because it is always and everywhere unity and double,”²⁹ he seems to be thinking of Baumgarten.

4.1.2 Truth

Baumgarten’s metaphysics of beauty creates the riddle of this aesthetics since it leaves open not only the relation between perfection and sensate cognition but also the relation between its subjective and objective aspects.³⁰ Is he articulating a theory of aesthetic experience or an ontology of beauty?³¹ As Scheer demonstrates, the answer is both: “This twofold site of beauty in Baumgarten makes this thinker a transitional figure in aesthetics. Beauty is anchored objectively (in traditional ontology) and subjectively (in the functions of sensation).”³² While in his *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, Kant recognizes “not the perfection of any object” but rather nothing “but the subjective purposiveness of representations in the mind of the beholder,”³³ in Baumgarten, ontology and aesthetics are still two sides of the same coin: one side concerns the beauty of the object, the other the judgment of sensate taste (see MET § 640). The necessity of such a doubling lies in the ambiguity of aesthetics itself, which he brings into play with the doubling of cognition and representation (*Darstellung*).³⁴ Once this doubling is recognized, the strategy no longer seems problematic – except, apparently, to Baumgarten, who attempts to penetrate the beautiful surface of literature to its true depths. In the *Aesthetica*, this leads to the sections on aesthetic truth (*veritas aesthetica*), where the concept of beauty cedes all its functions to the concept of aesthetic truth,³⁵ and aesthetic truth becomes the focus of the philosopher’s enormous efforts to resolve the ambiguity of aesthetics.

29 Ernst Cassirer, “The Problem of the Symbol and Its Place in the System of Philosophy (1927),” in *The Warburg Years*, 255.

30 See Anna-Maria C. Bartsch, *Form und Formalismus: Stationen der Ästhetik bei Baumgarten, Kant und Zimmermann* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2017), 35–91.

31 See Franke, *Kunst als Erkenntnis*, 89.

32 Scheer, *Einführung in die philosophische Ästhetik*, 78. See also Alexander Aichele, “Wahrheit – Gewissheit – Wirklichkeit: Die systematische Ausrichtung von A. G. Baumgartens Philosophie,” in Aichele and Mirbach, “Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten,” 13–36; Armin Emmel, “Logische, ästhetische und metaphysische Wahrheit bei Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten,” in *Identität – Logik – Kritik: Festschrift für Ulrich Pardey zum 65. Geburtstag*, ed. Benedikt Fait and Daniela Zumpf (Berlin: LIT, 2014), 211–242.

33 Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, § 15.

34 See 2.1 Ambiguity.

35 See Schweizer, *Ästhetik als Philosophie der sinnlichen Erkenntnis*, 40.

In the *Kollegium*, Baumgarten uses an illustration of his typology of truth to discuss the traditional metaphysical premises of truth. He includes his own new position in this schema with yet another etymologically created neologism: *veritas aestheticologica* (Fig. 1: KOLL § 424).




Fig. 1

The opposition of *metaphysica obiectiva* and *subiectiva* concerns the relationship of objective and subjective aesthetics. While objective, real, or material truth (*veritas realis, materialis*) is based on the ontological unity of the manifold,³⁶ subjective truth refers to a concept of the subject similar to the one used in rationalist epistemology. Subjective truth can therefore be called mental truth (*veritas mentalis*) or the logical truth of affinity, correspondence, and conformity (*veritas logica afficientiae, correspondentiae et conformitatis*) if it is achieved through the higher cognitive faculties; subjective truth is aesthetic truth if it is achieved through the lower cognitive faculties. There are no universal concepts (*universalia*) for knowing aesthetic truths but rather only singular terms (*individua*).³⁷ The more particular something is, the more complex and true it is, too, such that the singular truth (*veritas singularis*) of perceptions increases from the genus to the species to the individual: “the first [perception] is of the true, the second is of the truer, and the third is of the truest (§ 440)” (AE § 441; *Prima veri, secunda verioris, tertia verissimi. §. 440*). Given this presupposition, Baumgarten is faced with the problem of justifying aesthetic truth with regard to logical truth. The easiest way for him to do so is by referring to the dif-

³⁶ See 4.1.1 Perfection; 4.2 The Real.

³⁷ See 3.4.1 Complexity.

ferent ratios for mixing aesthetic and logical truth. On the one hand, what is aesthetically true is often also logically true (see AE § 427); on the other, aesthetic parts contribute to a logically true whole (see AE § 428).

Aestheticological truth is further differentiated into general and singular aestheticological truth (see AE § 440), depending on whether it refers to universal concepts or singular terms:

It will be preferable, however, to repeat the degrees of aestheticological truth somewhat more deeply for more serious supporters [of aesthetics]. The smallest aestheticological truth is the smallest perception of the smallest metaphysical truth. Hence (1) the richer, (2) the greater and worthier, (3) the more precise, (4) the clearer and more distinct, (5) the more certain and firmer, (6) the more fiery the perception of an object is, (7) the more things the object itself encompasses, (8) the greater and weightier the things it encompasses, (9) the stronger the standards according to which it encompasses, (10) the more consistent the things it encompasses, so much greater is the aestheticological truth (§ 437; *Metaphysica* § 184).

Praestabit autem severioribus veritatis fautoribus aestheticologicae gradus altius nonnihil repetere. Minima est minima perceptio veritatis metaphysicae minimae. Hinc 1) quo uberior, 2) quo maior et dignior, 3) quo exactior, 4) quo clarius et distinctior, 5) quo certior et solidior, 6) quo ardentior est perceptio obiecti, 7) quo hoc plura, 8) quo maiora ac graviora, 9) quo fortioribus regulis, 10) quo convenientiora complectitur, hoc maior est veritas aestheticologica, §. 437. M. §. 184. (AE § 556)

In this passage, Baumgarten switches – and this has escaped notice in the scholarship – to a theory of fiction in which he concretizes what is aesthetically or logically true in a poetic world.³⁸ But since I would first like to remain on the abstract level of concepts before I take up this problem in chapter 5 on narratology, I will only discuss a brief example here. The cover of this book displays the painting *Artus reitet* from Dieter Asmus's *Parzival-Zyklus* (2011). In this painting, King Arthur and his armed entourage are riding through a field of giant poppies. The horses are logically true, and so is the historical background. The magnificent poppies are aesthetically true, as is the mythological background and the connotation of sleep and death, which makes the poppy a chthonic-maternal symbol in Arthur's rite of passage. By contrast, the proportions of the knights and poppies are logically and aesthetically false. Would this image not be a perfect emblem for Baumgarten's own adventure in facing poetry? But if we turn away for now from this theory of fiction to literature's linguistic nature, we can understand the relation of logical and aesthetic truth in a more general manner, since language has both logical and aesthetic aspects. Grammar is re-

³⁸ See 5.3.1 Possibility.

sponsible for the logical truth of literature; the pre-predicative phenomena of poetic passages, such as figurality, phonetics, and rhythm, are responsible for its aesthetic truth.³⁹

The compound attribute *aestheticologicus* has to reconcile reason and sensation within subjective truth. Aestheticological truth is a kind of truth “in which aesthetic intuition and logical distinction are combined into a unity or [...] in which the difference between ‘aesthetic’ and ‘logical’ has not yet even become relevant.”⁴⁰ In any case, the difference between aesthetics and logic does not concern the hierarchy of reason and sensation or the different relations between the aesthetic and logical components of truth (see AE §§ 427–428). It is rooted, rather, in the problem that aesthetic and logical truth must be oriented toward one and the same absolute: the logical truth of the whole (*veritas totius logica*). Baumgarten does not leave any room for doubt that aestheticological truth is always deficient in comparison to the highest form of truth, logical truth, which can only be intuited by God. Aestheticological truth is, by contrast, human and thus imperfect (see AE § 57).

In the end, Baumgarten is actually not interested in logical truth at all but only in aesthetic truth. In analyzing aestheticological truth, he is concerned with an indirect mode of truth only possible in aesthetic truth:

We only note this: that truth, insomuch as it is intellectual, is not sought directly by the aesthetician; if it emerges indirectly out of many aesthetic truths or coincides with something that is aesthetically true, the rational aesthetician can congratulate himself on this (§ 38). Yet this is not what he was chiefly seeking (§ 423).

Hoc unum observamus, veritatem ab aethetico, quatenus intellectualis est, non directo intendi, si per indirectum ex veritatibus aetheticis pluribus una prodeat, aut cum aethetice vero coincidat, de illo sibi gratulari aetheticum rationalem, §. 38. neque tamen illud esse, quod nunc potissimum quaerebatur, §. 423. (AE § 428)

The concept *aestheticologicus* thus acts as a placeholder in the discourse on truth. The logical part of the concept provides temporary assistance and serves at the same time as a nod to the rationalist tradition, but its main purpose is to allow Baumgarten to proceed as quickly as possible to engaging with aesthetic truth:

Of the general aestheticological truths, the aesthetic ones are those that can – and they are aesthetic only insofar as they can – be represented sensately by the analogon of reason without losing their beauty (§§ 440, 423), either manifestly and explicitly, or cryptically

³⁹ See 4.2.1 Materiality.

⁴⁰ Schweizer, *Ästhetik als Philosophie der sinnlichen Erkenntnis*, 42.

in the omitted assertions of enthymemes, or in examples, in which, just as in concrete things, these abstract things are detected.

Veritatum aestheticologicarum generalium eae tantum aestheticae sunt, quae et quatenus analogo rationis, salva venustate, sensitive repraesentari possunt, §. 440, 423. vel manifesto, et explicite, vel cryptice in omissis enthymematum enunciationibus, vel in exemplis, in quibus, tanquam concretis, haec abstracta deprehendantur. (AE § 443)

With *aestheticologicus*, Baumgarten thus brings together metaphysics, epistemology, and rhetoric by positing that the sensate operations of the analogon of reason are responsible for producing aesthetic truth.

But this raises the question of how the indirect mode of aesthetic truth is consistent with the certain intuition of beauty, which is the only way it is available to cognition. The truth of literature is, according to Baumgarten, beautifully evident. In section 50 on aesthetic evidentia (evidentia aesthetica) – which belongs to the sections on aesthetic persuasion (persuasio aesthetica) – he therefore outlines the concept of an evidentia that is defined by the attributes *aesthetica*, *bella*, *pulcra*, or *sensitiva*. As I discussed above, evidentia plays an important role in Baumgarten’s literary theory since it defines two of the three functions of the structure of literary discourse: opacity in the tradition of enargeia and performativity in the tradition of energeia.⁴¹ But in addition to these rhetorically anchored concepts, evidence also has a metaphysical dimension, which is based on Cartesian logic. Baumgarten introduces evidence in the *Metaphysica* as follows: “The clearer, livelier, more distinct and more certain is knowledge, the greater it is. A PERCEPTION having the certitude of another as a corollary, and ITS POWER, is either PERSUASIVE or CONVINCING. Certain perspicuity is EVIDENCE” (MET § 531; Quo clarior, quo vividior, quo distinctior, quo certior cognitio est, hoc maior est. PERCEPTIO certitudinem alterius habens pro corollario, & VIS EIUS, est vel PERSUASORIA, vel CONVINCENS. Certa perspicuitas est EVIDENTIA).

In this context, Baumgarten first juxtaposes intellectual evidence and sensate evidentia and differentiates sensate certitude (certitudo sensitiva) through persuasion from rational certitude through conviction (convictio): “Sense certitude is PERSUASION, whereas intellectual certitude is CONVICTION” (MET § 531; Certitudo sensitiva est PERSUASIO, intellectualis CONVICTIO). When he later defines evidentia in the *Aesthetica*, he reconfirms this difference between intellectual evidence and sensate evidentia, “which others call a demonstration for the eye, for the senses, and palpable, the analogue of an intellectually convincing demonstration” (AE § 847; quam alii demonstrationem ad oculum, ad

⁴¹ See 3.4.2 Opacity; 3.4.3 Performativity.

sensus, et palpabilem dixerint, demonstrationis intellectualiter convincentis analogon). Such bella evidentia is immediately accessible and intuitive. That this definition of sensate evidentia is analogous to that of intellectual evidence once again reaffirms Baumgarten's analogical method:

However much more clearly, yet sensately so (§ 614), hence however much more vividly (§ 619), however many more and greater truths are set up before the eyes of the mind by persuading your personal objects, so much greater will the persuasion be, and so much greater the evidentia that will accompany it (*Metaphysica* § 880).

Quo clarius, sensitive tamen, §. 614 hinc quo vividius, §. 619. quo plures, quo maiores veritates persuadendo sistuntur objectis tuis personalibus ob oculos mentis: hoc maior erit persuasio, hoc maior eam comitabitur evidentia, M. §. 880. (AE § 853)

Campe argues that in addition to the tension between logic and rhetoric, Baumgarten repeats the “doubling of intuition and rhetoric” on the side of sensate evidentia by differentiating between visual figures in the sections on aesthetic light (*lux aesthetica*) and figures of intentionality in the sections on aesthetic persuasion (*persuasio aesthetica*). The former aim for a “certitude that is due to attention in the representation,” and the latter for a “certitude that lies in the intention of the representation.”⁴² Contrary to Campe, I think this differentiation has a different force, one that is mainly based on how Baumgarten distinguishes within evidentia between enargeia and energieia, and thus describes the function of opacity in the context of the cognitive faculties and the function of performativity in the context of the appetitive faculties.

With regard to literature, Baumgarten assigns opacity to the field of viscosity and performativity to the field of affectivity. He accordingly differentiates between visual evidentia, which he discusses in the sections on aesthetic light (*lux aesthetica*), and affective evidentia, which he treats in the sections on aesthetic persuasion (*persuasio aesthetica*). Visual evidentia places something before the eyes of the mind, producing sensate perspicuity, while affective evidentia moves and touches. Of course, we cannot be certain about this differentiation, since Baumgarten abandoned the *Aesthetica* at this point and did not complete the sections on aesthetic persuasion (*persuasio aesthetica*) where he would have defined bella evidentia as affective evidentia; but I think he would have had to turn there to performative figures related to the voice.⁴³

In any case, visual evidentia depends on the rhetorical figures and tropes responsible for sensate perspicuity. Especially the figures of allegory and descrip-

⁴² Campe, “Der Effekt der Form,” 33. See 6.3.2 Parrhesia.

⁴³ See 3.4.3 Performativity.

tio prove to be particularly productive for metaphysics. In this respect, Campe offers insightful remarks on the origin and redeployment of descriptio: “When Baumgarten calls the perfection of the aesthetic object its complete determination, he constructs the fundamental concept framing the sensate cognition of aesthetics based on visual descriptio of baroque provenance. Nowhere is it clearer that rhetoric is absorbed into some of its concepts in the eighteenth century.”⁴⁴ Campe’s suggestion that Baumgarten must have been reserving *bella evidentialia* for the figures “that are not tropes, that is, for syntactic, tonal, and morphological figures,”⁴⁵ must, however, be rejected in light of my earlier analysis of figures and tropes,⁴⁶ both of which induce *bella evidentialia*. For the whole canon of style is responsible for both the visual and the affective *evidentialia* of beauty.

4.1.3 Twilight

The search for truth leads into a fog (nebula; see AE § 451). It is a fog that results from the necessity of using metaphors instead of concepts in this philosophical context. By employing figures and tropes, Baumgarten’s own discourse makes *bella evidentialia* beautifully evident. And in total, the *Aesthetica* contains more sections on metaphorology than on the typology of truth. Altogether, this suggests that it would be productive to read some paragraphs of the *Aesthetica* located at the intersection between psychology, rhetoric, and metaphysics as literature – with just as much attention to their techniques of representation as to their propositional content. In particular, the epistemological metaphors of light running through the *Aesthetica* express what Baumgarten expects from the metaphysics of beauty. These metaphors culminate in the sections on aesthetic light (*lux aesthetica*).

Bella evidentialia appears at “dawn” (KOLL § 7; *Dämmerung*). The truth of beauty is thereby measured against the logical ideal of reason, which shines brightly like the sun (*sol*; see AE § 616). Baumgarten turns away from this rationalistic ideal and looks for the beautiful not in the bright sun but rather in the waning night, the realm of shadows. Especially in the third part of the *Metaphysica* on psychology (*psychologia*), he views darkness as the anthropological foundation of aesthetics: “There are obscure perceptions in the soul (§ 510). The collection of these perceptions is called the FOUNDATION OF THE SOUL”

⁴⁴ Campe, “Vor Augen Stellen,” 209.

⁴⁵ Campe, “*Bella Evidentialia*,” 253.

⁴⁶ See 3.4.2 Opacity.

(MET § 511; Sunt in anima perceptiones obscurae, §. 510. Harum complexus FUNDUS ANIMAE dicitur). Dark or obscure representations are those that do not draw any distinct contours between marks but instead blur marks together: “Therefore, one who is confusedly thinking something represents some things obscurely” (MET § 510; Ergo confuse quid cogitans quaedam obscure repraesentat).⁴⁷ Baumgarten draws a very clear correlation between the concepts *confusus* and *obscurus*, which means that nondistinct sensate representations belong to the realm of darkness (regnum tenebrarum), for which the lower cognitive faculty is responsible: “Hence the faculty of knowing something obscurely and confusedly, or indistinctly, is the INFERIOR COGNITIVE FACULTY. Therefore, my soul has an inferior cognitive faculty (§57, 216)” (MET § 520; Unde FACULTAS obscure confuseque seu indistincte aliquid cognoscendi COGNOSCITIVA INFERIOR est. Ergo anima mea habet facultatem cognoscitivam inferiorem, §. 57, 216; see also MET § 518).

This model literally paints things in black and white: here is the sphere of reason and light (*perspicuitas*, *lux*), and there the sphere of sensation and darkness (*obscuritas*, *caligo*). Although Baumgarten vindicates darkness with reference to nature (*obscuritas naturae*; see AE § 653), he rejects it when he is concerned with literature “since the lack and opposite of clarity is *obscurity*” (AE § 631; Defectus et oppositum lucis ac claritatis quum sit *obscuritas*). Whatever contains a flaw like that of darkness cannot be perfect or beautiful. He therefore repeatedly juxtaposes beautiful perspicuity (*bella perspicuitas*) with ugly darkness. So, unlike the models of the unconscious that build on Herder, Baumgarten’s *Aesthetica* does not affirm irrational darkness. Instead, like Leibniz and Wolff, Baumgarten conceives of the dark processes of the soul from the perspective of the rational:⁴⁸

Our soul is made in such a way (which one would not realize from the improvements in psychology) that an astonishing quantity of representations remain dark in its foundation but often reach a low degree of darkness and simultaneously latch onto the realm of clarity. [...] The realm of clarity and this field of dark representations, which moves somewhat toward the realm of clarity, together provide a broad field for the beautiful spirit.

Unsere Seele ist so beschaffen (welches man vor der Verbesserung der Psychologie nicht bemerkte), daß eine erstaunende Menge von Vorstellungen im Grunde derselben dunkel bleiben, daß sie aber oft zu einem geringen Grade der Dunkelheit gelangen und sich gleichsam an das Reich der Klarheit anhängen. [...] Das Reich der Klarheit und dieses Feld

⁴⁷ See 3.4.1 Complexity. See also Frauke Berndt, “In the Twilight Zone: Ambiguity and Aesthetics in Baumgarten,” in *Amphibolie – Ambiguität – Ambivalenz*, ed. Berndt and Stephan Kammer (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2009), 121–136.

⁴⁸ See Adler, “Fundus Animae,” 202.

der dunklen Vorstellungen, das etwas an das Reich der Klarheit anrückt, geben zusammen genommen ein weites Feld für den schönen Geist. (KOLL § 80)

Since neither similarities nor differences can be made out in dark representations, completely dark sensate representations are incompatible with Baumgarten's theoretical presuppositions. He therefore suspects beauty to be somewhere between light and darkness, a transition that he not only characterizes as temporal but also as a spatially intermediate realm – a realm that opens up between the heavenly domain and the foundation of the soul:

Our opponents say that confusion is the mother of error; let us extend the metaphor; a mother cannot always give birth, so confusion also cannot always produce errors. In nature, it is not now night and then bright day follows immediately after, but rather there is a dawn in between them. So we do not immediately have the bright day of knowledge, but rather confusion comes in between as the dawn.

Unsere Gegner sagen, die Verwirrung ist die Mutter des Irrtums; lasset uns die Metapher fortsetzen; eine Mutter darf nicht immer gebären, so darf auch die Verwirrung nicht immer Irrtümer hervorbringen. In der Natur ist nicht jetzt Nacht, und dann folgt gleich heller Mittag, sondern es ist eine Dämmerung dazwischen. So haben wir nicht gleich hellen Mittag der Kenntnis, sondern die Verwirrung als die Dämmerung ist dazwischen. (KOLL § 7; see also MET § 511)

“Nature does not leap from obscurity into distinctiveness” (AE § 7; *natura non facit saltum ex obscuritate in distinctionem*). With this statement, Baumgarten justifies the metaphor of dawn, which stands for ambiguity. Yet such an ambiguity – an equivocality located between perspicuity and darkness, between clear explicitness and dark indeterminateness – could not have been his intention. If he had related aesthetic truth to logical truth using the times of day as a model and assigned a directional vector to this relationship – from the night through sunrise to midday (*ex noctis per auroram meridies*; see AE § 7) – then such a model would represent the unavoidable end of aesthetics' autonomy from logic, since every sunrise would be a step on the path toward midday.

His defense of dawn with respect to midday therefore turns out to be somewhat complicated: “We also do not seek it [confusion] because it is confused but rather because it is vivid; let us give an example from theology: God seeks the sinner but not because he is a sinner” (KOLL § 7; *Wir suchen sie [die Verwirrung] auch nicht, weil sie verworren ist, sondern weil sie lebhaft ist; und dürfen wir ein Exempel aus der Theologie geben: Gott sucht den Sünder, aber nicht weil er ein Sünder ist*). Dawn is thus not a particularly apt metaphor for *bella evidentia*, since the model of the times of day relates dawn and midday to one another in a temporal continuum. This model does not adequately represent beauty be-

cause ambiguity is not a rhetorical vice but rather the most dignified aesthetic quality.

From an epistemological perspective, Baumgarten is well able to establish the autonomy of aesthetics from logic. Sensate representations are not distinct but confused, not obscure but clear, not intensively clear but extensively clear. These differentiations guide the light metaphors in the prolegomena of the *Aesthetica*. But in the sections on aesthetic light (*lux aesthetica*), they move away from a kind of provisional solution like dawn to a much more sophisticated model of light:

Section XXXVII: Aesthetic light (*lux aesthetica*)

Section XXXVIII: Aesthetic darkness (*obscuritas aesthetica*)

Section XXXVIII: Aesthetic shadow (*umbra aesthetica*)

Section XXXX: The right dispensation of light and shadow (*iusta lucis et umbrae dispensatio*)

In this shading of aesthetic light, Baumgarten posits that the light and darkness of sensation are not located between the night and day of reason but are, instead, different from its light and darkness:

Since the lack and opposite of clarity is *obscurity*, but light and clarity are either sensitive or intellectual (section XXXVII), the ancients already distinguished quite rightly between obscurity *kat' aisthesin* [according to sensation] and obscurity *kata noesin* [according to intellection]. The thing and thought that, when it is to be perceived by the senses, does not have enough clarity, meaning extensive clarity, or aesthetic light, is obscure *kat' aisthesin* [according to sensation].

Defectus et oppositum lucis ac claritatis quum sit *obscuritas*, lux autem et claritas vel sensitiva, vel intellectualis, S. XXXVII. rectissime iam veteres obscuritatem κατ' αἰσθησιν ab obscuritate κατὰ νοῆσιν distinxerunt. Res et cogitatio, quae sensitive percipienda non satis claritatis, extensivae scilicet, aestheticaeque lucis habet, est obscura κατ' αἰσθησιν. (AE § 631)

A different light than that of the sun of logic shines in the realm of aesthetics. Sensate light (*lux sensitiva*) does not shine less brightly than the sun but differently because it involves a kind of indirect illumination (see AE § 617). This twilight does not lead from the domain of aesthetics into the domain of logic because the world of twilight is a different one than that of logic. This indirect light is suited to the specific structure of aesthetic cognition; it is the illumination technique of extensively clear representations, from which arises the opacity of literature.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ See 3.4.2 Opacity.

Baumgarten differentiates in this indirectly produced light between absolute and relative aesthetic light. Whereas absolute light shines on the metaphysical goal of all cognition, aesthetic cognition takes place in relative light. It appears in the complex, opaque, and performative structure of literary discourse. This relative light strives toward a goal that it necessarily fails to meet (see AE § 617). In opposition to active luminosity, aesthetic light only passively reflects absolute light. This brilliance radiates from a body that does not glow itself but rather is only shined upon:

And so all aesthetic light you directly strive for will be the sensate perspicuity of things, the extension of clarity through the multitude of marks (§ 617), and indeed absolute, certainly comparative, the brilliance and splendor of vivid thoughts and matter (*Metaphysica* § 531).

Omnis itaque lux aethetica, quam in rebus intendas directo, perspicuitas rerum erit sensitiva, claritatis per multitudinem notarum extensio, §. 617. etiam absoluta, comparativa vero vividarum cogitationum et materiae nitor ac splendor. M. §. 531. (AE § 618)

In an open appropriation of Quintilian's terms,⁵⁰ Baumgarten introduces two types of beautiful cognition (*cognitio pulcra*): simple, clear, and distinct (*genus dilucidum et perspicuum*) on the one hand, and brilliant and splendid on the other (*genus nitidum et splendidum*; see AE § 625). Only the second type possesses the splendor of beauty, with which he revives the medieval idea of beauty as splendor veritas; Hegel will later inherit this metaphor from Baumgarten. With complexity, brilliance increases less in intensity than in extensity and thereby reaches its splendor; for this, Baumgarten uses the attribute *praegnans*:⁵¹ "Pregnant perceptions (*Metaphysica* § 517), and complex ones too (*Metaphysica* § 530) if all else is equal, themselves shine more than those that are less complex, and can become arguments that are illustrative of the whole meditation they undertake (§ 730)" (AE § 732; *Perceptiones praegnantes*, M. §. 517. et complexae, M. §. 530. et ipsae, caetera si fuerint paria, magis splendent, quam minus complexae, et totius, quam ingrediuntur, meditationis possunt argumenta fieri illustrantia, §. 730).

The differentiation between absolute and relative aesthetic light also finds its way into aesthetic darkness. If it is absolute, Baumgarten speaks pejoratively of aesthetic darkness; if it is relative, he speaks of aesthetic shadow, which he universally characterizes positively in contrast to darkness and pure night (*nox*; see AE § 634). He conceives of six rules for using the art of shading (*ars*

⁵⁰ See Quint., *Inst.* 8.2–3.

⁵¹ See Gottfried Gabriel, "Baumgartens Begriff der 'perceptio praegnans' und seine systematische Bedeutung," in Aichele and Mirbach, "Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten," 61–71.

obumbrandi), which playfully dips beauty into twilight by means of the appropriate illumination (see AE §§ 657–662). With the relationship of absolute light and relative brightness, absolute darkness and relative shadows, he draws on a comparison that strongly associates *bella evidētia* with a deficiency. But it is a constitutive deficiency: like a painting that only becomes visible in the interplay of brightness and shadow, neither absolute light nor absolute darkness appear in literary texts (see AE § 635). That is the result of Baumgarten's analysis of a poem by Catullus:

It is true for all beauty just as for painting, provided that all things are conspicuous through the light we called absolute, that not all things but rather only certain things that are comparatively bright

*[shine with a] face as bright as a flower in bud –
white parthenium blossom or
golden yellowish poppy.*⁵² (Catull.)

Certain things are truly, are suitably clear, although whenever they are compared to brilliant and exceedingly illuminated things, they appear opaque, and at first glance they are judged coarse (§ 621). Not everything but *many things shine* elegantly in a poem (Hor.; § 625).

Verum in omni venustate generatim, sicut in pictura, modo sint omnia luce, quam absolutam diximus, conspicua, non omnia, sed quaedam tantum, comparative lucida

*Ore floridulo nitent,
Alba parthenice velut,
Luteumve papaver,* Cat.

quaedam sunt vere, sunt belle perspicua, quanquam, cum nitidis illis et admodum collustratis ubi comparentur, appareant opaca, quaeque primo obtutu iudicentur horrida, §. 621. Eleganter, non omnia, sed *plura nitent in carmine*. Hor. §. 625. (AE § 624)

The idea of uniform direct light does not do justice to beauty; what does, rather, is a play of reflected light arising from the quick oscillation of brightness and shadows. The literary text thus becomes a simulacrum – a will-o'-the-wisp whose luminosity flits back and forth.

While Baumgarten does not coin a special metaphor for this, Meier does so in the *Anfangsgründe aller schönen Wissenschaften* (1748). With the help of the metaphor of granularity, he explains the *evidētia* of pregnant concepts (*conceptus praegnantēs*): “Such concepts, which are, as it were, pregnant, give rise to the granularity [das Körnichte] of our thoughts. As often as one thinks about them, one discovers something new in them that one had not perceived before, and one must speedily, so to speak, make an extensive commentary on them.”⁵³

⁵² Quoted (with modification) from Gaius Valerius Catullus, *The Poems of Catullus: A Bilingual Edition*, trans. Peter Green (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 61.186–188.

⁵³ Meier, *Anfangsgründe aller schönen Wissenschaften*, vol. 1, § 126.

The metaphor of granularity also stands for the structure of literary discourse, which Baumgarten defines as a spatiotemporal composition. The entry on *körnicht* in the Grimm dictionary defines the word as meaning “*made up of grains, in a granular form*” and quotes, among others, a cosmological example: “the ‘.’ shapes whose parts are strung together in a crystalline or granular manner. Humboldt *kosm.* 1, 165. *frequently together with another adj. such as* groszkörnicht, kleinkörnicht, grobkörnig, feinkörnig, vollkörnig, wahnkörnig *etc.*”⁵⁴ The attribute *granular* thus refers to a structure whose fragments variously refract light. In a certain way, *bella evidentia* also appears in a granular manner, that is, iridescently. Although Baumgarten never traveled and also does not qualify as a connoisseur of art, he is apparently well acquainted with the staging of light (light sources, light modeling, etc.) in landscape painting when he describes the truth of literature as analogous to the truth of a painted landscape (see AE § 624; indeed, the *Aesthetica* would go on to influence eighteenth-century visual art).⁵⁵ There he is fascinated by the change between illuminated and unilluminated spots; and it is the relations that arise precisely through this contrast – and not, for example, the relations between what is depicted – that give rise to the effect of the “whole” image; the effect, mind you, and nothing more, since in its complexity, opacity, and performativity, literature always remains granular.

When Baumgarten finally comes to a model of *bella evidentia*, he finds it in the process of indirect illumination, which is just as different from the darkness of the *fundus animae* and the sunlight of reason as it is from the idea of becoming enlightened through a transition from darkness to light. Aesthetic light does not shine uniformly, nor do single points always glow and others never; instead, they shimmer in the permanent fluctuation of brightness and shadows. Neither the brightest spot nor the darkest point reveals the beauty of literature because literature must remain a thing of the twilight. The metaphors of light thus confirm the principle of ambiguity at the core of the metaphysics of beauty, which situates the order of perfection between abundance and brevity in a constitutive structural ambiguity. Baumgarten discovers that “*unavoidable spin-off effect of a*

54 Jacob Grimm and Wilhelm Grimm, *Deutsches Wörterbuch* (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1873), s.v. “körnicht.” See also Johann Christoph Adelung, *Grammatisch-kritisches Wörterbuch der Hochdeutschen Mundart, mit beständiger Vergleichung der übrigen Mundarten, besonders aber der Oberdeutschen*, 2nd ed., vol. 2 (Leipzig: Johann Gottlob Immanuel Breitkopf, 1796), s.vv. “Körnicht,” “Körnig.”

55 See Andreas Jürgensen, “Der ästhetische Horizont: Baumgartens Ästhetik und Malerei um die Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts” (Diss., Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, 1993).

superordinate tendency or evolution towards higher autoreferentiality” discernible in beauty, whose ambiguity is the signature of modernity.⁵⁶

4.2 The Real

4.2.1 Materiality

The order of perfection is ambiguous, and the truth of literature appears in the twilight. This ambiguity of beauty, which extends Baumgarten’s literary epistemology into metaphysics, depends on the concept *phaenomenon*. In his analysis of perfection and different lighting conditions, his attention repeatedly turns to the materiality of literature. For the path, or rather the detour, to beauty always has to go through the sheer material of signification. Every rhetorical figure or trope clothes (vestire) a representation as if with a fabric (see AE § 565), which he seems to think of less as a beautifully falling garment than as a veritable web. On the basis of this radical materialization of beauty, of all the great nineteenth-century works on aesthetics, only Hegel can really be compared with Baumgarten. When Hegel defines art in his *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik* as a form of consciously interpreting the world through a representation whose task is to make truth evident, he emphasizes precisely the materiality of art that is so central in Baumgarten. His aesthetics thus points toward the future of a consolidating modernity.⁵⁷ Paying attention to the fact that literature always appears in the materiality of its signs, he invents the first metaphysics of media; in Baumgarten’s articulation, it is not a general metaphysics of media but rather a metaphysics of literature.

With the concept *phaenomenon*, Baumgarten is concerned with how only something “that is a phenomenon (§ 14)” (AE § 18; *qui phaenomenon sit*, §. 14) can be beautiful. He first establishes the dependence of beauty on phenomenality in his *Metaphysica*.⁵⁸ In paragraph 662 – which he refers to in paragraphs 14 and 18 of the *Aesthetica*, the central paragraphs on beauty in that work – he defines beauty as follows: “The perfection that is a phenomenon *<perfectio phae-*

56 Christoph Bode, “The Aesthetics of Ambiguity,” in *Actas del XII Congreso Nacional de la Asociación Española de Estudios Anglo-Norteamericanos: Alicante, 19–22 de Diciembre de 1988* (Granada: AEDEAN, 1991), 79.

57 See Scheer, *Einführung in die philosophische Ästhetik*, 123.

58 See Franke, *Kunst als Erkenntnis*, 76–116; Schweizer, *Ästhetik als Philosophie der sinnlichen Erkenntnis*, 40–81; Paetzold, *Ästhetik des deutschen Idealismus*, 35–42; Groß, *Felix aestheticus*, 143–162.

nomenon>, or the perfection observable by taste in the broader sense, is BEAUTY, whereas the imperfection that is a phenomenon <*imperfectio phaenomenon*>, or the imperfection observable by taste in the broader sense, is UGLINESS” (MET § 662; *Perfectio phaenomenon, s. gustui latius dicto observabilis, est PULCRITUDO, imperfectio phaenomenon, seu gustui latius dicto observabilis, est DEFORMITAS*).

With regard to literature, it is obvious that perfection becomes a phenomenon on the material surface of the literary text. In the rhetorical canon of *inventio*, Baumgarten differentiates the beauty of things from that of thoughts (*pulcritudo rerum et cogitationum*); in the canon of *dispositio*, he finds the beauty of order (*pulcritudo ordinis*), and in the canon of *elocutio*, that of the means of expression (*pulcritudo significationis*). These three types of beauty all also consist in perfection (see AE §§ 18–24). On the material surfaces of literary texts, they thus appear in figures of thought (*figurae sententiae*), figures of order (*figurae ordinis*), and figures of speech (*figurae significationis, figurae dictionis*; see AE § 26), which now have to be taken seriously in their materiality and also with regard to their metaphysical aspects. While concepts, which can be represented in logical formulas, are completely available to human reason, Baumgarten devalues them in comparison to phenomena:

For my part, I believe it is entirely apparent to philosophers that whatever particular formal perfection is present in cognition and logical truth can only have been acquired with the loss of much and great material perfection. For what is abstraction if not a loss?

Equi[d]em arbitror philosophis apertissimum esse iam posse, cum iactura multae magnaeque perfectionis in cognitione et veritate logica materialis emendum fuisse, quicquid ipsi perfectionis formalis inest praecipuae. Quid enim est abstractio, si iactura non est? (AE § 560; see also AE § 562)

In the second half of the eighteenth century, aesthetics actually limits itself to the question of representations of the beautiful, whereas beautiful representations as such, either in the acoustic medium of the voice or the graphic medium of the text, are ignored. In his analysis of the structure of literary discourse, Baumgarten turns attention to precisely this question.⁵⁹ Almost simultaneously, Henry Home’s *Elements of Criticism* (1762) articulates the preconditions for debating the relation between materiality and beauty, preconditions that apply both to William Hogarth’s *Analysis of Beauty* (1753) and Johann Joachim Winckelmann’s art-theoretical writings from the 1760s: “The term *beauty*, in its native signification, is appropriated to objects of sight. Objects of the other senses may be agree-

⁵⁹ See 3.3 Semiotics.

able, such as the sounds of musical instruments, the smoothness and softness of some surfaces: but the agreeableness denominated *beauty* belongs to objects of sight.”⁶⁰ In this context, there are only two possibilities for literature to be beautiful: it is either related, in the context of crude illusionism, to the paradigm of mimesis – in which case, it is not the arbitrary signs that are beautiful but rather the image of the world that literature imitates and simulates, possibly better than the natural signs of the visual arts can – or literature is regarded for its own manifest beauty, which is based on the specific sensation of acoustic and graphic media. In the 1760s, however, when Lessing and Denis Diderot laid the groundwork for semiotic aesthetics, this second possibility did not come into consideration.

To analyze the capacity of literature and visual arts to simulate beauty, Lessing and Diderot turn their attention to the different forms of intuition of the two media. The bottom line of the examination is, contrary to traditional poetics, their incompatibility: poetry is unlike a picture – *ut pictura poesis non erit*, as Diderot formulates the new anti-Horatian phrase in his response to the 1767 Salon.⁶¹ For the *non* of this analogy, Lessing proposes the two well-known medial *passe-partouts*: the temporal successiveness of language and the spatial simultaneity of the image. Based on them, he evaluates each medium’s suitability for representing the beautiful and finds, as Joachim Jacob summarizes, that “the beautiful is ‘uncomfortable’ for a linguistic representation that develops in the course of discourse” because it “is a quality of an object that is only adequately disclosed to a simultaneous visual impression.”⁶² According to Lessing, the prudent poet “abstains entirely from the depiction of physical beauty as such,” since “the concentrating glance which we try to cast back on the parts after they have been enumerated fails to produce the effect of a harmonious image.”⁶³

With such arguments, eighteenth-century media aesthetics is subject to the tyranny of mimesis. The possibility of literary beauty – of a beauty of literature – suffers under this subjugation;⁶⁴ paintings and sculptures are beautiful in this sense, not texts. The concept of representation (*Darstellung*) thus serves as an

⁶⁰ Henry Home (Lord Kames), *Elements of Criticism*, vol. 1 (Edinburgh, 1762; facsimile, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1970), 242–243.

⁶¹ See Denis Diderot, *Salons*, ed. Jean Seznec and Jean Adhémar, vol. 3, 1767 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 108.

⁶² Jacob, *Die Schönheit der Literatur*, 187.

⁶³ Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, *Laocoön: An Essay on the Limits of Painting and Poetry*, trans. Edward Allen McCormick (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 104.

⁶⁴ See 5.3.2 Probability.

“index and medium of an upheaval in the history of theory.”⁶⁵ Baumgarten, Lessing, and Herder use this concept to critique aesthetic illusion when they begin to consider the nonintuitive remainder of language. With language, the “new structure” of a linguistically mediated “imaginative synthesis” prevails in “thoroughly obscure sequences”⁶⁶ – a structure that is itself medially realized since it combines what Lessing separates into the spatial form of intuiting texts and the temporal form of intuiting voices.⁶⁷

By approaching literature with a metaphysics of media, Baumgarten positions himself somewhat askew to the discourses dominating the second half of the eighteenth century. His engagement with the structure of literary discourse and its functions of complexity, opacity, and performativity anticipates many arguments that formalism and phenomenology will use to turn attention to the medium of literature. Because he decouples beauty from vision and visibility,⁶⁸ beauty appears in the linguistic form itself: in letters, in conceptualized sounds recalled by letters, and, above all, in the combination of signs, words, and sentences that forms the graphic medium of the text as a whole.

Baumgarten even supplies the beauty of literature with an index of movement. Whereas Winckelmann tries once again to tie beauty, equanimity, and morality together in a single package, the categories of energy and life are at the center of reception aesthetics in the second half of the eighteenth century, which undergoes a paradigm change from *docere* to *movere*. As Jacob explains, “This leads to the consequence of either, as Lessing demonstrates, charging the beautiful with movement, or, following Edmund Burke’s example, placing it as ‘calm beauty’ – which is usually devalued in its aesthetic valence – in opposition to an ‘animate sublime.’”⁶⁹ It is not by accident that Lessing sets beauty in motion using a concept that aesthetics shares with nascent neurophysiology. “Stimulus [Reiz] is beauty in motion,”⁷⁰ as Lessing defines the media-specific beauty of literature,⁷¹ a beauty that implements the impulses of movement as if they were triggered by electrodes in a muscle.

This definition of a specifically literary beauty falls, however, far behind Baumgarten’s. When he considers the general conditions of beauty at the inter-

⁶⁵ Menninghaus, “Darstellung,” 205.

⁶⁶ Inka Mülder-Bach, *Im Zeichen Pygmalions: Das Modell der Statue und die Entdeckung der “Darstellung” im 18. Jahrhundert* (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1998), 142.

⁶⁷ See 3.3 Semiotics.

⁶⁸ See 4.1.1 Perfection.

⁶⁹ Jacob, *Die Schönheit der Literatur*, 259.

⁷⁰ Lessing, *Laocoön*, 112, translation modified. See 4.1.1 Perfection.

⁷¹ See Jacob, *Die Schönheit der Literatur*, 242.

face with the sublime, he defines all beauty as always and necessarily animate.⁷² And he aims to provide the animate beauty of the performative literary text with a mythology when he calls aesthetics the “philosophy of the Muses and Graces” (KOLL § 1; Philosophie der Musen und der Grazien). He may have been familiar with the concept of grace in English aesthetics. For example, Hogarth’s articulation of grace bears a resemblance to Baumgarten’s performativity, the third function of the structure of literary discourse – that is, the sensate will that sets literature in motion and is compared to a dancer’s elegant movements.⁷³ For Hogarth, the “line of grace” is, as Jacob explains, even superior to the “line of beauty.” This is because the line of grace “adds a further dimension to the beautiful in technique and, reaching far into the depths, is able to unite a variety to an even greater extent. For the painter Hogarth, beauty and grace are thus decidedly painterly and sculptural categories, categories that relate to one another according to the measure of complexity that is represented or made visible.”⁷⁴ Baumgarten realizes this possibility of translating grace from the visual arts into literature, a possibility that is offered above all by Home, who notes that both dance and public speaking can show grace: “Dancing affords great opportunity for displaying grace, and haranguing still more.”⁷⁵

In sum, beauty can never escape the two media of literature, text and voice.⁷⁶ Baumgarten therefore not only reflects on the metaphysics of phenomenal particularity but also on this metaphysics as a metaphysics of literature. Differently from Meier, for whom media are merely “channels [...] through which beautiful thoughts flow out of one beautiful spirit and into another”⁷⁷ – and so also differently from the practice of suppressing or denying the materiality of the medium or regulating it through fetishization in the age of sensibility (*Empfindsamkeit*) – Baumgarten brings media into the horizon of theoretical reflection.⁷⁸ Considering that even Lessing “foregoes formulating a concept of beauty tuned to the requirements of the poetic medium,”⁷⁹ Baumgarten’s model of the beautiful *text* is truly something new.

⁷² See 4.1.1 Perfection.

⁷³ See 3.4.3 Performativity.

⁷⁴ Jacob, *Die Schönheit der Literatur*, 263.

⁷⁵ Home, *Elements of Criticism*, 1:348.

⁷⁶ See 3.3 Semiotics.

⁷⁷ Meier, *Anfangsgründe aller schönen Wissenschaften*, § 711.

⁷⁸ See Karlheinz Stierle, “Das bequeme Verhältnis: Lessings *Laokoon* und die Entdeckung des ästhetischen Mediums,” in *Das Laokoon-Projekt: Pläne einer semiotischen Ästhetik*, ed. Gunter Gebauer (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1984), 23–24.

⁷⁹ Jacob, *Die Schönheit der Literatur*, 254.

4.2.2 Formlessness

In the course of metaphysically legitimizing materiality in the sections on aesthetic truth (*veritas aesthetica*), something epistemologically exciting happens. There Baumgarten becomes stuck on the example of an unhewn marble block (see AE § 560), an example that he hopes will help elevate the standing of phenomena in comparison to concepts. At this point in the text, he has already shown how examples themselves are an excellent example of literariness.⁸⁰ Searching for the role of materiality in his media metaphysics of literature, he turns to an example to capture what cannot be philosophically expressed in a concept or even with the help of metaphors. What the marble block accomplishes is simple to explain: Baumgarten has to think about a real object because this thinking helps him on his way to exciting insights. He then projects his insights about the marble block onto the concept of aesthetic truth. Through this projection, his statements about objective, real, material truth apply to aesthetic truth, which is by definition a subjective truth. Thus, to a certain extent, the phenomenon models aesthetic cognition, and Baumgarten finally interfolds metaphysica objectiva and subiectiva into the twofold nature of beauty.

It is not without reason that Baumgarten chooses – as many others do after him – sculpture as the reference medium for beauty, though he does not commit to the human body as the symbolic intuition of perfection as Winckelmann, Herder, Karl Philipp Moritz, and Johann Wolfgang Goethe later do.⁸¹ And when Baumgarten interprets the example of the unhewn marble block semiotically, he also does not fix the sign to the (partial) correspondence of shape and meaning (see AE § 561) as it is later formulated with the concept of the intuitive symbol (*Anschauungssymbol*) in the Goethezeit. Instead, the marble block generates its meaning on the basis of its own wealth of relations, and the material excess of this wealth is beautiful: “By similar reasoning, one cannot produce a marble globe out of irregularly shaped marble, at least not without such a loss of material that the price of roundness will be quite high” (AE § 560; *Pari ratione ex marmore irregularis figurae non efficias globum marmoreum, nisi cum tanto saltem materiae detrimento, quantum postulabit maius rotunditatis pretium*). The unhewn marble block does not have any form corresponding to a geometric concept. In its fragmentariness, it nevertheless proves to be more beautiful, and thus more perfect and more true, than the sphere. In the unhewn

⁸⁰ See 2.2 Analogy. See also Frauke Berndt, “Rock Sample: Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten,” in *Aesthetic Theory*, ed. Dieter Mersch, Sylvia Sasse, and Sandro Zanetti, trans. Brian Alkire (Zurich: Diaphanes, 2019), 21–35.

⁸¹ See Müllder-Bach, *Im Zeichen Pygmalions*, 20–48.

stone, Baumgarten does not want to round off anything or bring anything into a form even if the sublimity of the phenomenon that arises from this abstention exceeds the human powers of comprehension. That is exactly why the marble block is an example of aesthetic truth (*veritas aesthetica*).

Both Mirbach and Johannes Hees have pointed out that Baumgarten's search for aesthetic truth draws on Leibniz's ontological concept of individuality.⁸² In his introduction to the German translation of Leibniz's *Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain* (1765; written between 1703 and 1705), Cassirer notes:

But according to the fundamental principle that Leibnizian metaphysics expresses and undertakes in full clarity for the first time, the character of the real lies in its thorough individuality. [...] For if pure mathematical space is characterized by its total uniformity, then matter is characterized by its thorough dissimilarity. Here in real being and happening, there are no two elements that are completely similar, no two movements that are identical to one another in all their individual phases. There are only the "same parts" in an abstraction that can arbitrarily disregard certain differing moments; not in reality, whose particularity goes on infinitely. But how can this boundless manifold of reality be merged with the demand for unity that lies in our understanding; how can the universality of rules and laws grasp the individual, in which "being" originally and actually consists?⁸³

To deal with these metaphysical problems, Leibniz also employs a comparison with an unhewn marble block in the *Nouveaux essais*, a comparison that Baumgarten doubtlessly takes from him while making, however, decisive corrections. For Leibniz, the marble illustrates the philosophical problem of innate ideas:

I have also used the analogy of a veined block of marble, as opposed to an entirely homogeneous block of marble, or to a blank tablet – what the philosophers call a *tabula rasa*. For if the soul were like such a blank tablet then truths would be in us as the shape of Hercules is in a piece of marble when the marble is entirely neutral as to whether it assumes this shape or some other. However, if there were veins in the block which marked out the shape of Hercules rather than other shapes, then that block would be more determined to that shape and Hercules would be innate in it, in a way, even though labour would

82 See Dagmar Mirbach, "Einführung zur fragmentarischen Ganzheit von Alexander Gottlieb Baumgartens *Aesthetica* (1750/58)," in Mirbach, ed. *Ästhetik* by Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, trans. Mirbach, vol. 1 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2007), xv–lxxx; Johannes Hees, "Denken und Betrachten: Zur Proto-Ästhetik bei Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz und Barthold Hinrich Brockes," *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und Allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft* 64.1 (2019): 87–109.

83 Ernst Cassirer, "Einleitung," in *Neue Abhandlungen über den menschlichen Verstand*, by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, trans. Cassirer, vol. 3 of *Philosophische Werke*, ed. Cassirer (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1996), xxiv–xxv.

be required to expose the veins and to polish them into clarity, removing everything that prevents their being seen. This is how ideas and truths are innate in us.⁸⁴

With the example of the marble block, Baumgarten is not interested in the problem of innate ideas. He is interested, rather, in its marbled materiality as such; or, more provocatively, he is interested in the real – the material remainder that constitutes objective, real, material truth (*veritas realis, materialis*). And with precisely this marble block, he switches from discussing subjective truth to discussing objective truth. This switch, which is a philosophical no-go, proves to be key to this theory of literature. For in Baumgarten's metaphysics of beauty, the beautiful is the material or the real in the sense of Jacques Lacan, who makes, as I have summarized elsewhere, exactly the same movement between the subject and the object when he defines the real: "It [the real] forms, with the imaginary and the symbolic, the third position in the triad that constitutes the foundation of Lacanian psychoanalysis. Like the other two concepts, the real also refers to a psychic structure; but in relation to the imaginary and the symbolic, it does not represent a mere remainder even though it is incomprehensible, unthinkable, impossible, and, above all, unsayable. Instead, Lacan defines the real as something that eludes symbolization (and imagination), indeed, as something that represents a resistance to the symbolic and, to a certain extent, a cut in the symbolic."⁸⁵ Baumgarten thus uses the example of the marble block to conceive the real of the literary text, that is, its phenomenality, which confronts him with the materially incommensurable remainder of literature.

When one considers the role of the marble block in discussing subjective truth and the role of aesthetics in aestheticological truth, it becomes clear that this example will have to stage the confrontation with the real as something overwhelming. In fact, Baumgarten does trace how the subject is overtaxed by the object's sheer materiality. In his own argumentation, this inundation is expressed in a series of further examples, which again reflects his lack of concepts for the problem he wants to describe. Instead of a single philosophical concept, he cites three concepts that the Aristotelian tradition uses to refer to formless matter: forest, Chaos, and matter (*silva, Chao, et materia*). He then returns to the example of the marble block when he investigates working on the material, the sculptor's work with his tools on the marble. In contrast to Leibniz's interpretation, however, a human torso like Hercules does not appear out of the marble;

⁸⁴ Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *New Essays on Human Understanding*, ed. and trans. Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), para. 52.

⁸⁵ Frauke Berndt, "Das Reale," in *Handbuch Literatur & Psychoanalyse*, ed. Berndt and Eckart Goebel (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2017), 638.

instead, as little material as possible is to be lost. Baumgarten is concerned with the apotheosis of formlessness, not with form – neither with geometric spheres nor with classical sculpture. If, indeed, he is concerned with Hercules, then he is interested in the destroyed, formless parts of a statue, just as Winckelmann is fascinated by the fragmentariness of the Belvedere Torso, in whose formlessness he imagines the presence of the actual mythological god in his *Beschreibung des Torso im Belvedere zu Rom* (1755):⁸⁶

The aesthetic horizon especially delights, however, in the singular, individual, and most determined things exhibiting the greatest material perfection of aestheticological truth, in its forest, Chaos, and matter (§ 129), out of which it sculpts aesthetic truth into a form that is, if not perfect, nevertheless beautiful (§§ 558, 14) such that while it is being worked, as little materially perfected truth as possible may be lost and, for the sake of elegance, be rubbed away by its own power (§ 563).

praesertim autem perfectionem materialem veritatis aestheticologicae maximam exhibentibus singularibus, individuis, et determinatissimis fruitur horizon aestheticus, sua silva, Chao, et materia, §. 129. ex quibus veritatem aestheticam ad formam, nisi perfectam omnino, pulcrum tamen, §. 558, 14. ita exsculpat, ut inter elaborandum, quam fieri potest minimum veritatis materialiter perfectae pereat et elegantiae causa pollendo deteratur, §. 563. (AE § 564)

With the comparisons, Baumgarten also draws a line back to the philosophical concepts he uses to define the example – to singular, particular, and most-determined objects. This exceptional and thus thoroughly modern truth only applies to them. It is this truth that is visually and affectively evident, that both stands before the eyes and touches and moves us.

When Baumgarten wants to describe the role of aesthetics in aestheticological truth, the role that the example plays in his literary epistemology changes. In the *Meditationes*, the example is an example of literature, or rather of literariness. The objects of his observations and descriptions are single examples, such as Horace's first ode or the catalogue of ships in the second canto of Homer's *Iliad* (see MED §§ 19–20), but these examples are, to a certain extent, only examples of the example itself; and the example itself is, in turn, an example of what literature is; and literature is itself, finally, an example of aesthetic cognition. Baumgarten therefore treats examples in the *Aesthetica* because, first,

86 See Frauke Berndt, "Ex marmore: Evidenz im Ungeformten bei J. J. Winckelmann und A. G. Baumgarten," in *Präsenz und Evidenz fremder Dinge im Europa des 18. Jahrhunderts*, ed. Birgit Neumann (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2015), 73–96; Ralf Simon, "Petites perceptions und ästhetische Form," in *Leibniz in Philosophie und Literatur um 1800*, ed. Wenchao Li and Monika Meier (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 2016), 210–212.

the analogon of reason can only grasp aesthetic truth sensately, that is, through examples. And, second, he uses them – for better or worse – at the crucial point on aesthetic truth (*veritas aesthetica*), which starts with a series: the marble block, the forest, Chaos, and matter are not merely deployed where knowledge is lacking or too complex but rather where knowledge no longer has a propositional form at all.

This discovery of a new aesthetic truth that is precisely *not* analogous to logical truth drives Baumgarten to switch within his own discourse from a conceptual mode to a literary one. It is in this moment, in using examples, that the philosopher himself becomes a poet. For the creative poet can do something that the strict philosopher does not even dare to dream of: he simply transfers real or material truth from the position of the object (*veritas obiectiva*) in his philosophical system to the position of the subject (*veritas subiectiva*). There, real or material truth organizes Baumgarten's concept of aesthetic truth. The example thus does not illustrate aesthetic truth. Instead, the marble block develops a "dynamic of displacement" that he condenses into a series of metonymies: "*silva, Chao, et materia*." As an etymological "trope that displaces borders,"⁸⁷ metonymy thereby accomplishes exactly what the conceptual work of philosophy is incapable of accomplishing. Baumgarten etymologically displaces the border between premodern and modern knowledge – as well as between conceptual and nondiscursive knowledge – just enough for the new concept of aesthetic truth to be inserted into the eighteenth-century order of knowledge, and he condenses this new concept in a series of examples since he lacks other concepts to explain it.

By doing so, he also separates – I would say irrevocably – similarity from the epistemology of the exemplary. The marble block, the forest, Chaos, and matter are neither similar nor dissimilar nor opposite to aesthetic truth. Baumgarten does not ground his analogy ontologically like Leibniz, nor does he anchor it ethically in the archive of things that have been held to be similar. In the literary mode, examples attain autonomy. The marble block, the forest, Chaos, and matter are not analogies for aesthetic truth because they produce a semantic relation between a particular and another particular but rather because, in their formlessness, they embody the nondiscursivity of aesthetic truth in a structurally analogous way. The example is thereby the relay between the episteme of representation and the episteme of presence. With this structural analogy, Baumgarten's literary epistemology does not, of course, collapse in a logical paradox that does not allow any differentiation between embodiment and the embodied.

⁸⁷ Wolfram Groddeck, *Reden über Rhetorik: Zu einer Stilistik des Lesens* (Frankfurt am Main: Stroemfeld, 1995), 234.

Instead, his analogy drifts metonymically in the direction of the never-reachable vanishing point of aesthetic truth: beauty. And again, this dynamic requires that sensate desire be considered both in epistemology⁸⁸ – where it primarily appears as the performativity of the structure of literary discourse⁸⁹ – and in metaphysics.⁹⁰

In the *Aesthetica*, Baumgarten copes with this philosophical crisis, which literally leaves him speechless, by inserting an epistemologically exciting break in the argumentation: namely, he suddenly returns from metaphysics to rhetoric. According to Baumgarten's summation of his theoretical experiment, literature cannot actually be true at all in a philosophical sense – neither objectively nor subjectively, neither logically nor aesthetically – and the whole metaphysics of beauty was just a waste of time. Literature – this is his conclusion – cannot claim any kind of truth but rather only truth-likeness. That is the crux that Baumgarten attends to in section 29 on aesthetic verisimilitude (*verisimilitudo aesthetica*). Precisely this rhetorical concept takes him to a new field of literary theory – the theory of poetic fiction.⁹¹

88 See 3.1.2 Desire.

89 See 3.4.3 Performativity.

90 See 4.1.1 Perfection.

91 See 5.3.2 Probability.

5 Narratology

5.1 Prose

That literature can be true – aesthetically true – is somewhat plausible as long as one remains on the abstract level of concepts. But right in the middle of his metaphysics of beauty, in the sections on aesthetic truth (*veritas aesthetica*), a challenging question upsets Baumgarten's reflections: Can poetic fiction be true? And if yes, how true? If the question of the truth of aesthetic cognition drives him to despair, then the truth of poetic fiction pushes his project to the brink of collapse. While he usually progresses from section to section with amazing consistency, he suddenly interrupts his argumentation on aesthetic truth to cope with this challenging question and inserts three revolutionary sections:

Section XXX: Fictions (*fictiones*)

Section XXXI: Poetic fictions (*fictiones poeticae*)

Section XXXII: Fables (*fabulae*)

Together, I call these sections the sections on fiction.¹ They have not played a noteworthy role in the scholarship; only Hans Adler has considered Baumgarten's "phenomenology of fiction" in the *Meditationes*.² Yet in these three sections of the *Aesthetica*, Baumgarten lays out his own narratology and the first modern theory of fiction, over twenty years before Friedrich von Blanckenburg's *Versuch über den Roman* (1774) and Johann Jakob Engel's *Ueber Handlung, Gespräch und Erzählung* (1774), which are considered the most significant German contributions to narratology in the eighteenth century.³ Baumgarten's sections on fiction may therefore be the most exciting and unprecedented in the entire *Aesthetica*.

So far I have shown how Baumgarten's investigation into beauty and the real provides a metaphysical explanation for the three functions of the structure of

¹ See Frauke Berndt, "Mundus poetarum: A. G. Baumgartens Fiktionstheorie," in *Komplexität und Einfachheit: DFG-Symposium 2015*, ed. Albrecht Koschorke (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 2017), 316–338.

² Hans Adler, "Utopie und Imagination: A. G. Baumgartens Fiktionstheorie am Rande der Aufklärung," in *Positive Dialektik: Hoffnungsvolle Momente in der deutschen Kultur; Festschrift für Klaus L. Berghahn zum 70. Geburtstag*, ed. Jost Hermand (Bern: Peter Lang, 2007), 24. See 5.3.2 Probability.

³ See Sebastian Meixner, *Narratologie und Epistemologie: Studien zu Goethes frühen Erzählungen* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2019), 72–78.

literary discourse: complexity, opacity, and performativity. The matrix of his concept of literature consists in the poetic passages of literary texts; indeed, Baumgarten often finds his examples in lyric poetry, and in the *Meditationes* he above all considers phenomena like rhyme, meter, and rhythm, so his literary theory in that work tends toward poetics. The *Aesthetica* too has a distinctly poetological character, but genre does not play any role in the examples he selects. With *poema*, Baumgarten is thus concerned with a general concept of literature, which is additionally confirmed by the fact that in eighteenth-century German, the terms *Gedicht* and *Dichtung* do not only designate poems but rather literature more generally.

The *Aesthetica*'s arguments are not just indifferent to genre; they actually dissolve genre boundaries in the concept of literature. For example, Baumgarten does not care whether an author is “a writer of prose, a writer of verse, a painter, or a sculptor etc.” (AE § 592; *sive prosaicus scriptor, sive metricus, sive pictor, sive sculptor, e.c. fuerit*).⁴ Baumgarten would, of course, have been familiar with genre concepts defined by linguistic forms. Prose is based on the flow and grammar of discursive language, whereas verse manipulates rhyme, meter, and rhythm. Yet he elides these differences by focusing on tropes. And his tropology not only dissolves boundaries between genres but also between media. For example, he defines metaphor as

every elegant substitution of one perception for another, whether signified with transferred words, which is most familiar, or with sounds substituted for each other by a musician, or with colors by a painter, or when through any other type of sign you express that you elegantly have one thing in mind in place of another.

omnem elegantem perceptionis unius pro altera substitutionem, sive vocabulis translatis significetur, quod notissimum, sive sonis sibi invicem substitutis a musico, sive coloribus a pictore, sive per aliud quodcunque signorum genus eleganter te pro uno aliud cogitasse exprimas. (AE § 780)

Considering such formulations, one can assume that Baumgarten's concept of literature tends toward being a medial concept; perhaps his literary theory is even a mediology. While I have shown that this is not the case with regard to the dominance of literature as the medium of reference,⁵ the dissolution of boundaries in the concept of literature confirms that he is hardly interested in literary genres in the *Aesthetica*, which distances his theory from poetics.

⁴ See 6 Ethics.

⁵ See 2.1 Ambiguity.

Considering this disregard for genre, it is striking that the sections on fiction focus on the two great founding narratives of Rome, Virgil's *Aeneis* and Livy's *Ab urbe condita*. In these sections, he additionally cites – in alphabetical order – other narratives from Roman antiquity, again mixing epic and historical genres: Pseudo-Ausonius's *In Didonis imaginem*, Silius Italicus's *Punica*, Statius's *Achilleid* and *Thebaid*, Juvenal's *Satire XV*, Ovid's *Metamorphoseon*, Petronius's *Satyricon*, and Virgil's *Georgica*. He also occasionally cites Horace's *Carmina*, Terence's *Andria*, and secondhand examples from Horace, Quintilian, and Cicero. Most of these texts are, of course, not in prose but in verse; in particular, Virgil's *Aeneis* uses the hexameter of heroic verse.

Yet Baumgarten seems nevertheless to be thinking of prose, which shares its narrative form, though not its linguistic form, with the ancient epics he treats. This can be seen in the etymological displacement that organizes his argument.⁶ The concept of prose appears in the paragraphs on truth where he refers to the three Aristotelian metaphors for formless matter: “forest, Chaos, and matter (§ 129)” (AE § 564; *silva*, *Chao*, et *materia*, §. 129).⁷ The concept *silva* is also used by Latin poets as a title for collections of “raw” occasional poems, which are born from the “chaos” of improvisation and wait as “matter” or material for further refinement. In this sense, Quintilian notes how there are poets “who elect to make a draft of the whole subject as rapidly as possible, and write impromptu, following the heat and impulse of the moment. They call this draft their ‘raw material’ [*silva*].”⁸ In his use of *silva*, Baumgarten may have been thinking of the *Silvae* of the Roman poet Statius, whom he cites in the sections on fiction. But there is little reason to bring into play, as Simon does, Herder's theoretical essays entitled *Kritische Wälder*, which only appeared in 1769.⁹ In any case, in the *Aesthetica*, the concept of prose does not refer to a linguistic form but to a decomposition of form. Baumgarten thus does not define the concept of prose positively but rather negatively; in contrast to the forms of verse, prose appears in literary texts that exhibit only weak formal structures, though they do tell stories.

Because he developed his theory of literature over a period – between the *Meditationes* (1735) and the *Aesthetica* (1750/1758) – when the literary field was fundamentally changing and the novel was rising to prominence, Baumgarten was confronted with the problem that a theory claiming universal validity and devoted to the philosophically explosive question of the truth of literature

⁶ See 2.3 Etymology.

⁷ See 4.2.2 Formlessness.

⁸ Quint., *Inst.* 10.3.17.

⁹ Cf. Ralf Simon, *Die Idee der Prosa*, 52–54.

could not concentrate only on lyric poetry and ignore the novel. In the middle of the eighteenth century, as early modern romance and picaresque novels were being supplanted and the modern novel was beginning to take shape, the genre of the novel moved with rapid speed to become the focus of intellectual attention to literature. In the 1730s, Johann Gottfried Schnabel published *Die Insel Felsenburg* under the pseudonym Gisander; in the 1740s, Samuel Richardson wrote his sentimental novels in England; Henry Fielding's *Tom Jones* appeared in 1749; and in the 1750s, Christoph Martin Wieland began publishing his novels.

In addition to the appearance of these seminal novels in the decades leading up to Baumgarten's *Aesthetica*, the novel also attained a relatively fixed position and definition in encyclopedic knowledge. In his analysis of eighteenth-century theories of the novel, Sebastian Meixner notes that the entry on "Romanen, Romainen, Romans" from the 1742 volume of Johann Heinrich Zedler's *Grosses vollständiges Universal-Lexicon Aller Wissenschaften und Künste* "is taken – except for negligible changes in its formulations – word for word" from the 1722 edition of the *Allgemeines historisches Lexicon* edited by Johann Franz Buddeus.¹⁰ This suggests that by the time of the *Aesthetica*, the novel was a well-established genre. This must have suddenly become clear to Baumgarten in the sections on aesthetic truth (*veritas aesthetica*), where he seems prompted to change the parameters for the concept of literature. There he tries to prove his theory of literature with regard to this expansion of the subject matter, though he only tests it on ancient epics and not on such wondrous and adventurous stories as Miguel de Cervantes's *Don Quijote* (1605/1615) or on the novels by his contemporaries.

In his recent study on theories of prose, Simon defines the "maximal elasticity of form" found in great epics and encyclopedic novels as the matrix of Baumgarten's aesthetics. In doing so, he ascribes an implicit concept of prose to Baumgarten and places his aesthetics in a tradition of prose and reflection on prose that goes back to François Rabelais and forward to Jean Paul, James Joyce, and Arno Schmidt, a tradition that makes it possible "to call the *poema* prose."¹¹ Contrary to this invention of a generic genealogy, I am of the view that Baumgarten does not present a genre poetics of the epic in his sections on fiction. The only genre that he really treats as a genre in a narrow sense is, of all things, the fable. And only a single concrete collection of fables is the basis of section 32 on fables (*fabulae*): Phaedrus's *Fabulae Aesopiae*, which freely adapts Aesop's Greek fables in iambic senarii. The masters of the fable are

¹⁰ Meixner, *Narratologie und Epistemologie*, 47n7.

¹¹ Simon, *Die Idee der Prosa*, 53.

missing from Baumgarten's sources, as is any trace of modern fables. He places the fable at the center of his reflections on fiction because it was particularly important to Enlightenment discussions about using literature for didactic purposes. He may thus have discovered the theoretical relevance of the fable in the rhetorical textbooks he worked with or in Lessing's *Fabeln*, an Enlightenment rejoinder to Jean de La Fontaine's *Fables choisies, mises en vers* (1668). Lessing's work appeared in 1759 and served as a model for eighteenth-century narratology,¹² but it cannot be proved that Baumgarten was familiar with it.

In fact, neither the epic nor the fable lead him to consider genre poetics, which historical narratology views as containing theories of fiction *avant la lettre*. This is because Baumgarten is not concerned with prose genres but rather with expanding his concept of literature. With the weak formal structures found in epics and fables, he transitions from the level of form to the level of content. In Virgil, Livy, and Phaedrus, he turns his attention to the stories narrated in epics and fables. Hence, when Baumgarten considers what aesthetic truth might be, the problems associated with conceptualizing aesthetic truth compete in his argumentation with problems related to the objects of thought and representation (*Darstellung*). His attention therefore shifts in the sections on fiction from the how to the what of literature in such a way that he implicitly differentiates, like twentieth-century structuralists, between discourse and story. Based on these considerations, neither prose nor the fable can serve as alternatives to Baumgarten's concept of literature; instead, they are subordinate to the concept *poema*, which he further elaborates in the sections on fiction.

This shift from how to what is not surprising since the novel, lurking in the background, is like a thorn in this philosopher's side. Indeed, one could even go a step further and argue that Baumgarten projects the formlessness of the novel onto the narrative genres of antiquity. In this context, one should remember that the whole project of the *Aesthetica* has an apologetic character since he must justify the new science to the philosophers' guild. How can a philosopher devote himself to aesthetic cognition when only logic can lay claim to truth? That is the central problem.¹³ Something so unthinkable as explaining aesthetic truth by employing a general concept of literature as the model for aesthetic cognition only barely works. Baumgarten already sows the seeds for his theory of fiction in the *Meditationes*: "The objects of such representations are either possible or impossible in the real world. Let the latter be called **fictions** and the former **true fictions**. [...] Only true and heterocosmic fictions are poetic, § 50, § 52" (MED

12 See Meixner, *Narratologie und Epistemologie*, 51–55.

13 See 2.1 Ambiguity.

§§ 51, 53; *Repraesentationum talium obiecta vel in mundo existente possibilia vel impossibilia*. Has FIGMENTA, illas liceat dicere FIGMENTA VERA. [...] *Sola figmenta vera & heterocosmica sunt poetica*. §. 50 52).

Baumgarten's theory of literature manages to integrate the question of whether literature is true or not through a twofold argumentation. First, he carefully approaches the structures of narratives on the level of discourse (discours). Second, he relates poetic fiction to his ontology, working on the level of the story (histoire) to address modes of truth in worlds that do not correspond to our own actual world because they are remembered, dreamed, foreseen, anticipated, or imagined. Because Baumgarten first places ontology on a secure foundation before inserting the sections on fiction into his inquiries on aesthetic truth, one could say that he *first* analyzes narrative discourse so as, *second*, to modify ontology on that basis. Representation and truth once again depend on one another here, as Baumgarten's comparative analysis of Virgil's and Livy's narratives of the founding of Rome will make clear.

Following this insight, the layout of my chapter on Baumgarten's narratology ties narrativity and fictionality into a twofold unity, retracing the steps we have already taken in the previous chapters. In 5.2 Narrativity, I return to my analysis of sensate cognition and sensate desire (see 3 Epistemology) so as to add a narrative function to the three functions of the structure of literary discourse. I do not base my argumentation in this part on Genette or on other structuralist narratologists but rather on the minimal definition of narration that both historical narratology and transmedial narratology work with. This definition posits that narrative conveys sequences of at least two linked events, which narratology calls narrative events. The next two subsections discuss sequentiality (5.2.1) and mediation (5.2.2), the two characteristics of the structure of literary discourse that Baumgarten observes and analyzes in his examples. In 5.3 Fictionality, I return to the metaphysical problems of the structure of literary discourse (see 4 Metaphysics) in order to address the problems relevant to the narrative function. I do not limit my analysis to the sections on fiction but rather look again at the sections on aesthetic truth (*veritas aesthetica*) to show that Baumgarten invents an aesthetic ontology or even cosmology. In these sections, he attempts to classify different groups of narratives, which leads to a surprising explanation of literature and its truth. Sections on possibility (5.3.1), probability (5.3.2), and accessibility (5.3.3) account for this explanation and so round off this narratology.

5.2 Narrativity

5.2.1 Sequentiality

In chapter 2 on methodology, I argued that aesthetic discourse functions with the help of a translation machine. This makes it possible for Baumgarten to describe different aspects of aesthetics with the same six concepts: abundance, greatness, truth, clarity, certitude, and life. The translation begins with epistemology (psychology, rhetoric, semiotics, poetics) and then leads to metaphysics (and later even to ethics).¹⁴ Baumgarten's narratology, too, functions with the help of this machine. Above all, he employs the central concept (*con*)*nexus*, which is rooted in the complexity, opacity, and performativity of the structure of literary discourse. He uses this concept in the context of psychology and rhetoric, when he analyzes the structure of narratives, and in the context of ontology and cosmology, when he considers the structure of worlds. This results in different types of narratives and worlds serving as variables in the structure of literary discourse. I will elaborate this in what follows.

Baumgarten does not reinvent the wheel for his narratology. Poetic fiction is also anchored in the faculties of sensate cognition, which he posits in the *Meditationes*, explains in the *Metaphysica*, and carries over into the *Aesthetica*. This faculty consists in the imagination (*phantasia*), perspicacity (*perspicacia*), memory (*memoria*), the faculty of invention (*facultas fingendi*), foresight (*praevision*), judgment (*iudicium*), anticipation (*praesagatio*), and the faculty of characterization (*facultas characteristica*).¹⁵ In section 7 on the faculty of invention (*facultas fingendi*) in part 3 of the *Metaphysica* on psychology (*psychologia*), Baumgarten delineates the poetic faculty and defines invention structurally as the ability to separate the attributes of an object – which he calls its marks (*notae*) following rationalist philosophy – and then to combine them into a new object. This faculty thus formally operates *pars pro toto* like synecdoche (see AE § 505). Mythological figures such as the centaur or mermaid, which Horace uses to introduce his “*Ars poetica*,” serve as prototypes for this operation: the centaur combines marks from a horse and a man, and the mermaid marks from a woman and a fish (see AE § 446). This is why the English translation of the *Metaphysica* uses *invent* for the Latin *fingere*; the German translation uses the word *dichten*, which means something like “to compose literature” and is fit-

¹⁴ See 6 Ethics.

¹⁵ See 3.1.1 Cognition.

ting in this context since the faculty of invention is characterized as being poetic (*facultas poetica fingendi*):

By SEPARATING and combining images, i.e. by only being attentive to a part of some perception, I INVENT. Therefore, I have the POETIC faculty of invention (§216). Since a combination is a representation of many things as one, and hence is actualized through the faculty of perceiving the correspondences of things (§572, 155), the faculty of invention is actualized through the power of the soul for representing the universe (§557, 576).

Combinando phantasmata & PRAESCINDENDO i.e. attendendo ad partem alicuius perceptionis tantum, FINGO. Ergo habeo facultatem fingendi, §. 216. POETICAM. Combinatio quum sit repraesentatio plurium, ut unius, hinc facultate identitates rerum percipiendi actuetur, §. 572, 155. facultas fingendi per vim animae repraesentativam universi actuatur, §. 557 576. (MET § 589)

Separating and combining are the two operations that sensing (*sentire*) and inventing or composing literature (*fingere*) share with each other: “Things that we do not perceive with as many ideas as we in turn think of them with, but that must nevertheless be known sensately, have to be invented (*Metaphysica* § 589)” (AE § 505; Quae non totidem ideis sensimus, quot denuo cogitamus, quaeque tamen sensitive cognoscenda sunt, sunt fingenda, M. §. 589). This is because any fiction selects a few ideas from the entirety of ideas that belong to the sensate cognition of an object and combines them into new objects. The first philosophical principles regulate the coherence of the combination.¹⁶

With selection and combination, Baumgarten’s psychological delineation of the faculty of poetic invention treats the same two operations that Jakobson traces two hundred years later for both language in general and poetic language.¹⁷ In Baumgarten, selection and combination should be governed, on the one hand, by the law of beautiful coherence (*pulcre cohaerentia*; see AE § 439): “This is the rule of the faculty of invention: *Parts of images are perceived as one whole* (§589)” (MET § 590; *Facultatis fingendi haec est regula: Phantasmatum partes percipiuntur ut unum totum*, §. 589). On the other hand, this metaphysical imperative is empirically grounded because every sensation or experience (*experientia*) operates in the same way as the faculty of invention (see AE § 482). In fact, Baumgarten goes so far as to define fiction as the actual object of aesthetics. This is because all objects can be thought in a beautiful way with the help of the faculty of invention; they can, as it were, become aestheticized: “Hence FICTIONS MORE BROADLY SPEAKING (*Metaphysica* § 590), per-

¹⁶ See 5.3.2 Probability.

¹⁷ See Jakobson, “Linguistics and Poetics.”

ceptions formed by combining and separating images, constitute by far the greatest part of things that are to be thought beautifully” (AE § 505; Hinc FICTIONES LATIUS DICTAE, M. §. 590. perceptiones combinando praescindendoque phantasmata formatae, longe maximam pulcre cogitandorum partem constituunt).

Although the imagination is only let off its leash later in the eighteenth century to engage in free play by Kant, Baumgarten has no choice but to make aesthetically unbridled dreams the reference medium for these fictions: “The imagination of someone sleeping is more unbridled (§571), and the faculty of invention more exorbitant, than of someone wide awake (§592). Those asleep produce more lively imaginations and fictions not obscured by stronger sensations (§549)” (MET § 594; Dormientis phantasia magis effraenis, §. 571. & facultas fingendi exorbitantior, quam vigilantis, §. 592. non obscuratas fortioribus sensationibus vividiores imaginationes & fictiones producunt, §. 549). Although this reference creates quite a few ethical problems,¹⁸ Baumgarten holds to it. Fictions are not only based on the same operations of selection and combination as dreams but also share their novelty (novitas). The first separated and then newly combined marks make each object appear in a new light (lux nova), as he explains with regard to the appeal of the new in Cicero and Quintilian (see AE §§ 809–810). In the eighteenth century, this appeal was broadly discussed as a poetics of the wonderful.¹⁹ But as stated, Baumgarten does not feel entirely comfortable with such fictions, and negative examples instead of positive examples of such a poetic ars combinatoria – like chimeras (chimaerae) and empty images (vana phantasmata) – tend to dictate his argumentation. In particular, Horace’s mythological figures lack the logical coherence (see MET § 590) that Baumgarten’s theory requires:²⁰ “*Suppose a painter chose to put a human head / Upon a horse’s neck and add assorted plumes / To limbs from every beast so that an ugly fish / Below attaches to a woman’s curves above*” (AE § 446; *Humano capiti cervicem pictor equinam / Addere si velit, et varias inducere plumas / Undique collatis membris, ut turpiter atrum / Desinat in piscem mulier formosa superne*). From an aesthetic perspective, such hybrids of the imagination must appear as falsehoods,²¹ and from an ethical perspective, as lies (see AE § 525).

Baumgarten refers to such hybrids with the term *figura* when he is interested in the structural operations of fiction, switching with this concept from psychology to rhetoric. The concept of the figure makes clear that his reflections on po-

¹⁸ See 6.2.3 Melancholy.

¹⁹ See 6.2.2 Wonder.

²⁰ See Thorsen, “Baumgarten’s *Meditationes*.”

²¹ See 5.3.2 Probability.

etic fictions are directly related to the canon of style, raising the question of whether rhetoric is capable of again providing concepts for the sections on fiction. And it does indeed supply this protonarratologist with his concepts, creating a bridge from fictions in general to poetic fictions in particular – and so to narrative (narratio). For in rhetoric, narrative is, on the one hand, the part of discourse that follows the introduction (exordium), which makes it an essential part of all speeches and of the theory of oration. On the other hand, narrative belongs to the figures of amplification, which intensify the evidentiality of discourse. In this sense, Quintilian writes, “As to vividness [evidential], it is [...] undoubtedly an important virtue of Narrative, when a truth requires not only to be told but in a sense to be presented to the sight. All the same, it can be included under Lucidity [perspicuitas].”²² In his explanation of the technique of “putting something before our eyes,” Quintilian lays out the narratological basis of the corresponding figure: evidentiality “happens when, instead of stating *that* an event took place, we show *how* it took place, and that not as a whole, but in detail.”²³

Following Quintilian, Baumgarten models narrative in the context of amplification between the poles of the spatial and temporal forms of intuition.²⁴ Sequentiality forms the starting point, leading from the simple figures of repetition to the narrative trope of allegory. He therefore advocates linking representations into sequences with the goal of amplifying *one* theme (see MED §§ 66–68), linking different themes, and linking one theme to other unlinked representations to build thematic sequences (see MED §§ 67–69): “By **theme** we mean that whose representation contains the sufficient reason of other representations supplied in the discourse, but which does not have its own sufficient reason in them” (MED § 66; *Id, cuius repraesentatio aliarum in oratione adhibitarum rationem sufficientem continet, suam vero non habet in aliis est THEMA*). Andrea Krauss points out that Baumgarten’s understanding of *theme* draws on Leibniz–Wolffian ontology: a theme is “sufficient reason” for organizing a sequence of representations.²⁵ In the *Aesthetica*, he refers to such sequences as collations (collationes; see AE § 734), and they link at least two elements, if not infinitely many elements, into a perfect order; and this is exactly where performativity, the third function of the structure of literary discourse, enacts sensate desire.²⁶ For these links,

²² Quint., *Inst.* 4.2.64.

²³ Quint., *Inst.* 9.2.40.

²⁴ See 3.4.1 Complexity.

²⁵ See Andrea Krauss, “Nuancen des Firmaments: Versuchsanordnungen ‘extensiver Klarheit’ zwischen Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten und Barthold Heinrich Brockes,” in Allerkamp and Mirbach, *Schönes Denken*, 237.

²⁶ See 3.1.2 Desire; 3.4.3 Performativity.

Baumgarten introduces the concept (*con*)*nexus*, which is also central to his metaphysics of beauty.²⁷

In his treatment of narrative, (*con*)*nexus* replaces the concept of complexity, which dominates the analysis of lyric poetry, because it more strongly emphasizes “linking together” than “flowing into” one another: “The interconnection of poetic representations must contribute to sensate cognition, §7, §9. Therefore, it must be poetic, §11” (MED § 65; *Nexus repraesentationum poeticarum debet facere ad cognitionem sensitivam §. 7. 9. ergo debet esse poeticus. §. 11*). The resulting sequentiality amplifies the extensive clarity of literary texts – which I have elaborated as their opacity²⁸ – meaning that literature should strive to combine single ideas together: “It is poetic for sense impressions and images of a poem, which are not themselves themes, to be determined through the theme, for if they are not determined through it, they are not connected with it, and it is the interconnection that is poetic, § 65” (MED § 68; *Ideas sensuales & phantasmata poematis, quae non sunt themata, determinari per thema poeticum, nisi enim determinantur per illud, non connectuntur cum eo, nexus vero est poeticus §. 65*). On account of this contribution to the evidentiality of literature, sequentiality is governed by a lucid method (*methodus lucida*): “Since order in a succession of representations is called **method**, method is poetic, § 69. And, with Horace, when he attributes a lucid order to poets, let us call that poetic method **lucid**” (MED § 70; *Quum ordo in repraesentationum successione dicatur methodus, methodus est poetica, §. 69. eam vero METHODUM, quae poetica, dicamus, cum poeta lucidum ordinem poetis tribuente, LUCIDAM*).²⁹

But neither Horace, whom Baumgarten invokes, nor he himself possess concepts for this method (see MED § 73n). To describe it, Baumgarten falls back on light metaphors since the “general rule of the lucid method” requires that thick links be clear:³⁰ “poetic representations are to follow each other in such a way that the theme is progressively represented in an extensively clearer way” (MED § 71; *Methodi lucidae generalis regula est: ita se excipiant repraesentationes poeticae, ut thema extensive clarius sensim clariusque repraesentetur*). Within progressively represented sequences, the links are based on various methods for making something lucid:

Since, according to § 71, certain of the coördinate ideas can cohere as premises with conclusions, certain as like with like and related with related, certain through the law of sen-

²⁷ See 4.1.1 Perfection.

²⁸ See 3.4.2 Opacity.

²⁹ See Hor., *Ars P.* 41.

³⁰ See 3.4.1 Complexity.

sation and imagination, therefore there is available for lucid presentations the method of reason, the method of wit, and the method of the historians, respectively.

Quum secundum §. 71. coordinatarum repraesentationum quaedam possint ut praemissae cum conclusionibus cohaerere, quaedam ut simile cum simili & cognatum cum cognato, quaedam per legem sensationis & imaginationis, *methodus historicorum, ingenii & rationis in lucida possibilis*. (MED § 72)

As figures, such sequences are characterized by coherence since they, like every other figure, are given to consciousness in a temporal form of intuition. Yet the temporal form of coherence in sequences is more complex than in “normal” figures, since one element not only follows another in a series; rather, the temporality of the sequence also represents temporally structured events in the world. This necessary expansion of the purely formal analysis of the structure of literary discourse to include content leads Baumgarten to consider synecdoches of species for genus and individuals for species in the *Meditationes* (see MED § 84),³¹ and he uses such synecdoches in the *Metaphysica* to describe the operations of the poetic faculty of invention.

But it is actually allegory, not synecdoche, that serves as the trope of narrative. In Baumgarten, the master trope of allegory marks the fluent transition from poetic passages to narratives. As a narrative, allegory surpasses every other trope both in complexity and in evidentiality, making it the figural principle of the literary: “Since by **allegory** we mean a series of connected metaphors, it contains individual poetic representations, § 79, and more interconnection than where unrelated metaphors flow together. Thus allegories are highly poetic, § 65, § 8” (MED § 85; ALLEGORIA cum *metaphorarum connexarum* sit *series* in ea & repraesentationes singulae poeticae §. 79. & maior nexus, quam ubi heterogeneae confluunt metaphorae. Ergo *allegoria admodum poetica* §. 65. 8; see also AE §§ 802–805). In itself, this concept of allegory is not really new; it corresponds to the type of allegory Quintilian refers to as allegory “without Metaphor” (*allegoria sine translatione*).³² In contrast to other types of allegory, this one is only characterized by its sequentiality,³³ so Quintilian associates it with narrative long before Paul de Man asserts that the intentionality of allegory lies in its temporality.³⁴ In short, as Joel Fineman puts it, “the problem of allegorical narrative

³¹ See Arist., *Poet.* 1457b22, 1459a; *Rhet.* 1412a.

³² Quint., *Inst.* 8.6.46.

³³ See Gerhard Kurz, *Metapher, Allegorie, Symbol*, 3rd ed. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993), 40–41.

³⁴ See Quint., *Inst.* 8.6.46. See also Paul de Man, “The Rhetoric of Temporality,” in *Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge,

[is] primarily a temporal issue.”³⁵ And he relates allegory to Jakobson’s model of language as follows: “Allegory would be the poetical projection of the metaphorical axis onto the metonymic” axis under the precondition that “metaphor is understood as the synchronic system of differences which constitutes the order of language (*langue*), and metonymy as the diachronic principle of combination and connection by means of which structure is actualized in time in speech (*parole*).”³⁶

Yet it is less the figural temporality of allegory than its specific temporality that makes it a narrative. Allegories are not only composed of elements in sequences; their elements are rather also semantically coded temporal events. Narrative coherence is produced, of course, through linking these events. One could refer to this structure of time, following Edward M. Forster, as a “story,” for which he gave the famous example of two linked elements: “the king died, and then the queen died.”³⁷ In allegory, this sequentiality is also the precondition for motivating the links. Events are not only ordered in succession but also motivated in different ways. Motivation thus always accompanies the temporality of sequences such that one event results from another. Following Forster, one can call the structure of motivation the “plot”: “the king died, and then the queen died *of grief*.”³⁸ Not only does the king die first and then the queen; the queen also dies after the king for a good reason. In sequences, story and plot form two sides of the same coin. In his critique of Genette’s narratology, Meixner therefore unites temporality and motivation into the single category of consecution (Folge).³⁹ For Jakobson, this double linking within a sequence by means of temporality and motivation is the precondition of narration. “Unessential details”⁴⁰ are linked both temporally and through consistent motivation. Narration only achieves “verisimilitude” through such “justification.”⁴¹

2005), 187–228; Anselm Haverkamp, “Die Wiederkehr der Allegorie in der Ästhetik der Avantgarde: Baumgarten in der Vorgeschichte des *New Criticism*,” in *Allegorie: DFG-Symposion 2014*, ed. Ulla Haselstein et al. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2016), 244–272.

35 Joel Fineman, “The Structure of Allegorical Desire,” in *Allegory and Representation*, ed. Stephen J. Greenblatt (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 26.

36 Fineman, “The Structure of Allegorical Desire,” 31.

37 Edward Morgan Forster, *Aspects of the Novel* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1927), 130.

38 Forster, *Aspects of the Novel*, 130, emphasis mine.

39 See Meixner, *Narratologie und Epistemologie*, 31–37.

40 Roman Jakobson, “On Realism in Art,” in *Language in Literature*, 22.

41 Jakobson, “On Realism in Art,” 21, 27.

5.2.2 Mediation

Baumgarten's narratology is based on the rhetorical canon of style. The three functions of the structure of literary discourse – complexity, opacity, and performativity – are characterized by sequentiality. But now a fourth function is added to them: narrativity. He introduces narrativity with a brilliant move: he “narrativizes” the analogon of reason itself.⁴² As I have argued in previous chapters, Baumgarten grounds his aesthetics etymologically in the *Kollegium*: the word *aesthetics* “actually comes from *aisthanomai* [I sense]; this word refers to what *sentio* refers to in Latin” (KOLL § 1; kommt eigentlich von αισθανομαι her; dieses Wort bezeichnet das, was *sentio* im Lateinischen bezeichnet). In the sections on fiction, he simply replaces *aisthanomai*, “I sense,” with “I narrate” (AE § 506; *narrem*). Two hundred years before Russian formalism invents narratology, Baumgarten's clever substitution constitutes the birth of modern narrative theory. In the following, I will show that the narrative function of the structure of literary discourse presupposes both sequentiality and narrative mediation.

Since *narrem* substitutes for *sentio* at its position in the syntagm “I sense/narrate,” the two form a paradigm. What differentiates “I sense” and “I narrate” is not complexity, opacity, and performativity, which “I narrate” of course also partakes in. Instead, something is added in “I narrate” that “I sense” does not have and cannot do. This is mediation, which equally characterizes both fictions and experiences.⁴³ Baumgarten structurally equates fictions and experiences with regard to both their sequentiality and their narrative mediation, although in fictions, “real” experience is missing: “Nor in these fictions is anything missing except experience strictly speaking, if they are narrated purely and nakedly” (AE § 506; *Nec in his fictionibus carent, nisi experientiae stricte dictae, si narrentur omnino pure nudeque*). Purity (*puritas*) and nakedness (*nuditas*) refer to the coherence of narration (see AE § 505; MED § 72). Such a pure narration is one in which, following Aristotle, ideas are linked according to the three unities of time, space, and action (see AE § 469).

In thinking about poetic fiction, Baumgarten seems to encounter only narratological problems, which suggests that he, as Meixner puts it, “decidedly thinks of [poetic] fiction as narrative fiction.”⁴⁴ In this way, in the sections on fiction, the narratological duo of invention and narration replaces the duo of cognition

⁴² See 3.1.1 Cognition.

⁴³ See 5.2.1 Sequentiality.

⁴⁴ Meixner, *Narratologie und Epistemologie*, 74.

and representation (Darstellung) that founded Baumgarten's philosophical project. Just as one cannot speak of cognition without representation or of representation without cognition, all discourse about invention and narration is also ambiguous.⁴⁵ Invention is, namely, the cognitive operation that corresponds to the representational technique of narration; it is impossible to discuss one without discussing the other. What differentiates the inventions of poetic fiction from experience is merely the immediate witnessing of something. Only someone who experiences something immediately can testify as an eyewitness.

It is the case not only for things very close to true things but also for many things that are themselves true in the strictest sense that they cannot be thought beautifully or sensately except through what are loosely called fictions. How many objects does a person who wants to think beautifully have about which he can say: *I myself saw it,*

*And played a leading role?*⁴⁶

Non proxima solum veris, sed et ipsa strictissime vera plurima, non nisi fictionibus latius dictis pulcre cogitari sensitiveque possunt. Quot ea sunt obiectorum pulcre cogitaturi, de quibus ille possit dicere: *quae ipse vidi,*

Et quorum pars magna fui? (AE § 506)

Differentiating between experience and poetic fiction does not have to do with the problem of truth but rather with a level of narration where the I-Origo is decoupled from someone who has a particular experience at a particular time and place. For that reason, narrative mediation supplants immediate eyewitnessing. Although such narration still uses the grammatical form of the first-person singular, the personal pronoun no longer denotes someone who has experienced something but rather marks the level of narration from which the epic singer – Baumgarten's master example remains the *Aeneis* – tells of other characters and events. That Baumgarten actually analyzes a function with "I narrate" is additionally made clear by the grammatical finesse of the definition. In conditional sentences of fact – *si narrem* – the first-person singular present subjunctive active form of the verb *narrare* marks the distance between the level *where the narrative is produced* and the level of the narrated events themselves. Baumgarten defines this extradiegetic level as the birthplace of fiction (*genita sit fictio*; see AE § 508). The narrative function is thus poietic and not mimetic; it produces narrative discourse and narrated worlds.

⁴⁵ See 2.1 Ambiguity.

⁴⁶ Quoted (with modification) from Vergil, *The Aeneid*, trans. Sarah Ruden (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 2.5–6.

It was very difficult for twentieth-century narratology to avoid anthropomorphizing this narrative function, which Baumgarten grounds in the shift from immediate eyewitnessing to narrative mediation. At worst, author and narrator are still confused with one another or combined together in the strange construct of an “author-narrator” in cases of particularly dominant narrative voices. Only structural narratology formally analyzes the category of voice with regard to level, person, and discourse time (Erzählzeit): “What Genette refers to with *voice* is thus best described as the specification of a pragmatic textual function in which the grammatical and rhetorical personification of the narrating agent can take place more or less explicitly.”⁴⁷ Yet even Genette does not escape the aporias of anthropomorphization when he emphasizes that the “narrator’s voice is indeed always conveyed as the voice of a person, even if anonymous.”⁴⁸

Two hundred years pass after Baumgarten before Käte Hamburger formalizes narration in *Die Logik der Dichtung* (1957/1968), removing any possibility of anthropomorphization. Meixner shows that Hamburger’s narrative function, which is similar to a mathematical function, can be made productive for analyzing eighteenth-century narratology.⁴⁹ Hamburger defines narration as the function “through which the narrated persons, things, events, etc., are created: the *narrative function*, which the narrative poet manipulates as, for example, the painter wields his colors and brushes.” In this model, narrating *about* is replaced by narrating *that*: “*Between the narrating and the narrated there exists not a subject-object relation, i.e., a statement structure, but rather a functional correspondence.*”⁵⁰ As a “classificatory guideline,” the narrative function determines the “impersonal, purely functional relation existing between generative language and the generated fictional structure in thought.”⁵¹ As a result, every narrating agent represents a secondary way of filling the narrative function, which sets the epistemological frame for the narrator. Narrating agents are a visualization of the narrative function, which they personify with varying degrees of concrete-

47 Andreas Blödorn, Daniela Langer, and Michael Scheffel, “Einleitung: Stimmen – im Text?,” in *Stimme(n) im Text: Narratologische Positionsbestimmungen*, ed. Blödorn, Langer, and Scheffel (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2006), 1.

48 Gérard Genette, *Narrative Discourse Revisited*, trans. Jane E. Lewin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 64.

49 See Meixner, *Narratologie und Epistemologie*, 18–27.

50 Käte Hamburger, *The Logic of Literature*, trans. Marilynn J. Rose, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), 136.

51 Claudia Löschner, *Denksystem: Logik und Dichtung bei Käte Hamburger* (Berlin: Ripperger & Kremers, 2013), 36.

ness, from a rough pattern to the personal characteristics of an “author-narrator.”

In Baumgarten, the “laws of sensation” (*Empfindungs-Gesetze*)⁵² set the parameters for this “classificatory guideline,” meaning that the narrative function is not characterized by logical omniscience. As an aesthetic function, the narrative function is subjected instead to the limitations of the analogon of reason. In the sections on fiction, Baumgarten therefore lays out nothing less than an epistemological foundation for unreliable narration – for sensate narration, for which aesthetics prescribes the laws. Although the narrative function is extradiegetically anchored with regard to the various narrative levels, the narrating agent cannot narrate omnisciently with the sunlight of logic.⁵³ Instead, since all narration is sensate, there can only be unreliable narrating agents who are limited to sensate capacities. In the passages where Baumgarten articulates the anthropological foundation of sensate cognition and sensate desire and also describes their traces in literary texts, he also delineates the *felix aestheticus*, the happy aesthetician, as an allegorical personification.⁵⁴ This personification helps one understand Baumgarten’s epistemology of narration. As an ethical personification of aesthetics, the *felix aestheticus* can and wants to do everything, and also only the things, that the laws of sensation prescribe (see PHB 7). He therefore also occupies the extradiegetic narrative level and embodies, in all of his sensate limitations, the narrative function.

Narratology generally analyzes this narrative function using the category of voice (*voix*). In the following, I will show that Baumgarten not only formalizes the voice of narration but also formally analyzes the narrative function of the structure of literary discourse. In analyzing his examples, he encounters precisely the phenomena that will lead to various narratological systems in the twentieth century. He himself is still far from such a system and is actually just collecting mistakes he notices in poetic fiction. They form the core of section 28 on aesthetic falsity (*falsitas aesthetica*), which is extremely relevant to both narratology and fiction theory even though it has been largely ignored in the scholarship.⁵⁵ The catalogue of mistakes in this section evidences – before Baumgarten turns to their justification in the sections on aesthetic truth – the birth of narratology out of the spirit of deviation from pure and naked narration. For a deviation is not a mistake if the analogon of reason holds it to be aesthetically necessary. Judging these deviations leads to an astounding turning point in

⁵² See 2.1 Ambiguity.

⁵³ See 4.1.3 Twilight.

⁵⁴ See 6.3.1 Ethopoeia.

⁵⁵ See 5.3.1 Possibility.

narratology: in the end, Baumgarten does not judge deviations to be mistakes but rather to be achievements within the wide spectrum of possible kinds of narratives – especially of mythological narratives. And while his analysis does not form a closed system like those pursued by twentieth-century structuralists, he does provide the elements for such a system. In particular, he considers the arrangement of discourse time in the spectrum of narratives. Just as he grounds narrative coherence in sequentiality, discourse time plays the decisive role in narrative mediation. Most of the mistakes that Baumgarten encounters when analyzing the narrative function concern time, and they do so with regard to three aspects, which also form the core of twentieth-century narratological analyses of time: (1) order, (2) duration, and (3) frequency.

(1) *Order*. The examples he chooses for illustrating offenses against narrative order come from mythology. Mythological narratives violate “genealogy, geography, and chronology” (AE § 473; genealogia, geographia, chronologia). Baumgarten attends to such anachronies both in the sections on fiction and in section 28 on aesthetic falsity (*falsitas aesthetica*), which reads like a blacklist of such offenses. This draws his attention to inconsistencies; for example, in comparing Livy’s and Virgil’s stories of the Trojan origins of the Romans, he notes that Virgil first takes Aeneas to Thrace, while in Livy, Aeneas first goes to Macedonia (see AE § 508). Ovid also violates chronology with the speech of Pythagoras in his *Metamorphoseon* – and he does so, like Virgil, without graceful necessity (*necessitas venusta*). Long before Baumgarten, the passages in Ovid and Virgil were pejoratively designated as *glossema* (see AE § 473), which means something like “disturbing passages.” Another example of such offenses are prophecies. Baumgarten treats the genre of prophetic fiction in the *Meditationes* (see MED §§ 60–64) and considers prophecies to be highly poetic and common in epics.⁵⁶ Prophecies dramatically violate chronology because they narrate future events. To be on the safe side, he delegates them to the perspective of characters:

Yet it is dangerous to make predictions of things whose future state is unknown, and a prophecy belied by the event is sadly ridiculed. What should the poet do here? The cleverest of them prophesy in the name of others about things which have already come to pass, as if the prediction had anticipated the event. What does Helenus in Virgil not sing to Aeneas? Or Anchises in the Elysian Fields? Or the Cumean Sibyl? Or Vulcan about the shield? Horace has Nereus predict the outcome of the Trojan War, since he knew he could invent prophecies which the outcome had already confirmed.

Est tamen periculosum praedicere, quorum ignoratur futuritio, & destitutum eventu vaticinium misere ridetur. Quid hinc poetis agendum? Callidissimi homines vaticinantur in alte-

⁵⁶ See 6.3.3 Dubitatio.

rius nomine de rebus, quae nunc iam factae sunt, ac si tunc praedictae essent, cum nondum factae erant. Quae non Helenus canit Aeneae apud Virgilium? quae Anchises in campis Elysiis? quae Cumana ante Sibylla? quae Vulcanus in clypeo? Horatius Nerea iubet praedicere belli Troiani eventum, quum sciret, nunc ea se fingere posse vaticinia, quae eventus iam sequutus confirmarat. (MED § 64n)

Such anachronies not only concern minor deviations in pure narrative but also crude anachronies (anachronismi) and historical errors (anistoresias), of which Baumgarten also finds plenty of examples in Virgil. But they are only problematic when the analogon of reason does not hold them to be aesthetically necessary. Baumgarten notes that Virgil himself plays a self-referential game with this problem when he refers to an anachronistic description of the mythological ship *Chimaera* as a chimera (see AE § 474).⁵⁷ And he even looks kindly on proper metalepses, such as when Sosia and Mercury swear in the name of Hercules in Plautus's play *Amphitruo* even though Hercules is actually only born at the end of the play (see AE § 474).

(2) *Duration*. In addition to these offenses against order, changes in the speed of narration can also represent a deviation from the pure form of relation between discourse time (Erzählzeit) and story time (erzählte Zeit). While discourse time and story time overlap in dialogue, Baumgarten describes forms of accelerating story time in relation to discourse time, such as ellipses in Statius's *Thebaid*. And he analyzes the deceleration of story time in a passage where Tydeus stretches a moment of consecration into a thanksgiving prayer to Minerva twenty-five lines long (see AE § 461). The paradigm for these variations in speed within the doubled temporal sequence of narration is the famous description of Achilles's shield in Homer's *Iliad*, which is in turn the model for Virgil's description of Aeneas's shield in the *Aeneis* (see AE § 459). In these examples, discourse time asserts itself in a way that modern narratology refers to as a pause.

(3) *Frequency*. Finally, Baumgarten attends to deviations in the normal frequency of narration, which prescribes that an event is only narrated once. Virgil narrates an episode in which Cleopatra fights against Augustus twice – and the content of the two narratives is contradictory – so Baumgarten ascertains a switch from singular to repetitive narration: “If you say that she was depicted twice with the whole army of the East, not without a certain subtle and artificial interval – (1) giving the sign to fight, and (2) fleeing – then the first difficulty is increased” (AE § 459; Si dicas ipsam cum omni orientis exercitu fuisse bis pic-

57 See Verg., *Aen.* 5.104–285.

tam, non sine subtili et artificiosa quadam intercapedine, 1) signum pugnae dantem 2) fugientem, augetur difficultas prima).

While Baumgarten's analysis of narrative time provides enough material to reconstruct the fundamental features of a system, some of his other observations about the spectrum of different kinds of narratives can only be placed in a tentative relation to recent narratological concepts. His formal analysis of narrating agents is closely related to his understanding of temporal mistakes: he first treats the narrative function by looking at it with regard to discourse time. A narrating agent can tell about the past because "I" remember what happened, about the future because "I" can predict what will happen, and about the present because "I" can represent what is absent (see AE § 506).⁵⁸ As the first differentiation of the narrative function, discourse time thus leads to the narratological category of person as the second differentiation. Baumgarten's examples are all actually first-person narratives, which best fulfill the purity and nakedness of narrative coherence. The level of the narrating agent in relation to the characters is heterodiegetic because Livy's historian and Virgil's epic singer narrate about others.

With his focus on epics, Baumgarten certainly does not present a theory of the modern novel, but he does compile substantial pieces of such a theory. The fact that his favorite examples are all first-person narratives means that he follows in his analysis a different path than Blanckenburg, who only a little later in his *Versuch über den Roman* emphatically prefers third-person narratives to first-person ones. According to Blanckenburg, novels should narrate the life of a character as an unbroken causal chain of events – and they should do this not by following epics, which narrate a temporal chain of external events, but rather by conveying a complex, psychologically motivated plot. By contrast, Baumgarten pays attention to the unreliable voices of the historian and epic singer. And he repeatedly notes that these narrating agents let the characters speak: Virgil relays both Juno's anger (*ira Iunonis*) and the dialogue between Zeus and Venus (*colloquium Iovis et Veneris*; see AE § 512), and Ovid relates the prayer of Phaeton (*prex Phaetontis*) and the speech of Pythagoras (*declamatio Pythagorae*) word-for-word such that the narrated events are told from these characters' perspectives as in the prophecies mentioned above, which represents a deviation from pure narrative.

These deviations in polyvocal narratives illustrate the wide spectrum of narratives Baumgarten analyzes. He thus differentiates, like twentieth-century narratologists, between various degrees of mediacy, that is, between a narratively

⁵⁸ See Gérard Genette, *Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method*, trans. Jane E. Lewin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), 215–227.

mediated mode (diegesis) and a dramatically immediate mode (mimesis) of narration. Whereas Livy's *Ab urbe condita* employs the narrative mode, Baumgarten also analyzes how Virgil's *Aeneis* and other examples not only switch from the narrative mode to the dramatic mode but also switch, frequently at the same time, from an extradiegetic level to an intradiegetic level of narration when narrated characters themselves become narrators and tell their own stories. In comparison to the narrative mode, the dramatic mode is characterized by a high degree of evidentiality. For that reason, Baumgarten cites the long speech of the dying Dido from Silius even though he stays true to his Virgil when he compares versions of Dido by Virgil, Ovid, Silius, and Ausonius (see AE § 523).

With regard to mediacy, dialogues and monologues replace reportorial narration with scenic narration. Precisely such shifts in mode are the foundation of Engel's treatise *Ueber Handlung, Gespräch und Erzählung*, the most important eighteenth-century narratological text after Blanckenburg's. Baumgarten uses switches from the narrative mode to the dramatic mode in dialogues to distinguish fiction in general from poetic fiction, which he also differentiates on an ontological basis.⁵⁹ His privileging of long passages in direct speech by single characters (and so actually of intradiegetic narration as well) is logical since it corresponds to giving precedence to the particular over the general (see AE § 519): instead of abstract narrative mediation, "people" made of flesh and blood speak.

Baumgarten's catalogue of mistakes continues, and one could continue to analyze it productively. But such an analysis would never derive a narratological system from this catalogue. We can conclude, however, that a "pure" narrative does not actually exist; there are only "impure" ones with their special narrative features such as complex time structures and switches between the narrative and the dramatic modes. These deviations thus do not represent exceptions to the norm, though analyzing them can lead us to the rules of narration. As such, the catalogue of mistakes secures Baumgarten's place among the protonarratologists of the eighteenth century. His accomplishment lies in how he understands the combination of sequentiality and narrative mediation to be the structural characteristic of narrativity, and so he provides a minimal definition of narrative. Baumgarten obtains his definition through analyzing a wide spectrum of narratives. But the definition applies independently of genre and also independently of the differentiation between fictional and factual discourse; this leads to his theory of fiction.

⁵⁹ See 5.3.1 Possibility.

5.3 Fictionality

5.3.1 Possibility

Sequentiality and mediation define narrativity. But the emphasis of the sections on fiction is very clearly not on the how of narration but rather on the what of literature, not on the discourse but on the story, and with it on the narrated world. At precisely this point, narrativity and fictionality converge in Baumgarten and form a twofold unity that is not separated into narratology and fiction theory until the twentieth century. This unity arises from how he ties the disciplines of psychology and rhetoric (narrativity) to the disciplines of ontology and cosmology (fictionality) in the sections on aesthetic truth (*veritas aesthetica*). And this means that he ties representation or narration to the represented or narrated world. He does so because he is faced in the course of his argumentation with the question of what the world of the poets (*mundus poetarum*; see AE §§ 513–515) – the poetic world (*mundus poeticus*; see AE §§ 516–518) that all the great epics relate – actually is. The path to the poetic world leads through the concept of truth.

In the sections on aesthetic truth (*veritas aesthetica*), Baumgarten is primarily concerned with the difference between logical truth and aesthetic truth – a difference that he bridges by combining elements of logical truth and aesthetic truth together in aestheticological truth. But his engagement with the philosophical challenge of the sensate elements of aestheticological truth in these paragraphs also conceals an unconventional theory of fiction. This guides the text in a very particular philosophical direction: poetic fiction is true not in the logical sense but rather in the aesthetic sense – with all the metaphysical premises tied to aesthetic truth. Baumgarten is not interested in the tiresome discussion about the difference between fact and fiction that has defined recent debates and, in the worst cases, is limited to judging whether something is the case or not. Poetic fiction has, rather, a very particular, indirect mode of truth that depends on aesthetic cognition.⁶⁰

As regards the complexity of his reflections, Baumgarten is light-years ahead of contemporaneous inquiries into the problem of fiction in genre theory, and elements of recent theories of fiction can even be seen in his theoretical approach to the problem of fiction, which takes Leibniz's theory of possible worlds as its starting point. Baumgarten's theory of fiction is based – like the entire *Aesthetica* – on preparatory work in the *Metaphysica*. After part 1 on ontology

⁶⁰ See 4.1.2 Truth.

(ontologia), which he understands as “the science of the more general predicates of being” (MET § 4; *scientia praedicatorum entis generaliorum*), follows part 2 on cosmology (cosmologia), which encompasses “the science of the general predicates of the world” (MET § 351; *scientia praedicatorum mundi generalium*). Baumgarten’s translation machine is again at work here. He takes the concept (*con*)*nexus* – which he uses to analyze the coherence of narrative in the context of psychology and rhetoric and is rooted in the complexity, opacity, and performativity of the structure of literary discourse – and applies it here to analyze the structure of worlds in the context of ontology and cosmology. As a result, modes of narration and states of worlds become variables in the structure of literary discourse.

Because Baumgarten is concerned with the relation between narration and world, both the separation in narratology between story and discourse and the differentiation in fiction theory between real worlds and fictional worlds fall short. In Baumgarten, narratology and fiction theory converge in the concept (*con*)*nexus*. Through the ontological concept of the one (*unum*), (*con*)*nexus* leads to cosmology, which is completely neglected in fiction theory. In the context of ontology, *unum* refers to how manifold marks (*ubertas*) interlink, rounding out (*brevitas*) into a unity; as I have shown, the circle is the symbol for such a unity.⁶¹ Baumgarten applies this ontological principle to the concept of the world. An entity can only be a world if it is a unity: “Every world is one (§359) and yet has modes (§361, 112), and hence determinations separable in themselves (§72, 65), and hence a hypothetical (§76) and intrinsically contingent (§115) unity” (MET § 362; *Omnis mundus est unum*, §. 359. *modos tamen habet*, §. 361, 112. *hinc determinationes in se separabiles*, §. 72, 65. *hinc unitatem hypotheticam*, §. 76. & *intrinsecus contingentem*, §. 115). Around the same time, Gottsched based his *Versuch einer Critischen Dichtkunst* (1729) on the triad of contingency, connection, and possible worlds, as Karen S. Feldman argues.⁶²

With regard to the problem of fictionality, three further paragraphs are particularly relevant:

A world can only originate from nothing.

Mundus non potest oriri, nisi ex nihilo. (MET § 371)

A world (cf. §91, 403, 434, the universe, *πάν*) is a series (multitude, whole) of actual and finite beings that is not part of another.

⁶¹ See 4.1.1 Perfection.

⁶² See Karen S. Feldman, *Arts of Connection: Poetry, History, Epochality* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2019), 38–57.

MUNDUS (cf. §. 91, 403, 434. universum, πᾶν) est series (multitudo, totum) actualium finitorum, quae non est pars alterius. (MET § 354)

Since the parts of a world are either simultaneous or successive (§238, 354), if they are posited mutually apart from one another, then they are connected in a world through time, or space, or both (§239, 306).

Quum partes mundi vel sint simultanea, vel successiva, §. 238, 354. si extra se invicem ponantur, connectentur in mundo aut per tempus, aut per spatium, aut per utrumque, §. 239, 306. (MET § 374)

The primary concepts of these paragraphs – *series*, *connexus*, and *ex nihilo* – converge with the two structural elements of narration: sequentiality und mediation. On the one hand, the narrative function – *si narrem* – creates narration out of nothing – *ex nihilo* – since, as I have shown, the narrative function is poietic and not mimetic. Instead, it produces both narrative discourse and a narrated world.⁶³ On the other hand, the seriality of the world – *series* – corresponds to the sequentiality of narration. In the cosmological context, the concept (*con*) *nexus* refers to the linking of actual beings (actualia) that exist. In any case, it is important to note that Baumgarten's cosmology is not merely empirical but primarily rational (see MET § 351). Against this backdrop, possibility establishes existence and not existence possibility: "This world exists. Therefore, the world is possible in itself (§57, 18)" (MET § 355; Hic mundus existit. Ergo mundus est in se possibilis, §. 57, 18).

The concept of possibility (*possibilitas*) is at the core of Baumgarten's theory of fiction and suspends the incredulity of Thomas: "*Whatever I do not experience or sense clearly (§544) does not exist*, i.e. the PREJUDICE OF THOMAS, or *is impossible*" (MET § 548; *Quicquid non experior seu clare sentio*, §. 544. *non existit*, s. PRAEIUDICIUM THOMISTICUM, aut, *est impossibile*).⁶⁴ In the part of the *Metaphysica* on ontology (ontologia), the first section defines the possible (*possibile*) as that which does not violate the first philosophical principle, meaning the principle of contradiction (see MET § 7): "That which is not nothing is SOMETHING: the representable, whatever does not involve a contradiction, whatever is not both A and not-A, is POSSIBLE (§7)" (MET § 8; Nonnihil est ALIQUID: representabile, quicquid non involvit contradictionem, quicquid non est A et non-A, est POSSIBILE. §. 7). This is tied to a further differentiation consisting in whether the contrary of something is fundamentally possible or impossible. If the contrary is impossible, then Baumgarten speaks of necessity (*necessitas*);

⁶³ See 5.2.2 Mediation.

⁶⁴ See Clemens Schwaiger, *Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten – ein intellektuelles Porträt: Studien zur Metaphysik und Ethik von Kants Leitautor* (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 2011), 67.

if the contrary is possible, then he speaks of contingency (*contingentia*). This is not the place for a philosophical discussion of these premises; I just want to note that in his cosmological argumentation, they lead to the claim that all worlds are located in the realm of contingency since they do not exclude the contrary (see MET § 103): “All the parts of every world are contingent beings [...], and every world is a contingent being (§111)” (MET § 361; *Partes omnis mundi singulae sunt entia contingentia [...] & omnis mundus est ens contingens*, §. 111). This contingency is softened by the linking of the parts of such contingent worlds: “In no world is the conjunction of the parts absolutely necessary (§362, 102), and yet there is a coordination (§78)” (MET § 363; *Nullius mundi partium coniunctio est absolute necessaria*, §. 362, 102. *est tamen coordinatio*, §. 78). While linking is treated as narrative coherence in the narratological context, in the cosmological context, linking has a geometric dimension: “Coordinated beings touching <*contingentia*> one another are CONTIGUOUS” (MET § 284; *Coordinata se mutuo contingentia sunt CONTIGUA*).

By combining possibility and linking, Baumgarten discovers a criterion for measuring a world's degree of perfection. The differentiation between this world and other worlds makes clear that – in the tradition of Leibniz – Baumgarten does not exclude other worlds but posits that the actual world is the most perfect: “*In the most perfect world there is the greatest universal nexus* (§437, 94), harmony, and agreement (§436, 357) that is possible in a world” (MET § 441; *In mundo perfectissimo est maximus*, qui in mundo possibilis, *nexus universalis*, §. 437, 94. *harmonia & consensus*, §. 436, 357). In such a world – the actual world – the parts are composed in a perfect order:

There is order in every perfection (§95). Hence, in the most perfect world there is the greatest order that is possible in a world (§437, 175). Therefore, there are the most general rules of perfection, e.g. *the more, the greater, the more spacious* (§280), and *the longer lasting* (§299), *all else being equal, the better* (§437, 187). There is also a maximally composite order (§183), yet such that all the inferior and superior rules can in the end be known together from one and the same supreme and strongest rule of perfection (§182, 185).

In omni perfectione est ordo, §. 95. Hinc in mundo perfectissimo maximus est ordo, qui in mundo possibilis, §. 437, 175. Ergo plurimae regulae perfectionis communes, e.g. *Quo plura, quo maiora, quo spatiosiora*, §. 281. *quo diuturniora*, §. 299. *caeteris paribus, hoc melius*, §. 437, 187. & ordo maxime compositus, §. 183. ita tamen, ut inferiores superioresque regulae tandem ad unam omnes ex una summa perfectionis regula, eademque fortissima, cognosci possint, §. 182, 185. (MET § 444)

The assumption that the actual world is perfect, that perfection is linking, that linking is a composite, that a composite is an order, and that an order follows one rule is the basis of the analogy relating worlds to the structure of literary dis-

course. Not only the latter is beautiful, but also the former: both require that a manifold converges into a unity that is a contingent phenomenon (see AE § 18).⁶⁵

In the eighteenth century, the phrase “the best of all possible worlds” was a common topos, satirized in popular works like Voltaire’s *Candide ou l’optimisme* (1759). But mockery aside, other worlds than the actual one are possible; and because they are possible, they can also exist. Based on this precondition, Baumgarten subjects the objects of aesthetic cognition to possibility in section 27 of the *Aesthetica* on aesthetic truth (*veritas aesthetica*) using the philosophical principles he imports from the *Metaphysica*: the principle of contradiction, the principle of reason, and the principle of sufficient reason: “Aesthetic truth demands (I) the possibility of thinking of the objects elegantly (§ 426)” (AE § 431; *Veritas aesthetica postulat obiectorum eleganter cogitandorum I. possibilitatem*, §. 426; see also AE § 426). He differentiates between different types of possibility as follows:

- (1) absolute possibility (see AE § 431; *possibilitas absoluta*)
- (2) hypothetical possibility (see AE § 432; *possibilitas hypothetica*)
 - (a) natural possibility (see AE § 432; *possibilitas naturalis*)
 - (b) moral possibility (see AE § 433; *possibilitas moralis*)
 - (i) in the broad sense (see AE § 433; *latius dicta*)
 - (ii) in the narrow sense (see AE § 435; *strictius dicta*)

In addition to demanding that the objects of thought are possible, aesthetic truth also requires that objects be linked: “Aesthetic truth requires (II) the linkage of thinking the objects beautifully with reasons and consequences (§§ 426, 431) to the extent that this linkage is sensately knowable (§ 423; *Metaphysica* § 24) by the analogon of reason (*Metaphysica* § 640)” (AE § 437; *Veritas aesthetica requirit obiectorum pulcre cogitandorum, II. nexum cum rationibus et rationatis* §. 426, 431. *quatenus ille sensitive cognoscendus est*, §. 423. *M. §. 24. per analogon rationis*, *M. §. 640*). Although possibility and linking at first characterize different modes of aesthetic truth – that is, they are used ontologically – the question arises as to whether the concepts are also used cosmologically in the *Aesthetica*, whether they lead to an aesthetic cosmology. In fact, while Baumgarten does not address the world of the poets (*mundus poetarum*; see AE §§ 513–515) or the poetic world (*mundus poeticus*; see AE §§ 516–518) in the paragraphs on truth, he does explore them in the sections on fiction. The cosmological model for the poetic world is the “fabulous world (*Metaphysica* § 91)” (AE § 455; *mundus fabulosus*, *M. §. 91*); in English, one would say a “fantasy world” or “dream

⁶⁵ See 4.1.1 Perfection.

world.”⁶⁶ In any case, the etymological proximity to the genre of the fable is argumentatively relevant, and by using the literal translation “fabulous world,” I wish to emphasize precisely this proximity to poetic fiction, which is what Baumgarten is concerned with here.

He establishes the relation between a world and fabulousness with a structural analogy: both are defined by coherence.⁶⁷ But what functions without any problem in rhetoric creates several difficulties in cosmology. In the *Metaphysica*, it is less the coherence of the world that poses a problem for Baumgarten than the concept of world as such. In the part on cosmology, he is still very certain that all the things the lower cognitive faculties generate are not worlds: “A dream [I translate as “fabulous,” F. B.] world is not a world (§120)” (MET § 359; *Mundus fabulosus non est mundus*, §. 120). He therefore rigorously demarcates fabulous worlds from the true world in the part on ontology: “The confusion opposed to transcendental truth would be a DREAM TAKEN AS OBJECTIVE (cf. §593). An aggregate of dreams would be a FANTASY [I translate as “fabulous,” F. B.] WORLD (cf. §354)” (MET § 91; *Confusio veritati transcendentali opposita esset SOMNIUM OBJECTIVE SUMTUM* (cf. §. 593.) *Somniorum aggregatum esset MUNDUS FABULOSUS*, (cf. §. 354.)). This is because this world would violate the principle of sufficient reason, which Baumgarten posits following Wolff.⁶⁸ And if a world violates logical principles, it is not possible and so also cannot exist; it is a fabulous world.

Actually, at this point, Baumgarten uses the term *fictus*, “fictional” in English, for the first and only time: “A dream taken as objective and a fabulous world are non-beings (§118, 91), and if they seem to be beings, they are fictional beings (§62)” (MET § 120; *Somnium obiective sumtum et mundus fabulosus sunt nonentia*, §. 118, 91. *et si videantur entia, sunt entia ficta*, §. 62). These fictional beings should not be confused, however, with the problem of poetic fiction; instead, we should differentiate both conceptually and theoretically between ficta and fictions. Horace’s chimeras are ficta because they are not coherent; by con-

⁶⁶ See 6.2.3 Melancholy.

⁶⁷ See 5.2.1 Sequentiality.

⁶⁸ In his *Philosophia prima*, Wolff states: “Denial of the principle of sufficient ground changes the true world into a fantasy world <*mundus fabulosus*>, in which the human being’s will takes the place of the ground of that which occurs.” Christian Wolff, *Philosophia prima, sive ontologia, methodo scientifica pertractata, qua omnis cognitionis humanae principia continentur*, new ed., in *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. Jean École, vol. 2.3 (Frankfurt 1736; facsimile, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1962), § 77; translation quoted from Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, *Metaphysics: A Critical Translation with Kant’s Elucidations, Selected Notes, and Related Materials*, trans. Courtney D. Fugate and John Hymers (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 116n.

trast, in poetic fiction, one narrates about chimeras and empty images as well as about actualia. As a result, ficta can appear in fictional worlds, but they do not have to, meaning they do not play a role in classifying discourse. Under this precondition, there are fictional worlds with only ficta or actualia as well as worlds in which there are both ficta and actualia, for example in fables, which are very important for Baumgarten. There is no definitive indication that he intended this differentiation, but it is the only plausible reason for why the fabulous world serves as the model for poetic fiction and as the basis for a genuinely aesthetic cosmology in the *Aesthetica*.

In contrast to the rational cosmology in the *Metaphysica*, which Baumgarten articulates theoretically, his aesthetic cosmology is quite well hidden, making reconstructing it difficult. While he takes the ontological premises of fictional worlds from the *Metaphysica* and clearly proves them philosophically, his remarks on poetic worlds appear in section 28 on aesthetic falsity (*falsitas aesthetica*), which is where one finds his catalogue of mistakes.⁶⁹ There the Platonic topos of the lying poet serves as the starting point; Baumgarten cites it from Cicero: “A false argument is one containing a statement obviously untrue.”⁷⁰ Yet Baumgarten does not reject the infinite number of small aesthetic falsities contained in literary texts but rather, in twisting and turning his argumentation, affirms them such that his evaluation of mistakes becomes, in the end, the foundation for an aesthetic cosmology: it forms a theory of poetic worlds.

The pivotal point of these intellectual acrobatics is that aesthetic falsity presents something for evaluation that depends on sensate perception. The organ of this evaluation is the analogon of reason. Such aesthetic judgments are aestheticological.⁷¹ In order to evaluate them, Baumgarten plays Horace’s “*Ars poetica*” against Cicero’s *De oratore* because, as he lucidly notes, every forensic speech contains something false in its narrative part (see AE § 447). Working on the basis of aestheticological truth, falsities or even lies are, Baumgarten argues, only aesthetically false when they are judged to be lies not only by reason but also by the analogon of reason (see AE § 448) – and this analogon seems to be quite tolerant of mistakes! With a series of quotes from Lucretius, Baumgarten therefore emphasizes the autonomy of the senses, which cannot be deceived; somehow they already know what is true and what is false, even though there is not – as astounding as this finding might appear in the context of the Enlightenment – any definitive test or clear boundary between aestheticological truth

⁶⁹ See 5.2.2 Mediation.

⁷⁰ Cic., *De inv.* 1.90. Quoted from Cicero, *De inventione, De optimo genere oratorum, Topica*, trans. H. M. Hubbell, Loeb Classical Library 386 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949).

⁷¹ See 4.1.2 Truth.

and falsity: “*For not only would all Reason fall apart and come to grief / But in an instant, Life itself, unless you hazard belief / In the senses, and back away from the brink of sheer cliffs,*”⁷² etc. (Lucr. 504–509)” (AE § 449; *Non modo enim ratio ruat omnis: vita quoque ipsa / Concidat extemplo, nisi credere sensibus ausis, / Praecipitesque locos vitare.* e. c. 511). Not everything logically false is aesthetically false: this thought leads Baumgarten from legal discourse to the historicity of truth. He considers the difference between two themes that are both logically false, but only one of which has been proved false while the other is still considered true (see AE §§ 452–453). Although the theme that has been proved to be false suffers from logical and aesthetic falsity, he circumvents the problem of falsity by making it a matter of degree. When considered in this way, the analogon of reason is very generous with minor falsities because they are evaluated within the horizon of aesthetics (see AE § 454). This includes, for example, poetic passages that are characterized by ambiguity or vagueness. In any case, Baumgarten underhandedly switches the register here by veering from a false transmission to the falsity of representation. Against this backdrop, he makes the following claim about the fabulous worlds of poets like Homer and of painters like Apelles:

But let the dream or even the fabulous world be such that (1) the defect of internal impossibility is not at all exposed by the analogon of reason and (2) that it also lies hidden to reason and the intellect, which you ought to assume is in you and in your foremost spectators, or at least that the evidence of it is not apparent, evidence of the sort that should be expected to dispel all the craft of a beautifully pleasing work like spider webs: this dream, this fabulous world will not be annihilated by the aesthetic tribunal (§ 452).

Illud autem, vel hic etiam, ita se habeat, ut 1) impossibilitatis internae vitium prorsus non pateat analogo rationis 2) rationi ac intellectui, quas in te spectatoribusque tuis praecipuis praesumere debes, vel etiam lateat, vel saltem ea non obversetur evidentia, quae totam pulcre placituri operis fabricam, velut araneorum telas, disiectura sperari debeat: Hoc somnium, hic mundus fabulosus per tribunal aestheticum non annihilatur. §. 452. (AE § 455)

Only ficta (in the sense of the *Metaphysica*) that appear in the dreams of the sick (*aegri somnia*) are rejected as really false (see AE § 446). This means that a natural measurement of forces (*dynamomentria naturalis*) takes place every time the analogon of reason judges how much falsity a poetic world can tolerate (see AE § 457). There is thus – and this is notably modern – no prescriptive guiding principle of falsity but rather a negotiation of aesthetic falsity in every single text. This judgment of the analogon of reason is supported by ethical common

⁷² Quoted from Lucretius, *The Nature of Things*, trans. A. E. Stallings (London: Penguin Books, 2007), 508–510.

sense, which later also plays an important role in Kant's *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (see AE §§ 463–467).⁷³

In view of the bold thought that, instead of being aesthetically true as they are supposed to be, poetic worlds also exhibit aesthetic falsities, Baumgarten exclaims: “But what kind of ambiguity is that?” (AE § 471; *Quid autem illud est ambiguitatis?*). With a predictable yet somewhat tired imperative, he compels the poet to truth with Cicero: “*Ne quid falsi*” (AE § 472). But while the poet is a friend of truth (*amicus veritatis*), he is not its slave. For poetic worlds are defined by the necessity of falsity (*necessitas falsi*; see AE § 473); so simple is the definition. Such a world “will seem to be similar to the false” (AE § 518; *falsi similis videbitur*) – or, as Baumgarten's Latin suggests, *falsisimilar* – but it will never be so false that it falls victim to the aesthetic tribunal (*tribunal aestheticum*; see AE § 455). Poetic worlds are thus not one but double. Such worlds have, for Maurice Merleau-Ponty, two poles: a true one and a false one. And they are only accessible to the child (the paradigm of nonrational perception), who “inhabits a hybrid zone of oneiric ambiguity.”⁷⁴ The concept of ambiguity thus changes its setting once again: it refers to the structure of aesthetics, which is both epistemology and media theory; it refers to beauty, situated in between openness and closedness; and it refers to poetic worlds. The oneiric – that is, the dream-like – is the indiffereniable and thus also the undecidable that characterizes this zone.⁷⁵

5.3.2 Probability

Baumgarten's argumentation in section 28 on aesthetic falsity (*falsitas aesthetica*) clearly leads to a shift in the problem of fiction. He is not interested in the difference between fact and fiction, in whether there are chimeras or not. Instead, the problem of possibility organizes his ontologically and cosmologically anchored theory of poetic fiction, which – and this is the crux – merely forms the flip side of the psychological and rhetorical argumentation. The *tertium comparationis* of world and narration is coherence. In this, he takes a strange middle position between the premodern tradition that goes back to Aristotle – where philosophy concerns fundamental determinations of being – and Kant's modern analysis of subjective forms of judgment. While Baumgarten's theory of fiction is

⁷³ See 6.3.1 Ethopoeia.

⁷⁴ Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Child Psychology and Pedagogy: The Sorbonne Lectures 1949–1952*, trans. Talia Welsh (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2010), 182.

⁷⁵ See 6.2.3 Melancholy.

not actually based on the modal logic of propositions, he does analyze the modality of propositions in narration, and he does so with the somewhat cruder tools of stylistic analysis. This analysis of style is accompanied by a conceptual shift from ontological possibility (*possibilitas*) in the *Metaphysica* to rhetorical probability (*probabilitas*) in the *Meditationes* and then to aesthetic verisimilitude (*verisimilitudo*) in the *Aesthetica*.

Against Wolff's ontological disclaimer about figments,⁷⁶ which follows the Platonic tradition in equating literature with lies because literature contains fictions (*ens fictum*), Baumgarten begins in the *Meditationes* to reflect on "what can be considered thinkable or imaginable at all"⁷⁷ by ontologically differentiating between three types of fictions:

MED § 51: True fictions (*figmenta vera*), or representations that are possible in the real world.

MED § 52: Heterocosmic fictions (*figmenta heterocosmica*), or representations that are impossible in the real world but possible in other possible worlds.

MED § 52: Utopic fictions (*figmenta utopica*), or representations that are impossible in all worlds.

The conceptual shifts begin when Baumgarten proposes yet another unique concept of truth for his concept of possibility. He does not, however, take this concept from his philosophical sources, Leibniz and Wolff, but rather from Cicero's rhetorical writings:

Hence, concerning contingent things, singular truth constitutes these things either as possibilities and parts of this universe (*Metaphysica* § 377) – and this truth, along with the highest truth of things that are absolutely necessary, is called TRUTH IN THE STRICTEST SENSE and in popular parlance simply TRUTH – or else as possibilities of another world and part of it, for the intermediate cognition of men (*Metaphysica* § 876), which is called HETEROCOSMIC TRUTH.

Hinc veritas singularis de contingentibus aut ea sistit, ut possibilia et partes huius universi, M. §. 377. et haec veritas cum veritate absolute necessariorum maxima dicitur STRICTISIME, popularique sermone simpliciter, VERITAS, aut ut possibilia alterius universi, eiusque partes, cognitioni hominum mediae, M. §. 876. VERITAS HETEROCOSMICA. (AE § 441)

⁷⁶ See Adler, "Utopie und Imagination," 23. See also Horst-Michael Schmidt, *Sinnlichkeit und Verstand: Zur philosophischen und poetologischen Begründung von Erfahrung und Urteil in der deutschen Aufklärung* (Leibniz, Wolff, Gottsched, Bodmer und Breitingen, Baumgarten) (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1982), 214–218.

⁷⁷ Adler, "Utopie und Imagination," 24. See also Pietro Pimpinella, "Veritas aesthetica: Erkenntnis des Individuellen und mögliche Welten," in Aichele and Mirbach, "Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten," 37–60.

The attribute *heterocosmicus* refers to the truth of possible objects (possibilia) from another world. In the *Meditationes*, Baumgarten introduces this concept to describe poetic passages in literary texts and casts it rhetorically: “Confused descriptions of sense impressions, images, and fictions, true and heterocosmic, are highly poetic, § 54” (MED § 55; *Descriptiones idearum sensualium, phantasmatum, figmentorum verorum & heterocosmicorum confusae sunt admodum poeticae* §. 54). One paragraph later, he introduces the concept of fiction for both heterocosmic and poetic fictions, both of which require that “many things can be presumed to enter the stream of thought of many listeners or readers” (MED § 56; *plura [...] seriem in animis multorum auditorum lectorumve ingressa praesumi possunt*). The premise for this is that “there is nothing self-contradictory in poetic fictions, § 53” (MED § 57; *in figmentis poeticis nil sibi invicem repugnat*. §. 53).

To describe the logic of heterocosmic and poetic fictions, Baumgarten thus never – neither in the *Meditationes* nor in the *Aesthetica* – turns to the discourse on mimesis.⁷⁸ Instead, he embraces poesis in an emphatically modern sense by analyzing the rhetorical figures of amplification, which produce *evidentia*.⁷⁹

If any philosophical or universal theme whatever is to be represented poetically, it is wise to determine it as much as possible, § 18, by the introduction of examples, § 22, definite as to place and time, § 28, and by description enumerating as many other details as possible, § 49. If experience does not suffice, true fictions are available; if, indeed, the historical part is not rich enough, heterocosmic fictions are likely to be necessary, § 44, § 47. Therefore, fictions both true and heterocosmic are, on condition, necessary in a poem.

Si philosophica vel universalia quaevis repraesentanda poetice, determinare quam maxime §. 18. exemplis involvere §. 22. eaque ratione loci & temporis §. 28. & enumeratis aliis quam pluribus variis describere §. 49. mens est; experientia non sufficiente figmenta vera, nec historia quidem satis divite, figmenta probabiliter heterocosmica necessaria §. 44. 47. Ergo *figmenta tam vera, quam heterocosmica in poemate hypothetice necessaria*. (MED § 58)

Baumgarten’s poet is accordingly “not an imitator; he mimes imitation,”⁸⁰ as Derrida puts it. For creating heterocosmic and poetic fictions is an “operation [that] is no longer comprehended within the process of truth”⁸¹ but rather produces “reality-effects.”⁸²

⁷⁸ See Gabriel Trop, *Poetry as a Way of Life: Aesthetics and Askesis in the German Eighteenth Century* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2015), 47–48.

⁷⁹ See Adler, “Utopie und Imagination,” 24. See also 3.4.1 Complexity.

⁸⁰ Jacques Derrida, “The Double Session,” in *Dissemination*, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 219.

⁸¹ Derrida, “The Double Session,” 207.

⁸² Derrida, “The Double Session,” 206.

Although Baumgarten primarily addresses lyric poetry in the *Meditationes* to analyze the effects of the three functions of the structure of literary discourse – complexity, opacity, and performativity – he already focuses here, and not only later in the *Aesthetica*, on the narrative function, which the evidentiality of heterocosmic and poetic fictions depends on. Precisely in analyzing historical narratives from a narratological perspective, he replaces the ontological concept of possibility with the rhetorical concept of probability. “In fact,” as Douglas Lane Patey explains this change in register, “for Baumgarten, probability is a property intrinsic neither to true nor to heterocosmic fictions, but is a relation to evidence. Baumgarten is clear [...] about the status of such evidence as comes from ‘the work itself’”:⁸³

More remote history is never so determinately known as the pen of the poet requires – as already demonstrated. What is narrated, therefore, has to be more fully determined. Determinations have to be added to the poem about those things concerning which history is silent. They can be discerned only by taking note of whatever must be presupposed for their literal truth. But since this does not fall within the limits of comprehension, they must be guessed at from very little and often insufficient evidence. In this respect the truth of poetic inventions is decidedly improbable; that is, their nonexistence and their status among the heterocosmic fictions are probable.

Historia remotior nunquam tam determinate cognita, ut stilus poscit poeticus, per demonstrata, ergo magis determinanda, quae narrat. Determinationes poemati addendae, de quibus tacet historia, cognosci nequeunt, nisi ex perspicentia omnium requisitorum ad veritatem earundem, quae cum in limitatum non cadat intellectum, ex aliquibus & paucissimis rationibus insufficientissimis hariolandae sunt, adeoque vehementer improbabilis earum veritas i.e. probabilis non existentia & statio inter heterocosmica figmenta. (MED § 58n)

He takes up probability again in the next paragraph when he declares that the degree of rhetorically produced evidentiality determines the degree of literariness: “a poem which treats of probable events represents things more poetically than a poem which treats of improbable events, § 56” (MED § 59; *poema fingens probabilia facta magis poetice res repraesentat, quam fingens improbabilia* §. 56). Probability and an evidentiality liberated from mimesis go hand in hand. Binding together probability and evidentiality makes literature into a simulacrum, though not in the pejorative sense of deception but rather in the emphatic sense of the autonomous evidentiality of such worlds whose possibility is not morally

⁸³ Douglas Lane Patey, *Probability and Literary Form: Philosophic Theory and Literary Practice in the Augustan Age* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 318n71. See also René Wellek, *A History of Modern Criticism: 1750 – 1950*, vol. 1, *The Later Eighteenth Century* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1955), 145 – 146.

grounded – as was common in the middle of the eighteenth century – but rather self-referentially grounded.

How tightly probability and evidentialia belong together is finally also made clear in section 33 on evidential arguments (*argumenta probantia*). Baumgarten derives them from the arguments of probability (*eikota*), which play a central role in Greek rhetoric and dialectics when the orator cannot depend on certain proofs. In Plato's *Phaedrus*, Socrates bemoans rhetoricians who teach the use of arguments: "It is they who realized that what is likely must be held in higher honor than what is true; they who, by the power of their language, make small things appear great and great things small; they who express modern ideas in ancient garb, and ancient ones in modern dress."⁸⁴ *Paregmenon* (AE § 543),⁸⁵ *sententia* (AE § 549), *definitio*, and *descriptio* (AE § 551) qualify as such figures of "making evident"; and Baumgarten discusses *descriptio* in section 43 on illustrative arguments (*argumenta illustrantia*), that is, again in the arguments responsible for evidentialia.

The relation between probability and evidentialia solves the theoretical problems that arise in the *Aesthetica* from Baumgarten's complicated grounding of aesthetic truth and from his affirmation of aesthetic falsity in the service of this truth. The change of concepts makes clear that the probability of poetic fiction has to do with a probability based on rhetorical evidentialia. This is also the case when Baumgarten replaces the concept of probability with the concept of verisimilitude in the sections on aesthetic truth and places verisimilitude under the auspices of *Suada*, the Roman goddess of persuasion (see AE § 838) in section 50 on aesthetic evidence (*evidentialia aesthetica*), directly referring to Quintilian (who himself cites Cicero).⁸⁶ In the following paragraphs, he then specifies that aesthetic verisimilitude produces *sensate evidentialia*:

From verisimilar things of this sort (§§ 843–846), provided that persuasive aesthetics (§ 838) surrounds them with *sensate perspicuity* (§ 618), is born *sensate evidentialia* (*Metaphysica* § 531), which others call a demonstration for the eye, for the senses, and palpable, the analogue of an intellectually convincing demonstration.

Verisimilibus eiusmodi, §. 843–846. *dum aesthetica suada*, §. 838. *circumfundit perspicuitatem sensitivam*, §. 618. *nascitur inde evidentialia*, M. §. 531. *sensitiva*, quam alii demonstrationem ad oculum, ad sensus, et palpabilem dixerint, demonstrationis intellectualiter convincentis analogon. (AE § 847)

⁸⁴ Pl., *Phdr.* 267b. Quoted from Plato, *Phaedrus*, trans. Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995).

⁸⁵ All etymological figures serve to (mechanically) amplify arguments through repetition.

⁸⁶ See Quint., *Inst.* 9.2.40. See also 5.3.2 Probability.

But beside rhetorical evidentia, something else is also at stake with verisimilitude. In section 29 on aesthetic verisimilitude (*verisimilitudo aesthetica*), Baumgarten is not interested in the stylistic technique of placing something before the eyes. Instead, he is searching for an aesthetic truth recognized by the analogon of reason with equal standing to real, proper truth (see AE § 481). Something verisimilar is not only similar to the truth or seemingly true; it is, rather, a truth that becomes phenomenally manifest, making it aesthetically true. The rhetorical discovery of verisimilitude thus helps him draw truth-likeness out of the false-likeness of poetic worlds.⁸⁷

Now I would think that it is established with the clearest calculus that many of the things perceptible during graceful thinking are not completely certain, and that their truth is not completely discerned in the light (§§ 481–482). Nor can, nevertheless, any sensate falsity be discerned in anything without ugliness (section XXVII). Such things, however, about which we are indeed not completely certain but in which we nevertheless do not perceive any falsity are VERISIMILAR. Aesthetic truth (section XXVII), more properly called VERISIMILITUDE, is therefore the degree of truth that, even if it is not exalted to complete certitude, nevertheless contains no trace of observable falsity.

Iam apertissimo putaverim calculo constare plurima inter venuste cogitandum appercipienda, non esse complete certa, neque luce completa veritatem eorum conspici, §. 481, 482. Nec in ullo tamen falsitatis aliquid sensitivae deprehendi potest sine turpitudine, S. XXVIII. Talia autem, de quibus non complete quidem certi sumus, neque tamen falsitatem aliquam in iisdem appercipimus, sunt VERISIMILIA. Est ergo veritas aesthetica S. XXVII. a potiori dicta VERISIMILITUDO, ille veritatis gradus, qui, etiamsi non evectus sit ad completam certitudinem, tamen nihil contineat falsitatis observabilis. (AE § 483; see also AE § 518)

Baumgarten lays out the rules for simulating the quantitative and qualitative phenomenal concurrence of representation and world in fourteen points (see AE §§ 491–502).⁸⁸ In the following, I do not want to address them, however, but rather the result of the conceptual shift from possibility to probability to verisimilitude. And that result is the fable; in analyzing it, Baumgarten brings together verisimilitude and aesthetic evidentia so as to define the narrative matrix of poetic fiction. With this move, a “heteronomous minor genre for representing straightforward morality thus becomes a matrix for evaluating literature in general.”⁸⁹

⁸⁷ See 5.3.1 Possibility.

⁸⁸ See Heinrich Niehues-Pröbsting, “Rhetorische und idealistische Kategorien der Ästhetik,” in *Kolloquium Kunst und Philosophie*, ed. Willi Oelmüller, vol. 1, *Ästhetische Erfahrung* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1981), 97–98.

⁸⁹ Meixner, *Narratologie und Epistemologie*, 78.

In section 32 on fables (*fabulae*), he defines the fable as a small narrative (*narratiuncula*) that serves as an example for a moral maxim (*sententia*; see AE § 526); in other words, a fable makes a moral maxim evident. In genre poetics, the fable traditionally stood in the service of probability. With the concept of verisimilitude, Baumgarten changes the relationship between probability and the fable. Meixner is the first to have drawn attention to the fact that the poetics of the fable – and so also eighteenth-century narratology – does not begin with Lessing’s book on fables. And Feldman confirms the importance of this genre for Gottsched’s poetics.⁹⁰ Baumgarten already uses the concept of the fable to refer both to the genre and to the structure of literary discourse that creates coherence in poetic worlds, thereby relating fiction theory to narratology. He differentiates between *fable*₁ as a genre, which he calls *fabella* (see AE § 529), and *fable*₂ as a plot pattern, which he calls a poetic fable (*fabula poetica*; see AE § 530). Not only major and minor narrative forms but also dramatic genres like comedy and tragedy have *fables*₂ (see AE § 529). “For his purposes, Baumgarten decidedly reinterprets Quintilian,”⁹¹ whose typology he cites:

We are told that there are three species of Narrative, apart from the one used in actual Causes. One is Fable [*fabulam*], found in tragedies and poems, and remote not only from truth but from the appearance of truth. The second is Plot [*argumentum*], which is the false but probable fiction of comedy. The third is History [*historiam*], which contains the narration of actual events. We have given poetical Narratives to the *grammatici*; the rhetor should begin with historical ones, which are more grown-up because they are more real.⁹²

On the one hand, Baumgarten inverts Quintilian’s hierarchy of narrative types: *historia*, *argumentum*, *fabula*; but he still retains the climax of the argumentation. Now truth in the strictest sense (*veritas strictissime dicta*) is no longer at the top, but rather *fable*₂, which Quintilian calls plot and is merely similar to truth (see AE § 529).

Baumgarten abstracts a *fable*₂ structure from a series of Phaedrus’s Aesopian fables₁ (see AE §§ 536–538); it follows the plot structure Aristotle develops in his *Poetics* for tragedy: knot (*nodus*), interwoven and interlinked fables (*fabulae implicatae et connexae*) with desis (*colligatio*), metabasis (*transitus*), and lysis (*solutio*; see AE § 535). The minor narrative form of the *fabella* thus has just as much of a *fable*₂ (see AE § 529) as the major form of the epic. For this reason, Baumgarten actually differentiates between verisimilitude in the strictest sense (*verisi-*

⁹⁰ See Feldman, *Arts of Connection*, 47–50.

⁹¹ Meixner, *Narratologie und Epistemologie*, 76.

⁹² Quint., *Inst.* 2.4.2.

militudo strictissime dicta), which only narratives anchored in the actual world can possess, and the poetic and heterocosmic verisimilitude (verisimilitudo poetica/heterocosmica) of narratives that take us to other worlds. Only heterocosmic narratives “without vividly noticeable contradictions, a gap, or a jump” are verisimilar with regard to their fables₂ (AE § 530; sine vividius notabili repugnantia, hiatu, saltu).

At the end of this complex explanation of verisimilitude in section 32 on fables (fabulae), Baumgarten suddenly switches concepts yet again and returns to speaking of probability as he does in the *Meditationes*. It is hard to tell why. I do not think it makes sense to translate *probabilitas* as “Glaubhaftigkeit” (plausibility or credibility), as both the German translations of the *Aesthetica* and the scholarship on the fable tend to do. Baumgarten also seems serious about differentiating verisimilitude and probability, considering that he further differentiates aesthetic probability (*probabilitas aesthetica*) into historical probability, poetic probability, and heterocosmic probability (see AE § 533). So I believe that the relapse to using the concept of probability from the poetologically oriented *Meditationes* is exclusively due to how Baumgarten follows the history of the genre of the fable, in which a distinction is made between probable and improbable fables (fabulae probabiles et improbabiles). At the end of his analysis of fables₁, he is concerned with precisely this problem: with “(im)probabilities” in fables₁ – a problem that the word *verisimilitude* simply does not morphologically correspond to.

Yet despite the change in concepts, he is in actuality still interested in the verisimilitude of fables₁. In a close reading of Phaedrus’s first fable, “Lupus et agnus,” Baumgarten notes the combination of improbability and truth: “Phaedrus’s first fable is improbable in a stricter sense (§ 532)” (AE § 534; Prima Phaedri fabula est improbabilis strictius, §. 532). In this fable, a wolf eyes a lamb and so as to initiate a quarrel with the lamb, invents a story about how the lamb insulted him six months ago. When the lamb replies that it was not yet born six months ago, the wolf then suddenly accuses the lamb’s father of insulting him and eats up the lamb. Baumgarten finds the dialogue between the wolf and the lamb to be improbable because the narratological coherence in the fable does not convince him. Yet with regard to the moral of the fable, he notes that often nothing is more true than that people “invent false charges by which to oppress the innocent.”⁹³

⁹³ Phaedrus, *Phaedri Augusti liberti fabularum Aesopiarum* 1.1.15; quoted from Babrius and Phaedrus, *Fables*, trans. Ben Edwin Perry, Loeb Classical Library 436 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).

The conceptual shifts from ontological possibility in the *Metaphysica* to rhetorical probability in the *Meditationes*, and then to aesthetic verisimilitude in the *Aesthetica*, result from Baumgarten's reflections on aesthetic truth. In the eighteenth century, the concept of verisimilitude applied to things that were not anchored in the actual world, and so he treats verisimilitude as a question of narrative with regard to representation in general. The analysis of "Lupus et agnus" thus confirms that the ambiguity of poetic worlds consists in a philosophically troubling truth-likeness. This ambiguity applies to all the types of fiction that Baumgarten provides examples for in the sections on fiction in the *Aesthetica*.

5.3.3 Accessibility

The conceptual shift from possibility to probability to verisimilitude prepares a typology of fictions (*systema fictionum*; see AE § 513)⁹⁴ that does not differentiate between fact and fiction but rather combines different ontological states of worlds and different modes of truth in narration into different types of fiction. In this typology, both world and truth depend on the narrative function of the structure of literary discourse. Historical models are available for reconstructing this typology – in particular, Leibniz's theory of possible worlds – yet even a glance at twentieth-century literary theory quickly discloses the dimensions of Baumgarten's typology. And this also shows that what seems to be old-fashioned in this typology turns out to be the silver bullet for fiction theory, a solution that David Lewis was the first to take up again, two hundred years after Baumgarten, under the influence of analytic philosophy in his essay "Truth in Fiction" and his book *On the Plurality of Worlds* (1986). More recent theories of fiction have followed his lead. Using modal logic, they all attempt to escape the ontological trap of a cheap differentiation between fictionality and factuality.

In her explanation of recent approaches to fiction, Marie-Laure Ryan traces the current concept of possible worlds back to Leibniz: "For a world to be possible, it must be linked to the actual world by a relation of accessibility. The boundaries of the possible depend on the particular interpretation given to this notion of accessibility. The most common interpretation associates possibility with logical laws: every world that respects the principles of non-contradiction and of the excluded middle is a possible world. On the basis of this model, we can define a proposition as necessary if it is true in all worlds linked to the actual world (including this actual world itself); as possible if it is true in

94 See Berndt, "Mundus poetarum."

only some of these worlds; as impossible (e. g., contradictory) if it is false in all of them; and as true, without being necessary, if it is verified in the actual world of the system but not in some other possible world.”⁹⁵ The approaches that employ this concept display striking parallels to Baumgarten’s aesthetic cosmology. All of them differentiate between our actual world and other possible worlds that are not our actual world.

Drawing on such theories of possible worlds, one can glean a typology of fiction from Baumgarten’s remarks on his examples. The typology consists in three different ontological states of worlds and two different modes of truth. Combined, these two variables yield six types of fiction in total, expanding on the three types of fiction from the *Meditationes* named above (see MED §§ 51–53): true fictions, heterocosmic fictions, and utopic fictions. The typology is, however, only implicit in the *Aesthetica*, and it is difficult to fill in all the placeholders that it provides for; furthermore, the borders between the types prove to be problematic. I will first describe the typology based on the *Aesthetica* (at times taking into account the *Meditationes* as well), then briefly explain it, and finally analyze Baumgarten’s “fiction trouble.”

Mode of truth State of world	Generally true/false/verisimilar fictions (fictiones generales)	Individually true/false/verisimilar fictions (fictiones singulares)
Actual world	1 fictiones strictius historicae e.g., Livy: <i>Ab urbe condita</i> (i. e., histories) fabulae historicae	2 fictiones historicae latius dictae e.g., Virgil: <i>Aeneis</i> (i. e., myths)
Nonactual possible worlds	3 fictiones poeticae e.g., Virgil: <i>Aeneis</i> fabulae poeticae e.g., Phaedrus: <i>Fabulae Aesopiae</i>	4 fictiones heterocosmicae
Impossible worlds	5 figmenta anomala	6 figmenta utopica figmenta vaticiniorum

⁹⁵ Marie-Laure Ryan, “Possible Worlds,” in *Handbook of Narratology*, ed. Peter Hühn et al., 2nd ed., vol. 2 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2014), 726–727. See Ryan, *Possible Worlds, Artificial Intelligence, and Narrative Theory* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991).

(1) *Historical fictions in a narrower sense (fictiones strictius historicae) and historical fables (fabulae historicae)*. Although Baumgarten hedges his definition with a few relativizations, he is still certain that historical fictions narrate events that took place, that are currently taking place, or that will take place in the actual world. Livy's monumental history of Rome, *Ab urbe condita*, is paradigmatic for this type of fiction. Historical fables, which are different from histories due to their brevity, also belong to this group (see AE § 527).

(2) *Historical fictions in a broader sense (fictiones historicae latius dictae)*. Baumgarten differentiates historical fictions in a narrower sense from historical fictions in a broader sense. Historical fictions in a broader sense narrate events that have occurred in a more or less similar way in the actual world:

Thus, fictions, just as truths, falsities, and verisimilitudes, will be either general or particular, and they will either be engaged in cognition about this universe or be heterocosmic (§§ 445, 441). The general ones have their own rules (section XXVIII). The singular ones, part of graceful cognition about this universe, will be either true in the strictest sense (§ 506) – matters of fact, whether constituting present events or things that will truly take place, which the one thinking them has not, however, experienced strictly speaking – or true in a less strict sense.

Erunt itaque fictiones, sicuti veritates, falsitates et verisimilitudines, vel generales, vel singulares, et hae vel huius universi cognitionem ingredientur, vel erunt heterocosmicae, §. 445, 441. Generales habent suas regulas S. XXVIII. Singulares, pars cognitionis de hoc universo venustae, aut erunt strictissime verae, §. 506, res facti, vel eventus praesentes, vel vere futura sistentes, quae tamen ipse cogitans non stricte expertus est, aut minus. (AE § 507; see also AE § 509)

Narratives about the nature of this world are therefore not generally true but rather individually true; that is, they only apply to one particular case. The *Aeneis* by the Roman poet Virgil is paradigmatic for this type of fiction. Virgil's epic narrates the founding myth of the Roman Empire, which he relates to the myth of the Trojan War. In Baumgarten's understanding, such myths are special historical fictions: "The AESTHETICS OF THE MYTHICAL is the part of aesthetics that devises and presents fictions" (MET § 592; AESTHETICA MYTHICA est aesthetices pars de fictionibus excogitandis & proponendis).

(3) *Poetic fictions (fictiones poeticae) and poetic fables (fabulae poeticae)*. Poetic fictions and their shorter variant, poetic fables, narrate possible events:

If such things should be invented that, because of a circumstance – known, as one must assume, both to the one thinking and to those who would think under his guidance – and a hypothesis and a sure event of this world, have no place in this same universe as its possibilities, but nevertheless, if some other hypothesis is supposed that is not a possibility of this universe, could have happened or could happen in a beautiful or ugly manner

through intermediate cognition, then such heterocosmic FICTIONS (§ 441) are called POETIC since their inventor creates a new world even if they are mostly brought forth from the historical.

Si fingantur talia, quae ob notam et cogitanti et cogitaturis ipso duce, sicuti praesumi debet, circumstantiam, et hypothesin eventumque huius mundi certum, in eodem hoc universo locum non habeant, ut eiusdem possibilia, supposita tamen alia quadam hypothesi, quae non est possibile huius universi, fieri pulcre potuissent aut possent, vel turpiter, per cognitionem mediam: tales FICTIONES heterocosmicae, §. 441, quia inventor earum, quasi novum creat orbem fingendo, si vel maxime ab historico proferantur, dicuntur POETICAE. (AE § 511; see also AE §§ 527–528)

The proximity of poetic and heterocosmic fictions is not noteworthy since Baumgarten uses the attributes *heterocosmicus* and *poeticus* as synonyms in the *Meditationes*. What is more important is the fact that he considers narratives about poetic worlds to be categorically true, while heterocosmic fictions can only be individually true. But since heterocosmic and poetic fictions are so similar, the difference between general truth and individual truth becomes porous. This is confirmed by the fact that Baumgarten does not have a paradigmatic example for poetic fictions but rather selects Virgil's *Aeneis* again, even though he has already classified it as a historical fiction (in a broader sense). If one looks at this paradigm from the perspective of production, poets of historical fictions in a broader sense, poets of heterocosmic fictions, and poets of poetic fictions all apparently enjoy the same poetic liberty (*libertas poetica*; see AE § 523).

(4) *Heterocosmic fictions (fictiones heterocosmicae)*. Baumgarten does not have a different definition or a different paradigmatic example for heterocosmic fictions than for poetic fictions. Narratives about these worlds are individually true; apart from that, everything that applies to poetic fictions also applies to heterocosmic fictions.

(5) *Anomalous figments (figmenta anomala)*. Anomalous figments are characterized by aesthetic deviations and ethical irregularities. They narrate impossible events. Such “mistakes” are allowable in small doses in poetic fictions, as I explained in my analysis of section 28 on aesthetic falsity (*falsitas aethetica*),⁹⁶ but when more extensive, they are a disqualifying criterion.

(6) *Utopic fictions (figmenta utopica) and prophetic fictions (figmenta vaticiniorum)*. Aesthetic deviations also characterize utopias in the *Aesthetica* and prophetic fictions – including wonders (*mirabilia*), miracles (*miracula*), and fantasies (*phantasmata*), and others – in the *Meditationes* (see MED §§ 43–64). Contrary to anomalous figments, for which Baumgarten does not provide any ex-

⁹⁶ See 5.3.1 Possibility.

amples, the narratives of this group are individually true, although they also narrate impossible events. Utopias are impossible, though not absolutely impossible, and disclose a “region of chimeras” (AE § 514; *regio chimaerarum*; see also MED §§ 52, 59n), while wonders mainly belong to poetic fiction even though they narrate impossible events (see MED §§ 43–49). Yet Baumgarten legitimizes their exceptional state through their poetic autonomy. Fiction is poetic if the analogon of reason represents it sensately, independently of whether it exists in the actual world or in a possible world or not. This means that wonders are even “more poetic” than other narratives (MED § 45; *magis poeticae*) because the analogon of reason has to expend more energy than normal due to their higher degree of complexity, opacity, and performativity. Miracles are also highly poetic and wonderful for the same reasons, as are fantasies (see MED § 50) and, most of all, prophetic fictions (see MED §§ 60–64). Baumgarten justifies them with reference to the Bible – to Noah’s prophecy on the Ark – and to Horace and Virgil, who narrate prophecies and even the future (see MED §§ 59n, 64n).⁹⁷ Nevertheless, not only wonders but all these narratives require a minimum level of familiarity if they are not to disconcert the reader: “If, therefore, wonders are to be represented, there ought still to be something that can be confusedly recognized in the representation of them, § 45; that is, to mingle skillfully the familiar with the unfamiliar in the wonderful itself is in the highest degree poetic, § 47” (MED § 48; *Quod si ergo mirabilia repraesentanda §. 45. debent tamen quaedam in eorum repraesentatione posse confuse recognosci, i.e. in ipsis mirabilibus nota incognitis apte miscere maxime poeticum §. 47*).

What very clearly unsettles this typology is what I want to refer to as the Virgil paradox. In the end, this paradox solves the problem of familiarity. Baumgarten differentiates historical fiction into generally true histories (Livy) and individually true myths (Virgil). Virgil’s *Aeneis* serves as an example of such myths, but he also cites the *Aeneis* as an example of poetic fiction, which he then differentiates from heterocosmic fiction with regard to the mode of truth: poetic fiction is generally true, whereas heterocosmic fiction is individually true. This first aspect of the Virgil paradox – that is, the difference between histories and myths – is easy to understand within the typology of fiction: since Livy narrates about the actual world, the *Ab urbe condita* is generally true. Virgil, by contrast, invents a founding myth when he ties the *Aeneis* to Homer’s *Iliad* and *Odyssey* and narrates the descent of the Romans from the Trojans, so his epic is not generally true. But as a manifest singular case (*thema singularis*), this Rome cannot be held to correspond to the actual world; it belongs, rather, to a nonactual, possi-

97 See 5.2.2 Mediation.

ble world, so Baumgarten should logically classify the *Aeneis* as a heterocosmic fiction.

That he still treats the *Aeneis* as representing our actual world has to do with accessibility.⁹⁸ The analogon of reason has easy access to both Livy's and Virgil's Romes because their Romes, while not identical, are maximally similar to one another and to our Rome. The analogon of reason makes this judgment based on its experience in the world⁹⁹ and its previous knowledge (*praeconceptio*) about the world. Narratives about the nature of the actual world are therefore generally true. With Ryan, one could consider whether the category of necessity comes into play here, a category that Baumgarten's aesthetic cosmology categorically excludes with regard to existing worlds (see MET §§ 102, 363).¹⁰⁰ Narratives are necessary if they are true in all worlds that are "linked to the actual world (including this actual world itself)."¹⁰¹ What Baumgarten therefore first attends to are minimal differences between the two Romes: for example, Virgil narrates that Aeneas fled from the hostile Greeks, while Livy states that along with Antenor, Aeneas was spared from the "law of war" "because of a long-standing right of hospitality and because he had always advocated peace and the restoration of Helen" (AE § 508; *ius belli; vetustum hospitii ius, et quia pacis reddendaeque Helenae semper auctor fuerat*). Virgil takes Aeneas first to Thrace, whereas in Livy he goes to Macedonia (see AE § 508). And Virgil is especially guilty of one absolute "mistake" in a passage where the supposed chastity of Dido contradicts the fact that she and Aeneas have a "cave date" (see AE § 473), which would obviously signal the end of her virginity.

These differences are at first unproblematic because Baumgarten believes the historian more than the poet. But things become tricky when Baumgarten considers the conflicting genealogies of Aeneas's progeny. With regard to the son of Aeneas, for whom both the names Ascanius and Iulus have been transmitted, Livy says that Lavinia is the mother of Ascanius and Creusa the mother of Iulus; that is, he ascribes the two names to different people. By contrast, Virgil writes that Ascanius and Iulus are actually two names for the one son of Creusa and Aeneas, so he ascribes both names to a single person. In view of this contradiction, Baumgarten approvingly cites Livy, who notes the following with regard to the state of the sources:

⁹⁸ See David Lewis, *On the Plurality of Worlds* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 27–50.

⁹⁹ See 5.2.1 Sequentiality.

¹⁰⁰ See 5.3.1 Possibility.

¹⁰¹ Ryan, "Possible Worlds," 727.

*I shall not discuss the question – for who could affirm for certain so ancient a matter? – whether this boy was Ascanius, or an elder brother, born by Creusa while Ilium yet stood, who accompanied his father when he fled from the city, being the same whom the Julian family call Iulus and claim as the author of their name. No matter where born or of what mother – it is agreed in any case that he was Aeneas' son.*¹⁰²

Haud nihil ambigam (quis enim rem tam veterem pro certo affirmet?) Hiccinne fuerit Ascanius, an maior, quam hic, Creusa natus matre, Ilio incolumi, comesque inde paternae fugae, quem Iulum eundem Iulia gens auctorem nominis sui nuncupat. Ubicunque et quacunque matre genitus, certe natum Aenea constat. (AE § 508)

That Livy replaces matrilineage with patrilineage in his genealogy of the founding family may have been a politically motivated decision: Rome's father is symbolically more important than Rome's mother, although biological motherhood is proverbially always more certain than fatherhood – *pater semper incertus est*; perhaps fatherhood has to be symbolically secured so strongly for precisely that reason. In any case, Baumgarten gives, as Meixner explains, a narratological turn to the problem of genealogy by attributing, in a laconic sentence, the uncertain fatherhood not to Aeneas but rather to the fathers of the two texts themselves:¹⁰³ “Wherever and from whichever father true fiction in the strictest sense is generated (§ 506), these fictions by both [Virgil and Livy] are, among others, historical fictions broadly speaking (§ 507)” (AE § 508; *Ubicunque et quocunque patre genita sit fictio strictissime vera, §. 506. amborum hae, praeter alias, sunt fictiones historicae late dictae, §. 507*). Virgil and Livy are not giving birth to Ascanius and Iulus here but rather to fictions.

Yet the point of the sentence is that both fictions of Rome are fictions *because* they were created, independently of whether they are a historical fiction in a narrower sense like Livy's or a historical fiction in a broader sense like Virgil's. This “being created” refers to something beyond the narrated world, that is, to an extradiegetic level where the narrative function is located. The I-Origos of both the *Ab urbe condita* and the *Aeneis* do not bear witness to the history of Rome through experience or prior knowledge. Instead, the narrative function – *si narrem* – is occupied in both narratives by personified narrating agents in the first-person present singular:¹⁰⁴ in *Ab urbe condita*, the extradiegetic position is filled by the persona of the historian; in the case of the *Aeneis*, by the persona of the epic singer. But in analyzing the differences, it becomes unclear whether one of these roles is epistemologically privileged relative to the other, that is,

¹⁰² Quoted (with modification) from Livy, *History of Rome*, trans. B. O. Foster, vol. 1, Loeb Classical Library 114 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1919), 1.3.3.

¹⁰³ See Meixner, *Narratologie und Epistemologie*, 74–75.

¹⁰⁴ See 5.2.2 Mediation.

whether the historian is a more reliable narrator than the singer. This is because the point of comparison for deciding what is true and what is false is missing. Neither of the narrating agents are telling about the actual Rome. As a result, the narrating agents of both Livy's history and Virgil's myth are unreliable and limited because they can only have an aesthetic perspective and not a logical one. In Baumgarten's typology, not only the individually true *Aeneis* but also the supposedly generally true history *Ab urbe condita* would thus have to be moved from the group of historical fictions to the group of heterocosmic fictions. By analyzing the minimal differences between the types, one realizes that Baumgarten transgresses the frame of his own typology of fiction.

He brings the decisive concept of verisimilitude into play again at precisely this point regarding the unreliable creation of narratives: "In the *Aeneis*, Ascanius is a verisimilar character" (AE § 508; Ascanius in Aeneide est persona verisimilis). Suddenly, Baumgarten is no longer interested in events, spaces, and objects in the poetic world as such. Instead, the identity of the characters – in this case the identity of Ascanius – defies the unreliability of the narration. The problem of mediation is thus managed with recourse to tradition. For what is the criterion of verisimilitude, which concerns the accessibility of poetic worlds, if experience and previous knowledge are lacking? The answer to this question leads to the second aspect of the Virgil paradox. Individually true heterocosmic fictions and generally true poetic fictions can narrate about nonactual, possible worlds. And why, of all things, are poetic fictions considered generally true? Perhaps because something is generally true in any poetic world when it is linked to the literary encyclopedia: it is the similarity of one text to other texts that makes it verisimilar and guarantees accessibility.

That a poetic world's accessibility depends on similarity leads again to Baumgarten's engagement with Horace: "He tells us that the heroic subjects of the myths are the most familiar. Medea, Io, Ino, Ixion, Orestes are examples of the same concept of what constitutes the most tragic characters in the theater" (MED § 56n; Heroas materias fabularum notissimas. *Medea, Io, Ino, Ixion, Orestes* exempla eiusdem conceptus generalioris personarum in theatris tristissimarum). In the *Kollegium*, one finds another reference to this intertextual form of poetic repetition: "What we sense and have sensed, that is old; since he [the poet] is now to create something new, he must not purely show the old perception again but rather put the old ones together with new ones with imagination" (KOLL § 34; Was wir empfinden und empfunden haben, das ist alt, da er [der Dichter] nun etwas Neues schaffen soll, so muß er nicht pur die alten Empfindungen wieder zeigen, sondern die alten mit Imagination verbunden mit neuen zusammensetzen). In the *Aesthetica*, Baumgarten returns to the passage in Horace, which he cites now in its full length:

*If perhaps as playwright you create Achilles when honored,
 Let him be energetic, furious, relentless, bitter,
 And renounce laws, saying that everything comes down to arms;
 Let Medea be fierce and unrestrained, Ino sorrowful,
 Ixion treacherous, Io roaming, Orestes sad. (Hor., Ars P. 120–124)*

*Scriptor, honoratum si forte reponis Achillem,
 Impiger, iracundus, inexorabilis, acer,
 Iura neget sibi nata, nihil non arroget armis,
 Sit Medea ferox invictaque, flebilis Ino,
 Perfidus Ixion, Io vaga, tristis Orestes. A. P. 120. (AE § 517)*

Both Livy's and Virgil's heterocosmic fictions are verisimilar precisely because both authors do not have any personal experience with the historical Rome they narrate about (*uterque non expertus*; see AE § 508). Instead, their narratives are based on the same sources, although minimal differences do appear. But Aeneas is Aeneas, no matter what route he travels; Ascanius is Ascanius, no matter who his mother was; both variations do not contradict the common sense of literature.

This intertextuality has astonishing consequences for the mode of truth. Baumgarten does not interpret Virgil's *Aeneis* as a case of heterocosmic fiction, as would be expected, but rather as an example of poetic fiction. As sensately manifest individual cases (*themata singularia/individua/obiecta*), both types of fiction – histories and myths – narrate about nonactual, possible worlds. But such heterocosmic fictions are only poetic if their possible worlds are *textual worlds*:

A poetic fiction (§ 511) of a poetic world (§ 513) not bordering on utopia in an ugly manner (§§ 514–515) will conceive of its world – which it creates by inventing it heterocosmically – in conformity to some part of that poetic world, and indeed positively; that is, such that it coheres well inasmuch as it should assume that its particular listeners will scrutinize the matter, that it can be molded properly by the mind to the known part of the world of poets from preconceptions about that world, that it thus constitutes its own events, as is customary, in a given region of the poetic world, that it has an aesthetic unity with that region, and that it receives its verisimilitude from it in return. Let us call a POETIC FICTION of this sort ANALOGICAL.

Quaedam fictio poetica, §. 511. mundi poetici, §. 513, non tangens turpiter utopiam, §. 514, 515. cuidam ex eodem parti conformiter, etiam positive, i.e. ita concipiet suum orbem, quem creat heterocosmice fingendo, ut hic bene cohaereat, quantum aesthetice suos praecipuos auditores rem scrutaturos debet praesumere, probe cognitae parti mundi poetarum, ex eius anticipationibus mente formari possit, ita eventus suos sistat, uti solitum est, in regione mundi poetici data, habeat cum eadem unitatem aestheticam, et ex eadem suam mutuo verisimilitudinem accipiat. Eiusmodi FIGMENTUM POETICUM dicamus ANALOGICUM. (AE § 516)

The analogy ensures that Achilles is similar to Achilles, Medea to Medea, Ino to Ino, Io to Io, Orestes to Orestes. *Imitatio* and *aemulatio*, the humanist model of influence in Renaissance poetics, are released into the universe of text in Baumgarten. In contrast to analogical poetic fictions, simple heterocosmic fictions lack the intertextual interface that makes generally true fictions out of individually true fictions. The unprecedented modernity of the typology lies in its appraisal of the literary encyclopedia as the guarantor of the general truth of literature; with it, Baumgarten secures literature's place in the order of knowledge.

The truth of poetic fiction is thus not anchored in the actual world or in the poetic world but rather in the literary encyclopedia. This anchoring establishes the autonomy of literature. Although the truth of poetic fiction makes a claim to universal validity, it is not absolute. With regard to the metaphysical frames of the sections on fiction, poetic truth has the same structure as aesthetic truth. The ambiguity of beauty is reflected in the ambiguity of poetic fiction, and the ambiguity of poetic fiction is only a special case of the ambiguity of literature.

6 Ethics

6.1 Anthropology

In his theory of literature, Baumgarten analyzes the structure of literary discourse, engages with the metaphysics of beauty, and develops a narratology that adds narrativity as a fourth function to the structure of literary discourse and ultimately culminates in a typology of fiction. In this theory of fiction, as well as in other places, Baumgarten engages with ethics.¹ This is because many questions that arise in the context of aesthetic truth and falsity compel him to consider the authors of literary texts. In his *Meditationes*, he uses the term *poeta* to refer to the author; in the *Aesthetica* and *Kollegium*, he alternates between a set of terms like *auctor*, *scriptor*, and *Schriftsteller*, unless he calls the author a *felix aestheticus* – a term whose meaning is not quite captured with the translation “happy aesthetician” – or a *schöner Geist*, a “beautiful spirit.” With the *felix aestheticus*, we turn from aesthetics to ethics and, at the same time, from the theory of literature to the ethical practices of literature, which Dorothea von Mücke has recently drawn attention to.² The practices Baumgarten observes are rooted in anthropology,³ which establishes itself in the eighteenth century as a discipline of observation. He thus articulates an anthropologically based, modern theory of authorship long before the “genius” comes into view in the middle of the century. In contrast to the discourse on the genius, he is not interested in the questions of authorship and originality that will occupy Friedrich Gottlieb Klopstock or Goethe and that have characterized recent debates – not least because of Roland Barthes’s and Foucault’s essays on the “death of the author.” Baumgarten is rather engaged in a genuine ethics of literature, in which “truth, beauty, and goodness are one, different facets of one basic value, which is perfection” (see AE § 56: “*pulcre! bene! recte!*”).⁴ This aesthetico-ethical rationalism not only depends, however, on ethical practices; rather, the practices

1 See Hans Georg Peters, *Die Ästhetik Alexander Gottlieb Baumgartens und ihre Beziehungen zum Ethischen* (Berlin: Junker und Dünhaupt, 1934), 39–58; Clemens Schwaiger, “Baumgartens Ansatz einer philosophischen Ethikbegründung,” in Aichele and Mirbach, “Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten,” 219–237; Mirbach, “*Magnitudo aesthetica*,” 102–128; Buchenau, *The Founding of Aesthetics*, 178–192.

2 See Dorothea E. von Mücke, *The Practices of the Enlightenment: Aesthetics, Authorship, and the Public* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 6.

3 See Stöckmann, *Anthropologische Ästhetik*, 87–147.

4 Frederick C. Beiser, *Diotima’s Children: German Aesthetic Rationalism from Leibniz to Lessing* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 2.

appear as rhetorical figures that represent the forms of the practices and their traces in literary texts.

Like Kant's philosophical system, Baumgarten's encompasses a logic, an ethics, and an aesthetics; and like Kant, he bases all three "critiques" on a meta-physical master plan. Baumgarten's *Aesthetica* and *Ethica*, which he composed almost twenty years earlier, are thus "twin-sisters" born to mother *Metaphysica*.⁵ For the "ethical perfection of action is [...] dependent on the perfection of cognition,"⁶ and vice versa. Beautiful cognition and the beautiful spirit are two sides of the same coin. As ethical categories, Baumgarten therefore adopts the same six categories of rhetorical style – abundance, greatness, truth, clarity, certitude, and life – that are the basis of the analogy between epistemology and media theory in the *Aesthetica*, and arranges his *Ethica* according to them (*ubertatem, gravitatem, veritatem, claritatem, certitudinem et vitam*; see ETH § 443). Cognitive and moral illumination (*illuminatio moralis*) thus always mirror one another.

From the perspective of the intimate tie between the two projects, aesthetics serves as a school or institution of ethics and is entirely in its service: there is not any beautiful cognition that is not also ethical. In the lectures transcribed in the *Kollegium*, Baumgarten gives himself the pedagogical task of clarifying "how the subject that is to engage in it [aesthetics] must be constituted" (KOLL § 27; *wie das Subjekt beschaffen sein muß, das sie [die Ästhetik] treiben soll*). And the first seven sections introducing the *Aesthetica* posit a deep relation between aesthetics and ethics. In this, Baumgarten follows Quintilian, who in addition to offering guidance on how to manufacture a good discourse also considers the character of the speaker and his education. That is why aesthetics consists in analyzing more than just beautiful cognition; it also encompasses the nature and education of the happy and successful aesthete, the *felix aestheticus*, who thinks beautifully and desires in the same manner, since cognition and desire are intrinsically tied together. The *felix aestheticus* is, of course, male, like all of Baumgarten's other conceptions of poets and authors. He only considers women in the *Philosophische Briefe von Aletheophilus* when he addresses Charlotte Juliane von Lichtfeld as "most estimable beauty" (PHB 57; *Wertheşte Schöne*) and in the *Kollegium* when he refers to grooming oneself as an exercise in beauty: "A woman who grooms herself daily does this to please and to be beautiful, even if she does not always put on all her finery" (KOLL § 47; *Dies*

⁵ Mirbach, "*Magnitudo aesthetica*," 104.

⁶ Dagmar Mirbach, "*Ingenium venustum und magnitudo pectoris*: Ethische Aspekte von Alexander Gottlieb Baumgartens *Aesthetica*," in Aichele and Mirbach, "Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten," 200.

tut ein Frauenzimmer, das sich täglich putzt, um zu gefallen, und um schön zu sein, ob sie gleich nicht immer ihren völligen Staat anziehet). With this gendering in mind, and because Baumgarten describes the practices of thinking and desiring beautifully as literary practices, I refer to the person who “composes literature” with the historical term *poet* (as an equivalent to the male *Dichter*, which commonly referred in eighteenth-century German to literary authors in general).

Baumgarten devotes the first two sections of the *Aesthetica* to describing the innate capacities of a person who thinks and desires beautifully and another four sections to dealing with his moral duties; in addition to these eighty-six introductory paragraphs he adds another nine paragraphs treating the person’s abundance of spirit. Together, these sections make up 95 of the 904 total paragraphs. I will first only treat the three sections italicized below and will come to the others in 6.2.1 Exercise:

Section II: Natural aesthetics (aesthetica naturalis)

Section III: Aesthetic exercise (*exercitatio aesthetica*)

Section IIII: Aesthetic instruction (*disciplina aesthetica*)

Section V: Aesthetic inspiration (impetus aestheticus)

Section VI: Aesthetic correction (*correctio aesthetica*)

Section VII: Certain precautions (*cautiones quaedam*)

Section XII: Abundance of spirit (ubertas ingenii)

In sections 2 and 5, Baumgarten outlines the essential features of the aesthetician (*character aesthetici*) in the hope that everyone can perfect their aesthetic cognition so as to contribute to the common good. In the argumentation, a negative definition (see AE §§ 104–114) containing warnings and admonitions follows a positive definition (see AE §§ 28–103) treating the poet’s aptitudes and education. In section 2 on natural aesthetics (*aesthetica naturalis*), Baumgarten defines the faculties of the soul that characterize the poet as an innate beautiful and elegant spirit (*ingenium venustum et elegans connatum*) and an innate aesthetic temperament (*temperamentum aestheticum connatum*).

Under the concept of temperament, Baumgarten treats the poet’s appetitive faculties, and under *ingenium* – roughly the poet’s “spirit” or “mind,” though this term eludes a simple translation and should be understood as a conceptual token from the millennia-old discourse on creativity – he subsumes both the higher (see AE § 38) and lower cognitive faculties (see AE §§ 30–37), which he relates to one another with his usual caution by conceiving sensate cognition as analogous to logical cognition. Because he also lacks concepts in the field of ethics, Baumgarten replaces the mind and temperament with two metaphors that were already dead in the middle of the Enlightenment: he equips the poet

with “a good head and a good heart” (KOLL § 28; einen guten Kopf und ein gutes Herz).

To understand these two terms, which Baumgarten uses ubiquitously in ethical contexts, it is necessary to trace the nuance he infuses them with. The poet’s head is a sensate head; his heart, a rational heart. Just as the poet’s head does not only think but also thinks sensately, the poet’s heart not only symbolizes the radical other of reason – drive (instinctus; see MET § 677) – but is also rationally grounded: it can both choose and err (see KOLL § 63); it can be good and noble but also evil; and in a moral sense, it can burden itself with guilt and also be improved (see KOLL § 44); it can be “raw” or “cooked” (inoctum pectus aestheticum; see AE § 63). So the opposition of head and heart, of reason and sensation, yields in Baumgarten to the chiasmus of the reason of the heart and the sensation of the head, a chiasmus that is actually quite typical for the age of Empfindsamkeit.

Let us first deal with the head of the poet. Baumgarten’s definition of the mind, which employs an epistemological register, does not offer anything surprising. Natural aesthetics – which encompasses the physical constitution, nature, innate aptitudes, and earliest formation of the poet (see AE § 28) – describes the sensate faculties essential to his vocation: wit, acumen, memory, the poetic and inventive faculties, foresight, taste, and the faculty of characterization, all of which Baumgarten summarizes in part 3 of the *Metaphysica* on psychology (psychologia).⁷ To characterize the natural dispositions of the poet’s soul (dispositiones naturales animae), Baumgarten simply translates the faculties of sensate cognition into an anthropological account of character. The poet thus possesses a disposition to be acutely sensitive (dispositio acute sentiendi; see AE § 30), which corresponds to the sensate faculty (facultas sentiendi); a disposition to be imaginative (dispositio naturalis ad imaginandum; see AE § 31), which corresponds to the imagination (phantasia); a disposition to penetrating insights (dispositio naturalis ad perspicaciam; see AE § 32), which corresponds to the lower cognitive faculties of wit (ingenium) and acumen (acumen); a disposition to recognize things (dispositio naturalis ad recognoscendum; see AE § 33), which corresponds to memory (memoria); a disposition to be poetic (dispositio poëtica; see AE § 34), which responds to the faculty of invention (facultas fingendi); a disposition to good taste (dispositio ad saporem delicatum; see AE § 35), which corresponds to the faculty of taste (facultas diiudicandi); a disposition to foresee future things (dispositio ad praevidendum et praesagendum; see AE § 36), which corresponds to foresight (facultas expectatio casuum

⁷ See 3.1.1 Cognition.

similium); and finally a disposition to express ideas (*dispositio ad significandas perceptiones suas*; see AE § 37), which corresponds to the faculty of characterization (*facultas caracteristica sensitiva*). With these dispositions, Baumgarten's poet guards the laws of the lower cognitive faculties as a lower judge (*iudex inferior*; see AE § 35). He is defined by the abundance of his spirit (*ubertas aesthetica*; see AE §§ 152–156), which allows him to cope with the abundance of the world.

In comparison, Baumgarten approaches the heart of the poet much less mechanically. To define the innate aesthetic temperament (see AE § 44), he switches from the cognitive to the appetitive faculties, though nothing changes in his analogical method since the poet desires just as he thinks. Already in the *Metaphysica*, Baumgarten does not understand desire to be radically opposed to cognition but rather places both faculties of the soul on the same foundation of representation. On this basis, he describes a sensate will that, as I have shown, paradoxically desires what is rational.⁸ Baumgarten mobilizes the metaphor of the heart to characterize this paradox of rationalized desire; the heart is the organ of the sensate will. In this sense, he understands the innate greatness of the heart (*magnitudo pectoris connata*) as a “most potent drive to greatness” (AE § 45; *instinctum in magna potissimum*),⁹ making its rationalization an ethical matter. Good desire, which is based on the sensate will, leads to the pursuit of money, power, work, leisure, pleasure, freedom, honor, friendship, strength, and health as well as, above all, the pursuit of beautiful cognition.

Because questions of the poet's heart are so closely tied to ethics, the actual location in Baumgarten's philosophical system for treating the innate greatness of the heart (see AE § 183) is not section 2 on natural aesthetics (*aesthetica naturalis*) but rather the sections on aesthetic greatness (*magnitudo aesthetica*); with 246 paragraphs, they are the largest cohesive set of sections in the *Aesthetica*. In addition, in one of her articles on Baumgarten's ethics, Mirbach notes that the paragraphs on the spirit, or mind (i.e., the rational aptitude of the poet), correspond to section 12 on the abundance of spirit (*ubertas ingenii*).¹⁰ Together with the 86 introductory paragraphs, Baumgarten thus actually devotes 333 of the total 904 paragraphs, so a good third of the book, to the ethics of aesthetics. In the sections on greatness, heart and mind form a conceptual pair (*pulcrum ingenium et pectus*; see AE § 189).¹¹ In the first of these sections, he views aesthetic greatness from the perspective of his “science of everything that is sen-

⁸ See 3.1.2 Desire.

⁹ See Mirbach, “*Magnitudo aesthetica*,” 113–114.

¹⁰ See Mirbach, “*Magnitudo aesthetica*,” 114–115.

¹¹ See Mirbach, “*Magnitudo aesthetica*,” 119.

sate”; that is, he treats the ethics of greatness as a matter of thinking and representing beautifully. His analysis encompasses both what he calls *genera cogitandi*, which are based on the rhetorical *genera dicendi*, and magnifying arguments (*argumenta augmentia*), which cast certain rhetorical figures as arguments that amplify the ethical greatness of objects of beautiful cognition. Yet the semantic spectrum of greatness is even wider. Mirbach notes that Baumgarten furthermore refers to ethical greatness using a number of partial synonyms: *pondus*, *gravitas*, *dignitas*, *nobilitas*, *maiestas*, and *magnanimitas*,¹² so the following sections actually also belong to the understanding of character found in the introductory sections of the *Aesthetica*:

Section XXVIII: Absolute aesthetic gravitas (*gravitas aesthetica absoluta*)

Section XXV: Relative aesthetic magnanimity (*magnanimitas aesthetica comparativa*)

Section XXVI: Maximum aesthetic magnanimity (*magnanimitas in aestheticis genere maxima*)

Baumgarten differentiates moral aesthetic greatness (*magnitudo aesthetica moralis*) from natural aesthetic greatness (*magnitudo aesthetica naturalis*), moving moral greatness into the vicinity of freedom (*libertas*; see ETH § 443), which his ethics analyzes in various forms, including as freedom of speech.¹³ This is why aesthetic greatness depends on moral laws (*leges morales*; see AE § 182). Greatness and dignity (*dignitas*) are neither absolute nor relative; and they are either objective, that is, of objects and material (*obiecta et materiae*), or subjective, that is, of a person (*persona*; see AE §§ 177–190).

Such aesthetic greatness, magnanimity, and dignity (see AE §§ 189, 352) characterize the poet, who aims at the “STATE OF LIGHT” or the “moral realm of light” (ETH § 443; *STATUM LUCIS*, s. *regnum lucis morale*): “We wish for this greatness of mind and heart, both potential greatness, a part of the happy aesthetician’s general character (sections II–VI), and then actual greatness when he turns to thinking beautifully” (AE § 355; *Hanc ingenii pectorisque magnitudinem et potentialem optamus, partem characteris generalis in felici aesthetico, S. II–VI. et tunc, quando ad pulcre cogitandum accedit, actualement*). In this, Baumgarten considers the poet’s social and historical background, measuring the individual’s potential for aesthetic greatness by his greatness of heart and mind (*magnum satis pectus ac ingenium*; see AE §§ 364–422). Whereas Mirbach anchors

¹² See Mirbach, “Ethische Aspekte von Alexander Gottlieb Baumgartens *Aesthetica*,” 202.

¹³ See 6.3.2 Parrhesia.

Baumgarten's "heart" in Pietistic theology,¹⁴ such modern moments in which he historicizes and contextualizes aesthetic greatness distinguish his use of the term *heart* from the religious context.

In my view, Baumgarten only mentions a religious context for greatness twice: he traces objective greatness back to revelation (see AE § 398) and subjective greatness back to man's being made in the image of God: "let all human things, even those that are the greatest in a specific way, be subject to divine things (§ 206)" (AE § 399; *humana quaecunque, vel specificae maxima, divinis subiicito*, §. 206). In all the other paragraphs, greatness is an ethical abstraction that takes different concrete forms from one context to the next.

6.2 Practices

6.2.1 Exercise

With this anthropological grounding of aesthetics, Baumgarten turns from considering the appetitive and lower cognitive faculties theoretically to discussing them as a mode of experience that one can train and exercise. From this perspective, the "science of everything that is sensate" is actually an art (*ars/techne*) – an art of experience in which sensate thinking, desiring, and representing are translated into ethical practices. "Practices are *organised* sets of doings and sayings";¹⁵ they involve both mental and bodily actions and are governed by specific discourses – in Baumgarten's case by aesthetic discourse, which prescribes ethical practices for training sensate thinking, desiring, and representing in such a way as to qualify the poet for achieving beauty, truth, and goodness in composing literature.¹⁶ This qualification for writing literature can only be attained through attention to reading literature. Baumgarten's training of aesthetic judgment therefore occurs nowhere else than at his writing desk, where the poet reads, compares, and imitates (*imitatio*) so as to perfect (*aemulatio*) himself in sensate thinking, desiring, and representing.¹⁷ Only practice makes perfect. In

¹⁴ See Mirbach, "*Magnitudo aesthetica*." See also Simon Grote, "Pietistische *Aisthesis* und moralische Erziehung bei Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten," in Aichele and Mirbach, "Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten," 175–198; Grote, *The Emergence of Modern Aesthetic Theory*, 67–101.

¹⁵ Theodore Schatzki, "Sayings, Texts and Discursive Formations," in *The Nexus of Practices: Connections, Constellations, Practitioners*, ed. Allison Hui, Schatzki, and Elizabeth Shove (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), 129.

¹⁶ See 4.1.1 Perfection.

¹⁷ See 2.1 Ambiguity.

the *Kollegium*, he claims that the poet furthermore needs to acquire the “language of the heart”:

He [the poet] must speak the language of the heart – that is, he must move – if he is to move others, he must first be moved himself. He cannot move if he does not arouse desires, and he cannot arouse desires if the object of them is not in the future. Indeed, if he wants to be particularly beautiful, then he must at times be able to suppress all his sensations and let insight into the future alone rule and elevate it above everything. He must intensely train intermediate knowledge (*scientia media*). He must always see certain worlds that would be real if certain hypotheses were real. So intensely must he compose literature and exercise the faculty of foresight.

Er [der Dichter] muß die Sprache des Herzens reden, das ist rühren, soll er andere rühren, so muß er selbst zuvor gerührt sein. Er kann nicht rühren, wann er nicht Begierden erregt, und er kann nicht Begierden erregen, wann der Gegenstand derselben nicht zukünftig ist. Ja, will er besonders schön sein, so muß er zuweilen alle Empfindungen unterdrücken können, und die Einsicht in die Zukunft allein herrschen lassen, und über alles erheben. Er muß die mittlere Erkenntnis (*Scientia media*) stark üben. Er muß immer gewisse Welten sehen, die wirklich wären, wann gewisse Hypothesen wären. So stark muß er dichten und das Vorhersehungsvermögen üben. (KOLL § 36)

Both the starting point and goal of the training process are thus the beautiful literary text; as I will show in the following, the process encompasses training the appetitive and lower cognitive faculties.¹⁸

Within the anthropological foundations of the *Aesthetica*,¹⁹ the four sections italicized below are directly devoted to the question of how to train the poet:

- Section II: Natural aesthetics (*aesthetica naturalis*)
- Section III: *Aesthetic exercise (exercitatio aesthetica)*
- Section IIII: *Aesthetic instruction (disciplina aesthetica)*
- Section V: Aesthetic inspiration (*impetus aestheticus*)
- Section VI: *Aesthetic correction (correctio aesthetica)*
- Section VII: *Certain precautions (cautiones quaedam)*
- Section XII: Abundance of spirit (*ubertas ingenii*)

These sections focus on two ethical practices: “*askesis* and AESTHETIC EXERCISE” (AE § 47; Ασκησις et EXERCITATIO AESTHETICA).²⁰ Following Pierre Hadot, whose *Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique* (1981) traces the history

¹⁸ See 3.1.1 Cognition.

¹⁹ See 6.1 Anthropology.

²⁰ See Christoph Menke, *Force: A Fundamental Concept of Aesthetic Anthropology*, trans. Gerrit Jackson (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 13–29.

of spiritual exercises (*askesis*) in antiquity and Christianity,²¹ Gabriel Tropic argues that such exercises are at the center of the *Aesthetica*. “Baumgarten’s use of the term *askesis*” does not refer, he explains, to denying the flesh, but rather “to the genre of the spiritual exercise inherited from Hellenistic philosophy, a term that was virtually synonymous with the training of the mind through the careful coordination of semiotic practices (above all speaking, reading, and writing) with patterns of thought and bodily activity. The aesthetic is therefore an *ascetic*, but only in the more archaic sense of the term as one who exercises.”²² Tropic explains how these exercises aim to sensitize perception: “The primary purpose of a spiritual exercise is transformative, and it culminates in the production of a total way of being: a way of seeing, a way of thinking, and a way of acting in the world.”²³ From this understanding of spiritual exercises, Baumgarten develops a specific “bundle”²⁴ of aesthetic exercises with a focus on maintaining and fostering openness and indeterminacy: “Such an aesthetic exercise demands effort and generates a certain way of being in the world, one that is attracted to cognitive processes that bind the world of phenomena.”²⁵

Section 3 on aesthetic exercise (*exercitatio aesthetica*) begins with the natural disposition of the poet. To compose beautiful literature, the poet must train his sensate faculties:²⁶ the imagination, the faculty of invention, and the faculty of characterization. Following the rhetorical tradition, Baumgarten repeatedly uses military examples and metaphors to describe the exercises for training these faculties. For example, in the *Kollegium* he reports that the Renaissance humanist Petrus Lotichius “produced a lot while on sentry duty as a soldier” (KOLL § 81; hat sehr viel auf der Schildwacht als Soldat verfertigt) and also compares the poet’s exercises to those of a Roman soldier:

To exercise, the Roman soldiers had to make blows and thrusts against a stake in their drills; this was not required of a soldier who had already mastered all the exercises. But when one wants to cultivate the beautiful spirit, one sets up the exercises in such a way that he will not be immediately discouraged and give up all hope that something will become of him.

21 See Pierre Hadot, *Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1981).

22 Tropic, *Poetry as a Way of Life*, 40. See also Tropic, “Aesthetic Askesis: Aesthetics as a Technology of the Self in the Philosophy of Alexander Baumgarten,” *Das achtzehnte Jahrhundert* 37.1 (2013): 56–73.

23 Tropic, *Poetry as a Way of Life*, 25.

24 Schatzki, “Sayings, Texts and Discursive Formations,” 133.

25 Tropic, *Poetry as a Way of Life*, 48–49.

26 See 3.1.1 Cognition.

Die römischen Soldaten mußten, um sich zu üben, die Hiebe und Stöße in ihren Übungen auf einen Pfahl tun, dazu erforderte man nun noch keinen Soldaten, der schon die Übungen alle inne hätte. Man richte aber die Übungen, wann man den schönen Geist bilden will, ja so ein, daß er nicht sogleich niedergeschlagen wird und alle Hoffnung aufgibt, daß aus ihm etwas werden werde. (KOLL § 49)

The soldiers' blows and thrusts evoke the flying arrows, spears, and projectiles whose metapoetic connotation has been well known ever since Aristotle used them to visualize metaphor.²⁷ Baumgarten replaces the weapons with the soldier's (and poet's) blows and thrusts.

But he also refers to rhetoric explicitly as an art of shooting: "A soldier's heart can be in his weapons from his nature and training, but all of this alone will remain dead if he does not really hit the mark" (KOLL § 78; Es kann bei einem Soldaten Herz von Natur und Übung in den Waffen sein, allein dieses alles kann tot bleiben, wann er nicht wirklich mit ins Treffen kommt). This military allegory leads to the crux of the paragraphs on exercise, which the scholarship has yet to consider. The poet does not only have to train his mind but most of all his heart – that is, his sensate will²⁸ – by intentionally exercising it. Critical self-examination therefore comes at the beginning of this creative process, which is still thoroughly rationally grounded in Baumgarten:

I must ask: What is the state of my horizon? Will I be able to go from this one into another one? Will I be able to manage everything in this hour, at this time, under these circumstances? This is the first judgment that the beautiful spirit or the aesthetically rich spirit must make.

Ich muß fragen: Wie ist mein Horizont beschaffen, werde ich aus dem einen in den anderen gehen können? Werde ich alles in dieser Stunde, zu dieser Zeit, unter diesen Umständen zwingen können? Dies ist die erste Beurteilung, die der schöne Geist oder der ästhetisch reiche machen muß. (KOLL § 149)

Aesthetic exercises discipline the mind and heart. These ethical practices therefore form "the foundation for the modern discourse of subjectivity."²⁹ In a remarkable move, Christoph Menke relates Baumgarten's "DYNAMIC or critical AESTHETICS" (AE § 60; AESTHETICA DYNAMICA s. critica) to Foucault's *Surveiller et punir* (1975) by casting aesthetics as the ideology and instrument of disci-

²⁷ See Arist., *Rhet.* 1411b. See also 3.4.2 Opacity.

²⁸ See 3.1.2 Desire.

²⁹ Christoph Menke, "Die Disziplin der Ästhetik ist die Ästhetik der Disziplin: Baumgarten in der Perspektive Foucaults," in *Baumgarten-Studien: Zur Genealogie der Ästhetik*, ed. Rüdiger Campe, Anselm Haverkamp, and Menke (Berlin: August, 2014), 241.

plinary subjectivation. Because the subject has to train sensation, sensation is itself “a-subjective”: “In aesthetic exercises, the sensate is situated between the analogy with the form of reason and the ‘alogy’ of formlessness.”³⁰ Menke therefore inverts Foucault’s analysis of disciplinary power: “The disciplining through aesthetics is answered by the aestheticizing of discipline.”³¹

That aesthetics is the reflection of discipline is nowhere clearer than in the self-reflexive turn with which Baumgarten confirms that disciplining the sensate will depends, in the end, on the will itself. Aptitude and exercise in sensation achieve nothing “if one doesn’t decide to bring them to life” (KOLL § 78; wann nicht der Schluß gefaßt wird, sie lebendig zu machen). “For a beautiful spirit, we therefore further require the state where his soul moves to resolve to bring these powers to life” (KOLL § 78; Daher erfordern wir ferner zu einem schönen Geist den Zustand, da seine Seele zu dem Vorsatze geht, diese Kräfte lebendig zu machen). In the *Aesthetica*, Baumgarten also emphasizes such a sensate will to bring greatness to life in section 24 on absolute aesthetic gravitas (gravitas aethetica absoluta):

This will be the absolute greatness of mind and heart (§ 45), not only the innate greatness but certainly also the greatness nurtured by exercises, custom (§ 51), and instruction (§ 63), not that dead greatness but rather a greatness sufficient for eliciting full desires – as much absolute aesthetic greatness, hence also dignity, as all things that are to have it require to be thought beautifully.

Haec erit absoluta magnitudo ingenii et pectoris, §. 45, sed non connata solum, verum etiam innutrita exercitiis, usu, §. 51. ac disciplina, §. 63. non ea mortua, sed plenis appetitionibus eliciendis sufficiens, quantam omnia magnitudinem, hinc et dignitatem, absolutam aetheticam habitura pulcre cogitanda requirunt, §. 178. (AE § 352)

The third, fourth, sixth, and seventh sections delineate aesthetic exercises as technologies of the self for nurturing greatness, to which Barbara Thums, Anthony Mahler, and Trop pay attention.³² Baumgarten differentiates between three aesthetic exercises in the broader sense; all of them are rooted in rhetorical education: aesthetic exercise in the narrow sense (*exercitatio aethetica*), aesthetic instruction (*disciplina aethetica*), and certain precautions (*cautiones quaedam*). Among the aesthetic exercises in the narrow sense, he mainly empha-

30 Menke, “Die Disziplin der Ästhetik ist die Ästhetik der Disziplin,” 246.

31 Menke, “Die Disziplin der Ästhetik ist die Ästhetik der Disziplin,” 247.

32 See, among others, Barbara Thums, *Aufmerksamkeit: Wahrnehmung und Selbstbegründung von Brookes bis Nietzsche* (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2008); Anthony Mahler, “Writing Regimens: The Dietetics of Literary Authorship in the Late German Enlightenment” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2014); Trop, “Aesthetic Askesis,” 56–73; Trop, *Poetry as a Way of Life*, 25–49.

sizes the repetition of certain phrases (*repetitio*), the imitation of exemplary texts (*imitatio*), and the correction of one's own texts (*correctio*). All three types of aesthetic exercises in the broader sense refer to the literary authority of the classical canon, as Baumgarten points out by citing a well-known line from Horace: "Hence it is a greater aesthetic exercise and appears more common (§ 54) *to turn over in one's hands* the models of the finest authors *night and day* (§ 54)" (AE § 56; *Hinc exercitium aestheticum maius est, ac plerumque videtur, §. 54., exemplaria bellissimorum auctorum Nocturna versare manu, versare diurna.* §. 54). As this quote from Horace makes clear, the poet's work at refining his texts transfers the Greek tradition of *progymnasmata* from rhetoric into aesthetics. In the context of education, "*progymnasmata* [...] conveyed to students a thoroughly useful toolkit of narrative, argumentative, and stylistic techniques, a certain repertoire of literary models, and a set stock of themes, content, characters, and also moral values, with which students could operate and make themselves understood in front of a similarly educated audience."³³ "The *progymnasmata* were therefore crucial in laying the foundations for elite discourse."³⁴

In addition to *progymnasmata*, aesthetic exercises also encompass "*autoschediasmata* [improvisations] without the guidance of the art of erudition" (AE § 52; *αὐτοσχεδιασμάτα citra directionem artis eruditae*) and exercises according to the rules of the art of erudition (*ars erudita*; see AE § 58). With spontaneous improvisation, Baumgarten bets on the power of a proto-unconscious, overcoming here his timidity with regard to the dark ground of the soul.³⁵ "The space of the aesthetic exercise is not rigidly determined by social institutions, nor are such exercises a result of individual decision-making strategies – which would represent a decidedly subject-centered mode of exercise – but the energy of the exercise travels through an openness and attunement to heterogeneous ways of associating phenomena, to the alterity of imaginary worlds."³⁶ Christiane Frey has also drawn attention to the role of improvisation, but she overlooks that

33 Christine Heusch, "Die Ethopoiie in der griechischen und lateinischen Antike: Von der rhetorischen *Progymnasma*-Theorie zur literarischen Form," in *Ἡθοποιία: La représentation de caractères entre fiction scolaire et réalité vivante à l'époque impériale et tardive*, ed. Eugenio Amato and Jacques Schamp (Salerno: Helios, 2005), 12.

34 Ruth Webb, "The *Progymnasmata* as Practice," in *Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity*, ed. Yun Lee Too (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 290.

35 See Christiane Frey, "Zur ästhetischen Übung: Improvisiertes und Vorbewusstes bei A. G. Baumgarten," in Allerkamp and Mirbach, *Schönes Denken*, 176.

36 Trop, *Poetry as a Way of Life*, 29.

this spontaneity is approached with an elaborate complex of rules.³⁷ In Baumgarten, faith is good, control is better.

Although both Trop and Frey are right to be excited about this modern move in Baumgarten, they seem to overlook the tradition of progymnasmata, which appear in the *Aesthetica* in the form of work on texts (repetitio, imitatio, correctio) in section 4 on aesthetic instruction (disciplina aesthetica). All exercises would be blind without concepts. Aesthetic concepts mediate between the mind and poetological rules and norms, which Baumgarten's theory of literature in no way throws overboard. Achieving beauty is not simply a matter of the poet's achieving agreement within his mind and between his mind and beautiful nature (natura pulcra), as Baumgarten outlines in section 2 on natural aesthetics (aesthetica naturalis). Baumgarten is not so modern that he would define the poet as a genius, excuse him from all ethical duties and moral demands, and release him into the realm of pure inspiration. He hedges his affirmation of the sensate will both rationally and also morally. Being healthy, socially acceptable, and capable of producing something perfect is only a "lower degree" (KOLL § 78; niedriger Grad) of inspiration. Baumgarten's poet is not a genius who simply has to answer to his nature and otherwise has carte blanche. His heart must answer to obligations other than aesthetic autonomy.

Baumgarten commits the poet to a moral education and the duties of a happy life (vita beata) including diet (dieta), physical and mental health, leisure, mineral cures, wine, and sex, which all serve to stimulate the poet. Conquering poverty, displeasure, ridicule, troubles, and sad circumstances can also stimulate him (see AE §§ 81–92). In the *Ethica*, he sets out the rules of dietetic moderation in the second chapter, in which he treats duties to the self (officia erga te ipsum); section 11 deals with the care of the body (cura corporis). In section 6 of the *Aesthetica* above all, Baumgarten obliges the poet to labor on aesthetic improvement (correctio aesthetica). After first writing a text, the poet must engage in a post hoc, iterative analytic process of critical, rule-governed examination and improvement (studium correctionis): "Even if the beautiful spirit has nature, art, exercise, and inspiration, he still must not forget, after being inspired and the first fit of writing, to put the finishing touches to the work and to complete it in an even more elegant manner" (KOLL § 113; Wann auch der schöne Geist Natur, Kunst, Übung und Begeisterung hat, so muß er dennoch nicht vergessen, nach der Begeisterung und dem ersten Anfall, da er geschrieben hat, die letzte Hand an das Werk zu legen und es noch feiner auszuarbeiten). Improving a work is a step in the process of producing beauty; it "doesn't have to

37 Cf. Frey, "Zur ästhetischen Übung," 171–181.

disturb us when we are inspired; rather, it must occur afterward” (KOLL § 98; muß uns nicht im impetu stören, sondern sie muß hernach geschehen). Improvement is also itself “part of the beauty of the whole” (KOLL § 98; Teil von der Schönheit des Ganzen): “If nature remains without disciplinary improvement, then it does not think in a noble way” (KOLL § 106; Wenn die Natur ohne disziplinarische Verbesserung bleibt, so denkt sie nicht edel).

Based on this emphasis on practice, labor, and improvement, the poet is not cast so much as a genius but as a craftsman who smooths his texts with the “toil and tedium of the file” (AE § 97; limae labor et mora). He does this on the basis of aesthetic topoi: “Who? With what help? What? How? Why? Where, when?” (AE § 133; *Quis? quibus auxiliis? quid? quomodo? cur? ubi, quando?*). The file should not grind away the artifact, but only this work on the literary text guarantees its beauty. And for the sensitive poet, honorable labor with the file flows more easily from the hand anyway than the impulse-driven act of production itself (see AE § 98). The file abrades the aesthetic and ethical bumps in literary texts (see AE § 99) and protects the beautiful spirit with his sensate will from narcissistic phantasies of omnipotence (see AE § 113).

6.2.2 Wonder

Training the sensate will is the vanishing point where Baumgarten’s aesthetics and ethics meet. The ethical practice of exercises ensures that the poet trains an open and indeterminate mind. To do so, he has to be able to walk a tightrope between inspiration and control, spontaneity and correction, improvisation and rules. In any case, the most important ethical practice is cultivating an attitude that does not belong to the aesthetic exercises but is nevertheless central to Baumgarten’s ethics of literature. I am referring here to wonder (*admiratio*). With wonder, he not only ties together ethics and aesthetics but also relates the poetic foundation of the *Aesthetica* to his theory of fiction. In her study on the aesthetics of wonder, Nicola Gess shows that eighteenth-century French texts on poetics established an intimate association between the wonderful and dreams, an association that influenced Bodmer’s and Breitinger’s seminal articulations of the wonderful:³⁸ “by wonder is understood a dreaming with a rational foundation that designs fantasy worlds based on new insights into the order of nature, fantasy worlds that are closer to truth than to mere verisimil-

³⁸ See 5.2.1 Sequentiality.

itude.”³⁹ In the *Meditationes*, Baumgarten defines wonder as “an intuition of many things in a representation, such things as are not found together in many series of our perceptions” (MED § 43; *intuitus plurium in repraesentatione tanquam non contentorum in multis perceptionum nostrarum seriebus*). Quoting René Descartes, Baumgarten “regards wonder as ‘a sudden seizure of the soul, in that it is lifted into a rapt consideration of objects which seem to it rare and extraordinary’” (MED § 43n; *admirationem habente pro subitanea animae occupatione, qua fertur in considerationem attentam obiectorum, quae ipsi videntur rara & extraordinaria*). Wonder cuts into the symbolic and opens the soul to the imaginary.⁴⁰ That is the reason why wonders (*mirabilia*) form the Urszene of poetic fiction:⁴¹

We generally pay marked attention to those things which have anything of the wonderful in them. Those things to which we pay such attention, if they are confusedly represented, are extensively clearer than those to which we do not, § 16. Therefore, representations which have anything of the wonderful in them are more poetic than those which do not.

Ad ea, in quibus mirabilia, attendere solemus, ad quae attendimus, ea si confuse, extensive clarius repraesentantur, quam ad quae non attendimus §. 16. ergo *repraesentationes, in quibus mirabilia, magis poeticae, quam in quibus non sunt*. (MED § 45)

What Trop refers to as Baumgarten’s art of attention is therefore an art of wonder. This art is not rooted in the lower cognitive faculties; it is rather, as I will demonstrate in the following, a genuine act of the sensate will of the lower appetitive faculties.⁴²

In section 48 on aesthetic thaumaturgy (*thaumaturgia aesthetica*), Baumgarten lays out the ethical foundations of sensate desire. He grounds this desire in wonder from the perspective of affect theory and assigns an aesthetic exercise to it: the poet must refine his sensibility to phenomena by learning to feel wonder. This idea goes back to antiquity. According to Stefan Matuschek, *thaumazein* refers in Plato’s *Theaetetus* to a reverential wonder, which is intensified in the *Phaedrus* into an ecstatic amazement due to the sublimity of the ideas.⁴³ While Plato’s philosophy leads to wonder, Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* posits that wonder as a response to phenomena belongs to the initial stage of philosophy.

³⁹ Nicola Gess, *Staunen: Eine Poetik* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2019), 66.

⁴⁰ See 4.2.2 Formlessness.

⁴¹ See 5.3.3 Accessibility.

⁴² See 3.1.2 Desire.

⁴³ See Stefan Matuschek, *Über das Staunen: Eine ideengeschichtliche Analyse* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1991), 6.

Only by overcoming wonder can the philosopher begin to acquire knowledge about phenomena. Rationalist philosophy follows Aristotle in this, expelling wonder from the discipline.⁴⁴

But Enlightenment poetics brings wonder back into play. In this context, Baumgarten's student Meier defended the *Meditationes* against Gottsched and his followers in Leipzig during the 1740s in the so-called small war of the poets (Kleiner Dichterkrieg).⁴⁵ In this literary dispute, Bodmer and Breitinger mobilized against Gottsched's conservative, rule-governed poetics (Regelpoetik) by elevating the imagination, the new, and especially the wonderful. Baumgarten did not play any part in the dispute, but if he had participated, he would have been on the side of the Zurich team, advancing his concept of wonder against Leipzig. With the ethical practice of wonder, Baumgarten sets a precondition for creating poetic worlds. Composing literature depends on a certain way of being in the world, on affirming phenomenal individuality, which wonder both stimulates and maintains. This is because wonder initiates a cut in the symbolic order, allowing the real to break through to the poet's attention.⁴⁶

It is through wonder that the poet attunes himself to objects by desiring them without preconceptions, indeed, without concepts. Wonder is what affirms phenomenal individuality and the aesthetic truth of phenomenal individuality, which makes Baumgarten's theory of literature so modern. Nondiscursive thought, which results from and produces the poetic passages in literary texts, depends not on what the poet perceives but rather on wonder. Unlike Kant, Baumgarten does not reserve such an aesthetic experience for sublime objects; instead, every object can become aestheticized through wonder. Wonder thus functions like a poetry machine by activating a state of the soul that Baumgarten describes in the first paragraph on thaumaturgy:

The light of novelty illuminates perceptions excellently (*Metaphysica* §§ 549–550). The intuition of novelty, WONDER, excites curiosity (*Metaphysica* § 688); curiosity excites attention (*Metaphysica* §§ 625, 529); attention brings new light to the thing that is to be depicted vividly (*Metaphysica* §§ 628, 531). Hence things that are to be thought beautifully, when they are to be illuminated (§ 730), are well set up to bring about wonder through novelty, eagerness to know a thing more clearly through wonder, and finally attention through the eagerness to know a thing more clearly. For the sake of brevity, let us refer to bringing about nov-

⁴⁴ See Matuschek, *Über das Staunen*, 157.

⁴⁵ See Georg Friedrich Meier, *Vertheidigung der Baumgartischen Erklärung eines Gedichts, wider das 5 Stück des 1 Bandes des neuen Büchersaals der schönen Wissenschaften und freyen Künste* (Halle: C. H. Hemmerde, 1746).

⁴⁶ See 4.2.2 Formlessness.

elty, and through it wonder, and through it curiosity, and through it attention, as AESTHETIC THAUMATURGY.

Lux novitatis perceptiones illustrat egregie, M. § 549, 550. Novitatis intuitus, ADMIRATIO curiositatem excitat, M. §. 688. curiositas attentionem, M. §. 625, 529. attentio ad rem vivide sibi pingendam novam lucem affert. M. §. 628, 531. Pulcre hinc cogitanda, quando illustranda sunt, §. 730. bene sistuntur admirationem novitate, clarius cognoscendi studium admiratione, tandem attentionem studio clarius rem cognoscendi conciliantia. Conciliatio novitatis, per hanc admirationis, per hanc curiositatis, per hanc attentionis AESTHETICA, brevitatis caussa, dicatur a nobis THAUMATURGIA. (AE § 808)

Baumgarten uses the concept of wonder (*admiratio*) in a triad with curiosity (*curiositas*) and attention (*attentio*), all of which refer to the *Metaphysica*. The Greek verb *thaumazein* is translated in English as “to be able to wonder” or also simply as “to wonder,” and it usually means “to wonder at something.” The scene he outlines in the first paragraph of the section evokes, however, a transitive use of the verb that defines wonder as a mode of desire related to the ethical practice of the poet’s pursuit (*studium*) of beautiful literature. Through wonder, this pursuit becomes a more complex desire that hones attention. The thrill of the new is the basis of this process. The poet should thus strive to feel wonder himself (see AE §§ 809–810) so that his text, in turn, provokes wonder in its readers.

This ethical practice of wonder is firmly anchored in eighteenth-century theories of literature. Bodmer und Breitinger defend the wonderful as a pedagogical technique: in their view, the wonderful does not simply entertain; rather, by arousing admiration, curiosity, and attention, it can illustrate knowledge in a lively manner, making literature particularly capable of transmitting knowledge and providing moral instruction.⁴⁷ Because Baumgarten did not finish the relevant sections on aesthetic life (*vita cognitionis aesthetica*), Gess skips over him in her discursive history of wonder and turns instead, like Torra-Mattenklott, to Meier’s articulation of Baumgarten’s ideas in his *Anfangsgründe aller schönen Wissenschaften* (1748–1750), which presents wonder as a mode of sensate cognition.

By discussing wonder in the context of the concept of life, Meier shifts wonder from the side of the reader, who wonders at literature, to the side of the author, who makes literature through wonder. But when one replaces Baumgarten with Meier, one misses the all-important fact that Baumgarten does not treat wonder among the lower cognitive faculties but rather among the lower appetitive faculties. In this context, wonder does not represent fantasies but rather affects. This makes it necessary to reconstruct the sections on aesthetic life so as to

⁴⁷ See Gess, *Staunen*, 64–70.

differentiate Baumgarten from Meier. In the *Metaphysica*, Baumgarten defines wonder as a sensate desire.⁴⁸

The intuition of something as not reproduced is AMAZEMENT [I translate as “wonder,” F. B.]. The drive <*instinctus*> to know that which we do not yet know is CURIOSITY, and according to the diversity of wits, more broadly considered, it is HISTORICAL, concerning historical knowledge, or PHILOSOPHICAL, concerning philosophical knowledge, or MATHEMATICAL, concerning mathematical knowledge.

Intuitus alicuius ut non reproducti, est ADMIRATIO. Instinctus ad cognoscendum, quae nondum cognovimus, est CURIOSITAS, pro diversitate ingeniorum latius dictorum vel HISTORICA in cognitionem historicam, vel PHILOSOPHICA in cognitionem philosophicam, vel MATHEMATICA in cognitionem mathematicam lata. (MET § 688)

This placement of wonder among the lower appetitive faculties makes two things clear. First, in Baumgarten, wonder does not build a bridge between aesthetics and logic, since it is exclusively located in aesthetics. Second, within aesthetics, it also does not wrangle together sensate cognition and sensate desire; as an affect, wonder is governed rather by sensate desire, plain and simple, and so depends on the sensate will.

In the *Metaphysica*, Baumgarten ties together intuition and drive by defining wonder as a representation rooted in the drive of curiosity. Curiosity itself can be directed toward history, philosophy, or mathematics. But it can also be directed toward sensate cognition and sensate desire themselves. Although he does not present a concept of aesthetic curiosity in the *Metaphysica*, and he does not use one in the incomplete *Aesthetica* either, there are two arguments that move in the direction of aesthetic curiosity, and both lead to literature. Baumgarten begins the first one with a montage of citations from Virgil’s *Eclogae*, in which it is the poet’s rational mind that, “because of this, often *wonders at Olympus’ strange threshold*, / *And sees the planets and the clouds* (§ 318) *beneath his feet* / *He will often receive the life divine* (section V; § 206) *and see the gods / Mingling with heroes*, and at the same time *be seen by them*”⁴⁹ (AE § 394; *Hinc saepe insuetum miratur limen Olympi, / Sub pedibusque videt nubes* §. 318. *et sidera. / Saepe deum vitam, S. V. §. 206. accipiet, divisque videbit / Permistos heroas, idemque videbitur illis*). The poet’s rational head is characterized, in turn, by its heart (see AE § 394), that is, by the organ of the sensate will.⁵⁰ Head and heart,

⁴⁸ See 3.1.2 Desire.

⁴⁹ Quoted (with modification) from Virgil, *Eclogues: The Latin Text with a Verse Translation and Brief Notes*, trans. Guy Lee (Liverpool: Francis Cairns, 1980), 5.56–57, 4.15–16.

⁵⁰ See 6.1 Anthropology.

the analogon of reason and the sensate will, define the poet as a person who wonders.

The second argument leading to aesthetic curiosity follows a cross-reference in paragraph 808 of the *Aesthetica* to paragraph 730 of the *Metaphysica*. In this astonishing paragraph from the *Metaphysica*, Baumgarten outlines, a good fifty years before Hegel's engagement with Plato in *Die Phänomenologie des Geistes* (1807), his own master–slave dialectic. The context is formed in section 21 on freedom (*libertas*), which outlines an economy of rational desire and aversion in the upper appetitive faculties:

My free volitions and nolitions are called ELICITED ACTS OF THE SOUL, whereas the free actions of the rest of the faculties are called MASTERED ACTS, and insofar as they depend on the freedom of the soul, MASTERY is ascribed to the soul over these. Hence the mastery of the SOUL OVER ITSELF is the faculty that produces the actions of one faculty, and then of another faculty, and then that once again produces their opposite, all according to a distinct preference. Therefore, the greater is the freedom, the greater is the mastery of the free soul over itself (§725). A significant lack of mastery over oneself is MORAL SLAVERY, IN THE BROAD SENSE. Whatever functions to promote mastery over oneself is LIBERAL (noble), and whatever promotes slavery is SERVILE.

Volitiones nolitionesque meae liberae dicuntur ACTUS ANIMAE ELICITI, reliquarum facultatum actiones liberae, ACTUS IMPERATI, & quatenus a libertate animae pendent, ipsi in eas IMPERIUM adscribitur. Hinc ANIMAE IN SEMETIPSAM IMPERIUM est facultas pro distincto lubitu nunc huius, nunc illius facultatis actiones producendi, nunc earum producendi oppositum. Quo maior ergo libertas, hoc maius liberi in se est imperium, §. 725. Insignis imperii in se ipsum defectus est SERVITUS MORALIS SIGNIFICATU LATO. Ad augendum in se imperium faciens est (ingenuum) LIBERALE, servitutem promovens moralem est SERVILE. (MET § 730)

By rooting human morality in freedom, this allegory brings together psychology and ethics. While human morals (*mores hominum*) are naturally determined, they also depend on free choice (see MET § 720). The master–slave allegory stages the path to freedom as an ethical practice of liberation, and Baumgarten transfers this practice – as usual on the basis of his analogical method – from “above” to “below,” from reason to the objects of sensate desire. Due to this transfer of the allegory, one could say that he aestheticizes it: statements about rational will and refusal become statements about sensate desire and aversion. What was his goal with this cross-reference to the paragraph in the *Metaphysica*? The allegory narrates a story of self-efficacy that leads from slavery to mastery (and so to freedom). The will can traverse from one state to the other because it is attributed with free choice between slavery and mastery. This mastery is the appetitive faculty of producing actions (*facultas actiones producenda*); the master–slave allegory visualizes it as an ethical practice, meaning that

Baumgarten once again turns to employing the techniques of the poet himself to deal with this tricky point.

In the *Metaphysica*, Baumgarten sets aside sensate choice so as to consider different ratios of mixing rational will and sensate desire.⁵¹ The allegorical method of presentation allows him to avoid the paradox that leads to the concept of the sensate will, since the displacement itself places us in the context of aesthetics. In the context of this transfer, wonder is the ethical practice of producing actions in order to increase aesthetic self-efficacy. Only wonder is an elicited act of the soul; memories, dreams, foresight, anticipation, and mental images are all mastered acts, formed by the cognitive faculties. They are governed by the sensate will, which manifests itself in the ethical practice of wonder, as Baumgarten indirectly notes in the citation of Virgil's fifth *Ecloga*. The immediacy of wonder is often expressed in exclamations and punctuation marks, particularly as they are used in the poetry of *Empfindsamkeit* in the middle of the eighteenth century: *O ... – !*

That the master–slave allegory implies an action is not only suggested by the emphasis on free choice but also by the gradation of wonder. One can wonder more or less, which means that wonder can be trained like other exercises. The goal of this training consists in focusing attention on objects that are to be perceived aesthetically. This attention is related to the attention Baumgarten discusses among the lower faculties of the soul and not among the higher ones:

I AM ATTENTIVE to that which I perceive more clearly than other things. I ABSTRACT away that which I perceive more obscurely than other things. Therefore, I have a faculty of being attentive and one of abstracting (§216), but both of these are finite (§354) and hence they are only in a certain degree and not the supreme degree (§248). The more that is taken away from a finite quantity, the less is left over. Therefore, the more I am attentive to one thing, the less I am able to be attentive to others. Therefore, a stronger perception that greatly occupies [my] attention obscures a weaker perception, or causes [me] to abstract from a weaker perception (§528, 515).

Quod aliis clarius percipio ATTENDO; quod aliis obscurius, ABSTRAHO AB EO. Ergo habeo facultatem attendendi & abstrahendi, §. 216. sed finitas, §. 354. hinc in certo tantum, non maximo gradu utrasque, §. 248. Quo plus quantitati finitae demitur, hoc minus est residuum. Ergo quo magis attendo uni rei, hoc minus possum attendere aliis: ergo perceptio fortior attentionem admodum occupans obscurat debiliorem, seu facit a debiliori abstrahere, §. 528. 515. (MET § 529)

The more focused the poet's attention is, the higher the degree of abundance, greatness, truth, clarity, certitude, and life in literature. For that reason, the eth-

51 See 3.1.2 Desire.

ical practice of wonder – or even, one could now say, the ethical practice of aestheticization, rooted in the lower appetitive faculties – is the best path to beauty, truth, and goodness in literature.

Possessing a sensate will and training it through the ethical practice of wonder are thus the ethical core of Baumgarten's aesthetics. But a wondrous danger is looming. The sensate will may have rationalized desire, but even as the sensate will, desire remains desire. The forms of poetic curiosity are therefore not simply positive; rather, as the paragraph on wonder in the *Metaphysica* warns very explicitly: "The insane, in whose soul only burdensome affects reign, are MELANCHOLIC, and those in whom anger reigns are FURIOUS" (MET § 688; *Mente capti, in quorum anima soli affectus molesti regnant, sunt MELANCHOLICI, in quibus ira regnat, FURIOSI*). An analysis of melancholy is thus necessary to acquire a better understanding of Baumgarten's ethics of literature.

6.2.3 Melancholy

"Among the temperaments, the melancholic has been commonly considered the most suitable for a poet" (KOLL § 46; *Gemeinlich hat man unter den Temperamenten den Melancholicus zum Dichter am geschicktesten befunden*). Yet, unleashed from his head, the melancholic's heart – the organ of the sensate will – is in danger. Baumgarten plays through the well-known cultural imaginary of these dangers. The poet is not only radically open and maximally attentive to the manifold of impressions; he also must govern and manage his supposedly melancholic temperament, an idea that has shaped our understanding of creativity since time immemorial:

The beautiful spirit thinks perhaps so deeply into his materials that he has a similarity to the melancholic, and his thoughts about how he wants to execute his plan – thoughts that he has been mulling over for a long time and that bring him to this silence or also at times to a strange gesture – are a distinguishing feature of a beautiful spirit. But this is the natural order, and the degree of madness that one objects to is not there.

[D]er schöne Geist denkt vielleicht so tief in seine Materien, daß er eine Ähnlichkeit mit den Melancholicis hat, und die Gedanken, wie er seinen Entwurf ausführen will, mit denen er sich eine Zeitlang trägt, und die ihn in dies Stillschweigen, oder auch zuweilen in eine seltsame Geberde bringen, sind Kennzeichen eines schönen Geistes. Dieses ist aber die natürliche Ordnung, und der Grad der Tollheit ist nicht da, von der man im Einwurf sagt. (KOLL § 40)

Melancholic topoi from different origins play an important role in the theoretical disciplines concerned with creativity. These topoi are stored in the collective

memory and are constantly combined in new ways. Particularly in the *Kollegium*, Baumgarten refers, as if it were self-evident, to the “divine spirit” (KOLL § 58; göttliche Ingenium), which ennobles the poet in *Problems* 30.1, the pseudo-Aristotelian text that serves as the basis of the European discourse on melancholy. The discourse on melancholy thus visualizes Baumgarten’s theory of sensate desire.

Two problems arise in this discourse. The first concerns the relationship between labor and talent, which enter the *Aesthetica* in the form of the two melancholically indexed concepts of the poeta faber (see AE § 95) and the poeta vates (see AE § 36). The second concerns the relationship between creative energy and rational control, which the *Aesthetica* visibly tries to balance. Creative inspiration was a tricky topic in the Enlightenment. Only after elaborating the positive influence of aesthetic exercise (*exercitatio aesthetica*) on the poet in section 3, the benefits of aesthetic instruction (*disciplina aesthetica*) in section 4, and the entire catalogue of traditional rule-governed poetics does Baumgarten turn to aesthetic inspiration (*impetus aestheticus*) in section 5, of course not without again exhorting the poet to belabor the literary texts produced in this state through aesthetic improvement (*correctio aesthetica*) in section 6.

Against the backdrop of melancholy, Baumgarten relates inspiration to the abilities of foresight and anticipation. On this basis, he characterizes the ancient poets as seers (see AE § 36), which leads back to his theory of fiction and the poet’s ability to invent something new.⁵² To describe the poet’s creative and prophetic capacities, Baumgarten invokes the character type of the *melancholia generosa*, naming the examples of Homer, Pindar, and their modern descendant John Milton (see KOLL §§ 29, 53):

The melancholic is more sober, and since we know that a beautiful spirit must be able to see into the future because he must arouse desires, and that whoever is to see into the future must have a sober way of thinking, and since this is present in melancholics and since they are, therefore, the most skillful at seeing into the future, they also have the most aptitude to be beautiful spirits.

Der Melancholicus ist gesetzter, und da wir wissen, ein schöner Geist muß in die Zukunft sehen können, weil er Begierden erregen muß, wer aber in die Zukunft sehen soll, ein gesetztes Nachdenken haben muß. Da sich dieses nun bei den Melancholicis befindet, und sie also am geschicktesten sind, in die Zukunft zu sehen, so haben sie auch die mehreste Anlage zu einem schönen Geiste. (KOLL § 46)

⁵² See 5.2.1 Sequentiality.

The melancholic possesses an aptitude to enter states of inspiration that the poet must attain in order to be creative at all: “The happy aesthetician’s general character (§ 27) requires (IV) AESTHETIC INSPIRATION (the beautiful arousal and inflammation of the mind, *horme* [impulse], ecstasy, fury, *enthousiasmos* [enthusiasm], *pneuma theou* [the spirit of god])” (AE § 78; Ad characterem felicitis aethetici generalem §. 27 requiritur IV. IMPETUS AESTHETICUS (pulcra mentis incitatio, inflammatioque, ορμη, ecstasis, furor, ενθουσιασμος, πνευμα θεου)).

At first reserving judgment as to their characteristics, Baumgarten elaborates the phenomenal forms of inspiration in the *Kollegium* as follows:

The beautiful spirit focuses with such strong powers of attention on his topic that he cannot turn them to other things at the same time. [...] This state of inspiration increases even more when it becomes similar to the phenomenon that one perceives in the mad. That is indeed why it is called fury. A particular intensity is expressed here, and the soul manages something that it would not have been able to manage without this fury. [...] Enthusiasm is a new kind of inspiration and does not refer here, as in philosophy, to the mistake where one believes to have divine sensations and deludes oneself; the name rather derives from the mythology of the ancient pagans. Since they had such a great quantity of minor deities, one ascribed being moved in a particular way to one of these deities and called it enthusiasm or the spirit of a particular god (*pneuma theou*).

Der schöne Geist denkt mit so starken Attentionskräften auf sein Thema, daß er sie auf andere äußere Dinge zu der Zeit nicht wenden kann. [...] Diese Begeisterung nimmt noch stärker zu, wann sie dem Phänomenis ähnlich wird, die man bei Rasenden wahrnimmt. Deshalb heißet sie auch furor. Es äußert sich hier eine besondere Stärke, und die Seele zwinget etwas, das sie ohne diesen furorem nicht würde gezwungen haben. [...] Der Enthusiasmus ist eine neue Art der Begeisterung und bezeichnet hier nicht, wie in der Philosophie, den Irrtum, da man glaubt, göttliche Empfindungen zu haben, und sich betrügt, sondern die Benennung wird aus der Götterlehre der alten Heiden hergeleitet. Da sie eine so große Menge von Untergottheiten hatten, so schrieb man es einer von diesen Gottheiten zu, wann man in eine besondere Bewegung gesetzt wurde, und nannte es Enthusiasmum oder den Geist eines gewissen Gottes (πνεύμα θεού). (KOLL § 78)

With recourse to the relevant paragraphs from the *Metaphysica*, Baumgarten’s deliberations culminate in the psychological diagnosis that the soul is capable of the highest achievements under the effects of such inspiration: as if mad, it imagines, remembers, foresees, and combines data – which he calls marks (notae) – into something new (see AE § 80; MET §§ 504–518). Melancholy thus goes hand in hand with poetic world-making.⁵³

⁵³ See 5.3.1 Possibility.

Understanding how the aspect of movement, which also organizes the theory of sensate desire,⁵⁴ is central to the melancholic and enthusiastic poet requires turning to the psychological tradition, which Baumgarten uses to subject the body of the poet to a reading: “Because the mad often have peculiar bodily postures, people have noticed this and often confused this posture with madness itself. We also sometimes find strange bodily movements in people who want to express themselves in a beautiful way” (KOLL § 78; Weil die Rasenden oft wunderliche Stellungen des Körpers haben, so hat man dieses auch angemerkt und diese Stellung oft mit der Wut selbst verwechselt. Auch bei Leuten, die sich schön ausdrücken wollen, finden wir zuweilen seltsame Bewegungen des Körpers). The more moved the beautiful body, the more moved the beautiful spirit is too – and the more complex, opaque, and performative is the literary text: “When we perceive this phenomenon, then we can definitely conclude that the writer was at the time in a kind of state of inspiration through which he performed something that we cannot now manage with cold blood” (KOLL § 79; Wann wir dieses Phänomene wahrnehmen, so können wir sicher schließen, daß der Schriftsteller damals in einer Art von Begeisterung gewesen, durch welche er etwas ausführet, das wir jetzt bei kaltem Blute nicht zwingen können).

Behind this is an economy of melancholy: poetry requires not too much inspiration but also not too little. Even negative experiences of poverty, displeasure, ridicule, troubles, and sad circumstances can be turned into inspiration (see AE §§ 81–92). Creativity is thus not at all beyond the control of the poet; rather, states of self-affection can be artificially produced by the sensate will. If inspiration has “until now only been present, for example, to four degrees” (KOLL § 78; bisher z. B. nur in vier Graden gewesen), Baumgarten advises “amplifying it such that it immediately grows for instance to sixteen degrees and falls back down to four after the action” (KOLL § 78; sie so zu verstärken, daß sie etwa gleich bis sechzehn Grad wachsen, und nach der Handlung wieder zu vieren herunterfallen). Here too, practice makes perfect: in thirteen points, he not only demands that poets compete with the beauty of other products; he also recommends that they care for their corporeal and mental health through leisure, mineral cures, wine, and love to prevent “blood clotting” (KOLL § 81; stockendes Geblüt). The poet therefore also benefits from the agility of youth: “the thirty-fifth to fortieth years are the peak for the beautiful spirit in age” (KOLL § 89; das 35 bis 40ste Jahr die Spitze für den schönen Geist im Alter ist).

To keep the poet’s blood moving, Baumgarten’s economy prescribes “motion and agitation of the body, especially of a somewhat melancholic body” (AE § 81;

⁵⁴ See 3.1.2 Desire.

motionem agitationemque corporis, praesertim non nihil melancholici). Physical and psychic movement – such as “by means of rather brisk horse-riding (§ 46)” (AE § 81; per equitationem celeriozem. §. 46) – have been considered classic therapies for melancholy since antiquity. Pliny the Younger “meditated well after some exercise while hunting” (nach einer Bewegung auf der Jagd gut meditiere); and Horace “often produced verses while traveling or at an inn” (KOLL § 81; oft auf der Reise oder im Wirtshause Verse gemacht habe). In this context of visualizing inspiration through the traditional discourse on melancholy, allow me to note that no less than Aristotle illustrates his own rational psychology with an image of motion and agitation in his short psychological text *On Divination in Sleep*. He compares the mental representations of dreamers, prophets, nostalgics, and poets to a disc thrower in a competition and characterizes them all as melancholics. He thereby describes a genuinely poetic function of these representations that operate metaphorically and metonymically: “For just as even madmen utter or mentally rehearse things associated by assonance, e.g. ‘Aphrodite’, ‘-phrodite’, as in the poems of Philaenis, so do these people string a series onwards. And again, because of their intensity, one movement does not get knocked out of them by another.”⁵⁵ Dubos, one of the godfathers of the *Aesthetica*, recommends movement to the French nobility to cure boredom (l’ennui).⁵⁶ So it is not without reason that Baumgarten also brings melancholy into the eighteenth-century countryside–court topos. The melancholic poet is an upright citizen, a man of “courteous conduct in society” (KOLL § 78; artigen Auf-führung in Gesellschaft; see also KOLL § 88), “tenderness in judgment” (Zärtlichkeit im Urteilen), and “beautiful thoughts” (KOLL § 29; schöne Gedanken), not a decadent aristocrat. Like the “melancholics” (Melancholicis), the poet should “practice moderation” (KOLL § 29; Maß zu halten) and not let “the dull and frosty way of thinking” (KOLL § 111; die matte und frostige Art zu denken) or the “licentious way of thinking” (KOLL § 112; ausschweifenden Art zu denken) take the upper hand. Both idleness (akedeia; in the Christian context, sloth is a cardinal sin) and licentiousness endanger him to the same degree (see MED § 68n), threatening to turn him into the malus melancholicus, who is characterized by addictions to hypocrisy, competition, fraternization, sycophancy, licentiousness, orgies, idleness, laziness, and the pursuit of personal gain, especially wealth (see AE § 50).

⁵⁵ Arist. *Div. somn.* 464b. Quoted from Aristotle, *On Divination through Sleep*, in *On Sleep and Dreams*, trans. David Gallop (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1996), 115.

⁵⁶ See Jean-Baptiste Dubos, *Reflexion critiques sur la poésie et sur la peinture*, vol. 1 (Paris: Jean Mariette, 1719), 6.

Above all, the poet should not lose the right balance of desire: that is, the touching, moving, passionate, effective idea is living, while the cold, lifeless, theoretical, ineffective idea is dead (see MET § 669). Baumgarten juxtaposes the brilliance (*nitor*) of the ethically good representation with the melancholic dryness (*siccitas*) of the bad one (see MET § 531). Against this backdrop, the precautions (*cautiones*) in section 7 seem as if they could be from a diagnostic compendium on melancholy. They advise avoiding the following types of cognition (*genera cogitandi*): the raw, the uneducated, the sluggish, the pedantic and scholastic, the forced, the affected, the powerless and frosty, the unrestrainedly excessive, and the imperfect (see AE §§ 106–113; ETH § 403).

As the chief witness for his melancholic poet, who works on the border between creativity and pathology, Baumgarten finally invokes, and not without reason, a pagan god: Apollo, the god of prophecy and poetry, who appears in Plato's *Phaedrus* as a melancholic accompanied by the Muses, Dionysus, and Aphrodite.⁵⁷ Apollo is the ancient godfather of the modern poet: "Since Apollo is a god of physicians, of the future, and the leader of the Muses, one calls such an inspired person a *phoibolepton*, one who is inspired by Phoebus" (KOLL § 82; Da Apollo ein Gott der Ärzte, der Zukunft und der Anführer der Musen ist, so nennt man einen solchen Begeisterten φοιβοληπτον, einen, der von Phöbus begeistert ist). The Phoebus-Apollo constellation evoked by this turn is reflected both in the *Aesthetica* and in the *Kollegium* in the attribute of fire, which Baumgarten uses to refer to the inspiration of the poet. As the flame of beautiful thoughts (*flamma pulcre cogitandorum*; see AE § 114), the "wild fire" of enthusiasm (KOLL § 78; Feuer, das [...] wild ist), the fire of "wit" (KOLL § 44; Witzen), and certainly as the Promethean fire of the creative power, fire symbolizes creative inspiration.

Apollo therefore stands at the beginning of a proper mythology of the poet, at whose side Baumgarten now also places "Orpheus" (AE § 43), the singer and poet, who is supposed to have descended from the divine Apollo Citharoedus or at least be devoted to him. Orpheus's genealogy reveals, however, yet another tradition in which Baumgarten fixes the melancholic seer: the association with Dionysus, the god of intoxication and ecstasy. Baumgarten particularly invokes the essential orphic trait of (fast) movement:

The other characteristic of inspiration is speed. We do not mean the gift of writing swiftly, since one can safely wager any time that one will be done, for example, with one's poem before someone else; rather, we understand here the state of the soul when it decides to

⁵⁷ See Raymond Klibansky, Erwin Panofsky, and Fritz Saxl, *Saturn and Melancholy: Studies in the History of Natural Philosophy, Religion and Art* (London: Thomas Nelson, 1964), 355.

articulate something and in articulating it, feels that it goes faster and faster and never comes to a standstill.

Das andere Kennzeichen der Begeisterung ist die Geschwindigkeit. Wir meinen hier nicht jene Gabe hurtig zu schreiben, da man jedes Mal getrost eine Wette anstellen kann, man z. B. mit seinem Gedicht eher fertig werde als ein anderer, sondern wir verstehen hier den Zustand der Seele, da sie sich entschließt, etwas auszuarbeiten, und indem sie ausarbeitet, spürt, daß es immer geschwinder geht und niemals ins Stocken gerät. (KOLL § 79)

In Orphism, this temporal characterization of the singer is based on mistaking Kronos (Saturn) with chronos (time). In their classic study on melancholy, Raymond Klibansky, Erwin Panofsky, and Fritz Saxl explain how the titan Kronos was melded with chronos, casted “as a seer, and described as a πρόμαντις or προμηθεύς. The foundation of this lay in the equation, expressly recognised by the Neoplatonists, of Kronos with Chronos – that is to say, with Time, the fundamental principle of the Orphic theology.”⁵⁸ Baumgarten’s primary response to this association is to radically accelerate the “speed” (KOLL § 79; Geschwindigkeit) of literature. With regard to Reinhart Koselleck’s characterization of modernization as acceleration,⁵⁹ Baumgarten’s imagination of even a “machine-like movement” (KOLL § 29; maschinenmäßigen Bewegung) certainly participates in the discourse of modernity.

The temperament of the poet – his heart – thus leads not to the ground of the soul but rather, with mythology, to the ground of the cultural imaginary. There Pliny the Younger paints the setting of inspiration that Baumgarten appropriates in paragraph 84 – not with a word-for-word quotation but rather with a relatively free interpretation of the following passage, as Andrea Allerkamp has noted:⁶⁰

I always realize this when I am at Laurentum, reading and writing and finding time to take the exercise which keeps my mind fit for work. There is nothing there for me to say or hear said which I would afterwards regret, no one disturbs me with malicious gossip, and I have no one to blame – but myself – when writing doesn’t come easily. Hopes and fears do not worry me, and I am not bothered by idle talk; I share my thoughts with myself and my books. It is a good life and a genuine one, a seclusion which is happy and honourable, more rewarding than almost any “business” can be. The sea and shore are truly my private Helicon, an endless source of inspiration.⁶¹

⁵⁸ Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl, *Saturn and Melancholy*, 154.

⁵⁹ See Koselleck, *Futures Past*. See also 2.2 Analogy.

⁶⁰ See Andrea Allerkamp, “Onirotica und mundus fabulosus: Traum und Erfindung,” in Allerkamp and Mirbach, *Schönes Denken*, 204–206.

⁶¹ Plin., *Ep.* 1.9.4–7. Quoted from Pliny the Younger, *Letters*, trans. Betty Radice, vol. 1, Loeb Classical Library 55 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969).

Baumgarten replaces idleness from the discourse on melancholy with leisure (otium), and Pliny's villa with Helicon and Parnassus, the two seats of the Muses. There the poet awaits (pascere) and dreams (somniare) of his inspiration: inflammation and acceleration. That is why Baumgarten has him cry out: "*o! mare! o! litus! verum secretumque μῆσεϊον!*" (AE § 84). In Allerkamp's reading, "with the list of the sea, beach, and the temple of the Muses, three places of nature and culture are invoked that stand for endlessness, contemplation, and poetry." While the sea and beach are "places of creation, places between the work on memory [*memoria*] and ingenious invention [*inventio*],"⁶² the temple and the invocation of the Muses, which stands at the beginning of all poetry, refer back to Apollo, the leader of the Muses, whose position the poet has now assumed in Baumgarten's mythology.

The affirmation of inspiration looks ahead to modernity, yet Baumgarten would not have approved of this affirmation. He repeatedly subjects the poet to the stronger laws of the happy life (*fortiores vitae beatae leges*). They include the imperative of moderation, especially in all things that become excessive in melancholy. In section 28 on aesthetic falsity (*falsitas aesthetica*), he warns the poet against too much inspiration, which can result in the representations of literary texts appearing to be lies to the analogon of reason (see AE § 448).⁶³ The poet's creativity can lead to beautiful literature, but it can also produce – Baumgarten again cites Horace⁶⁴ – literary texts that do not appear like a dream on Parnassus but rather "*like a sick man's dreams*" (AE § 446; *velut aegri somnia*). That is the point at which beauty suddenly changes into ugliness, aesthetic light into melancholic darkness.⁶⁵

6.3 Traces

6.3.1 Ethopoeia

Recent scholarship has engaged eagerly with the ethical aspects of the *Aesthetica*. The shift in interest from philosophy to anthropology accompanying this focus is, of course, very distant from Baumgarten's actual epistemic object: literature. Perhaps this is not a problem if one simply accepts, based on common sense, that any literary text must have been written by a real person. So any

⁶² Allerkamp, "*Onirotica und mundus fabulosus*," 204.

⁶³ See 5.3.1 Possibility.

⁶⁴ See Allerkamp, "*Onirotica und mundus fabulosus*," 205.

⁶⁵ See 4.1.3 Twilight.

poet *must* possess certain talents, be educated as a poet, and fulfill a series of duties related to literary writing. But Baumgarten does not follow common sense; on the contrary, he tests it. For he does not direct his attention to the poet, author, writer, beautiful spirit, or *felix aestheticus* himself but rather to the traces that he leaves in literary texts. Even Baumgarten's analysis of inspiration demonstrates this: "If one wants to examine whether this inspiration was with a beautiful writer, then one should read him carefully" (KOLL § 79; Wann man untersuchen will, ob diese Begeisterung bei einem schönen Schriftsteller gewesen ist, so lese man ihn genau). These traces of sensate cognition and sensate desire become manifest as the abundance, greatness, truth, clarity, certitude, and life of the structure of literary discourse. From a psychological perspective, Baumgarten views these traces as originating from a person. But he also views them from a narratological perspective, ascribing these traces to the narrative voice, which is – as I have shown – the trace not of a person but rather of a function.⁶⁶ In the *Aesthetica*, he invents his own persona, or mask, which gives this voice a face and forms the center of his theory of authorship.

More or less every rhetorical textbook treats the orator and his education in addition to technical instructions for composing a formally complete speech. Following this model, Baumgarten describes the poet's nature and education, copying the antiquated and clearly defined ideal of the orator from Cicero, Quintilian, and Virgil. It is the ideal of the good man (*vir bonus*); the *Aesthetica* does not conceive of a *mulier bona*, of course.⁶⁷ Yet the obligation to perfect sensate cognition and sensate desire is only realized in the literary text; the visualization of a "poet" is merely the aftereffect of the rhetorical figure of *ethopoeia*, which Baumgarten uses consciously.

In rhetoric, the figure of *sermocinatio* (*ethopoeia*) is, as a sister of personification, or *fictio personae* (*prosopopoeia*), one of the figures of thought (*figurae sententiae*). A speaker uses *ethopoeia* to let a person other than himself speak directly within his own speech. The history of the concept reaches back to Aristotle, who explains the figure as an ethically coded tool for achieving *evidentia* in speech. In ancient *progymnasmata*, which Baumgarten takes up in his aesthetic exercises, *ethopoeia* becomes a trainable speech act. Whereas the well-known figure of *prosopopoeia* is understood more in the sense of personification and aims to evoke a face and voice,⁶⁸ *ethopoeia* produces a character. It does so through characterization, the allocation of characteristics. Particularly central in

⁶⁶ See 5.2.2 Mediation.

⁶⁷ See Cic., *De or.* 3.189, 2.194; Quint., *Inst.* 2.8. See also Linn, "Baumgartens *Aesthetica*," 435–436; Finsen, "Evidenz und Wirkung im ästhetischen Werk Baumgartens," 201.

⁶⁸ See Paul de Man, "Autobiography as De-facement," *MLN* 94.5 (1979): 926.

the theory of ethopoeia is Dionysius of Halicarnassus's description of Lysias in *The Ancient Orators*. There he ties ethopoeia to the rhetorical commonplaces that produce the effect of a good and trustworthy character (*loci a persona*). These characteristics are *topoi* and do not necessarily belong to the person or speaker,⁶⁹ meaning that the ethics of this rhetorical figure of character-making is firmly anchored in the consensus of convention.

As the figure of character-making, ethopoeia has the dual task of amplifying both the evidentiality and believability of discourse, so it is strange that Baumgarten does not list this figure in the series of figures he treats in section 53 on persuasive arguments (*argumenta persuasoria*).⁷⁰ Perhaps he overlooked the figure because it does not seem to be a figure at all. That is, if ethopoeia succeeds, then one measures its success by whether the audience believes that the real person is speaking instead of a rhetorically presented persona. Against this backdrop, Quintilian, Baumgarten's most important source, treats ethopoeia as the figure of mimesis: "The representation of the characters of others, which is called Ethopoeia or, as some prefer, Mimesis, [...] operates both with actions and with words. The form with actions is akin to Hypotyposis."⁷¹ Ethopoeia is therefore also a fixed component of rhetorical exercises⁷² and possesses "the closest affinity to creative literature."⁷³

Tracing Baumgarten's use of ethopoeia must begin in the *Meditationes*, where he creates the ethical character of the poeta by means of a figura etymologica, employing once again his analogical method.⁷⁴ There he replaces the product – the poema – with the producer – the poeta – by simply exchanging the *m* for a *t*: "By **poem** we mean a perfect sensate discourse, by **poetics** the body of rules to which a poem conforms, by **philosophical poetics** the science of poetics, by **poetry** the state of composing a poem, and by **poet** the man who enjoys that state" (MED § 9; *Oratio sensitiva perfecta est POEMA, complexus regularum ad quas conformandum poema POETICE, scientia poetices PHILOSOPHIA POETICA, habitus conficiendi poematis POESIS, eoque habitu gaudens POETA*). The later baptism of the poet as the felix aestheticus in the *Aesthetica* speaks volumes about Baumgarten's use of the figura etymologica: he simply changes the gender of the word *aesthetica*, creating the male *aestheticus*,

⁶⁹ See Roland Spalinger, "Ethopoeia: Historische und theoretische Analyse einer rhetorischen Figur" (MA thesis, Universität Zürich, 2018), 8–9.

⁷⁰ See 6.3.3 Dubitatio.

⁷¹ Quint., *Inst.* 9.2.58.

⁷² See 6.2.1 Exercise.

⁷³ Webb, "The *Progymnasmata* as Practice," 306.

⁷⁴ See 2.3 Etymology.

whose reputation is qualified by the attribute *felix*. Just how suggestive the figure of character-making was for Baumgarten is shown in his own reflection on the “mythology of the old pagans” (KOLL § 78; Götterlehre der alten Heiden), in which the dance of the Muses is derived from “nothing other than different ways of expressing oneself beautifully about different objects” (KOLL § 83; nichts als verschiedene Arten, sich von verschiedenen Gegenständen schön auszudrücken): “Each particular way was given an apt name and transformed into a person” (KOLL § 83; Einer jeden besonderen Art gab man contenable Namen und verwandelte sie in Personen). For that reason, the aptitudes, duties, and exercises of the *felix aestheticus* do not refer to an actual human being; instead, ethopoeia depends on the structure of literary discourse and its functions. This is because, as Groß notes, the *felix aestheticus* is, “as the embodied beautiful spirit, essentially a poieticus.”⁷⁵ He can do what literature can do – only that, and nothing else.

With ethopoeia, we are thus not discussing a real person but rather a rhetorical persona, a mask. In contrast to Quintilian’s rhetorical ethopoeia, however, Baumgarten constructs an aesthetic ethopoeia. Not the loci a persona but the aesthetic topoi give the *felix aestheticus* his ethical profile. In the *Aesthetica*, Baumgarten discusses topoi in section 10 on tropes (tropi). There he differentiates positively coded aesthetic topoi from “miserable topics” (KOLL § 130; elenden Topiken). After positing that particular topoi (loci particulares), which can be applied to individual objects, have preeminence over general topoi (loci universales), he demands aesthetic topoi from psychologists. In free indirect speech, he puts a series of questions in the mouth of the *felix aestheticus*, who thus serves as a personification of aesthetics in Baumgarten’s own discourse. The six categories of style – abundance, greatness, truth, clarity, certitude, and life – structure the soliloquy:

If I, for example, wanted to compose my own life story, even if just for my own amusement, then I would first ask myself: how rich is he then, how big is his family, what changes will occur in it, further, how important are they, what truth, what verisimilitude, what vividness is there? Where must I direct full light? Where should I move? This is the particular topic we propose in the first exercises.

Wann ich z.B. meinen eigenen Lebenslauf, auch nur zu meiner eigenen Belustigung aufsetzen wollte, so würde ich mich zuerst fragen: wie reich ist er wohl, wie groß ist die Verwandtschaft, was für Veränderungen werden darin vorkommen, ferner wie wichtig sind sie, was für Wahrheit, was für Wahrscheinlichkeit, was für Lebhaftigkeit ist da? Wo muß ich das

75 Groß, *Felix aestheticus*, 119.

volle Licht hinsetzen? Wo soll ich rühren? Dies ist die besondere Topik, die wir bei den ersten Übungen vorschlagen. (KOLL § 139)

Baumgarten accordingly translates the parts of literary texts – the canons of rhetoric (inventio, dispositio, elocutio) – into steps for producing literature. The parts listed in the *Meditationes* – “The several parts of a poem are: (1) sensate representations, (2) their interrelationships, (3) words as their signs, § 9, § 6” (MED § 10; *Poematis varia sunt*, 1) *repraesentationes sensitivae* 2) *earum nexus* 3) *voces earum signa*. §. 9. 6; see also AE §§ 18–20) – thus correspond to the step-by-step process described in the *Kollegium*. There Baumgarten obliges the working aesthetician to “imagine a thing for the first time in such a way that it becomes manifest to the senses and moves” (KOLL § 14; ein Ding sich zum ersten Male so vorstellen, daß es in die Sinne fällt und rührt). The aesthetician should do so by sticking to “the rules for thinking beautifully and movingly of things of which one has not at all thought of before” (KOLL § 14; die Regeln schön und rührend von Dingen zu denken, davon man bisher noch nicht so gedacht). Then the successful beautiful spirit must also “perceive the harmony of the signs and structure” (KOLL § 20; die Übereinstimmung der Zeichen und der Ordnung wahrnehmen) to represent something beautifully. Aesthetic ethopoeia thus acquires its profile through the functions of the structure of literary discourse, which are rooted in the cognitive and appetitive faculties.⁷⁶ The poet first places sensately processed elements in relation to one another (combine) so as to produce complexity; second, he crops the images (*praescindere*; see AE § 34) and places them before the eyes (see AE § 39) to produce opacity; and third, he brings these images to life to produce performativity.

The performative function of the structure of literary discourse depends, however, on the appetitive faculties. In Baumgarten’s aesthetic ethopoeia, the performative function configures the desire of the beautiful spirit (see KOLL § 45), who therefore seems particularly human. As I have shown, the sensate will forms the ethical core of the *Aesthetica*.⁷⁷ Yet mere will is not sufficient for the *felix aestheticus*. To be a genuine aesthetician, he must have a *will to a sensate will*, which is itself sensate. That is why “the first judgment the beautiful spirit or aesthetically rich spirit must make” (KOLL § 149; die erste Beurteilung, die der schöne Geist oder der ästhetisch reiche machen muß) comes before the six questions listed above: “I must ask: What is the state of my horizon? Will I be able to go from this one into another? Will I be able to manage everything in this

⁷⁶ See 3.1.1 Cognition.

⁷⁷ See 3.1.2 Desire.

hour, at this time, under these circumstances?” (KOLL § 149; Ich muß fragen: Wie ist mein Horizont beschaffen, werde ich aus dem einen in den anderen gehen können? Werde ich alles in dieser Stunde, zu dieser Zeit, unter diesen Umständen zwingen können?). By means of *ethopoeia*, Baumgarten stages the *Urszene* of literature as an initial reflexive will to a sensate will. In this will, the theory of literature converges with the theory of creativity, suggesting a causal relation in which a real person wrote the literary text. That this is the case, that a literary text always has one or more producers, would of course belong to another chapter of literary theory that does not concern me here.

Here the *ethopoeia* of the *felix aestheticus* is not produced by someone but rather produces itself. Paradoxically, it arises together with the structure of literary discourse, to which it is indebted. This metaleptic structure does not depend on any authority beyond itself, especially not on an empirical author. Indeed, the *felix aestheticus* coincides with the act that Baumgarten places – above all, in the context of his narratology – at the base of poetic world-making: “I sense” or “I narrate”:⁷⁸

The beautiful spirit must have the natural poetic aptitude to create something new and be, as the French put it, an *esprit créateur*. What we sense and have sensed, that is old; since he is now to create something new, he must not purely show the old perception again but rather put the old ones together with new ones with imagination.

Der schöne Geist muß die natürliche poetische Anlage haben, etwas Neues zu schaffen, und wie es die Franzosen ausdrücken ein *esprit createur* sein. Was wir empfinden und empfunden haben, das ist alt, da er nun etwas Neues schaffen soll, so muß er nicht nur die alten Empfindungen wieder zeigen, sondern die alten mit Imagination verbunden mit neuen zusammensetzen. (KOLL § 34)

This *sensate will to poetic world-making* aims both at the rhetorical completeness and metaphysical perfection of literature.⁷⁹ Against this metaphysical backdrop, Baumgarten undergirds the will to will with the allegory of the playing boy, which he borrows from Horace: “when a boy converses, when he plays, especially when he invents games or acts like a little leader among his comrades – wholly intent on what he is doing with them – he breaks out in a sweat, endures a lot, and does a lot” (AE § 55; *dum confabulatur puer, dum ludit, praesertim ubi ludorum inventor est, aut parvulus director inter commilitones, iisque gnaviter intentus iam sudat, et multa fert, multa facit*).⁸⁰ According to Anthony Krupp, “the

⁷⁸ See 5.2.2 Mediation.

⁷⁹ See 4.1.1 Perfection.

⁸⁰ See Hor., *Ars P.* 412–413.

child's mimetic activity is viewed here as nothing less than the source of culture,"⁸¹ providing a developmental narrative from childhood to manhood and from nature to culture. Moreover, Baumgarten takes recourse to one of the traditional allegories of the alchemical process of transformation; such a *ludus puerorum* stages the final and highest level of the work (*opus*) in Alexandrian hermeticism.⁸² This allegory does not emphasize the goal of the sensate will to poetic world-making but rather the impulse that keeps the process in motion. In contrast to alchemic work, the *felix aestheticus* cannot, of course, ever reach the goal of literature: its beauty, truth, and goodness.

Although the character of the *felix aestheticus* could certainly be suspected of merely serving to visualize Baumgarten's literary theory, his aesthetic *ethopoeia* is actually about something else: poetic world-making. Norbert Menzel argues that as a maker of poetic worlds, the *felix aestheticus* was historically typical and influenced by contemporary theories of genius.⁸³ But since the emphatic genius of the 1770s was not yet prominent around 1750, one has to invert the direction of influence: Baumgarten influenced the later theories of genius by giving his *felix aestheticus* "the contours of the new figure of the great solitary" poet.⁸⁴

6.3.2 Parrhesia

In the very last paragraph of the *Aesthetica*, Baumgarten gives the persona of the *felix aestheticus* an interesting makeover when he concludes his reflections on literature with the rhetorical figure of frankness (*parrhesia*). With regard to Baumgarten's canon of style, *parrhesia* supposedly belongs to the "figures of intentionality,"⁸⁵ which he treats in section 53 on persuasive arguments (*argumen-*

81 Anthony Krupp, "Cultivation as Maturation: Infants, Children, and Adults in Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten's *Aesthetica*," *Monatshefte* 98.4 (2006): 532.

82 See Gustav F. Hartlaub, "Signa hermetis: Zwei alte alchemistische Bilderhandschriften," *Zeitschrift des deutschen Vereins für Kunstwissenschaft* 4 (1937): 149; Hartlaub, "Arcana artis: Spuren alchemistischer Symbolik in der Kunst des 16. Jahrhunderts," *Zeitschrift für Kunstgeschichte* 6 (1937): 289–324.

83 See Norbert Menzel, "Der anthropologische Charakter des Schönen bei Baumgarten" (Diss., Pontificia Universita Gregoriana, 1969), 296.

84 Finsen, "Evidenz und Wirkung im ästhetischen Werk Baumgartens," 212.

85 Rüdiger Campe, "Epoche der Evidenz: Knoten in einem terminologischen Netzwerk zwischen Descartes und Kant," in *"Intellektuelle Anschauung": Figurationen von Evidenz zwischen Kunst und Wissen*, ed. Sibylle Peters and Martin Jörg Schäfer (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2006), 31. See also Frauke Berndt, "Schönes Wollen: A. G. Baumgartens literarische Medienethik," in

ta persuasoria). While he grumbles in the *Aesthetica* that “whether the rhetoricians always or never call this argument a figure is all the same to me” (AE § 349; Hoc argumentum an figura dicatur semper, an nunquam rhetoribus, mihi perinde est), in the *Kollegium* he claims that parrhesia is a figure in no uncertain terms:

If such a passage now appears in a beautiful periodic sentence of a speech or of a poem where I wait to say something and finally do say it and thereby present the matter really importantly, this is a particular beauty, and in this whole of the sentence the most beautiful aspect, and so a *figure*.

Insofern nun in einer schönen Periode einer Rede oder eines Gedichtes eine solche Stelle kommt, wo ich anstehe, etwas zu sagen und es endlich doch sage und hierdurch die Sache recht wichtig darstelle, ist dies eine besondere Schönheit, und in diesem Ganzen der Periode das Schönste, folglich eine Figur. (KOLL § 349, emphasis mine)

One can understand the relation of the two figures, ethopoeia and parrhesia, as one of specification: every instance of parrhesia is an instance of ethopoeia, but not every instance of ethopoeia is an instance of parrhesia. Evidentia is where they converge. While the duty and goal of ethopoeia is the *aesthetic evidentia* of the poetic world,⁸⁶ the duty and goal of parrhesia is *frank evidentia*, for anyone who wants to be educated to think and desire beautifully should “gracefully transition from here to the bella parrhesia of evidentia (§ 349)” (AE § 904; venuste transeas ab hac ad bellam evidentiae parrhesian. §. 349). With regard to the translation of this passage, I propose interpreting “evidentiae” here as a genitive of quality that modifies the accusative object “bellam parrhesian” and not, as is often the case, as a dative of purpose that makes evidentia, which in itself can be qualified as something different, the aim of bella parrhesia. If a genitive of quality, the bella parrhesia of evidentia can basically be understood as *frank evidentia*. By contrast, Campe associates parrhesia with a freedom of thought that results from aesthetic experience.⁸⁷ Either way, Baumgarten recommends beautiful parrhesia as a figure for producing ethically coded evidentia.

With the concept of bella parrhesia, Baumgarten bridges the gap between the beginning and the end of the *Aesthetica* – a further argument for viewing his theory of literature as complete and not fragmentary. That is, the *Aesthetica* concludes with a phrase that replaces the aesthetic goal of beauty from para-

Bella Parrhesia: Begriff und Figur der freien Rede in der Frühen Neuzeit, ed. Rüdiger Campe and Malte Wessels (Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach, 2018), 171–194.

⁸⁶ See 4.1.2 Truth.

⁸⁷ See Campe, “Bella Evidentia,” 255.

graph 14 with the ethical duty of frank evidentia.⁸⁸ Since they are substituted for one another within the syntagms in paragraphs 14 and 904, the metaphysical concept of beauty and the ethical concept of frankness form a paradigm in his literary theory:

Aesthetices finis est *perfectio cognitionis sensitivae*, qua talis, §. 1. Haec autem est *pulcritudo* (§ 349). (AE § 14, emphasis mine)

[...] si venuste transeas ab hac *ad bellam evidentiae parrhesian*. §. 349. (AE § 904, emphasis mine)

While Baumgarten treats *bella evidentia* in the context of aesthetic truth,⁸⁹ he substantiates the paradigm between frankness and beauty by associating evidentia and persuasion so strongly that he does not treat aesthetic evidentia within the context of truth but rather in the context of verisimilitude.⁹⁰ Evidentia is produced through what is probable; and because what is evident is probable, evidentia is also persuasive. One may assume, as Campe notes, that as a political and legal theorist, Baumgarten was well familiar with the rhetorical figure of parrhesia before transforming it into aesthetic parrhesia.⁹¹ In the eighteenth century, the Greek *parrhesia* and its Latin translation *licentia* referred, on the one hand, to the right to bring a legal suit and, on the other, to being allowed or qualified to teach in an academic context.⁹² Both meanings are rooted in rhetoric, where parrhesia has been caught since sophism between being an aptitude and a technique, between nature and art (*ars/techne*).⁹³ In the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, composed in the first century BC, parrhesia has both a narrow political definition, since it is about freedom of speech, and a broader ethical meaning that relates to a speaker's duties: "It is Frankness of Speech when, talking before those to whom we owe reverence or fear, we yet exercise our right to speak out, because we seem justified in reprehending them, or persons dear to them, for some fault."⁹⁴ It is also in this sense that Foucault develops parrhe-

⁸⁸ See 4.1.1 Perfection.

⁸⁹ See 4.1.2 Truth.

⁹⁰ See 4.2.2 Formlessness; 5.3.2 Probability.

⁹¹ See Campe, "Bella Evidentia," 255.

⁹² See Johann Heinrich Zedler, *Grosses vollständiges Universal-Lexicon aller Wissenschaften und Künste*, vol. 17 (Halle, 1738), s.vv. "Licentia," "Licentiatus."

⁹³ See Michael P. Schmude, "Licentia," in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik*, ed. Gert Ueding, vol. 5 (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 2001), cols. 253–258.

⁹⁴ *Rhet. Her.* 4.48. Quoted from *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, trans. Harry Caplan, Loeb Classical Library 403 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954).

sia into the absolute duty of anyone who wants to speak the political truth: “In *parrhesia*, the speaker uses his freedom and chooses frankness instead of persuasion, truth instead of falsehood or silence, the risk of death instead of life and security, criticism instead of flattery, and moral duty instead of self-interest and moral apathy.”⁹⁵

Quintilian depoliticizes *parrhesia* with the concept of *licentia*. In contrast to an absolute duty, Quintilian argues for a relative *licentia* tailored to the individual person of the speaker, a *licentia* that is furthermore not bound to truth but to consensus: one must “take care that what is said is not out of keeping with the man who says it. [...] For what is liberty in some is called licence in others.”⁹⁶ That is the reason why he integrates *licentia* into the figures of thought in the canon of style. As a performative figure, *licentia* is available to the educated speaker in various communicative contexts for achieving his goals in these particular situations. Real frankness is thus hard to distinguish from feigned flattery. And indeed, only fake frankness is a means of rhetorical persuasion: “When these expressions are sincere, they do not come under our present topic; but if they are feigned and artificially produced they are undoubtedly to be regarded as Figures. The same may be said of Free Speech, which Cornificius calls Licence, and the Greeks *parrhesia*. For what is less ‘figured’ than true freedom?”⁹⁷ With regard to ethics, *licentia* is therefore also the figure in which the ambiguity of rhetoric receives a form. Because one cannot distinguish between “eloquence” and “artful trickery,” between good and bad rhetoric,⁹⁸ Kant calls for vigilance with regard to rhetoric in its entirety. Even the greatness of the soul and dignity of the person can, as Baumgarten complains, be simulated by “SWEET-TALKING AND CARELESS NITPICKERS (quibblers)” (AE § 356; PULCELLI LEVICULIQUE MICROLOGI. (leptologi.)).

Before discussing it in the *Aesthetica*, Baumgarten refers to *licentia* in his *Ethica philosophica*, where he is concerned with the appetitive faculties and the perfection of morality. The *Ethica* addresses the all-important question of what the rational will should be directed toward. So far I have focused on the psychological aspects of the sensate will, tracing its development into the will to a sensate will and then into the sensate will to poetic world-making; now I will turn my attention to the ethical aspects. The location of *licentia* in the synopsis of the *Ethica* is in itself indicative. In the second chapter, in which he goes

⁹⁵ Michel Foucault, *Fearless Speech*, ed. Joseph Pearson (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2001), 19–20.

⁹⁶ Quint., *Inst.* 3.8.48.

⁹⁷ Quint., *Inst.* 9.2.27–28.

⁹⁸ Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, § 53.

through the duties to the self (*officia erga te ipsum*) and then comes to the duties to the soul and its faculties (*officia erga animam eiusque facultatem*), Baumgarten discusses the duties to the higher appetitive faculty (*speciatim officia erga facultatem appetitivam superiorem*). Section 10 on the care of the will (*cura voluntatis*) deals with freedom (*libertas*), which he defines in the part 3 of the *Metaphysica* on psychology (*psychologia*).⁹⁹

The precondition of freedom is in the morality of the person, and although a person has a natural predisposition to certain morals, morality depends, according to Baumgarten, on conscious decisions since humans possess free choice. In the paragraph in which he finally treats *licentia*, he therefore lists the perfection of freedom as the seventh of ten strategies for personal perfection: “You are to perfect your liberty₁ (7) lest you confuse it with a false and vapid kind of liberty, the sort of lawless *licentia* and liberty₂ that operates by pure chance (§ 247)” (ETH § 248, subscripts mine; *Perfecturus libertatem tuam* 7) *ne ipsam cum falsa et inani eius specie confundas, qualis exlex licentia et libertas per casum purum operata*, §. 247). The differentiation between good, true freedom and false, untrue freedom is noteworthy in this passage where Baumgarten uses the term *libertas* twice. First, liberty₁ serves as the umbrella concept; second, “*licentia* and liberty₂” encompasses misused types of freedom such as the negatively connoted stylistic techniques of frank and free speech (see AE § 877).

In the context of the *Ethica*, Baumgarten binds liberty₁ to truth, which he defines theologically, and to the will: *licentia* is thus the rhetorical figure of the rational will to truth. Hence, when *licentia* appears in the *Aesthetica* as *bella parrhesia*, it has been displaced from the higher appetitive faculties to the lower ones (see AE § 904). As a result, *bella parrhesia* is the figure of the analogon of the will to truth. Such a *sensate will to aesthetic truth* corresponds – as an echo of the paragraphs on exercise¹⁰⁰ – to the *felix aestheticus*’s pursuit of aesthetic truth and the fight against aesthetic falsity (*falsitas aesthetica*):

Section XXXIII: The absolute aesthetic pursuit of truth (*studium veritatis aestheticum absolutum*)

Section XXXV: The comparative pursuit of truth (*studium veritatis comparativum*)

Section XXXVI: The poetic pursuit of the true (*studium veri poëticum*)

From the beginning, the duty to pursue truth is understood as necessarily unfulfillable. For humanity cannot bridge the gap between human truth and the highest logical truth (*veritas summa logica*; see AE § 557), which only God grasps. All

⁹⁹ See 3.1.2 Desire.

¹⁰⁰ See 6.2.2 Wonder.

that is left for the *felix aestheticus* is the poetic pursuit of the true (*studium veri poëticum*), to which Baumgarten devotes all of section 36. There it is certain that the only truth the *felix aestheticus* can strive for is aesthetic verisimilitude.¹⁰¹ The *felix aestheticus* must thus ask himself no less than sixteen questions so that, even if he does not speak the truth, he at least does not violate the verisimilitude of the literary text (see AE §§ 590–613).

Nevertheless, Baumgarten justifies exceptions from the truth as poetic freedom (*libertas poetica*; see AE § 523) as long as they do not offend against taste (*exceptiones non inelegantes*; see AE § 25). So such poetic license (*licentia poetica*) is not only possible but actually defines literature. Although literary texts are flawed and deficient, their perfection – and that means their beauty – is greater than the perfection of every other form of sensate discourse:

And so we come to the concept of poetic license. Because poetry must have particularly great perfections, particularly great exceptions are to be made here; and because one has not yet heard of rhetorical license, one also sees that the perfections here are not allowed to be so great.

[U]nd so kommen wir auf den Begriff der *Licentia poetica*. Weil die Poesie besonders große Vollkommenheiten haben muß, so werden hier besonders große Ausnahmen zu machen sein; und da man noch nichts von einer *Licentia rhetorica* gehört hat; so siehet man zugleich, daß hier die Vollkommenheiten nicht so groß sein dürfen. (KOLL § 24)

Against the backdrop of the ethical duty of verisimilitude, *parrhesia* is thus the figure of the *sensate will to aesthetic verisimilitude*. It first appears – initially without the attributive adjective *bella* – in the context of aesthetic greatness (*magnitudo aesthetica*) in section 23 on magnifying arguments (*argumenta augentia*) that increase greatness. There Baumgarten lists *parrhesia* among the figures of the sublime:¹⁰²

Among the magnifying arguments, we should without a doubt include *parrhesia*, which reveals, whether implicitly or explicitly, that in order for a meditation that is certain or the signification of a meditation to be decided upon, we needed a notable exertion of freedom, and that it was not without a fight that the better case nevertheless won in the spirit. For after a prologue of this sort, or tacitly currying favor, it is not reasonable for one usually to expect commonplace or familiar things.

101 See 5.3.2 Probability.

102 See augmentum/incrementum (AE § 330); meteora (AE § 331); hypotyposis (AE § 332); repetitio (AE § 333); hyperbaton, climax, gradatio (AE § 334); anticlimax (AE § 335); metaphora, similia, comparatio (AE § 336); hyperbole (AE §§ 339–341); polyptoton (AE § 342); anaphora (AE § 343); epistrophe or epiphora (AE § 344); symploce, epanalepsis, anadiplosis, ploce, epizeuxis (AE § 345); synathroismus (AE § 348); exclamatio (AE § 351).

In augentibus sine dubio habeamus Parrhesian, implicite vel explicite ostendentem, ut certa meditatio meditationisve significatio decerneretur, opus nobis insigni fuisse libertatis nisu, non nisi post luctam aliquam vicisse tamen in animo meliorem caussam. Post eiusmodi enim prologum, vel tacitam insinuationem, sane non vulgaria solent exspectari ac trita. (AE § 349)

By first introducing parrhesia in a rhetorical context, Baumgarten marks the state of exception that Foucault later pointedly emphasizes: “*Parrhesia*, then, is linked to courage in the face of danger: it demands the courage to speak the truth in spite of some danger. And in its extreme form, telling the truth takes place in the ‘game’ of life or death.”¹⁰³ In Baumgarten, parrhesia requires a provisional arrangement, an introduction or silent insinuation, which recalls Foucault’s state of exception.¹⁰⁴ Within this framework, a speaker decides – despite inner conflict – to employ parrhesia, and this use of it is accompanied by a turn to the morally good. For this reason, the figure also magnifies the object of aesthetic discourse, which is not in poor taste. In any case, the freedom that is the basis of this decision remains strategic and potentially fake.

The examples of parrhesia from Virgil’s *Aeneis* that Baumgarten cites in paragraph 349 and the following one are something like ethical clichés for guiding attention. In the *Kollegium*, he recommends that parrhesia should be used with “great cunning” (großer List) and states that it has the purpose of arousing “curiosity” (Neugier) since “one acts like something is important and lets a kind of hesitation be seen before one says it out loud and then finally says it nevertheless” (KOLL § 349; man eine Sache als wichtig verstellt und eine Art von Wankelmüt blicken läßt, ehe man sie heraussagt und sie endlich doch sagt). Parrhesia makes people believe “that it really must be a matter of importance” (KOLL § 349; daß es wirklich eine Sache von Wichtigkeit sein müsse). As such, speaking the truth is best evidenced by noting *that* one is speaking the truth or truthfully. With regard to this new “discursive reality” of speaking the truth in aesthetic contexts, Florian Fuchs points out that “Baumgarten [...] divides discourse into a logical narrative statement and a sensate linguistic effect.”¹⁰⁵ In this sense, Baumgarten cites the speech of the Greek Sinon from Virgil’s *Aeneis*. With an invented story, Sinon convinces the Trojans that the wooden horse in front of the gates of Troy is the Greeks’ parting gift and that they should bring it into their city. But behind Sinon’s narrative lurk lies and ruin, as Baumgarten

103 Foucault, *Fearless Speech*, 16.

104 See Florian Fuchs, “Sich des Lügners entzücken: Ästhetische Freiheit und Baumgartens Szene ‘schöner’ Parrhesie,” in Campe and Wessels, *Bella Parrhesia*, 195.

105 Fuchs, “Ästhetische Freiheit,” 202.

ascertains in his intense close reading of the passage, which highlights Sinon's rhetorical techniques and their effects:

The fictitious Sinon proceeds *meta polles parrhesias* [with much parrhesia] until he thinks he has enough attention. Then indeed he simulates a struggle within himself again, [...] with what effect? [...]

When, however, he nearly hit the nail on the head, on account of which he was playing out the whole fable, not another word did he utter before:

He raised his hands – unfettered – to the stars.

[...]

But keep your promises, since Troy is saved –

*If this true news pays richly for my safety.*¹⁰⁶

The result teaches how valuable this parrhesia, as well as the narrative rolled into it, is held to be.

Pergit fictus Sinon μετα πολλης παρρησιας, donec attentionem ac isse se satis putat. Tum vero luctam intra animum denuo simulat. [...]

quo effectu? [...]

Quum autem rem iam acu paene tangeret, cuius gratia omnis ludebatur fabula, non verbum prius, quam

Sustulit exutas vinclis ad sidera palmas:

[...]

Tu modo promissis maneat, servataque serves,

Troia, fidem, si vera feram, si magna rependam.

Eventus docuit, quanti haec habita sit parrhesia, et narratio huic involuta. (AE § 350)

On account of its affinity to false pathos, parrhesia is generally suspected of deception. Baumgarten therefore confirms Quintilian's critique of fake frankness earlier in the *Aesthetica*. But in stating that Sinon "simulates a struggle within himself" in this paragraph, Baumgarten breaks, as Fuchs notes, with the rhetorical tradition by turning from content to form to affirm fakery. The effect of the figure is independent from the truth of the statement. Consequently, parrhesia becomes an "aesthetic effect."¹⁰⁷

This finding is correct, but it misses the point. The affirmation of fake frankness occurs when Baumgarten analyzes the use and effects of parrhesia in narration. Sinon's intradiegetic narration takes the form of parrhesia; it is the mask through which Sinon narrates. And since he invents a fake story to tell with that mask, bella parrhesia is the figure of the sensate will to aesthetic verisimilitude, which is always fake from an ethical point of view.¹⁰⁸ By substituting beauty in

¹⁰⁶ Quoted (with modification) from Vergil, *Aeneid*, 2.153, 2.160 – 161.

¹⁰⁷ Fuchs, "Ästhetische Freiheit," 198.

¹⁰⁸ See 5.2.1 Sequentiality.

paragraph 14 with frank evidentia in the last paragraph of the *Aesthetica*, Baumgarten establishes the ethical ambiguity of literature between frankness and fakeness.

6.3.3 Dubitatio

The ethical aspects of the will, which specify the sensate will to aesthetic truth as a sensate will to aesthetic verisimilitude, lead to another figure of thought in the last paragraph of the *Aesthetica*: the figure of doubt (dubitatio), which actually precedes parrhesia and is, in a way, its precondition. This is surprising since doubt is a highly contradictory concept in Baumgarten's theory of literature. On the one hand, doubtful hesitation (dubia fluctuatio) is generally viewed from a philosophical perspective with suspicion (see AE § 23), and so it is continually used in a negative sense in the *Aesthetica*. On the other hand, doubt is nothing less than a synonym for being human in theology (see MET § 873): is not every person a doubting Thomas who must be convinced of the truth? In the end, the mask of the felix aestheticus is thus also the mask of someone in doubt, and any poet is literally a doubting Thomas. Doubt leads back to the sensate will to poetic world-making, which provides the impulse for literature.¹⁰⁹

Baumgarten embraces a dubitatio that belongs, like parrhesia, to the “figures of intentionality”¹¹⁰ in the sections on aesthetic persuasion (persuasio aesthetica), specifically in the planned but incomplete section 53 on persuasive arguments (argumenta persuasoria): “Hence I discern cases in which DOUBT can be put to good use for confirming or reprehending, [...] especially if you gracefully transition from here to the bella parrhesia of evidentia (§ 349; section L)” (AE § 904: Hinc agnosco casus, in quibus belle ad confirmandum reprehendendumve possit adhiberi DUBITATIO, [...] praesertim si venuste transeas ab hac ad bellam evidentiae parrhesian. §. 349. S. L.). Doubt is an ethical practice and, like parrhesia, doubt functions as a figure of thought. A speaker uses dubitatio for the purpose of persuasion so as to strengthen the credibility of his viewpoint with regard to something – and not the credibility of the thing itself. That is why he simulates doubt: “Hesitation too gives a certain guarantee of sincerity: we pretend to be asking ourselves where to begin and where to stop, what it is best

¹⁰⁹ See 6.2.3 Melancholy.

¹¹⁰ Campe, “Epoche der Evidenz,” 31.

to say, or whether to speak at all.”¹¹¹ Quintilian differentiates between doubt in something, which he discusses among the figures of thought, and a linguistic form of doubt, which he discusses among the figures of speech.¹¹² But instead of following this path – that is, dealing with the effect of *dubitatio* on the audience – my argumentation focuses, as in my analysis of *parrhesia*, on the structure of literary discourse.

One has to recall that in the sections on aesthetic persuasion (*persuasio aesthetica*), Baumgarten is concerned with *sensate certitude* (*certitudo sensitiva*) attained through the analogon of reason:

We count a fifth beauty of thoughts (§ 22) among the foremost ones (§§ 113, 177, 423, 614): *sensate certitude*, to be obtained by the analogon of reason, the consciousness and light of truth and verisimilitude, *PERSUASION*, in particular *AESTHETIC PERSUASION* (§ 22; *Metaphysica* § 531).

Pulcritudinem cogitationum in primariis §. 113, 177, 423, 614. *quintam numeramus*, §. 22. *certitudinem sensitivam*, *analogo rationis etiam obtinendam veritatis et verisimilitudinis conscientiam et lucem*, *PERSUASIONEM*, sed *AESTHETICAM*, §. 22. M. §. 531. (AE § 829)

Persuasion is a rhetorical concept and so naturally suspect to philosophy. Being persuaded of something, he thus explains, is catching sight of it “*like a moonrise as one / sees on the first of the month, or thinks one saw, through the clouds* (Verg., *Aen.* 6.453–454)” (AE § 678; *qualem primo quis surgere mense / Aut videt, aut vidisse putat per nubila lunam*, *Aen.* VI. 454). Baumgarten is uncomfortable in this fog, which makes him feel the need to defend the methodological role of rhetoric in his aesthetics one last time (see AE §§ 834–838, 841). And one should remember that he uses dawn, moonlight, twilight, and fog as epistemological metaphors in his metaphysics of beauty.¹¹³

I have already argued that Baumgarten juxtaposes the *sensate certainty* resulting from persuasion with the *rational certainty* resulting from conviction in the metaphysical discussion of evidence.¹¹⁴ He differentiates the distinct consciousness of truth (*conscientia veritatis distincta*), which he refers to as conviction, from the indistinct and *sensate consciousness of truth* (*conscientia veritatis indistincta et sensitiva*), which he refers to as persuasion (see AE § 832). In treating persuasion, he distinguishes further between general persuasion (*persuasio generatim*) and aesthetic persuasion. The latter aims for verisimilitude: “He who

¹¹¹ Quint., *Inst.* 9.2.19.

¹¹² See Quint., *Inst.* 9.3.88.

¹¹³ See 4.1.3 Twilight.

¹¹⁴ See 4.1.2 Truth.

would persuade aesthetically knows to give to his [works] (1) verisimilitude in accordance with §§ 423–613, and to this verisimilitude the necessary light (§§ 624–824)” (AE § 839; *Aestheticæ persuasurus dare noverit suis 1) verisimilitudinem secundum §. 423–613, et huic lucem necessariam, §. 624–824*). He also differentiates between absolute persuasion (*persuasio absoluta*) and comparative persuasion (*persuasio comparativa*). Aesthetic persuasion is absolute persuasion when the *felix aestheticus* achieves certitude along with fulfilling his other five duties: abundance, greatness, truth, clarity, and life. In any case, persuasion is in the service of the certitude and probability of what is already known, desired, and represented beautifully (see AE §§ 843–845). Thus, because aesthetic persuasion has to follow the rules of verisimilitude, one simply believes fiction (see AE § 839).

In the sections on aesthetic truth (*veritas aesthetica*), Baumgarten first introduces doubt in the context of probability and improbability, two concepts from genre poetics, which means that *dubitatio* secretly leads back to his theory of fiction.¹¹⁵ That is, he treats doubt with regard to the probability or improbability of poetic worlds. The decision to hold something to be aesthetically true or verisimilar or not is the result of doubt (see AE § 485). Doubt is thus a practice: something can be doubted logically and aesthetically (see AE § 486); doubt is aesthetic when there is a disturbing excess of aesthetic falsities. The practice of doubting is not only performed by the audience or reader of literature but also by the author. It is not uncommon that one becomes a poet (*non raro poeta fiet*) by searching for one’s objects in the dubious:

Hence the aesthetician persuades one to seek the beautifully true not only in things that are completely certain but likewise to rummage through the uncertainties of probable, doubtful, improbable things as long as one is not drawn into ugly falsisimilitude in the eyes of a connoisseur, or indeed into the ugliness of the false itself (section XXVIII).

Hinc aestheticus suadet non in solis complete certis pulcre verum quaerere, sed idem rimari simul per incerta, probabilium, dubiorum, improbabiliū, quamdiu semet ipsum non subducit amatoris oculis in turpem falsi similitudinem, vel ipsam falsi turpitudinem desinens. S. XXVIII. (AE § 503)

In section 51 on confirming (*confirmatio*), it becomes clear that the affirmation of doubt has far-reaching consequences for Baumgarten’s theory of literature. There he not only holds aesthetically doubtful objects to be particularly convincing (see AE § 846) but also derives the ambivalence of literature from doubt. In con-

115 See 5.3.2 Probability.

trast to the ambiguities of beauty, of poetic worlds, and of evidence, which I have analyzed so far, this ambivalence has to do with evaluating things:

A certain certitude can coexist with a certain incertitude, but no certitude – hence no persuasion, no evidence, no confirmation – can coexist with the total incertitude of doubters. Hence those supporters of universal doubting, as soon as they wish to bring someone charmingly into this venture, are in the habit of always forgetting their own counsel to him that one must be in doubt about all things, such that they seem to be less in doubt about this than about any other matter.

Certitudo quaedam cum quadam incertitudine potest consistere, sed nulla certitudo, hinc nulla persuasio, nulla evidentia, confirmatio nulla cum incertitudine totali dubitantium. Hinc ipsi dubitationis catholicae patroni quam primum belle volunt aliquem in hanc aleam inducere, consiliorum suorum eo usque solent oblivisci, ut de nulla re minus dubitare videantur, ac de eo, dubitandum esse de omnibus. (AE § 857)

Literature is characterized by the fact that its sensate certitude is always uncertain. Literature's ambivalence arises from this uncertainty. In this context, only faith (fides) can help. Thus, in paragraph 904, Baumgarten demands that the *felix aestheticus* not jeopardize faith by showing too much confidence (fiducia). The defense's closing argument in court should not suggest exaggerated confidence or even ignorance or arrogance, as Baumgarten stresses in his commentary on Quintilian, who himself quotes Cicero:

I do not deny Quintilian's rule (§ 903): *Let the orator* (all who would persuade beautifully) *display confidence and always speak* (think the things that are to be signified) *as though he thought most highly of his case*¹¹⁶ (were rightly persuaded about persuading his personal objects; Quint., *Inst.* 5.13.51–52). I only advise that one not put belief to the test by displaying excessive certitude. Hence I discern cases in which DOUBT can be put to good use for confirming or reprehending, doubt being the narration or simulation of a state of mind in which the reasons contending for and against a certain opinion are judged equal by the one reckoning.

Non nego Quintiliani regulam §. 903. *Fiduciam orator* (pulcre persuasurus omnis) *prae se ferat, semperque ita dicat* (significanda cogitet) *tanquam de casu optime cogitet* (de persuadendis suis obiectis personalibus probe persuasus). *Inst.* V. 13. Moneo tantum, ne nimiae certitudinis ostentator de fide periclitetur. Hinc agnosco casus, in quibus belle ad confirmandum reprehendendumve possit adhiberi DUBITATIO, narratio vel simulatio status animi, cui rationes pro quadam sententia pugnantes et contra eandem connumeranti censentur aequales. (AE § 904)

Only one conclusion can follow from this: effective aesthetic persuasion relies on dubitatio instead of on fiducia, and both are rhetorical figures of thought that

116 Quoted (with modification) from Quintilian, *The Orator's Education*, 5.13.51.

leave traces in the literary text. The actual point is to employ doubt – which is explicitly allowed for the purposes of confirming (*confirmatio*) in section 51 or reprehending (*reprehensio*) in section 52 – in a narrative (*narratio*) or simulation of a fictive character (*simulatio status animi*). These narratives and simulations are characterized by their ambivalence: they are positive and negative about the same things at the same time. This ambivalence infects the *felix aestheticus* with doubt.

In his lucid reading of paragraph 904, Fuchs calls attention to the implicit structure of repetition with which Baumgarten switches from rhetorical to aesthetic persuasion by staging the poet's ambivalence toward a thing. *Dubitatio* makes the *felix aestheticus* think through the pros and cons once and then do it again. Only on the second iteration does a “both ... and” become a pro and a con. But with repetition, time comes into play, and with time, sequentiality, and with sequentiality, narrativity,¹¹⁷ for repetition is the mother of narration. Considering this, it is easy to understand why Baumgarten treats *dubitatio*, *narratio*, and *simulatio* in paragraph 904 as paradigmatic variations of the same narratively structured operations – namely, of confirming or reprehending. In conclusion, doubt – just like a narrative or simulation of a fictive character – is a form of poetic world-making, which shows that Baumgarten thinks of doubt in the form of narrative.

But we may even want to go a step further and consider whether doubt functions as the figure of poetic world-making in general. While the problem of fake doubt and the orator's strategies for employing *dubitatio* are at the center of rhetorical discourse, Baumgarten's engagement with ambivalence leads back once again to the point in the argumentation where the figure of *parrhesia* unfolds its potential as the mask of the *felix aestheticus*. But in contrast to *parrhesia*, doubt does not seem to have its own genuine form; instead, it is nested in literature. For that reason, Baumgarten again refers in section 53 on persuasive arguments (*argumenta persuasoria*) both to evidential arguments (*argumenta probantia*) from section 33 and to illustrative arguments (*argumenta illustrantia*) from section 43.¹¹⁸ In this reappearance in the context of doubt, aesthetic evidentiality – both the figures of amplification and the figures of hypotyposis – is suddenly again under discussion.¹¹⁹ But if *dubitatio* is nested in literature, ambivalence will appear in any literary text. I would even go a step further and argue that *dubitatio* is the figural form of the sensate will to poetic world-making in literary

117 See 5.2.1 Sequentiality.

118 See *paregmenon* (AE § 543); *sententia* (AE § 549); *definitio*, *descriptio* (AE § 551).

119 See 3.4.2 Opacity.

texts. While “I sense” is the formula for sensate thinking, desiring, and representing, and “I narrate” the formula for sensate thinking, desiring, and representing in poetic fiction, “I doubt” is the formula for the impulse to poetic world-making.

Yet Baumgarten does not repeat Plato’s verdict that all poets lie. This claim would miss the theoretical point. Instead, he pokes around at a theory of literature when he carefully treats ambivalence. When Eugen Bleuler introduces the concept of ambivalence in 1910, he describes the phenomenon as one of “double valence that is usually by definition an opposing valence.”¹²⁰ Interestingly, Bleuler does not find “ambivalent complexes” in his patients suffering from schizophrenia in the clinic;¹²¹ he rather defines ambivalence as the primary formative principle of myths, dreams, and poetry.¹²² Baumgarten too ties the problem of ambivalence to the linguistic medium of the literary. In the second paragraph of the sections on aesthetic persuasion (persuasion *aesthetica*), he reflects on the ambiguity of language itself, which makes literature ambivalent: “As a result of this ambiguity of words, there are those who take the opportunity to apply more pandering and makeup (§ 688) than true charms to every speech meant to persuade” (AE § 830; *Ex qua vocabulorum ambiguitate, sunt, qui sibi fenestram aperiunt, orationem ad persuadendum idoneam omnem lenociniis potius et fuco, §. 688. quam veris accensendi venustatibus*).

Because of this ambiguity of language, the final commitment of the *felix aestheticus* to literature becomes both an affectively doubtful and ethically dubious undertaking. The sensate will to poetic world-making is the result of ambivalence and produces the ambiguity of beauty, of poetic worlds, and of evidence. Even etymologically, ambiguity refers precisely to this: *ambigere* means “to be in doubt.” The essence of literature lies in this constitutive ambiguity. In the middle of his intensive engagement with the structure of literary discourse, Baumgarten asks: “But what kind of ambiguity is that?” (AE § 471; *Quid autem illud est ambiguitatis?*).¹²³ At the end of this book, one could reply with Derrida that, at the threshold of modernity, literature is a “supplementary double.”¹²⁴ In this sense, Baumgarten could not have chosen a clearer ending point for his *Aesthetica* than exposing the ethical epicenter of literature: doubt.

120 Eugen Bleuler, “Die Ambivalenz,” in *Universität Zürich: Festgabe zur Einweihung der Neubauten 18. April 1914* (Zurich: Schulthess, 1914), 105.

121 Bleuler, “Die Ambivalenz,” 96.

122 See Bleuler, “Die Ambivalenz,” 102.

123 See 5.3.1 Possibility.

124 Derrida, “The Double Session,” 191.

7 Conclusion

In the introduction, I laid out the frame for my reading of Baumgarten's work. To conclude, I would like to consider the relevance of facing poetry for studying literature today. In the past fifty years, our discipline has gone through a number of turns, ranging from the linguistic turn to the cultural turn, to mention only the two most important ones. In the course of these turns, literary studies has lost sight of its foundation, namely its concept of literature. No academic discipline can do without a fundamental understanding of its object of inquiry. And yet in literary studies today, we consider all kinds of questions except for the most important one: what is literature?

Like busy hunters and gatherers, we forage in the forest of historical phenomena and certainly make some exciting discoveries; but in doing so, we risk forgetting why we have set out on this quest in the first place. What is the epistemological potential of literature? What are literature's contributions to a better understanding of what it means to be human? What does literature have to say about forms of human cognition and desire? Or, to put it differently, why is literature, even today, still a necessary epistemological object, one that is capable of revealing insights that cannot be gleaned from an MRI scan or statistical analysis? Baumgarten's philosophical project not only represents the beginning of modern literary theory but also advances an understanding of literature that anchors it in an entire order of knowledge. Baumgarten was aware that analyzing literature requires a holistic approach. His theory contains a methodology (chapter 2), sketches out an epistemology (chapter 3), makes forays into metaphysics (chapter 4), and marks its own intersections with ethics (chapter 6). In progressing through the various ways in which literature is embedded in the order of knowledge, Baumgarten shifts from analyzing poetic passages with their figures and tropes to analyzing narratives (chapter 5). The concept of literature at stake in his discussion of narration brings to the fore what has been lost in the second half of the twentieth century: truth and method, philosophy and rhetoric. Baumgarten investigates literature's capacity for truth and its task in the world.

Today literary studies no longer asks these questions because narratology has made sure that theories of literature are circumscribed by technical concerns. Moreover, exponents of poststructuralism have all but banned engaging with the epistemological and ontological aspects of literature. Their critiques of metaphysics threw the baby out with the bathwater. Epistemological and ontological concerns are now restricted to theories of fiction and no longer relevant to the foundations of literary studies, just as literary epistemology is no longer relevant to the epistemology of aesthetics. This might explain why current writ-

ing in literary studies is becoming more and more similar to journalistic forms and formats. Basic rhetorical and generic terms are neglected in favor of merely thematic and, at times, ideologically motivated discussions. Anybody can speak about literature with whatever concepts they choose. Even the distinction between our world and fictional worlds, which lies at the foundation of Baumgarten's literary theory, is disregarded. This precludes working on a concept of literature that reflects the five types of ambiguities Baumgarten addresses: first, the ambiguity of aesthetics between epistemology and media theory; second, the ambiguity of beauty between finitude and infinity; third, the ambiguity of poetic worlds between truth and falsity; fourth, the ambiguity of evidence between being frank and being fake; and fifth, affective ambivalence, which is rooted in the constitutive ambiguity of literature.

I sense, I narrate, I doubt: it is the right to doubt that preserves our liberty – a liberty that was philosophically claimed and politically institutionalized in the European Enlightenment. In its forms and practices, literature nurtures precisely this most dignified human capacity.

8 Afterword

by Gabriel Trop

The founding mythology underlying the genesis of aesthetics in the work of Alexander Baumgarten circles around an initial audacious idea. To lose sight of this initial idea and its audacity risks dissolving the extraordinary intensive and extensive dynamism of Baumgarten's thought into a static system of scholastic distinctions, lifeless typologies, and overly complicated conceptual nuances. Baumgarten expresses this idea in the introduction to his *Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus* as follows: "to demonstrate that many things that have been said hundreds of times, but scarcely ever proven," can in fact be proven, and most importantly, such things "can be proven from the single concept of the poem" (MED, [preface], 4; Ut enim ex una, [...] poematis notione probari plurima dicta iam centies, vix semel probata posse demonstrare).¹ The concept of the poem, as an evidentiary source heretofore unexplored, constructs a paradigmatic body from which cognitive, affective, metaphysical, ethical, and veridical operations can be drawn out of their latency. The work of art becomes not just one source of intelligibility among others, but *the* archetypal model through which an ideal order manifests itself, and even distorts itself, phenomenally (distorting itself inasmuch as the poem as an analogue of reason introduces a gap between itself and absolutely ideal, logical order). It is not the philosophy of the logicians that comes to light in the order of the poem. It is a lived and embodied philosophy, one intimately connected to the "sensate" truth that forms the primary interface of human beings with the problematic, ambiguous world surrounding them.

The power of the foundational myth surrounding the origin of aesthetics in Baumgarten's work derives not merely from the epistemological and metaphysical gains henceforth attached to the poem qua literary object, but also perhaps from a submerged narrative of fetishization, a kind of erotic cathexis: the poem as the transgressive and unruly erotic object that is eventually reconciled with the norms of philosophical thought through sheer force of passionate dedication and intellectual will. At first, then, the origin of aesthetics has the structure of a love story. Baumgarten broaches the emergence of the attraction to the poem through narrating his own personalized history in the introduction to the *Meditationes philosophicae*: the story of a young man who passed "scarcely a day [...]"

¹ Translation into English lightly modified from Grote, *The Emergence of Modern Aesthetic Theory*, 72.

without verse” (paene nulla dies sine carmine), who was drawn to other academic interests and yet, who “never entirely renounced poetry” (MED, [preface], 3; ut poesi tam a castissima iucunditate), only to finally dedicate his entire life to the elevation of this supposedly diminutive object to a status commensurate with philosophical dignity.² While the love story that gave birth to literary theory began when Baumgarten was nineteen years old, it continued until the day of his death, and then beyond his death, in the testament left behind in the fragments of his *Aesthetica*: unfinished and hence, in proper erotic fashion, always calling out for completion as an infinite task.

Such a self-representation – originally written as a young man and then, whether intentionally or not, enacted over the course of his life – belongs to a genre of rhetorical performance and hence is unapologetically self-mythologizing, even when it purports to be self-denigrating. The performative and rhetorical elements of any such self-mythologization would be unproblematic for the new type of philosopher eventually proposed by Baumgarten, the sensate philosopher who is also a joyful aesthete. Such rhetorical and figural elements would represent precisely the proper form in which sensate truth could concretize itself: the shape of a life become poetry, poetry as a vehicle for the force of life. It was indeed such a mythology that was transmitted through many of Baumgarten’s eighteenth-century disciples and biographers, until the heroic narrative – the story of the improbable audacity of aesthetics – eventually was overcome by other aesthetic tendencies less ensconced in a seemingly scholastic idiom (Winckelmann, Lessing, Herder) and less committed to rationalistic ontological tendencies. Finally, Baumgarten was to be submerged by the currents driving the history of the discipline that he helped found.

In spite of the relegation of Baumgarten to a moment in often teleological historiographies of aesthetics that posit a robust thesis of autonomy as the culminating point of modern theoretical aesthetic achievement, Baumgarten’s meditations on poetry in the light of the absolute surpass in their force of aesthetic cathexis many of the supposed sources that could otherwise claim foundational status for the birth of a theory of literature. In terms of the epistemological and metaphysical burden that is to be borne by the literary object, Baumgarten goes beyond early German Romanticism’s poetization of theory and theorization of poetry, Schelling’s philosophy of art, Nietzsche’s aesthetic affirmation of existence, or the late Heidegger’s poetic thought as an alternative mode of dwelling to the enframing of technology. In each of these instances, the poetic object is an element in a more capacious philosophical project rather than the singular ar-

2 See Grote, *The Emergence of Modern Aesthetic Theory*, 67–68.

chetyal paradigm of order in phenomenal being. In its most extreme formulation, Baumgarten's project seems like an improbability at the heart of rationalist philosophy, something that harnesses the very heterocosmic power that it otherwise ascribes to fiction: to make the illumination of the normative structure of all sensate experience, the *ordo plurium in uno*, depend upon the analysis of literature.

Such is the provocative idea that animates the emergence of aesthetics, and exploring the consequences of this idea – what it would mean to think about the literary object in this way, as generative of an entire way of looking at the world, a theory (theoria) in the proper sense of the term – has been the subject of much of Frauke Berndt's seminal work on Alexander Baumgarten, from *Poema / Gedicht: Zur epistemischen Konfiguration der Literatur um 1750* (2011) to the current work, *Facing Poetry* (2020). Above all in German-language scholarship, Berndt's work has played and continues to play a significant role not only in reawakening interest in Baumgarten, but also in exploring the ramifications of such aesthetic investigations as they extend into unexpected territories (narratological theory, media theory, psychoanalysis, ontologies of ambiguity, to name a few of these directions).

Baumgarten in Berndt's work does not appear as a figure of antiquarian or merely intellectual historical interest. Rather, his work represents a suppressed foundational moment in literary theory that both informs implicitly what literary theorists do (a descriptive element), suggests what they ought to do (a normative element), and indicates what they *could* do (a poetic element). Berndt's own work functions here paradigmatically in these respects, above all in this latter sense, by indicating what lies within the range of the possible – or even what lies just outside the possible – in the medial, rhetorical, affective, and semiotic potentialities and tendencies not just of literary art, but of theories of literary art that themselves harbor an irreducibly poetic element.

Berndt revives what is living in Baumgarten by framing his work as the first modern theory of literature, where literature becomes an epistemic object with its own distinctive methodologies, epistemologies, metaphysics, narratological frames (i.e., theories of fiction), and ethical concerns. Her critical approach is at one and the same time conceptual, historical, and most importantly, energetic. For what is needed in the case of Baumgarten is not yet another scholarly reevaluation of his work, but reanimations, discursive interventions dynamically organized around impetus and stimulus. It is precisely such a reanimation that takes place in *Facing Poetry*.

In meeting this challenge, Berndt follows Baumgarten's own program of an epistemology, aesthetics, and ethics of vivification. The program of aesthetics includes an energetics; a notion of force – material, epistemological, metaphysical,

semiotic – subtends Baumgarten’s thought. Just as bodies at rest tend to maintain themselves at rest, so too is knowledge itself – its forms, signs, and practices – subject to the force of inertia (see MET § 669).³ Part of the ethics of aesthetics entails countering the force of inertia in the life of the mind by cultivating works of art as sources of aesthetic exercises. This pragmatic dimension of aesthetic thought introduces an anti-speculative dynamic into the aesthetic field, albeit in a particular sense of the word “speculation.”⁴ Speculation, for Baumgarten, refers to an inert, bloodlessly theoretical, insensate form of knowledge: “perfect” (complete) and thus without lack or excess, but empty, hollow, and dead. In speculation, as the absolute limit point of epistemological inertia, the corpus of knowledge becomes a perfect corpse. In response to speculation as inert, immobile knowledge, aesthetics sets up a counter-attraction: the counter-perfection of sensate, living perfection, namely, the beautiful.

One of the byproducts of the beautiful consists in the systematic *impurification* of theory. Aesthetics provides a remedy for the fatal illness of speculation by connecting knowledge up to the motive and emotive forces that drive bodies and minds. This theoretical impurification is at the same time a rejuvenation, an animation of theory. In the function of the beautiful as an impurification of theory, error and falsehood thus become endowed with a generative potential. One of the most significant sections of *Facing Poetry* discovers the “birth of narratology out of the spirit of deviation”: deviations not as mistakes, but as “achievements within the wide spectrum of possible kinds of narratives.”⁵ The “catalogue of mistakes” becomes an aesthetic and narratological resource.

If aesthetics is meant to counter the inertia of knowledge – and by extension the tendency of signs, texts, and ideas to fall into a state of atrophy and torpor – it is one of the great ironies of philosophical history that Baumgarten’s texts themselves were particularly vulnerable to this inertia. There still remain strong impediments to the reanimation of Baumgarten’s works. Among the many tendencies conspiring to keep Baumgarten in a philosophical limbo may be counted: the legacy of the multiple critiques of rationality that continue to inform the theoretical landscape; the sheer complexity of rationalist philosophical discourse and a stylistic aversion to the *more geometrico* (which seems to exempt thinkers with strong heretical tendencies such as Spinoza); the development of nationalist programs of literary and philosophical schools that consciously or unconsciously prioritize vernacular works, especially after 1800; the dearth of

³ See 3.1.2 Desire.

⁴ According to Menke, “‘force’ and ‘proficiency’ both designate the *faculty of the subject*” for Baumgarten. Menke, *Force*, 21.

⁵ 5.2.2 Mediation.

adequate modern translations, which is only now being remedied; an association of processes of aesthetic subjectification with a Foucauldian analysis of discipline that dampens the emancipatory potential of rationalist and heteronomous aesthetic theories (even those that, like Baumgarten's, exhibit nascent tendencies toward harnessing a power of normative deviation in aesthetic representations); a general skepticism towards aesthetic ideologies; and historicizing and periodizing tendencies that do not adequately grasp the "heterocosmic" power of seemingly defunct ways of looking at the world.

In each of these impediments, however, lies an energetic potential waiting to be realized. Untimeliness can suddenly and unexpectedly become contemporary. The revitalization of Baumgarten could thus spawn its own set of heretical gestures and questions: What if Kant were not to be seen as the initial event of aesthetic modernity, but rather, to draw on Nietzsche, already symptomatic of a decline, of a weakening and impoverishment of the aesthetic field and its set of technical repertoires linking the work of art to lived practices? What if the imaginative potential of Baumgarten lay precisely in the malleability and cultivation of characterological capacities emerging from the frictions and tensions between norm and the sensuous gap *from* the norm held open by the operation of the analogy (the work of art as sensate analogue of reason rather than reason itself)? What if Baumgarten's contribution to aesthetic philosophy lay not in the emergence of a notion of the subject (reading Baumgarten retrospectively through the lens of Kant), but in the cultivation of a more capacious – more anthropologically determinate and yet open – human type, namely, the happy aesthete, the joyful philosopher of the senses or the philosophically-minded producer of art? Or, as Berndt claims, what if Baumgarten's theory of literature reveals an order of beings suffused with an ineliminable and constitutive ambiguity, both as a source of risk and creativity? Revisiting Baumgarten in a way that would do justice to the "energetics" of aesthetics requires asking such questions.

Rekindling the ambition of Baumgarten's aesthetic project proposes that imaginatively emancipatory tendencies might yet be uncovered where many would least expect to find them: in the epistemological, rhetorical, mediological, and semiotic operations of philosophical holisms and aesthetic heteronomies. If heteronomous aesthetic tendencies imbricate the work of art in as many mutually determinative sources of order and value as possible, sources that are indeed metaphysically one (*ordo plurium in uno*), the aesthete does not remain limited to these sources as static givens, but moves among new and different worlds. The aesthete is always translating self into text and text into self. Heteronomous ten-

dencies, or the activation of the “translation machine”⁶ between discursive orders, can thereby drift into a heterocosmos, where the aesthete can be exposed to the laws of an “other” order. Facing literature in such a theory entails encountering an object whose power derives from its many faces.

⁶ See 2.3 Etymology.

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